three dialogues-第15部分

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of　；　there　is　included　a　manifest　repugnance
and　inconsistency。　But　this　cannot　be　said　of　the　notion　of
Spirit。　That　ideas　should　exist　in　what　doth　not　perceive；　or　be
produced　by　what　doth　not　act；　is　repugnant。　But；　it　is　no
repugnancy　to　say　that　a　perceiving　thing　should　be　the　subject
of　ideas；　or　an　active　thing　the　cause　of　them。　It　is　granted　we
have　neither　an　immediate　evidence　nor　a　demonstrative　knowledge
of　the　existence　of　other　finite　spirits；　but　it　will　not　thence
follow　that　such　spirits　are　on　a　foot　with　material　substances：
if　to　suppose　the　one　be　inconsistent；　and　it　be　not　inconsistent
to　suppose　the　other；　if　the　one　can　be　inferred　by　no　argument；
and　there　is　a　probability　for　the　other；　if　we　see　signs　and
effects　indicating　distinct　finite　agents　like　ourselves；　and　see
no　sign　or　symptom　whatever　that　leads　to　a　rational　belief　of
Matter。　I　say；　lastly；　that　I　have　a　notion　of　Spirit；　though　I
have　not；　strictly　speaking；　an　idea　of　it。　I　do　not　perceive　it
as　an　idea；　or　by　means　of　an　idea；　but　know　it　by　reflexion。

　　　　　。　Notwithstanding　all　you　have　said；　to　me　it　seems
that；　according　to　your　own　way　of　thinking；　and　in　consequence
of　your　own　principles；　it　should　follow　that　　are　only　a
system　of　floating　ideas；　without　any　substance　to　support　them。
Words　are　not　to　be　used　without　a　meaning。　And；　as　there　is　no
more　meaning　in　　than　in　；　the　one　is　to　be　exploded　as　well　as　the　other。

　　　　　。　How　often　must　I　repeat；　that　I　know　or　am　conscious
of　my　own　being；　and　that　　am　not　my　ideas；　but
somewhat　else；　a　thinking；　active　principle　that　perceives；
knows；　wifls；　and　operates　about　ideas。　I　know　that　I；　one　｛234｝
and　the　same　self；　perceive　both　colours　and　sounds：　that　a
colour　cannot　perceive　a　sound；　nor　a　sound　a　colour：　that　I　am
therefore　one　individual　principle；　distinct　from　colour　and
sound；　and；　for　the　same　reason；　from　aft　other　sensible　things
and　inert　ideas。　But；　I　am　not　in　like　manner　conscious　either　of
the　existence　or　essence　of　Matter。　On　the　contrary；　I　know　that
nothing　inconsistent　can　exist；　and　that　the　existence　of　Matter
implies　an　inconsistency。　Farther；　I　know　what　I　mean　when　I
affirm　that　there　is　a　spiritual　substance　or　support　of　ideas；
that　is；　that　a　spirit　knows　and　perceives　ideas。　But；　I　do　not
know　what　is　meant　when　it　is　said　that　an　unperceiving　substance
hath　inherent　in　it　and　supports　either　ideas　or　the　archetypes
of　ideas。　There　is　therefore　upon　the　whole　no　parity　of　case
between　Spirit　and　Matter。＇＇8＇

　　　　　。　I　own　myself　satisfied　in　this　point。　But；　do　you　in
earnest　think　the　real　existence　of　sensible　things　consists　in
their　being　actually　perceived？　If　so；　how　comes　it　that　all
mankind　distinguish　between　them？　Ask　the　first　man　you　meet；　and
he　shall　tell　you；　　is　one　thing；　and　
is　another。

　　　　　。　　am　content；　Hylas；　to　appeal　to　the　common　sense
of　the　world　for　the　truth　of　my　notion。　Ask　the　gardener　why　he
thinks　yonder　cherry…tree　exists　in　the　garden；　and　he　shall　tell
you；　because　he　sees　and　feels　it；　in　a　word；　because　he
perceives　it　by　his　senses。　Ask　him　why　he　thinks　an　orange…tree
not　to　be　there；　and　he　shall　tell　you；　because　he　does　not
perceive　it。　What　he　perceives　by　sense；　that　he　terms　a　real；
being；　and　saith　it　；　but；　that　which　is　not
perceivable；　the　same；　he　saith；　hath　no　being。

