three dialogues-第16部分

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this　is　not　repugnant　to　the　universal　sense　of　mankind。　Were　our
dispute　to　be　determined　by　most　voices；　I　am　confident　you　would
give　up　the　point；　without　gathering　the　votes。

　　　　　。　I　wish　both　our　opinions　were　fairly　stated　and
submitted　to　the　judgment　of　men　who　had　plain　common　sense；
without　the　prejudices　of　a　learned　education。　Let　me　be
represented　as　one　who　trusts　his　senses；　who　thinks　he　knows　the
things　he　sees　and　feels；　and　entertains　no　doubts　of　their
existence；　and　you　fairly　set　forth　with　all　your　doubts；　your
paradoxes；　and　your　scepticism　about　you；　and　I　shall　willingly
acquiesce　in　the　determination　of　any　indifferent　person。　That
there　is　no　substance　wherein　ideas　can　exist　beside　spirit　is　to
me　evident。　And　that　the　objects　immediately　perceived　are　ideas；
is　on　all　hands　agreed。　And　that　sensible　qualities　are　objects
immediately　perceived　no　one　can　deny。　It　is　therefore　evident
there　can　be　no　　of　those　qualities　but　spirit；　in
which　they　exist；　not　by　way　of　mode　or　property；　but　as　a　thing
perceived　in　that　which　perceives　it。　I　deny　therefore　that　there
is　…　of　the　objects　of　sense；　and　　that　there　is　any　material　substance。　But　if　by
　is　meant　only　；　　which
is　seen　and　felt　（and　the　unphilosophical　part　of　the　world；　I
dare　say；　mean　no　more）　　then　I　am　more　certain　of　matter's
existence　than　you　or　any　other　philosopher　pretend　to　be。　If
there　be　anything　which　makes　；die　generality　of　mankind　｛238｝
averse　from　the　notions　I　espouse；　it　is　a　misapprehension　that　I
deny　the　reality　of　sensible　things。　But；　as　it　is　you　who　are
guilty　of　that；　and　not　1；　it　follows　that　in　truth　their
aversion　is　against　your　notions　and　not　mine。　I　do　therefore
assert　that　I　am　as　certain　as　of　my　own　being；　that　there　are
bodies　or　corporeal　substances　（meaning　the　things　I　perceive　by
my　senses）；　and　that；　granting　this；　the　bulk　of　mankind　will
take　no　thought　about；　nor　think　themselves　at　all　concerned　in
the　fate　of　those　unknown　natures；　and　philosophical　quiddities；
which　some　men　are　so　fond　of。

　　　　　。　What　say　you　to　this？　Since；　according　to　you；　men
judge　of　the　reality　of　things　by　their　senses；　how　can　a　man　be
mistaken　in　thinking　the　moon　a　plain　lucid　surface；　about　a　foot
in　diameter；　or　a　square　tower；　seen　at　a　distance；　round；　or　an
oar；　with　one　end　in　the　water；　crooked？

　　　　　。　He　is　not　mistaken　with　regard　to　the　ideas　he
actually　perceives；　but　in　the　inference　he　makes　from　his
present　perceptions。　Thus；　in　the　case　of　the　oar；　what　he
immediately　perceives　by　sight　is　certainly　crooked；　and　so　far
he　is　in　the　right。　But　if　he　thence　conclude　that　upon　taking
the　oar　out　of　the　water　he　shall　perceive　the　same　crookedness；
or　that　it　would　affect　his　touch　as　crooked　things　are　wont　to
do：　in　that　he　is　mistaken。　In　like　manner；　if　he　shall　conclude
from　what　he　perceives　in　one　station；　that；　in　case　he　advances
towards　the　moon　or　tower；　he　should　still　be　affected　with　the
like　ideas；　he　is　mistaken。　But　his　mistake　lies　not　in　what　he
perceives　immediately；　and　at　present；　（it　being　a　manifest
contradiction　to　suppose　he　should　err　in　respect　of　that）　but　in
the　wrong　judgment　he　makes　concerning　the　ideas　he　apprehends　to
be　connected　with　those　immediately　perceived：　or；　concerning　the
ideas　that；　from　what　he　perceives　at　present；　he　imagines　would
be　perceived　in　other　circumstances。　The　case　is　the　same　with
regard　to　the　Copernican　system。　We　do　not　here　perceive　any
motion　of　the　earth：　but　it　were　erroneous　thence　to　conclude；
that；　in　case　we　were　placed　at　as　great　a　distance　from　that　as
we　are　now　from　the　other　planets；　we　should　not　then　perceive
its　motion。

