the essays of montaigne, v16-第11部分

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see　their　own　ignorance。　　This　exclamation　is　safe；　〃That　is　fine；〃　after
having　heard　a　whole　page　of　Virgil；　　by　that　the　cunning　sort　save
themselves；　but　to　undertake　to　follow　him　line　by　line；　and；　with　an
expert　and　tried　judgment；　to　observe　where　a　good　author　excels　himself；
weighing　the　words；　phrases；　inventions；　and　his　various　excellences；　one
after　another；　keep　aloof　from　that：

　　　　　〃Videndum　est；　non　modo　quid　quisque　loquatur；　sed　etiam　quid
　　　　　quisque　sentiat；　atque　etiam　qua　de　causa　quisque　sentiat。〃

　　　　　＇A　man　is　not　only　to　examine　what　every　one　says；　but　also　what
　　　　　every　one　thinks；　and　from　what　reason　every　one　thinks。
　　　　　〃Cicero；　De　Offic：；　i。　41。＇

I　every　day　hear　fools　say　things　that　are　not　foolish：　they　say　a　good
thing；　let　us　examine　how　far　they　understand　it；　whence　they　have　it；
and　what　they　mean　by　it。　　We　help　them　to　make　use　of　this　fine
expression；　of　this　fine　sentence；　which　is　none　of　theirs；　they　only
have　it　in　keeping；　they　have　bolted　it　out　at　a　venture；　we　place　it　for
them　in　credit　and　esteem。　　You　lend　them　your　hand。　　To　what　purpose？
they　do　not　think　themselves　obliged　to　you　for　it；　and　become　more　inept
still。　　Don't　help　them；　let　them　alone；　they　will　handle　the　matter　like
people　who　are　afraid　of　burning　their　fingers；　they　dare　change　neither
its　seat　nor　light；　nor　break　into　it；　shake　it　never　so　little；　it　slips
through　their　fingers；　they　give　it　up；　be　it　never　so　strong　or　fair
they　are　fine　weapons；　but　ill　hafted：　How　many　times　have　I　seen　the
experience　of　this？　　Now；　if　you　come　to　explain　anything　to　them；　and　to
confirm　them；　they　catch　at　it；　and　presently　rob　you　of　the　advantage　of
your　interpretation；　〃It　was　what　I　was　about　to　say；　it　was　just　my
idea；　if　I　did　not　express　it　so；　it　was　for　want　of　language。〃　　Mere
wind！　　Malice　itself　must　be　employed　to　correct　this　arrogant　ignorance。
The　dogma　of　Hegesias；　〃that　we　are　neither　to　hate　nor　accuse；　but
instruct；〃　is　correct　elsewhere；　but　here　'tis　injustice　and　inhumanity
to　relieve　and　set　him　right　who　stands　in　no　need　on't；　and　is　the　worse
for't。　　I　love　to　let　them　step　deeper　into　the　mire；　and　so　deep；　that；
if　it　be　possible；　they　may　at　last　discern　their　error。

Folly　and　absurdity　are　not　to　be　cured　by　bare　admonition；　and　what
Cyrus　answered　to　him；　who　importuned　him　to　harangue　his　army；　upon　the
point　of　battle；　〃that　men　do　not　become　valiant　and　warlike　upon　a
sudden；　by　a　fine　oration；　no　more　than　a　man　becomes　a　good　musician　by
hearing　a　fine　song；〃　may　properly　be　said　of　such　an　admonition　as　this。
These　are　apprenticeships　that　are　to　be　served　beforehand；　by　a　long　and
continued　education。　　We　owe　this　care　and　this　assiduity　of　correction
and　instruction　to　our　own　people；　but　to　go　preach　to　the　first　passer…
by；　and　to　become　tutor　to　the　ignorance　and　folly　of　the　first　we　meet；
is　a　thing　that　I　abhor。　　I　rarely　do　it；　even　in　private　conversation；
and　rather　give　up　the　whole　thing　than　proceed　to　these　initiatory　and
school　instructions；　my　humour　is　unfit　either　to　speak　or　write　for
beginners；　but　for　things　that　are　said　in　common　discourse；　or　amongst
other　things；　I　never　oppose　them　either　by　word　or　sign；　how　false　or
absurd　soever。