　　　　　。　Yes；　Philonous；　I　grant　the　existence　of　a　sensible
thing　consists　in　being　perceivable；　but　not　in　being　actually
perceived。

　　　　　。　And　what　is　perceivable　but　an　idea？　And　can　an　idea
exist　without　being　actually　perceived？　These　are　points　long
since　agreed　between　us。

　　　　　。　But；　be　your　opinion　never　so　true；　yet　surely　you
will　not　deny　it　is　shocking；　and　contrary　to　the　common　sense　of
men。　｛235｝　Ask　the　fellow　whether　yonder　tree　hath　an　existence
out　of　his　mind：　what　answer　think　you　he　would　make？

　　　　　。　The　same　that　I　should　myself；　to　wit；　that　it　doth
exist　out　of　his　mind。　But　then　to　a　Christian　it　cannot　surely
be　shocking　to　say；　the　real　tree；　existing　without　his　mind；　is
truly　known　and　comprehended　by　（that　is　）　the
infinite　mind　of　God。　Probably　he　may　not　at　first　glance　be
aware　of　the　direct　and　immediate　proof　there　is　of　this；
inasmuch　as　the　very　being　of　a　tree；　or　any　other　sensible
thing；　implies　a　mind　wherein　it　is。　But　the　point　itself　he
cannot　deny。　The　question　between　the　Materialists　and　me　is　not；
whether　things　have　a　　existence　out　of　the　mind　of　this　or
that　person；　but　whether　they　have　an　　existence；
distinct　from　being　perceived　by　God；　and　exterior　to　all　minds。
This　indeed　some　heathens　and　philosophers　have　affirmed；　but
whoever　entertains　notions　of　the　Deity　suitable　to　the　Holy
Scriptures　will　be　of　another　opinion。

　　　　　。　But；　according　to　your　notions；　what　difference　is
there　between　real　things；　and　chimeras　formed　by　the
imagination；　or　the　visions　of　a　dream　　since　they　are　all
equally　in　the　mind？

　　　　　。　The　ideas　formed　by　the　imagination　are　faint　and
indistinct；　they　have；　besides；　an　entire　dependence　on　the　will。
But　the　ideas　perceived　by　sense；　that　is；　real　things；　are　more
vivid　and　clear；　and；　being　imprinted　on　the　mind　by　a　spirit
distinct　from　us；　have　not　the　like　dependence　on　our　will。　There
is　therefore　no　danger　of　confounding　these　with　the　foregoing：
and　there　is　as　little　of　confounding　them　with　the　visions　of　a
dream；　which　are　dim；　irregular；　and　confused。　And；　though　they
should　happen　to　be　never　so　lively　and　natural；　yet；　by　their
not　being　connected；　and　of　a　piece　with　the　preceding　and
subsequent　transactions　of　our　lives；　they　might　easily　be
distinguished　from　realities。　In　short；　by　whatever　method　you
distinguish　　on　your　scheme；　the　same；　it
is　evident；　will　hold　also　upon　mine。　For；　it　must　be；　I　presume；
by　some　perceived　difference；　and　I　am　not　for　depriving　you　of
any　one　thing　that　you　perceive。

　　　　　。　But　still；　Philonous；　you　hold；　there　is　nothing　in
the　world　but　spirits　and　ideas。　And　this；　you　must　needs
acknowledge；　sounds　very　oddly。