　　　　　。　I　understand　you；　and　must　needs　own　you　say　things
plausible　enough。　But；　give　me　leave　to　put　you　in　mind　of　｛239｝
one　thing。　Pray；　Philonous；　were　you　not　formerly　as　positive
that　Matter　existed；　as　you　are　now　that　it　does　not？

　　　　　。　I　was。　But　here　lies　the　difference。　Before；　my
positiveness　was　founded；　without　examination；　upon　prejudice；
but　now；　after　inquiry；　upon　evidence。

　　　　　。　After　all；　it　seems　our　dispute　is　rather　about　words
than　things。　We　agree　in　the　thing；　but　differ　in　the　name。　That
we　are　affected　with　ideas　　is　evident；　and　it　is
no　less　evident　that　there　must　be　（I　will　not　say　archetypes；
but）　Powers　without　the　mind；　corresponding　to　those　ideas。　And；
as　these　Powers　cannot　subsist　by　themselves；　there　is　some
subject　of　them　necessarily　to　be　admitted；　which　I　call
；　and　you　call　。　This　is　all　the　difference。

　　　　　。　Pray；　Hylas；　is　that　powerful　Being；　or　subject　of
powers；　extended？

　　　　　。　It　hath　not　extension；　but　it　hath　the　power　to　raise
in　you　the　idea　of　extension。

　　　　　。　It　is　therefore　itself　unextended？

　　　　　。　I　grant　it。

　　　　　。　Is　it　not　also　active？

　　　　　。　Without　doubt。　Otherwise；　how　could　we　attribute
powers　to　it？

　　　　　。　Now　let　me　ask　you　two　questions：　；　Whether
it　be　agreeable　to　the　usage　either　of　philosophers　or　others　to
give　the　name　　to　an　unextended　active　being？　And；
；　Whether　it　be　not　ridiculously　absurd　to　misapply
names　contrary　to　the　common　use　of　language？

　　　　　。　Well　then；　let　it　not　be　called　Matter；　since　you
will　have　it　so；　but　some　　distinct　from　Matter　and
Spirit。　For　what　reason　is　there　why　you　should　call　it　Spirit？
Does　not　the　notion　of　spirit　imply　that　it　is　thinking；　as　well
as　active　and　unextended？

　　　　　。　My　reason　is　this：　because　I　have　a　mind　to　have
some　notion　of　meaning　in　what　I　say：　but　I　have　no　notion　of　any
action　distinct　from　volition；　neither。　can　I　conceive　volition
to　be　anywhere　but　in　a　spirit：　therefore；　when　I　speak　of　an
active　being；　I　am　obliged　to　mean　a　Spirit。　Beside；　what　can　be
plainer　than　that　a　thing　which　hath　no　ideas　in　itself　cannot
impart　them　to　me；　and；　if　it　hath　ideas；　surely　it　must　be　a
Spirit。　To　make　you　comprehend　the　point　still　more　｛240｝　clearly
if　it　be　possible；　I　assert　as　well　as　you　that；　since　we　are
affected　from　without；　we　must　allow　Powers　to　be　without；　in　a
Being　distinct　from　ourselves。　So　far　we　are　agreed。　But　then　we
differ　as　to　the　kind　of　this　powerful　Being。　I　will　have　it　to
be　Spirit；　you　Matter；　or　I　know　not　what　（I　may　add　too；　you
know　not　what）　Third　Nature。　Thus；　I　prove　it　to　be　Spirit。　From
the　effects　I　see　produced；　I　conclude　there　are　actions；　and；
because　actions；　volitions；　and；　because　there　are　volitions；
there　must　be　a　。　Again；　the　things　I　perceive　must　have　an
existence；　they　or　their　archetypes；　out　of　　mind：　but；　being
ideas；　neither　they　nor　their　archetypes　can　exist　otherwise　than
in　an　understanding；　there　is　therefore　an　。　But
will　and　understanding　constitute　in　the　strictest　sense　a　mind
or　spirit。　The　powerful　cause；　therefore；　of　my　ideas　is　in
strict　propriety　of　speech　a　。

