three dialogues-第14部分

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concessions；　farther　declare　that　it　is　impossible　any　
corporeal　thing　should　exist　in　nature。

　　　　　。　You　amaze　me。　Was　ever　anything　more　wild　and
extravagant　than　the　notions　you　now　maintain：　and　is　it　not
evident　you　are　led　into　all　these　extravagances　by　the　belief　of
？　This　makes　you　dream　of　those　unknown
natures　in　everything。　It　is　this　occasions　your　distinguishing
between　the　reality　and　sensible　appearances　of　things。　It　is　to
this　you　are　indebted　for　being　ignorant　of　what　everybody　else
knows　perfectly　well。　Nor　is　this　all：　you　are　not　only　ignorant
of　the　true　nature　of　everything；　but　you　know　not　whether
anything　really　exists；　or　whether　there　are　any　true　natures　at
all；　forasmuch　as　you　attribute　to　your　material　beings　an
absolute　or　external　existence；　wherein　you　suppose　their　reality
consists。　And；　as　you　are　forced　in　the　end　to　acknowledge　such
an　existence　means　either　a　direct　repugnancy；　or　nothing　at　all；
it　follows　that　you　are　obliged　to　pull　down　your　own　hypothesis
of　material　Substance；　and　positively　to　deny　the　real　existence
of　any　part　of　the　universe。　And　so　you　are　plunged　into　the
deepest　and　most　deplorable　scepticism　that　ever　man　was。　Tell
me；　Hylas；　is　it　not　as　I　say？

　　　　　。　I　agree　with　you。　　was　no　more
than　an　hypothesis；　and　a　false　and　groundless　one　too。　I　will　no
longer　spend　my　breath　in　defence　of　it。　But　whatever　hypothesis
you　advance；　or　whatsoever　scheme　of　things　you　introduce　in　its
stead；　I　doubt　not　it　will　appear　every　whit　as　false：　let　me　but
be　allowed　to　question　you　upon　it。　That　is；　suffer　me　to　serve
you　in　your　own　kind；　and　I　warrant　it　shall　conduct　you　through
as　many　perplexities　and　contradictions；　to　the　very　same　state
of　scepticism　that　I　myself　am　in　at　present。

　　　　　。　I　assure　you；　Hylas；　I　do　not　pretend　to　frame　any
hypothesis　at　all。　I　am　of　a　vulgar　cast；　simple　enough　to
believe　my　senses；　and　leave　things　as　I　find　them。　To　be　plain；
it　is　my　opinion　that　the　real　things　are　those　very　things　I
see；　and　feel；　and　perceive　by　my　senses。　These　I　know；　and；
finding　they　answer　all　the　necessities　and　purposes　of　life；
have　no　reason　to　be　solicitous　about　any　other　unknown　beings。　A
piece　of　sensible　bread；　for　instance；　would　stay　my　stomach
better　than　ten　thousand　times　as　much　of　that　insensible；
unintelligible；　real　bread　you　speak　of。　It　is　likewise　my
opinion　that　colours　and　other　sensible　qualities　are　on　the
｛230｝　objects。　I　cannot　for　my　life　help　thinking　that　snow　is
white；　and　fire　hot。　You　indeed；　who　by　　and　fire　mean
certain　external；　unperceived；　unperceiving　substances；　are　in
the　right　to　deny　whiteness　or　heat　to　be　affections　inherent　in
。　But　I；　who　understand　by　those　words　the　things　I　see　and
feel；　am　obliged　to　think　like　other　folks。　And；　as　I　am　no
sceptic　with　regard　to　the　nature　of　things；　so　neither　am　I　as
to　their　existence。　That　a　thing　should　be　really　perceived　by　my
senses；　and　at　the　same　time　not　really　exist；　is　to　me　a　plain
contradiction；　since　I　cannot　prescind　or　abstract；　even　in
thought；　the　existence　of　a　sensible　thing　from　its　being
perceived。　Wood；　stones；　fire；　water；　flesh；　iron；　and　the　like
things；　which　I　name　and　discourse　of；　are　things　that　I　know。
And　I　should　not　have　known　them　but　that　I　perceived　them　by　my
senses；　and　things　perceived　by　the　senses　are　immediately
perceived；　and　things　immediately　perceived　are　ideas；　and　ideas
cannot　exist　without　the　mind；　their　existence　therefore　consists
in　being　perceived；　when；　therefore；　they　are　actually　perceived
there　can　be　no　doubt　of　their　existence。　Away　then　with　all　that
scepticism；　all　those　ridiculous　philosophical　doubts。　What　a
jest　is　it　for　a　philosopher　to　question　the　existence　of
sensible　things；　till　he　hath　it　proved　to　him　from　the　veracity
of　God；　or　to　pretend　our　knowledge　in　this　point　falls　short　of
intuition　or　demonstration！　I　might　as　well　doubt　of　my　own
being；　as　of　the　being　of　those　things　I　actually　see　and　feel。

