protagoras-第13部分

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therefore；　is　the　meaning　of　being　overcome　by　pleasure；…ignorance；



and　that　the　greatest。　And　our　friends　Protagoras　and　Prodicus　and



Hippias　declare　that　they　are　the　physicians　of　ignorance；　but　you；



who　are　under　the　mistaken　impression　that　ignorance　is　not　the　cause；



and　that　the　art　of　which　I　am　speaking　cannot　be　taught；　neither　go



yourselves；　nor　send　your　children；　to　the　Sophists；　who　are　the



teachers　of　these　things…you　take　care　of　your　money　and　give　them



none；　and　the　result　is；　that　you　are　the　worse　off　both　in　public　and



private　life：…Let　us　suppose　this　to　be　our　answer　to　the　world　in



general：　And　now　I　should　like　to　ask　you；　Hippias；　and　you；　Prodicus；



as　well　as　Protagoras　（for　the　argument　is　to　be　yours　as　well　as



ours）；　whether　you　think　that　I　am　speaking　the　truth　or　not？



　　They　all　thought　that　what　I　said　was　entirely　true。



　　Then　you　agree；　I　said；　that　the　pleasant　is　the　good；　and　the



painful　evil。　And　here　I　would　beg　my　friend　Prodicus　not　to　introduce



his　distinction　of　names；　whether　he　is　disposed　to　say　pleasurable；



delightful；　joyful。　However；　by　whatever　name　he　prefers　to　call　them；



I　will　ask　you；　most　excellent　Prodicus；　to　answer　in　my　sense　of



the　words。



　　Prodicus　laughed　and　assented；　as　did　the　others。



　　Then；　my　friends；　what　do　you　say　to　this？　Are　not　all　actions



honourable　and　useful；　of　which　the　tendency　is　to　make　life



painless　and　pleasant？　The　honourable　work　is　also　useful　and　good？



　　This　was　admitted。



　　Then；　I　said；　if　the　pleasant　is　the　good；　nobody　does　anything



under　the　idea　or　conviction　that　some　other　thing　would　be　better　and



is　also　attainable；　when　he　might　do　the　better。　And　this



inferiority　of　a　man　to　himself　is　merely　ignorance；　as　the



superiority　of　a　man　to　himself　is　wisdom。



　　They　all　assented。



　　And　is　not　ignorance　the　having　a　false　opinion　and　being　deceived



about　important　matters？



　　To　this　also　they　unanimously　assented。



　　Then；　I　said；　no　man　voluntarily　pursues　evil；　or　that　which　he



thinks　to　be　evil。　To　prefer　evil　to　good　is　not　in　human　nature；



and　when　a　man　is　compelled　to　choose　one　of　two　evils；　no　one　will



choose　the　greater　when　he　may　have　the　less。



　　All　of　us　agreed　to　every　word　of　this。



　　Well；　I　said；　there　is　a　certain　thing　called　fear　or　terror；　and



here；　Prodicus；　I　should　particularly　like　to　know　whether　you　would



agree　with　me　in　defining　this　fear　or　terror　as　expectation　of　evil。



　　Protagoras　and　Hippias　agreed；　but　Prodicus　said　that　this　was



fear　and　not　terror。



　　Never　mind；　Prodicus；　I　said；　but　let　me　ask　whether；　if　our



former　assertions　are　true；　a　man　will　pursue　that　which　he　fears　when



he　is　not　compelled？　Would　not　this　be　in　flat　contradiction　to　the



admission　which　has　been　already　made；　that　he　thinks　the　things　which



he　fears　to　be　evil；　and　no　one　will　pursue　or　voluntarily　accept　that



which　he　thinks　to　be　evil？



　　That　also　was　universally　admitted。



　　Then；　I　said；　these；　Hippias　and　Prodicus；　are　our　premisses；　and



I　would　beg　Protagoras　to　explain　to　us　how　he　can　be　right　in　what　he



said　at　first。　I　do　not　mean　in　what　he　said　quite　at　first；　for　his



