protagoras-第6部分

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several　times　while　you　were　speaking；　justice；　and　temperance；　and



holiness；　and　all　these　qualities；　were　described　by　you　as　if



together　they　made　up　virtue。　Now　I　want　you　to　tell　me　truly



whether　virtue　is　one　whole；　of　which　justice　and　temperance　and



holiness　are　parts；　or　whether　all　these　are　only　the　names　of　one　and



the　same　thing：　that　is　the　doubt　which　still　lingers　in　my　mind。



　　There　is　no　difficulty；　Socrates；　in　answering　that　the　qualities　of



which　you　are　speaking　are　the　parts　of　virtue　which　is　one。



　　And　are　they　parts；　I　said；　in　the　same　sense　in　which　mouth；



nose；　and　eyes；　and　ears；　are　the　parts　of　a　face；　or　are　they　like



the　parts　of　gold；　which　differ　from　the　whole　and　from　one　another



only　in　being　larger　or　smaller？



　　I　should　say　that　they　differed；　Socrates；　in　the　first　way；　they



are　related　to　one　another　as　the　parts　of　a　face　are　related　to　the



whole　face。



　　And　do　men　have　some　one　part　and　some　another　part　of　virtue？　Of　if



a　man　has　one　part；　must　he　also　have　all　the　others？



　　By　no　means；　he　said；　for　many　a　man　is　brave　and　not　just；　or



just　and　not　wise。



　　You　would　not　deny；　then；　that　courage　and　wisdom　are　also　parts



of　virtue？



　　Most　undoubtedly　they　are；　he　answered；　and　wisdom　is　the　noblest　of



the　parts。



　　And　they　are　all　different　from　one　another？　I　said。



　　Yes。



　　And　has　each　of　them　a　distinct　function　like　the　parts　of　the



face；…the　eye；　for　example；　is　not　like　the　ear；　and　has　not　the



same　functions；　and　the　other　parts　are　none　of　them　like　one　another；



either　in　their　functions；　or　in　any　other　way？　I　want　to　know　whether



the　comparison　holds　concerning　the　parts　of　virtue。　Do　they　also



differ　from　one　another　in　themselves　and　in　their　functions？　For　that



is　clearly　what　the　simile　would　imply。



　　Yes；　Socrates；　you　are　right　in　supposing　that　they　differ。



　　Then；　I　said；　no　other　part　of　virtue　is　like　knowledge；　or　like



justice；　or　like　courage；　or　like　temperance；　or　like　holiness？



　　No；　he　answered。



　　Well　then；　I　said；　suppose　that　you　and　I　enquire　into　their



natures。　And　first；　you　would　agree　with　me　that　justice　is　of　the



nature　of　a　thing；　would　you　not？　That　is　my　opinion：　would　it　not



be　yours　also？



　　Mine　also；　he　said。



　　And　suppose　that　some　one　were　to　ask　us；　saying；　〃O　Protagoras；　and



you；　Socrates；　what　about　this　thing　which　you　were　calling　justice；



is　it　just　or　unjust？〃…and　I　were　to　answer；　just：　would　you　vote　with



me　or　against　me？



　　With　you；　he　said。



　　Thereupon　I　should　answer　to　him　who　asked　me；　that　justice　is　of



the　nature　of　the　just：　would　not　you？



　　Yes；　he　said。



　　And　suppose　that　he　went　on　to　say：　〃Well　now；　is　there　also　such



a　thing　as　holiness？　〃we　should　answer；　〃Yes；〃　if　I　am　not　mistaken？



　　Yes；　he　said。



　　Which　you　would　also　acknowledge　to　be　a　thing…should　we　not　say　so？



　　He　assented。



　　〃And　is　this　a　sort　of　thing　which　is　of　the　nature　of　the　holy；



or　of　the　nature　of　the　unholy？〃　I　should　be　angry　at　his　putting　such



a　question；　and　should　say；　〃Peace；　man；　nothing　can　be　holy　if



holiness　is　not　holy。〃　What　would　you　say？　Would　you　not　answer　in　the



