three dialogues-第8部分

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a　new　set　of　sensations；　existing　only　in　his　mind？

　　　　　。　It　is　undeniable。

　　　　　。　But；　to　make　it　still　more　plain：　is　not　
a　line　turned　endwise　to　the　eye？

　　　　　。　It　is。

　　　　　。　And　can　a　line　so　situated　be　perceived　by　sight？

　　　　　。　It　cannot。

　　　　　。　Doth　it　not　therefore　follow　that　distance　is　not
properly　and　immediately　perceived　by　sight？

　　　　　。　It　should　seem　so。

　　　　　。　Again；　is　it　your　opinion　that　colours　are　at　a
distance？

　　　　　。　It　must　be　acknowledged　they　are　only　in　the　mind。

　　　　　。　But　do　not　colours　appear　to　the　eye　as　coexisting
in　the　same　place　with　extension　and　figures？

　　　　　。　They　do。

　　　　　。　How　can　you　then　conclude　from　sight　that　figures
exist　without；　when　you　acknowledge　colours　do　not；　the　sensible
appearance　being　the　very　same　with　regard　to　both？

　　　　　。　I　know　not　what　to　answer。

　　　　　。　But；　allowing　that　distance　was　truly　and
immediately　perceived　by　the　mind；　yet　it　would　not　thence　follow
it　existed　out　of　the　mind。　For；　whatever　is　immediately
perceived　is　an　idea：　and　can　any　idea　exist　out　of　the　mind？

　　　　　。　To　suppose　that　were　absurd：　but；　inform　me；
Philonous；　can　we　perceive　or　know　nothing　beside　our　ideas？

　　　　　。　As　for　the　rational　deducing　of　causes　from　effects；
｛203｝　that　is　beside　our　inquiry。　And；　by　the　senses　you　can　best
tell　whether　you　perceive　anything　which　is　not　immediately
perceived。　And　I　ask　you；　whether　the　things　immediately
perceived　are　other　than　your　own　sensations　or　ideas？　You　have
indeed　more　than　once；　in　the　course　of　this　conversation；
declared　yourself　on　those　points；　but　you　seem；　by　this　last
question；　to　have　departed　from　what　you　then　thought。

　　　　　。　To　speak　the　truth；　Philonous；　I　think　there　are　two
kinds　of　objects：　　the　one　perceived　immediately；　which　are
likewise　called　；　the　other　are　real　things　or　external
objects；　perceived　by　the　mediation　of　ideas；　which　are　their
images　and　representations。　Now；　I　own　ideas　do　not　exist　without
the　mind；　but　the　latter　sort　of　objects　do。　I　am　sorry　I　did　not
think　of　this　distinction　sooner；　it　would　probably　have　cut
short　your　discourse。

　　　　　。　Are　those　external　objects　perceived　by　sense　or　by
some　other　faculty？

　　　　　。　They　are　perceived　by　sense。

　　　　　。　Howl　Is　there　any　thing　perceived　by　sense　which　is
not　immediately　perceived？

　　　　　。　Yes；　Philonous；　in　some　sort　there　is。　For　example；
when　I　look　on　a　picture　or　statue　of　Julius　Caesar；　I　may　be
said　after　a　manner　to　perceive　him　（though　not　immediately）　by
my　senses。

　　　　　。　It　seems　then　you　will　have　our　ideas；　which　alone
are　immediately　perceived；　to　be　pictures　of　external　things：　and
that　these　also　are　perceived　by　sense；　inasmuch　as　they　have　a
conformity　or　resemblance　to　our　ideas？

　　　　　。　That　is　my　meaning。

　　　　　。　And；　in　the　same　way　that　Julius　Caesar；　in　himself
invisible；　is　nevertheless　perceived　by　sight；　real　things；　in
themselves　imperceptible；　are　perceived　by　sense。

　　　　　。　In　the　very　same。

　　　　　。　Tell　me；　Hylas；　when　you　behold　the　picture　of
Julius　Caesar；　do　you　see　with　your　eyes　any　more　than　some
colours　and　figures；　with　a　certain　symmetry　and　composition　of
the　whole？