As　to　the　rest；　nothing　vexes　me　so　much　in　folly　as　that　it　is　more
satisfied　with　itself　than　any　reason　can　reasonably　be。　　'Tis
unfortunate　that　prudence　forbids　us　to　satisfy　and　trust　ourselves；
and　always　dismisses　us　timorous　and　discontented；　whereas　obstinacy　and
temerity　fill　those　who　are　possessed　with　them　with　joy　and　assurance。
'Tis　for　the　most　ignorant　to　look　at　other　men　over　the　shoulder；　always
returning　from　the　combat　full　of　joy　and　triumph。　　And　moreover；　for　the
most　part；　this　arrogance　of　speech　and　gaiety　of　countenance　gives　them
the　better　of　it　in　the　opinion　of　the　audience；　which　is　commonly　weak
and　incapable　of　well　judging　and　discerning　the　real　advantage。
Obstinacy　of　opinion　and　heat　in　argument　are　the　surest　proofs　of　folly；
is　there　anything　so　assured；　resolute；　disdainful；　contemplative；
serious　and　grave　as　the　ass？

May　we　not　include　under　the　title　of　conference　and　communication　the
quick　and　sharp　repartees　which　mirth　and　familiarity　introduce　amongst
friends；　pleasantly　and　wittily　jesting　and　rallying　with　one　another？
'Tis　an　exercise　for　which　my　natural　gaiety　renders　me　fit　enough；　and
which；　if　it　be　not　so　tense　and　serious　as　the　other　I　spoke　of　but　now；
is；　as　Lycurgus　thought；　no　less　smart　and　ingenious；　nor　of　less
utility。　　For　my　part；　I　contribute　to　it　more　liberty　than　wit；　and　have
therein　more　of　luck　than　invention；　but　I　am　perfect　in　suffering；　for　I
endure　a　retaliation　that　is　not　only　tart；　but　indiscreet　to　boot；
without　being　moved　at　all；　and　whoever　attacks　me；　if　I　have　not　a　brisk
answer　immediately　ready；　I　do　not　study　to　pursue　the　point　with　a
tedious　and　impertinent　contest；　bordering　upon　obstinacy；　but　let　it
pass；　and　hanging　down　cheerfully　my　ears；　defer　my　revenge　to　another
and　better　time：　there　is　no　merchant　that　always　gains：　Most　men　change
their　countenance　and　their　voice　where　their　wits　fail；　and　by　an
unseasonable　anger；　instead　of　revenging　themselves；　accuse　at　once　their
own　folly　and　impatience。　　In　this　jollity；　we　sometimes　pinch　the　secret
strings　of　our　imperfections　which；　at　another　and　graver　time；　we　cannot
touch　without　offence；　and　so　profitably　give　one　another　a　hint　of　our
defects。　　There　are　other　jeux　de　main；＇practical　jokes＇　rude　and
indiscreet；　after　the　French　manner；　that　I　mortally　hate；　my　skin　is
very　tender　and　sensible：　I　have　in　my　time　seen　two　princes　of　the　blood
buried　upon　that　very　account。　　'Tis　unhandsome　to　fight　in　play。　　As　to
the　rest；　when　I　have　a　mind　to　judge　of　any　one；　I　ask　him　how　far　he　is
contented　with　himself；　to　what　degree　his　speaking　or　his　work　pleases
him。　　I　will　none　of　these　fine　excuses；　〃I　did　it　only　in　sport：

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　'Ablatum　mediis　opus　est　incudibus　istud。'

　　　　　　　　　　＇〃That　work　was　taken　from　the　anvil　half　finished。〃
　　　　　　　　　　Ovid；　Trist。；　i。　6；　29。＇