same　way？



　　Certainly；　he　said。



　　And　then　after　this　suppose　that　he　came　and　asked　us；　〃What　were



you　saying　just　now？　Perhaps　I　may　not　have　heard　you　rightly；　but　you



seemed　to　me　to　be　saying　that　the　parts　of　virtue　were　not　the　same



as　one　another。〃　I　should　reply；　〃You　certainly　heard　that　said；　but



not；　as　you　imagine；　by　me；　for　I　only　asked　the　question；



Protagoras　gave　the　answer。〃　And　suppose　that　he　turned　to　you　and



said；　〃Is　this　true；　Protagoras？　and　do　you　maintain　that　one　part



of　virtue　is　unlike　another；　and　is　this　your　position？〃…how　would　you



answer　him？



　　I　could　not　help　acknowledging　the　truth　of　what　he　said；　Socrates。



　　Well　then；　Protagoras；　we　will　assume　this；　and　now　supposing　that



he　proceeded　to　say　further；　〃Then　holiness　is　not　of　the　nature　of



justice；　nor　justice　of　the　nature　of　holiness；　but　of　the　nature　of



unholiness；　and　holiness　is　of　the　nature　of　the　not　just；　and



therefore　of　the　unjust；　and　the　unjust　is　the　unholy〃：　how　shall　we



answer　him？　I　should　certainly　answer　him　on　my　own　behalf　that



justice　is　holy；　and　that　holiness　is　just；　and　I　would　say　in　like



manner　on　your　behalf　also；　if　you　would　allow　me；　that　justice　is



either　the　same　with　holiness；　or　very　nearly　the　same；　and　above



all　I　would　assert　that　justice　is　like　holiness　and　holiness　is



like　justice；　and　I　wish　that　you　would　tell　me　whether　I　may　be



permitted　to　give　this　answer　on　your　behalf；　and　whether　you　would



agree　with　me。



　　He　replied；　I　cannot　simply　agree；　Socrates；　to　the　proposition　that



justice　is　holy　and　that　holiness　is　just；　for　there　appears　to　me



to　be　a　difference　between　them。　But　what　matter？　if　you　please　I



please；　and　let　us　assume；　if　you　will　I；　that　justice　is　holy；　and



that　holiness　is　just。



　　Pardon　me；　I　replied；　I　do　not　want　this　〃if　you　wish〃　or　〃if　you



will〃　sort　of　conclusion　to　be　proven；　but　I　want　you　and　me　to　be



proven：　I　mean　to　say　that　the　conclusion　will　be　best　proven　if　there



be　no　〃if。〃



　　Well；　he　said；　I　admit　that　justice　bears　a　resemblance　to　holiness；



for　there　is　always　some　point　of　view　in　which　everything　is　like



every　other　thing；　white　is　in　a　certain　way　like　black；　and　hard　is



like　soft；　and　the　most　extreme　opposites　have　some　qualities　in



common；　even　the　parts　of　the　face　which；　as　we　were　saying　before；



are　distinct　and　have　different　functions；　are　still　in　a　certain



point　of　view　similar；　and　one　of　them　is　like　another　of　them。　And



you　may　prove　that　they　are　like　one　another　on　the　same　principle



that　all　things　are　like　one　another；　and　yet　things　which　are　like　in



some　particular　ought　not　to　be　called　alike；　nor　things　which　are



unlike　in　some　particular；　however　slight；　unlike。



　　And　do　you　think；　I　said　in　a　tone　of　surprise；　that　justice　and



holiness　have　but　a　small　degree　of　likeness？



　　Certainly　not；　any　more　than　I　agree　with　what　I　understand　to　be



your　view。



　　Well；　I　said；　as　you　appear　to　have　a　difficulty　about　this；　let



us　take　another　of　the　examples　which　you　mentioned　instead。　Do　you



admit　the　existence　of　folly？



　　I　do。



　　And　is　not　wisdom　the。　very　opposite　of　folly？



　　That　is　true；　he　said。