　　　　　。　I　own　the　word　；　not　being　commonly　used　for
；　sounds　something　out　of　the　way。　My　reason　for　using　it
was；　because　a　necessary　relation　to　the　mind　is　understood　to
｛236｝　be　implied　by　that　term；　and　it　is　now　commonly　used　by
philosophers　to　denote　the　immediate　objects　of　the
understanding。　But；　however　oddly　the　proposition　may　sound　in
words；　yet　it　includes　nothing　so　very　strange　or　shocking　in　its
sense；　which　in　effect　amounts　to　no　more　than　this；　to　wit；　that
there　are　only　things　perceiving；　and　things　perceived；　or　that
every　unthinking　being　is　necessarily；　and　from　…the　very　nature
of　its　existence；　perceived　by　some　mind；　if　not　by　a　finite
created　mind；　yet　certainly　by　the　infinite　mind　of　God；　in　whom
〃we　five；　and　move；　and　have　our　being。〃　Is　this　as　strange　as　to
say；　the　sensible　qualities　are　not　on　the　objects：　or　that　we
cannot　be　sure　of　the　existence　of　things；　or　know　any　thing　of
their　real　natures　　though　we　both　see　and　feel　them；　and
perceive　them　by　all　our　senses？

　　　　　。　And；　in　consequence　of　this；　must　we　not　think　there
are　no　such　things　as　physical　or　corporeal　causes；　but　that　a
Spirit　is　the　immediate　cause　of　all　the　phenomena　in　nature？　Can
there　be　anything　more　extravagant　than　this？

　　　　　。　Yes；　it　is　infinitely　more　extravagant　to　say　　a
thing　which　is　inert　operates　on　the　mind；　and　which　is
unperceiving　is　the　cause　of　our　perceptions；　＇without　any　regard
either　to　consistency；　or　the　old　known　axiom；　＇。＇9＇　Besides；　that
which　to　you；　I　know　not　for　what　reason；　seems　so　extravagant　is
no　more　than　the　Holy　Scriptures　assert　in　a　hundred　places。　In
them　God　is　represented　as　the　sole　and　immediate　Author　of　all
those　effects　which　some　heathens　and　philosophers　are　wont　to
ascribe　to　Nature；　Matter；　Fate；　or　the　like　unthinking
principle。　This　is　so　much　the　constant　language　of　Scripture
that　it　were　needless　to　confirm　it　by　citations。

　　　　　。　You　are　not　aware；　Philonous；　that　in　making　God　the
immediate　Author　of　all　the　motions　in　nature；　you　make　Him　the
Author　of　murder；　sacrilege；　adultery；　and　the　like　heinous　sins。

　　　　　。　In　answer　to　that；　I　observe；　first；　that　the
imputation　of　guilt　is　the　same；　whether　a　person　commits　an
action　with　or　without　an　instrument。　In　case　therefore　you
suppose　God　to　act　by　the　mediation　of　an　instrument　or　occasion；
called　；　you　as　truly　make　Him　the　author　of　sin　as　I；
who　think　Him　the　immediate　agent　in　all　those　operations
vulgarly　ascribed　to　Nature。　I　farther　observe　that　sin　or　moral
turpitude　｛237｝　doth　not　consist　in　the　outward　physical　action
or　motion；　but　in　the　internal　deviation　of　the　will　from　the
laws　of　reason　and　religion。　This　is　plain；　in　that　the　killing
an　enemy　in　a　battle；　or　putting　a　criminal　legally　to　death；　is
not　thought　sinful；　though　the　outward　act　be　the　very　same　with
that　in　the　case　of　murder。　Since；　therefore；　sin　doth　not
consist　in　the　physical　action；　the　making　God　an　immediate　cause
of　all　such　actions　is　not　making　Him　the　Author　of　sin。　Lastly；
I　have　nowhere　said　that　God　is　the　only　agent　who　produces　all
the　motions　in　bodies。　It　is　true　I　have　denied　there　are　any
other　agents　besides　spirits；　but　this　is　very　consistent　with
allowing　to　thinking　rational　beings；　in　the　production　of
motions；　the　use　of　limited　powers；　ultimately　indeed　derived
from　God；　but　immediately　under　the　direction　of　their　own　wills；
which　is　sufficient　to　entitle　them　to　all　the　guilt　of　their
actions。

　　　　　。　But　the　denying　Matter；　Philonous；　or　corporeal
Substance；　there　is　the　point。　You　can　never　persuade　me　that
this　is　not　repugnant　to　the　universal　sense　of　mankind。　Were　our
dispute　to　be　determined　by　most　voices；　I　am　confident　y