I　was　not　an　hour　about　it：　I　have　never　looked　at　it　since。〃　　Well；
then；　say　I；　lay　these　aside；　and　give　me　a　perfect　one；　such　as　you
would　be　measured　by。　　And　then；　what　do　you　think　is　the　best　thing　in
your　work？　is　it　this　part　or　that？　is　it　grace　or　the　matter；　the
invention；　the　judgment；　or　the　learning？　　For　I　find　that　men　are；
commonly；　as　wide　of　the　mark　in　judging　of　their　own　works；　as　of　those
of　others；　not　only　by　reason　of　the　kindness　they　have　for　them；　but　for
want　of　capacity　to　know　and　distinguish　them：　the　work；　by　its　own　force
and　fortune；　may　second　the　workman；　and　sometimes　outstrip　him；　beyond
his　invention　and　knowledge。　　For　my　part；　I　judge　of　the　value　of　other
men's　works　more　obscurely　than　of　my　own；　and　place　the　Essays；　now
high；　or　low；　with　great　doubt　and　inconstancy。　　There　are　several　books
that　are　useful　upon　the　account　of　their　subjects；　from　which　the　author
derives　no　praise；　and　good　books；　as　well　as　good　works；　that　shame　the
workman。　　I　may　write　the　manner　of　our　feasts；　and　the　fashion　of　our
clothes；　and　may　write　them　ill；　I　may　publish　the　edicts　of　my　time；　and
the　letters　of　princes　that　pass　from　hand　to　hand；　I　may　make　an
abridgment　of　a　good　book　（and　every　abridgment　of　a　good　book　is　a
foolish　abridgment）；　which　book　shall　come　to　be　lost；　and　so　on：
posterity　will　derive　a　singular　utility　from　such　compositions：　but　what
honour　shall　I　have　unless　by　great　good　fortune？　　Most　part　of　the
famous　books　are　of　this　condition。

When　I　read　Philip　de　Commines；　doubtless　a　very　good　author；　several
years　ago；　I　there　took　notice　of　this　for　no　vulgar　saying；　〃That　a　man
must　have　a　care　not　to　do　his　master　so　great　service；　that　at　last　he
will　not　know　how　to　give　him　his　just　reward〃；　but　I　ought　to　commend
the　invention；　not　him；　because　I　met　with　it　in　Tacitus；　not　long　since：

　　　　　　　　　〃Beneficia　ea　usque　lxta　sunt；　dum　videntur　exsolvi　posse；
　　　　　　　　　　ubi　multum　antevenere；　pro　gratis　odium　redditur；〃

　　　　　＇〃Benefits　are　so　far　acceptable　as　they　appear　to　be　capable　of
　　　　　recompense；　where　they　much　exceed　that　point；　hatred　is　returned
　　　　　instead　of　thanks。〃Tacitus；　Annal。；　iv。　18。＇

and　Seneca　vigorously　says：

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　〃Nam　qui　putat　esse　turpe　non　reddere；
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　non　vult　esse　cui　reddat：〃

　　　　　＇〃For　he　who　thinks　it　a　shame　not　to　requite；　does　not　wish　to
　　　　　have　the　man　live　to　whom　he　owes　return。〃Seneca；　Ep。；　81。＇

Q。　Cicero　says　with　less　directness。：

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　〃Qui　se　non　putat　satisfacere；
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　amicus　esse　nullo　modo　potest。〃

　　　　　＇〃Who　thinks　himself　behind　in　obligation；　can　by　no
　　　　　means　be　a　friend。〃Q。　Cicero；　De　Petitione　Consul；　c。　9。＇

The　subject；　according　to　what　it　is；　may　make　a　man　looked　upon　as
learned　and　of　good　memory；　but　to　judge　in　him　the　parts　that　are　most
his　own　and　the　most　worthy；　the　vigour　and　beauty　of　his　soul；　one　must
first　know　what　is　his　own　and　what　is　not；　and　in　that　which　is　not　his
own；　how　much　we　are　obliged　to　him　for　the　choice；　disposition；
ornament；　and　language　he　has　there　presented　us　with。　　What　if　he　has
borrowed　the　matter　and　spoiled　the　form；　as　it　often　falls　out？　　We；　who
are　little　read　in　books；　are　in　this　strait；　that　when　we　meet　with　a
high　fancy　in　some　new　poet；　or　some　strong　argument　in　a　preacher；　we
dare　not；　nevertheless；　commend　it　till　we　have　first　informed　ourselves；
through　some　learned　man；　if　it　be　the　writer's　wit　or　borrowed　from　some
other；　until　that　I　always　stand　upon　my　guard。

I　have　lately　been　reading　the　history　of　Tacitus　quite　through；　without
interrupting　it　with　anything　else　（which　but　seldom　happens　with　me；　it
being　twenty　years　since　I　have　kept　to　any　one　book　an　hour　together）；
and　I　did　it　at　the　instance　of　a　gentleman　for　whom　France　has　a　great
esteem；　as　well　for　his　own　particular　worth；　as　upon　the　account　of　a
constant　form　of　capacity　and　virtue　which　runs　through　a　grea