　　And　when　men　act　rightly　and　advantageously　they　seem　to　you　to　be



temperate？



　　Yes；　he　said。



　　And　temperance　makes　them　temperate？



　　Certainly。



　　And　they　who　do　not　act　rightly　act　foolishly；　and　in　acting　thus



are　not　temperate？



　　I　agree；　he　said。



　　Then　to　act　foolishly　is　the　opposite　of　acting　temperately？



　　He　assented。



　　And　foolish　actions　are　done　by　folly；　and　temperate　actions　by



temperance？



　　He　agreed。



　　And　that　is　done　strongly　which　is　done　by　strength；　and　that



which　is　weakly　done；　by　weakness？



　　He　assented。



　　And　that　which　is　done　with　swiftness　is　done　swiftly；　and　that



which　is　done　with　slowness；　slowly？



　　He　assented　again。



　　And　that　which　is　done　in　the　same　manner；　is　done　by　the　same；



and　that　which　is　done　in　an　opposite　manner　by　the　opposite？



　　He　agreed。



　　Once　more；　I　said；　is　there　anything　beautiful？



　　Yes。



　　To　which　the　only　opposite　is　the　ugly？



　　There　is　no　other。



　　And　is　there　anything　good？



　　There　is。



　　To　which　the　only　opposite　is　the　evil？



　　There　is　no　other。



　　And　there　is　the　acute　in　sound？



　　True。



　　To　which　the　only　opposite　is　the　grave？



　　There　is　no　other；　he　said；　but　that。



　　Then　every　opposite　has　one　opposite　only　and　no　more？



　　He　assented。



　　Then　now；　I　said；　let　us　recapitulate　our　admissions。　First　of　all



we　admitted　that　everything　has　one　opposite　and　not　more　than　one？



　　We　did　so。



　　And　we　admitted　also　that　what　was　done　in　opposite　ways　was　done　by



opposites？



　　Yes。



　　And　that　which　was　done　foolishly；　as　we　further　admitted；　was



done　in　the　opposite　way　to　that　which　was　done　temperately？



　　Yes。



　　And　that　which　was　done　temperately　was　done　by　temperance；　and　that



which　was　done　foolishly　by　folly？



　　He　agreed。



　　And　that　which　is　done　in　opposite　ways　is　done　by　opposites？



　　Yes。



　　And　one　thing　is　done　by　temperance；　and　quite　another　thing　by



folly？



　　Yes。



　　And　in　opposite　ways？



　　Certainly。



　　And　therefore　by　opposites：…then　folly　is　the　opposite　of



temperance？



　　Clearly。



　　And　do　you　remember　that　folly　has　already　been　acknowledged　by　us



to　be　the　opposite　of　wisdom？



　　He　assented。



　　And　we　said　that　everything　has　only　one　opposite？



　　Yes。



　　Then；　Protagoras；　which　of　the　two　assertions　shall　we　renounce？　One



says　that　everything　has　but　one　opposite；　the　other　that　wisdom　is



distinct　from　temperance；　and　that　both　of　them　are　parts　of　virtue；



and　that　they　are　not　only　distinct；　but　dissimilar；　both　in



themselves　and　in　their　functions；　like　the　parts　of　a　face。　Which



of　these　two　assertions　shall　we　renounce？　For　both　of　them　together



are　certainly　not　in　harmony；　they　do　not　accord　or　agree：　for　how　can



they　be　said　to　agree　if　everything　is　assumed　to　have　only　one



opposite　and　not　more　than　one；　and　yet　folly；　which　is　one；　has



clearly　the　two　opposites　wisdom　and　temperance？　Is　not　that　true；



Protagoras？　What　else　would　you　say？



　　He　assented；　but　with　great　reluctance。



　　Then　temperance　and　wisdom　are　the　same；　as　before　justice　and



holiness　appeared　to　us　to　be　nearly　the　same。　And　now；　Protagoras；



I　said；　we　must　finish　the　enquiry；　and　not　faint。　Do　you　think　that