phaedo-第12部分

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source　of　beauty；　I　leave　all　that；　which　is　only　confusing　to　me；　and



simply　and　singly；　and　perhaps　foolishly；　hold　and　am　assured　in　my



own　mind　that　nothing　makes　a　thing　beautiful　but　the　presence　and



participation　of　beauty　in　whatever　way　or　manner　obtained；　for　as



to　the　manner　I　am　uncertain；　but　I　stoutly　contend　that　by　beauty　all



beautiful　things　become　beautiful。　That　appears　to　me　to　be　the　only



safe　answer　that　I　can　give；　either　to　myself　or　to　any　other；　and



to　that　I　cling；　in　the　persuasion　that　I　shall　never　be　overthrown；



and　that　I　may　safely　answer　to　myself　or　any　other　that　by　beauty



beautiful　things　become　beautiful。　Do　you　not　agree　to　that？



　　Yes；　I　agree。



　　And　that　by　greatness　only　great　things　become　great　and　greater



greater；　and　by　smallness　the　less　becomes　less。



　　True。



　　Then　if　a　person　remarks　that　A　is　taller　by　a　head　than　B；　and　B



less　by　a　head　than　A；　you　would　refuse　to　admit　this；　and　would



stoutly　contend　that　what　you　mean　is　only　that　the　greater　is　greater



by；　and　by　reason　of；　greatness；　and　the　less　is　less　only　by；　or　by



reason　of；　smallness；　and　thus　you　would　avoid　the　danger　of　saying



that　the　greater　is　greater　and　the　less　by　the　measure　of　the　head；



which　is　the　same　in　both；　and　would　also　avoid　the　monstrous



absurdity　of　supposing　that　the　greater　man　is　greater　by　reason　of



the　head；　which　is　small。　Would　you　not　be　afraid　of　that？



　　Indeed；　I　should；　said　Cebes；　laughing。



　　In　like　manner　you　would　be　afraid　to　say　that　ten　exceeded　eight



by；　and　by　reason　of；　two；　but　would　say　by；　and　by　reason　of；　number；



or　that　two　cubits　exceed　one　cubit　not　by　a　half；　but　by



magnitude？…that　is　what　you　would　say；　for　there　is　the　same　danger　in



both　cases。



　　Very　true；　he　said。



　　Again；　would　you　not　be　cautious　of　affirming　that　the　addition　of



one　to　one；　or　the　division　of　one；　is　the　cause　of　two？　And　you　would



loudly　asseverate　that　you　know　of　no　way　in　which　anything　comes　into



existence　except　by　participation　in　its　own　proper　essence；　and



consequently；　as　far　as　you　know；　the　only　cause　of　two　is　the



participation　in　duality；　that　is　the　way　to　make　two；　and　the



participation　in　one　is　the　way　to　make　one。　You　would　say：　I　will　let



alone　puzzles　of　division　and　addition…wiser　heads　than　mine　may



answer　them；　inexperienced　as　I　am；　and　ready　to　start；　as　the　proverb



says；　at　my　own　shadow；　I　cannot　afford　to　give　up　the　sure　ground



of　a　principle。　And　if　anyone　assails　you　there；　you　would　not　mind



him；　or　answer　him　until　you　had　seen　whether　the　consequences　which



follow　agree　with　one　another　or　not；　and　when　you　are　further



required　to　give　an　explanation　of　this　principle；　you　would　go　on



to　assume　a　higher　principle；　and　the　best　of　the　higher　ones；　until



you　found　a　resting…place；　but　you　would　not　refuse　the　principle



and　the　consequences　in　your　reasoning　like　the　Eristics…at　least　if



you　wanted　to　discover　real　existence。　Not　that　this　confusion



signifies　to　them　who　never　care　or　think　about　the　matter　at　all；　for



they　have　the　wit　to　be　well　pleased　with　themselves；　however　great



may　be　the　turmoil　of　their　ideas。　But　you；　if　you　are　a