　　　　　。　Not　so　fast；　Philonous：　you　say　you　cannot　conceive
how　sensible　things　should　exist　without　the　mind。　Do　you　not？

　　　　　。　I　do。

　　　　　。　Supposing　you　were　annihilated；　cannot　you　conceive
it　possible　that　things　perceivable　by　sense　may　still　exist？

　　　　　。　　can；　but　then　it　must　be　in　another　mind。　When　I
deny　sensible　things　an　existence　out　of　the　mind；　I　do　not　mean
my　mind　in　particular；　but　all　minds。　Now；　it　is　plain　they　have
an　existence　exterior　to　my　mind；　since　I　find　them　by　experience
to　be　independent　of　it。　There　is　therefore　some　other　Mind
wherein　they　exist；　during　the　intervals　between　the　times　of
｛231｝　my　perceiving　them：　as　likewise　they　did　before　my　birth；
and　would　do　after　my　supposed　annihilation。　And；　as　the　same　is
true　with　regard　to　all　other　finite　created　spirits；　it
necessarily　follows　there　is　an　；　which
knows　and　comprehends　all　things；　and　exhibits　them　to　our　view
in　such　a　manner；　and　according　to　such　rules；　as　He　Himself　hath
ordained；　and　are　by　us　termed　the　。

　　　　　。　Answer　me；　Philonous。　Are　all　our　ideas　perfectly
inert　beings？　Or　have　they　any　agency　included　in　them？

　　　　　。　They　are　altogether　passive　and　inert。

　　　　　。　And　is　not　God　an　agent；　a　being　purely　active？

　　　　　。　I　acknowledge　it。

　　　　　。　No　idea　therefore　can　be　like　unto；　or　represent　the
nature　of　God？

　　　　　。　It　cannot。

　　　　　。　Since　therefore　you　have　no　　of　the　mind　of
God；　how　can　you　conceive　it　possible　that　things　should　exist　in
His　mind？　Or；　if　you　can　conceive　the　mind　of　God；　without　having
an　idea　of　it；　why　may　not　I　be　allowed　to　conceive　the　existence
of　Matter；　notwithstanding　I　have　no　idea　of　it？

