on the soul-第13部分

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it　that　the　objects　of　the　other　senses　also　may　affect　them？　Is　not　the　true　account　this；　that　all　bodies　are　capable　of　being　affected　by　smells　and　sounds；　but　that　some　on　being　acted　upon；　having　no　boundaries　of　their　own；　disintegrate；　as　in　the　instance　of　air；　which　does　become　odorous；　showing　that　some　effect　is　produced　on　it　by　what　is　odorous？　But　smelling　is　more　than　such　an　affection　by　what　is　odorous…what　more？　Is　not　the　answer　that；　while　the　air　owing　to　the　momentary　duration　of　the　action　upon　it　of　what　is　odorous　does　itself　become　perceptible　to　the　sense　of　smell；　smelling　is　an　observing　of　the　result　produced？

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　　THAT　there　is　no　sixth　sense　in　addition　to　the　five　enumerated…sight；　hearing；　smell；　taste；　touch…may　be　established　by　the　following　considerations：　　　If　we　have　actually　sensation　of　everything　of　which　touch　can　give　us　sensation　（for　all　the　qualities　of　the　tangible　qua　tangible　are　perceived　by　us　through　touch）；　and　if　absence　of　a　sense　necessarily　involves　absence　of　a　sense…organ；　and　if　（1）　all　objects　that　we　perceive　by　immediate　contact　with　them　are　perceptible　by　touch；　which　sense　we　actually　possess；　and　（2）　all　objects　that　we　perceive　through　media；　i。e。　without　immediate　contact；　are　perceptible　by　or　through　the　simple　elements；　e。g。　air　and　water　（and　this　is　so　arranged　that　（a）　if　more　than　one　kind　of　sensible　object　is　perceivable　through　a　single　medium；　the　possessor　of　a　sense…organ　homogeneous　with　that　medium　has　the　power　of　perceiving　both　kinds　of　objects；　for　example；　if　the　sense…organ　is　made　of　air；　and　air　is　a　medium　both　for　sound　and　for　colour；　and　that　（b）　if　more　than　one　medium　can　transmit　the　same　kind　of　sensible　objects；　as　e。g。　water　as　well　as　air　can　transmit　colour；　both　being　transparent；　then　the　possessor　of　either　alone　will　be　able　to　perceive　the　kind　of　objects　transmissible　through　both）；　and　if　of　the　simple　elements　two　only；　air　and　water；　go　to　form　sense…organs　（for　the　pupil　is　made　of　water；　the　organ　of　hearing　is　made　of　air；　and　the　organ　of　smell　of　one　or　other　of　these　two；　while　fire　is　found　either　in　none　or　in　all…warmth　being　an　essential　condition　of　all　sensibility…and　earth　either　in　none　or；　if　anywhere；　specially　mingled　with　the　components　of　the　organ　of　touch；　wherefore　it　would　remain　that　there　can　be　no　sense…organ　formed　of　anything　except　water　and　air）；　and　if　these　sense…organs　are　actually　found　in　certain　animals；…then　all　the　possible　senses　are　possessed　by　those　animals　that　are　not　imperfect　or　mutilated　（for　even　the　mole　is　observed　to　have　eyes　beneath　its　skin）；　so　that；　if　there　is　no　fifth　element　and　no　property　other　than　those　which　belong　to　the　four　elements　of　our　world；　no　sense　can　be　wanting　to　such　animals。　　　Further；　there　cannot　be　a　special　sense…organ　for　the　common　sensibles　either；　i。e。　the　objects　which　we　perceive　incidentally　through　this　or　that　special　sense；　e。g。　movement；　rest；　figure；　magnitude；　number；　unity；　for　all　these　we　perceive　by　movement；　e。g。　magnitude　by　movement；　and　therefore　also　figure　（for　figure　is　a　species　of　magnitude）；　what　is　at　rest　by　the　absence　of　movement：　number　is　perceived　by　the　negation　of　continuity；　and　by　the　special　sensibles；　for　each　sense　perceives　one　class　of　sensible　objects。　