first　statement；　as　you　may　remember；　was　that　whereas　there　were　five



parts　of　virtue　none　of　them　was　like　any　other　of　them；　each　of



them　had　a　separate　function。　To　this；　however；　I　am　not　referring；



but　to　the　assertion　which　he　afterwards　made　that　of　the　five　virtues



four　were　nearly　akin　to　each　other；　but　that　the　fifth；　which　was



courage；　differed　greatly　from　the　others。　And　of　this　he　gave　me



the　following　proof。　He　said：　You　will　find；　Socrates；　that　some　of



the　most　impious；　and　unrighteous；　and　intemperate；　and　ignorant　of



men　are　among　the　most　courageous；　which　proves　that　courage　is　very



different　from　the　other　parts　of　virtue。　I　was　surprised　at　his



saying　this　at　the　time；　and　I　am　still　more　surprised　now　that　I　have



discussed　the　matter　with　you。　So　I　asked　him　whether　by　the　brave



he　meant　the　confident。　Yes；　he　replied；　and　the　impetuous　or　goers。



（You　may　remember；　Protagoras；　that　this　was　your　answer。）



　　He　assented。



　　Well　then；　I　said；　tell　us　against　what　are　the　courageous　ready



to　go…against　the　same　dangers　as　the　cowards？



　　No；　he　answered。



　　Then　against　something　different？



　　Yes；　he　said。



　　Then　do　cowards　go　where　there　is　safety；　and　the　courageous　where



there　is　danger？



　　Yes；　Socrates；　so　men　say。



　　Very　true；　I　said。　But　I　want　to　know　against　what　do　you　say　that



the　courageous　are　ready　to　go…against　dangers；　believing　them　to　be



dangers；　or　not　against　dangers？



　　No；　said　he；　the　former　case　has　been　proved　by　you　in　the



previous　argument　to　be　impossible。



　　That；　again；　I　replied；　is　quite　true。　And　if　this　has　been



rightly　proven；　then　no　one　goes　to　meet　what　he　thinks　to　be　dangers；



since　the　want　of　self…control；　which　makes　men　rush　into　dangers；　has



been　shown　to　be　ignorance。



　　He　assented。



　　And　yet　the　courageous　man　and　the　coward　alike　go　to　meet　that



about　which　they　are　confident；　so　that；　in　this　point　of　view；　the



cowardly　and　the　courageous　go　to　meet　the　same　things。



　　And　yet；　Socrates；　said　Protagoras；　that　to　which　the　coward　goes　is



the　opposite　of　that　to　which　the　courageous　goes；　the　one；　for



example；　is　ready　to　go　to　battle；　and　the　other　is　not　ready。



　　And　is　going　to　battle　honourable　or　disgraceful？　I　said。



　　Honourable；　he　replied。



　　And　if　honourable；　then　already　admitted　by　us　to　be　good；　for　all



honourable　actions　we　have　admitted　to　be　good。



　　That　is　true；　and　to　that　opinion　I　shall　always　adhere。



　　True；　I　said。　But　which　of　the　two　are　they　who；　as　you　say；　are



unwilling　to　go　to　war；　which　is　a　good　and　honourable　thing？



　　The　cowards；　he　replied。



　　And　what　is　good　and　honourable；　I　said；　is　also　pleasant？



　　It　has　certainly　been　acknowledged　to　be　so；　he　replied。



　　And　do　the　cowards　knowingly　refuse　to　go　to　the　nobler；　and



pleasanter；　and　better？



　　The　admission　of　that；　he　replied；　would　belie　our　former



admissions。



　　But　does　not　the　courageous　man　also　go　to　meet　the　better；　and



pleasanter；　and　nobler？



　　That　must　be　admitted。



　　And　the　courageous　man　has　no　base　fear　or　base　confidence？



　　True；　he　replied。



　　And　if　not　base；　then　honourable？



　　He　admitted　this。



　　And　if　honourable；　then　good？



　　Yes。