　　　　　。　As　to　your　first　question：　I　own　I　have　properly　no
；　either　of　God　or　any　other　spirit；　for　these　being
active；　cannot　be　represented　by　things　perfectly　inert；　as　our
ideas　are。　I　do　nevertheless　know　that　1；　who　am　a　spirit　or
thinking　substance；　exist　as　certainly　a　s　I　know　my　ideas　exist。
Farther；　I　know　what　I　mean　by　the　terms　I　；　and　I
know　this　immediately　or　intuitively；　though　I　do　not　perceive　it
as　I　perceive　a　triangle；　a　colour；　or　a　sound。　The　Mind；　Spirit；
or　Soul　is　that　indivisible　unextended　thing　which　thinks；　acts；
and　perceives。　I　say　；　because　unextended；　and
；　because　extended；　figured；　moveable　things　are
ideas；　and　that　which　perceives　ideas；　which　thinks　and　wills；　is
plainly　itself　no　idea；　nor　like　an　idea。　Ideas　are　things
inactive；　and　perceived。　And　Spirits　a　sort　of　beings　altogether
different　from　them。　I　do　not　therefore　say　my　soul　is　an　idea；
or　like　an　idea。　However；　taking　the　word　　in　a　large
sense；　my　soul　may　be　said　to　furnish　me　with　an　idea；　that　is；
an　image　or　likeness　of　God　　though　indeed　extremely
inadequate。　For；　all　the　notion　I　have　of　God　is　obtained　by
reflecting　on　my　own　soul；　heightening　its　powers；　and　removing
its　｛232｝　imperfections。　I　have；　therefore；　though　not　an
inactive　idea；　yet　in　　some　sort　of　an　active　thinking
image　of　the　Deity。　And；　though　I　perceive　Him　not　by　sense；　yet
I　have　a　notion　of　Him；　or　know　Him　by　reflexion　and　reasoning。
My　own　mind　and　my　own　ideas　I　have　an　immediate　knowledge　of；
and；　by　the　help　of　these；　do　mediately　apprehend　the　possibility
of　the　existence　of　other　spirits　and　ideas。　Farther；　from　my　own
being；　and　from　the　dependency　I　find　in　myself　and　my　ideas；　I
do；　by　an　act　of　reason；　necessarily　infer　the　existence　of　a
God；　and　of　all　created　things　in　the　mind　of　God。　So　much　for
your　first　question。　For　the　second：　I　suppose　by　this　time　you
can　answer　it　yourself。　For　you　neither　perceive　Matter
objectively；　as　you　do　an　inactive　being　or　idea；　nor　know　it；　as
you　do　yourself；　by　a　reflex　act；　neither　do　you　mediately
apprehend　it　by　similitude　of　the　one　or　the　other；　nor　yet
collect　it　by　reasoning　from　that　which　you　know　immediately。　All
which　makes　the　case　of　　widely　different　from　that　of
the　。

　　　　　＇。　You　say　your　own　soul　supplies　you　with　some　sort　of
an　idea　or　image　of　God。　But；　at　the　same　time；　you　acknowledge
you　have；　properly　speaking；　no　　of　your　own　soul。　You　even
affirm　that　spirits　are　a　sort　of　beings　altogether　different
from　ideas。　Consequently　that　no　idea　can　be　like　a　spirit。　We
have　therefore　no　idea　of　any　spirit。　You　admit　nevertheless　that
there　is　spiritual　Substance；　although　you　have　no　idea　of　it；
while　you　deny　there　can　be　such　a　thing　as　material　Substance；
because　you　have　no　notion　or　idea　of　it。　Is　this　fair　dealing？
To　act　consistently；　you　must　either　admit　Matter　or　reject
Spirit。　What　say　you　to　this？

　　　　　。　　say；　in　the　first　place；　that　I　do　not　deny　the
existence　of　material　substance；　merely　because　I　have　no　notion
of　it'　but　because　the　notion　of　it　is　inconsistent；　or；　in　other
words；　because　it　is　repugnant　that　there　should　be　a　notion　of
it。　Many　things；　for　aught　I　know；　may　exist；　whereof　neither　I
nor　any　other　man　hath　or　can　have　any　idea　or　notion　whatsoever。
But　then　those　things　must　be　possible；　that　is；　nothing　｛233｝
inconsistent　must　be　included　in　their　definition。　I　say；
secondly；　that；　although　we　believe　things　to　exist　which　we　do
not　perceive；　yet　we　may　not　believe　that　any　particular　thing
exists；　without　some　reason　for　such　belief：　but　I　have　no　reason
for　believing　the　existence　of　Matter。　I　have　no　immediate
intuition　thereof：　neither　can　I　immediately　from　my　sensations；
ideas；　notions；　actions；　or　passions；　infer　an　unthinking；
unperceiving；　inactive　Substance　　either　by　probable　deduction；
or　necessary　consequence。　Whereas　the　being　of　my　Self；　that　is；
my　own　soul；　mind；　or　thinking　principle；　I　evidently　know　by
reflexion。　You　will　forgive　me　if　I　repeat　the　same　things　in
answer　to　the　same　objections。　In　the　very　notion　or　definition
of　；　there　is　included　a　manifest　repugnance
and　inconsisten