philosopher；　will；　I　believe；　do　as　I　say。



　　What　you　say　is　most　true；　said　Simmias　and　Cebes；　both　speaking



at　once。



　　Ech。　Yes；　Phaedo；　and　I　don't　wonder　at　their　assenting。　Anyone



who　has　the　least　sense　will　acknowledge　the　wonderful　clear。　of



Socrates'　reasoning。



　　Phaed。　Certainly；　Echecrates；　and　that　was　the　feeling　of　the



whole　company　at　the　time。



　　Ech。　Yes；　and　equally　of　ourselves；　who　were　not　of　the　company；　and



are　now　listening　to　your　recital。　But　what　followed？



　　Phaedo。　After　all　this　was　admitted；　and　they　had　agreed　about　the



existence　of　ideas　and　the　participation　in　them　of　the　other　things



which　derive　their　names　from　them；　Socrates；　if　I　remember　rightly；



said：…



　　This　is　your　way　of　speaking；　and　yet　when　you　say　that　Simmias　is



greater　than　Socrates　and　less　than　Phaedo；　do　you　not　predicate　of



Simmias　both　greatness　and　smallness？



　　Yes；　I　do。



　　But　still　you　allow　that　Simmias　does　not　really　exceed　Socrates；　as



the　words　may　seem　to　imply；　because　he　is　Simmias；　but　by　reason　of



the　size　which　he　has；　just　as　Simmias　does　not　exceed　Socrates



because　he　is　Simmias；　any　more　than　because　Socrates　is　Socrates；　but



because　he　has　smallness　when　compared　with　the　greatness　of　Simmias？



　　True。



　　And　if　Phaedo　exceeds　him　in　size；　that　is　not　because　Phaedo　is



Phaedo；　but　because　Phaedo　has　greatness　relatively　to　Simmias；　who　is



comparatively　smaller？



　　That　is　true。



　　And　therefore　Simmias　is　said　to　be　great；　and　is　also　said　to　be



small；　because　he　is　in　a　mean　between　them；　exceeding　the　smallness



of　the　one　by　his　greatness；　and　allowing　the　greatness　of　the　other



to　exceed　his　smallness。　He　added；　laughing；　I　am　speaking　like　a



book；　but　I　believe　that　what　I　am　now　saying　is　true。



　　Simmias　assented　to　this。



　　The　reason　why　I　say　this　is　that　I　want　you　to　agree　with　me　in



thinking；　not　only　that　absolute　greatness　will　never　be　great　and



also　small；　but　that　greatness　in　us　or　in　the　concrete　will　never



admit　the　small　or　admit　of　being　exceeded：　instead　of　this；　one　of



two　things　will　happen…either　the　greater　will　fly　or　retire　before



the　opposite；　which　is　the　less；　or　at　the　advance　of　the　less　will



cease　to　exist；　but　will　not；　if　allowing　or　admitting　smallness；　be



changed　by　that；　even　as　I；　having　received　and　admitted　smallness



when　compared　with　Simmias；　remain　just　as　I　was；　and　am　the　same



small　person。　And　as　the　idea　of　greatness　cannot　condescend　ever　to



be　or　become　small；　in　like　manner　the　smallness　in　us　cannot　be　or



become　great；　nor　can　any　other　opposite　which　remains　the　same　ever



be　or　become　its　own　opposite；　but　either　passes　away　or　perishes　in



the　change。



　　That；　replied　Cebes；　is　quite　my　notion。



　　One　of　the　company；　though　I　do　not　exactly　remember　which　of



them；　on　hearing　this；　said：　By　Heaven；　is　not　this　the　direct



contrary　of　what　was　admitted　before…that　out　of　the　greater　came



the　less　and　out　of　the　less　the　greater；　and　that　opposites　are



simply　generated　from　opposites；　whereas　now　this　seems　to　be



utterly　denied。



　　Socrates　inclined　his　head　to　the　speaker　and　listened。　I　like



your　courage；　he　said；　in　reminding　us　of　this。　But　you　do　not　observe