So　that　it　is　clearly　impossible　that　there　should　be　a　special　sense　for　any　one　of　the　common　sensibles；　e。g。　movement；　for；　if　that　were　so；　our　perception　of　it　would　be　exactly　parallel　to　our　present　perception　of　what　is　sweet　by　vision。　That　is　so　because　we　have　a　sense　for　each　of　the　two　qualities；　in　virtue　of　which　when　they　happen　to　meet　in　one　sensible　object　we　are　aware　of　both　contemporaneously。　If　it　were　not　like　this　our　perception　of　the　common　qualities　would　always　be　incidental；　i。e。　as　is　the　perception　of　Cleon's　son；　where　we　perceive　him　not　as　Cleon's　son　but　as　white；　and　the　white　thing　which　we　really　perceive　happens　to　be　Cleon's　son。　　　But　in　the　case　of　the　common　sensibles　there　is　already　in　us　a　general　sensibility　which　enables　us　to　perceive　them　directly；　there　is　therefore　no　special　sense　required　for　their　perception：　if　there　were；　our　perception　of　them　would　have　been　exactly　like　what　has　been　above　described。　　　The　senses　perceive　each　other's　special　objects　incidentally；　not　because　the　percipient　sense　is　this　or　that　special　sense；　but　because　all　form　a　unity：　this　incidental　perception　takes　place　whenever　sense　is　directed　at　one　and　the　same　moment　to　two　disparate　qualities　in　one　and　the　same　object；　e。g。　to　the　bitterness　and　the　yellowness　of　bile；　the　assertion　of　the　identity　of　both　cannot　be　the　act　of　either　of　the　senses；　hence　the　illusion　of　sense；　e。g。　the　belief　that　if　a　thing　is　yellow　it　is　bile。　　　It　might　be　asked　why　we　have　more　senses　than　one。　Is　it　to　prevent　a　failure　to　apprehend　the　common　sensibles；　e。g。　movement；　magnitude；　and　number；　which　go　along　with　the　special　sensibles？　Had　we　no　sense　but　sight；　and　that　sense　no　object　but　white；　they　would　have　tended　to　escape　our　notice　and　everything　would　have　merged　for　us　into　an　indistinguishable　identity　because　of　the　concomitance　of　colour　and　magnitude。　As　it　is；　the　fact　that　the　common　sensibles　are　given　in　the　objects　of　more　than　one　sense　reveals　their　distinction　from　each　and　all　of　the　special　sensibles。

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　　Since　it　is　through　sense　that　we　are　aware　that　we　are　seeing　or　hearing；　it　must　be　either　by　sight　that　we　are　aware　of　seeing；　or　by　some　sense　other　than　sight。　But　the　sense　that　gives　us　this　new　sensation　must　perceive　both　sight　and　its　object；　viz。　colour：　so　that　either　（1）　there　will　be　two　senses　both　percipient　of　the　same　sensible　object；　or　（2）　the　sense　must　be　percipient　of　itself。　Further；　even　if　the　sense　which　perceives　sight　were　different　from　sight；　we　must　either　fall　into　an　infinite　regress；　or　we　must　somewhere　assume　a　sense　which　is　aware　of　itself。　If　so；　we　ought　to　do　this　in　the　first　case。　　　This　presents　a　difficulty：　if　to　perceive　by　sight　is　just　to　see；　and　what　is　seen　is　colour　（or　the　coloured）；　then　if　we　are　to　see　that　which　sees；　that　which　sees　originally　must　be　coloured。　It　is　clear　therefore　that　'to　perceive　by　sight'　has　more　than　one　meaning；　for　even　when　we　are　not　seeing；　it　is　by　sight　that　we　discriminate　darkness　from　light；　though　not　in　the　same　way　as　we　distinguish　one　colour　from　another。　Further；　in　a　sense　even　that　which　sees　is　coloured；　for　in　each　case　the　sense…organ　is　capable　of　receiving　the　sensible　object　without　its　matter。　That　is　why　even　when　the　sensible　objects　are　gone　the　sensings　and　imaginings　continue　to　exist　in　the　sense…organs。　　　