　　　　　。　Nothing　else。

　　　　　。　And　would　not　a　man　who　had　never　known　anything　of
Julius　Caesar　see　as　much？　｛204｝

　　　　　。　He　would。

　　　　　。　Consequently　he　hath　his　sight；　and　the　use　of　it；
in　as　perfect　a　degree　as　you？

　　　　　。　I　agree　with　you。

　　　　　。　Whence　comes　it　then　that　your　thoughts　are　directed
to　the　Roman　emperor；　and　his　are　not？　This　cannot　proceed　from
the　sensations　or　ideas　of　sense　by　you　then　perceived；　since　you
acknowledge　you　have　no　advantage　over　him　in　that　respect。　It
should　seem　therefore　to　proceed　from　reason　and　memory：　should
it　not？

　　　　　。　It　should。

　　　　　。　Consequently；　it　will　not　follow　from　that　instance
that　anything　is　perceived　by　sense　which　is　not；　immediately
perceived。　Though　I　grant　we　may；　in　one　acceptation；　be　said　to
perceive　sensible　things　mediately　by　sense：　that　is；　when；　from
a　frequently　perceived　connexion；　the　immediate　perception　of
ideas　by　one　sense　　to　the　mind　others；　perhaps
belonging　to　another　sense；　which　are　wont　to　be　connected　with
them。　For　instance；　when　I　hear　a　coach　drive　along　the　streets；
immediately　I　perceive　only　the　sound；　but；　from　the　experience　I
have　had　that　such　a　sound　is　connected　with　a　coach；　I　am　said
to　hear　the　coach。　It　is　nevertheless　evident　that；　in　truth　and
strictness；　nothing　can　be　；　and　the　coach　is
not　then　properly　perceived　by　sense；　but　suggested　from
experience。　So　likewise　when　we　are　said　to　see　a　red…hot　bar　of
iron；　the　solidity　and　heat　of　the　iron　are　not　the　objects　of
sight；　but　suggested　to　the　imagination　by　the　colour　and　figure
which　are　properly　perceived　by　that　sense。　In　short；　those
things　alone　are　actually　and　strictly　perceived　by　any　sense；
which　would　have　been　perceived　in　case　that　same　sense　had　then
been　first　conferred　on　us。　As　for　other　things；　it　is　plain　they
are　only　suggested　to　the　mind　by　experience；　grounded　on　former
perceptions。　But；　to　return　to　your　comparison　of　Caesar's
picture；　it　is　plain；　if　you　keep　to　that；　you　must　hold　the　real
things；　or　archetypes　of　our　ideas；　are　not　perceived　by　sense；
but　by　some　internal　faculty　of　the　soul；　as　reason　or　memory。　I
would　therefore　fain　know　what　arguments　you　can　draw　from　reason
for　the　existence　of　what　you　call　。　Or；　whether　you　remember　to　have　seen　them　formerly　as
they　are　in　themselves；　or；　if　you　have　heard　or　read　of　any　one
that　did。　｛205｝

　　　　　。　I　see；　Philonous；　you　are　disposed　to　raillery；　but
that　will　never　convince　me。

　　　　　。　My　aim　is　only　to　learn　from　you　the　way　to　come　at
the　knowledge　of　。　Whatever　we　perceive　is
perceived　immediately　or　mediately：　by　sense；　or　by　reason　and
reflexion。　But；　as　you　have　excluded　sense；　pray　shew　me　what
reason　you　have　to　believe　their　existence；　or　what　　you
can　possibly　make　use　of　to　prove　it；　either　to　mine　or　your　own
understanding。

　　　　　。　To　deal　ingenuously；　Philonous；　now　I　consider　the
point；　I　do　not　find　I　can　give　you　any　good　reason　for　it。　But；
thus　much　seems　pretty　plain；　that　it　is　at　least　possible　such
things　may　really　exist。　And；　as　long　as　there　is　no　absurdity　in
supposing　them；　I　am　resolved　to　believe　as　I　did；　till　you　bring
good　reasons　to　the　contrary。