that　there　is　a　difference　in　the　two　cases。　For　then　we　were　speaking



of　opposites　in　the　concrete；　and　now　of　the　essential　opposite　which；



as　is　affirmed；　neither　in　us　nor　in　nature　can　ever　be　at　variance



with　itself：　then；　my　friend；　we　were　speaking　of　things　in　which



opposites　are　inherent　and　which　are　called　after　them；　but　now



about　the　opposites　which　are　inherent　in　them　and　which　give　their



name　to　them；　these　essential　opposites　will　never；　as　we　maintain；



admit　of　generation　into　or　out　of　one　another。　At　the　same　time；



turning　to　Cebes；　he　said：　Were　you　at　all　disconcerted；　Cebes；　at　our



friend's　objection？



　　That　was　not　my　feeling；　said　Cebes；　and　yet　I　cannot　deny　that　I　am



apt　to　be　disconcerted。



　　Then　we　are　agreed　after　all；　said　Socrates；　that　the　opposite



will　never　in　any　case　be　opposed　to　itself？



　　To　that　we　are　quite　agreed；　he　replied。



　　Yet　once　more　let　me　ask　you　to　consider　the　question　from　another



point　of　view；　and　see　whether　you　agree　with　me：　There　is　a　thing



which　you　term　heat；　and　another　thing　which　you　term　cold？



　　Certainly。



　　But　are　they　the　same　as　fire　and　snow？



　　Most　assuredly　not。



　　Heat　is　not　the　same　as　fire；　nor　is　cold　the　same　as　snow？



　　No。



　　And　yet　you　will　surely　admit　that　when　snow；　as　before　said；　is



under　the　influence　of　heat；　they　will　not　remain　snow　and　heat；　but



at　the　advance　of　the　heat　the　snow　will　either　retire　or　perish？



　　Very　true；　he　replied。



　　And　the　fire　too　at　the　advance　of　the　cold　will　either　retire　or



perish；　and　when　the　fire　is　under　the　influence　of　the　cold；　they



will　not　remain；　as　before；　fire　and　cold。



　　That　is　true；　he　said。



　　And　in　some　cases　the　name　of　the　idea　is　not　confined　to　the



idea；　but　anything　else　which；　not　being　the　idea；　exists　only　in



the　form　of　the　idea；　may　also　lay　claim　to　it。　I　will　try　to　make



this　clearer　by　an　example：　The　odd　number　is　always　called　by　the



name　of　odd？



　　Very　true。



　　But　is　this　the　only　thing　which　is　called　odd？　Are　there　not



other　things　which　have　their　own　name；　and　yet　are　called　odd；



because；　although　not　the　same　as　oddness；　they　are　never　without



oddness？…that　is　what　I　mean　to　ask…whether　numbers　such　as　the　number



three　are　not　of　the　class　of　odd。　And　there　are　many　other



examples：　would　you　not　say；　for　example；　that　three　may　be　called



by　its　proper　name；　and　also　be　called　odd；　which　is　not　the　same　with



three？　and　this　may　be　said　not　only　of　three　but　also　of　five；　and



every　alternate　number…each　of　them　without　being　oddness　is　odd；



and　in　the　same　way　two　and　four；　and　the　whole　series　of　alternate



numbers；　has　every　number　even；　without　being　evenness。　Do　you　admit



that？



　　Yes；　he　said；　how　can　I　deny　that？



　　Then　now　mark　the　point　at　which　I　am　aiming：　not　only　do



essential　opposites　exclude　one　another；　but　also　concrete　things；



which；　although　not　in　themselves　opposed；　contain　opposites；　these；　I



say；　also　reject　the　idea　which　is　opposed　to　that　which　is



contained　in　them；　and　at　the　advance　of　that　they　either　perish　or



withdraw。　There　is　the　number　three　for　example；　will　not　that



endure　annihilation　or　anything　sooner　than　be　converted　int