The　activity　of　the　sensible　object　and　that　of　the　percipient　sense　is　one　and　the　same　activity；　and　yet　the　distinction　between　their　being　remains。　Take　as　illustration　actual　sound　and　actual　hearing：　a　man　may　have　hearing　and　yet　not　be　hearing；　and　that　which　has　a　sound　is　not　always　sounding。　But　when　that　which　can　hear　is　actively　hearing　and　which　can　sound　is　sounding；　then　the　actual　hearing　and　the　actual　sound　are　merged　in　one　（these　one　might　call　respectively　hearkening　and　sounding）。　　　If　it　is　true　that　the　movement；　both　the　acting　and　the　being　acted　upon；　is　to　be　found　in　that　which　is　acted　upon；　both　the　sound　and　the　hearing　so　far　as　it　is　actual　must　be　found　in　that　which　has　the　faculty　of　hearing；　for　it　is　in　the　passive　factor　that　the　actuality　of　the　active　or　motive　factor　is　realized；　that　is　why　that　which　causes　movement　may　be　at　rest。　Now　the　actuality　of　that　which　can　sound　is　just　sound　or　sounding；　and　the　actuality　of　that　which　can　hear　is　hearing　or　hearkening；　'sound'　and　'hearing'　are　both　ambiguous。　The　same　account　applies　to　the　other　senses　and　their　objects。　For　as　the…acting…and…being…acted…upon　is　to　be　found　in　the　passive；　not　in　the　active　factor；　so　also　the　actuality　of　the　sensible　object　and　that　of　the　sensitive　subject　are　both　realized　in　the　latter。　But　while　in　some　cases　each　aspect　of　the　total　actuality　has　a　distinct　name；　e。g。　sounding　and　hearkening；　in　some　one　or　other　is　nameless；　e。g。　the　actuality　of　sight　is　called　seeing；　but　the　actuality　of　colour　has　no　name：　the　actuality　of　the　faculty　of　taste　is　called　tasting；　but　the　actuality　of　flavour　has　no　name。　Since　the　actualities　of　the　sensible　object　and　of　the　sensitive　faculty　are　one　actuality　in　spite　of　the　difference　between　their　modes　of　being；　actual　hearing　and　actual　sounding　appear　and　disappear　from　existence　at　one　and　the　same　moment；　and　so　actual　savour　and　actual　tasting；　&c。；　while　as　potentialities　one　of　them　may　exist　without　the　other。　The　earlier　students　of　nature　were　mistaken　in　their　view　that　without　sight　there　was　no　white　or　black；　without　taste　no　savour。　This　statement　of　theirs　is　partly　true；　partly　false：　'sense'　and　'the　sensible　object'　are　ambiguous　terms；　i。e。　may　denote　either　potentialities　or　actualities：　the　statement　is　true　of　the　latter；　false　of　the　former。　This　ambiguity　they　wholly　failed　to　notice。　　　If　voice　always　implies　a　concord；　and　if　the　voice　and　the　hearing　of　it　are　in　one　sense　one　and　the　same；　and　if　concord　always　implies　a　ratio；　hearing　as　well　as　what　is　heard　must　be　a　ratio。　That　is　why　the　excess　of　either　the　sharp　or　the　flat　destroys　the　hearing。　（So　also　in　the　case　of　savours　excess　destroys　the　sense　of　taste；　and　in　the　case　of　colours　excessive　brightness　or　darkness　destroys　the　sight；　and　in　the　case　of　smell　excess　of　strength　whether　in　the　direction　of　sweetness　or　bitterness　is　destructive。）　This　shows　that　the　sense　is　a　ratio。　　　That　is　also　why　the　objects　of　sense　are　（1）　pleasant　when　the　sensible　extremes　such　as　acid　or　sweet　or　salt　being　pure　and　unmixed　are　brought　into　the　proper　ratio；　then　they　are　pleasant：　and　in　general　what　is　blended　is　more　pleasant　than　the　sharp　or　the　flat　alone；　or；　to　touch；　that　which　is　capable　of　being　either　warmed　or　chilled：　the　sense　and　the　ratio　are　identical：　while　（2）　in　excess　the　sensible　extremes