　　But　the　fear　and　confidence　of　the　coward　or　foolhardy　or　madman；　on



the　contrary；　are　base？



　　He　assented。



　　And　these　base　fears　and　confidences　originate　in　ignorance　and



uninstructedness？



　　True；　he　said。



　　Then　as　to　the　motive　from　which　the　cowards　act；　do　you　call　it



cowardice　or　courage？



　　I　should　say　cowardice；　he　replied。



　　And　have　they　not　been　shown　to　be　cowards　through　their　ignorance



of　dangers？



　　Assuredly；　he　said。



　　And　because　of　that　ignorance　they　are　cowards？



　　He　assented。



　　And　the　reason　why　they　are　cowards　is　admitted　by　you　to　be



cowardice？



　　He　again　assented。



　　Then　the　ignorance　of　what　is　and　is　not　dangerous　is　cowardice？



　　He　nodded　assent。



　　But　surely　courage；　I　said；　is　opposed　to　cowardice？



　　Yes。



　　Then　the　wisdom　which　knows　what　are　and　are　not　dangers　is



opposed　to　the　ignorance　of　them？



　　To　that　again　he　nodded　assent。



　　And　the　ignorance　of　them　is　cowardice？



　　To　that　he　very　reluctantly　nodded　assent。



　　And　the　knowledge　of　that　which　is　and　is　not　dangerous　is



courage；　and　is　opposed　to　the　ignorance　of　these　things？



　　At　this　point　he　would　no　longer　nod　assent；　but　was　silent。



　　And　why；　I　said；　do　you　neither　assent　nor　dissent；　Protagoras？



　　Finish　the　argument　by　yourself；　he　said。



　　I　only　want　to　ask　one　more　question；　I　said。　I　want　to　know　whether



you　still　think　that　there　are　men　who　are　most　ignorant　and　yet



most　courageous？



　　You　seem　to　have　a　great　ambition　to　make　me　answer；　Socrates；　and



therefore　I　will　gratify　you；　and　say；　that　this　appears　to　me　to　be



impossible　consistently　with　the　argument。



　　My　only　object；　I　said；　in　continuing　the　discussion；　has　been　the



desire　to　ascertain　the　nature　and　relations　of　virtue；　for　if　this



were　clear；　I　am　very　sure　that　the　other　controversy　which　has　been



carried　on　at　great　length　by　both　of　us…you　affirming　and　I　denying



that　virtue　can　be　taught…would　also　become　clear。　The　result　of　our



discussion　appears　to　me　to　be　singular。　For　if　the　argument　had　a



human　voice；　that　voice　would　be　heard　laughing　at　us　and　saying：



〃Protagoras　and　Socrates；　you　are　strange　beings；　there　are　you；



Socrates；　who　were　saying　that　virtue　cannot　be　taught；



contradicting　yourself　now　by　your　attempt　to　prove　that　all　things



are　knowledge；　including　justice；　and　temperance；　and　courage；…which



tends　to　show　that　virtue　can　certainly　be　taught；　for　if　virtue



were　other　than　knowledge；　as　Protagoras　attempted　to　prove；　then



clearly　virtue　cannot　be　taught；　but　if　virtue　is　entirely



knowledge；　as　you　are　seeking　to　show；　then　I　cannot　but　suppose



that　virtue　is　capable　of　being　taught。　Protagoras；　on　the　other　hand；



who　started　by　saying　that　it　might　be　taught；　is　now　eager　to　prove



it　to　be　anything　rather　than　knowledge；　and　if　this　is　true；　it



must　be　quite　incapable　of　being　taught。〃　Now　I；　Protagoras；



perceiving　this　terrible　confusion　of　our　ideas；　have　a　great　desire



that　they　should　be　cleared　up。　And　I　should　like　to　carry　on　the



discussion　until　we　ascertain　what　virtue　is；　whether　capable　of　being



taught　or　not；　lest　haply　Epimetheus　should　trip　us　up　and　deceive



us　in　the　argument；　as　he　forgot　us　in　the　story