　　　　　。　And　now　I　warrant　you　think　you　have　made　the　point
very　clear；　little　suspecting　that　what　you　advance　leads
directly　to　a　contradiction。　Is　it　not　an　absurdity　to　imagine
any　imperfection　in　God？

　　　　　。　Without　a　doubt。

　　　　　。　To　suffer　pain　is　an　imperfection？

　　　　　。　It　is。

　　　　　。　Are　we　not　sometimes　affected　with　pain　and
uneasiness　by　some　other　Being？

　　　　　。　We　are。

　　　　　。　And　have　you　not　said　that　Being　is　a　Spirit；　and　is
not　that　Spirit　God？

　　　　　。　I　grant　it。

　　　　　。　But　you　have　asserted　that　whatever　ideas　we　perceive
from　without　are　in　the　mind　which　affects　us。　The　ideas；
therefore；　of　pain　and　uneasiness　are　in　God；　or；　in　other　words；
God　suffers　pain：　that　is　to　say；　there　is　an　imperfection　in　the
Divine　nature：　which；　you　acknowledged；　was　absurd。　So　you　are
caught　in　a　plain　contradiction。

　　　　　。　That　God　knows　or　understands　all　things；　and　that
He　knows；　among　other　things；　what　pain　is；　even　every　sort　of
painful　sensation；　and　what　it　is　for　His　creatures　to　suffer
pain；　I　make　no　question。　But；　that　God；　though　He　knows　and
sometimes　causes　painful　sensations　in　us；　can　Himself　suffer
pain；　I　positively　deny。　We；　who　are　limited　and　dependent
spirits；　are　liable　to　impressions　of　sense；　the　effects　of　an
｛241｝　external　Agent；　which；　being　produced　against　our　wills；
are　sometimes　painful　and　uneasy。　But　God；　whom　no　external　being
can　affect；　who　perceives　nothing　by　sense　as　we　do；　whose　will
is　absolute　and　independent；　causing　all　things；　and　liable　to　be
thwarted　or　resisted　by　nothing：　it　is　evident；　such　a　Being　as
this　can　suffer　nothing；　nor　be　affected　with　any　painful
sensation；　or　indeed　any　sensation　at　all。　We　are　chained　to　a
body：　that　is　to　say；　our　perceptions　are　connected　with
corporeal　motions。　By　the　law　of　our　nature；　we　are　affected　upon
every　alteration　in　the　nervous　parts　of　our　sensible　body；　which
sensible　body；　rightly　considered；　is　nothing　but　a　complexion　of
such　qualities　or　ideas　as　have　no　existence　distinct　from　being
perceived　by　a　mind。　So　that　this　connexion　of　sensations　with
corporeal　motions　means　no　more　than　a　correspondence　in　the
order　of　nature；　between　two　sets　of　ideas；　or　things　immediately
perceivable。　But　God　is　a　Pure　Spirit；　disengaged　from　all　such
sympathy；　or　natural　ties。　No　corporeal　motions　are　attended　with
the　sensations　of　pain　or　pleasure　in　His　mind。　To　know
everything　knowable；　is　certainly　a　perfection；　but　to　endure；　or
suffer；　or　feel　anything　by　sense；　is　an　imperfection。　The
former；　I　say；　agrees　to　God；　but　not　the　latter。　God　knows；　or
hath　ideas；　but　His　ideas　are　not　conveyed　to　Him　by　sense；　as
ours　are。　Your　not　distinguishing；　where　there　is　so　manifest　a
difference；　makes　you　fancy　you　see　an　absurdity　where　there　is
none。

　　　　　。　But；　all　this　while　you　have　not　considered　that　the
quantity　of　Matter　has　been　demonstrated　to　be　proportioned　to
the　gravity　of　bodies。　And　what　can　withstan