　　　　　。　What！　Is　it　come　to　this；　that　you　only　
the　existence　of　material　objects；　and　that　your　belief　is
founded　barely　on　the　possibility　of　its　being　true？　Then　you
will　have　me　bring　reasons　against　it：　though　another　would　think
it　reasonable　the　proof　should　lie　on　him　who　holds　the
affirmative。　And；　after　all；　this　very　point　which　you　are　now
resolved　to　maintain；　without　any　reason；　is　in　effect　what　you
have　more　than　once　during　this　discourse　seen　good　reason　to
give　up。　But；　to　pass　over　all　this；　if　I　understand　you　rightly；
you　say　our　ideas　do　not　exist　without　the　mind；　but　that　they
are　copies；　images；　or　representations；　of　certain　originals　that
do？

　　　　　。　You　take　me　right。

　　　　　。　They　are　then　like　external　things？

　　　　　。　They　are。

　　　　　。　Have　those　things　a　stable　and　permanent　nature；
independent　of　our　senses；　or　are　they　in　a　perpetual　change；
upon　our　producing　any　motions　in　our　bodies　　suspending；
exerting；　or　altering；　our　faculties　or　organs　of　sense？

　　　　　。　Real　things；　it　is　plain；　have　a　fixed　and　real
nature；　which　remains　the　same　notwithstanding　any　change　in　our
senses；　or　in　the　posture　and　motion　of　our　bodies；　which　indeed
may　affect　the　ideas　in　our　minds；　but　it　were　absurd　to　think
they　had　the　same　effect　on　things　existing　without　the　mind。

　　　　　。　How　then　is　it　possible　that　things　perpetually
fleeting　and　variable　as　our　ideas　should　be　copies　or　images　of
anything　fixed　and　constant？　Or；　in　other　words；　since　all
sensible　｛206｝　qualities；　as　size；　figure；　colour；　&c。；　that　is；
our　ideas；　are　continually　changing；　upon　every　alteration　in　the
distance；　medium；　or　instruments　of　sensation；　how　can　any
determinate　material　objects　be　properly　represented　or　painted
forth　by　several　distinct　things；　each　of　which　is　so　different
from　and　unlike　the　rest？　Or；　if　you　say　it　resembles　some　one
only　of　our　ideas；　how　shall　we　be　able　to　distinguish　the　true
copy　from　all　the　false　ones？

　　　　　。　I　profess；　Philonous；　I　am　at　a　loss。　I　know　not　what
to　say　to　this。

　　　　　。　But　neither　is　this　all。　Which　are　material　objects
in　themselves　　perceptible　or　imperceptible？

　　　　　。　Properly　and　immediately　nothing　can　be　perceived　but
ideas。　All　material　things；　therefore；　are　in　themselves
insensible；　and　to　be　perceived　only　by　our　ideas。

　　　　　。　Ideas　then　are　sensible；　and　their　archetypes　or
originals　insensible？

　　　　　。　Right。

　　　　　。　But　how　can　that　which　is　sensible　be　like　that
which　is　insensible？　Can　a　real　thing；　in　itself　；　be
like　a　；　or　a　real　thing；　which　is　not　；　be　like
a　？　In　a　word；　can　anything　be　like　a　sensation　or　idea；
but　another　sensation　or　idea？

　　　　　。　I　must　own；　I　think　not。

　　　　　。　Is　it　possible　there　should　be　any　doubt　on　the
point？　Do。　you　not　perfectly　know　your　own　ideas？

　　　　　。　I　know　them　perfectly；　since　what　I　do　not　perceive
or　know　can　be　no　part　of　my　idea。

　　　　　。　Consider；　therefore；　and　examine　them；　and　then　tell
me　if　there　be　anything　in　them　which　can　exist　without　the　mind：
or　if　you　can　conceive　anything　like　them　existing　without　the
mind。

　　　　　。　Upon　inquiry；　I　find　it　is　impossible　for　me　to
conceive　or　understand　how　anything　but　an　idea　can　be　like　an
idea。　And　it　is　most　evident　that　。