on the soul-第14部分

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　warmed　or　chilled：　the　sense　and　the　ratio　are　identical：　while　（2）　in　excess　the　sensible　extremes　are　painful　or　destructive。　　　Each　sense　then　is　relative　to　its　particular　group　of　sensible　qualities：　it　is　found　in　a　sense…organ　as　such　and　discriminates　the　differences　which　exist　within　that　group；　e。g。　sight　discriminates　white　and　black；　taste　sweet　and　bitter；　and　so　in　all　cases。　Since　we　also　discriminate　white　from　sweet；　and　indeed　each　sensible　quality　from　every　other；　with　what　do　we　perceive　that　they　are　different？　It　must　be　by　sense；　for　what　is　before　us　is　sensible　objects。　（Hence　it　is　also　obvious　that　the　flesh　cannot　be　the　ultimate　sense…organ：　if　it　were；　the　discriminating　power　could　not　do　its　work　without　immediate　contact　with　the　object。）　　　Therefore　（1）　discrimination　between　white　and　sweet　cannot　be　effected　by　two　agencies　which　remain　separate；　both　the　qualities　discriminated　must　be　present　to　something　that　is　one　and　single。　On　any　other　supposition　even　if　I　perceived　sweet　and　you　perceived　white；　the　difference　between　them　would　be　apparent。　What　says　that　two　things　are　different　must　be　one；　for　sweet　is　different　from　white。　Therefore　what　asserts　this　difference　must　be　self…identical；　and　as　what　asserts；　so　also　what　thinks　or　perceives。　That　it　is　not　possible　by　means　of　two　agencies　which　remain　separate　to　discriminate　two　objects　which　are　separate；　is　therefore　obvious；　and　that　（it　is　not　possible　to　do　this　in　separate　movements　of　time　may　be　seen'　if　we　look　at　it　as　follows。　For　as　what　asserts　the　difference　between　the　good　and　the　bad　is　one　and　the　same；　so　also　the　time　at　which　it　asserts　the　one　to　be　different　and　the　other　to　be　different　is　not　accidental　to　the　assertion　（as　it　is　for　instance　when　I　now　assert　a　difference　but　do　not　assert　that　there　is　now　a　difference）；　it　asserts　thus…both　now　and　that　the　objects　are　different　now；　the　objects　therefore　must　be　present　at　one　and　the　same　moment。　Both　the　discriminating　power　and　the　time　of　its　exercise　must　be　one　and　undivided。　　　But；　it　may　be　objected；　it　is　impossible　that　what　is　self…identical　should　be　moved　at　me　and　the　same　time　with　contrary　movements　in　so　far　as　it　is　undivided；　and　in　an　undivided　moment　of　time。　For　if　what　is　sweet　be　the　quality　perceived；　it　moves　the　sense　or　thought　in　this　determinate　way；　while　what　is　bitter　moves　it　in　a　contrary　way；　and　what　is　white　in　a　different　way。　Is　it　the　case　then　that　what　discriminates；　though　both　numerically　one　and　indivisible；　is　at　the　same　time　divided　in　its　being？　In　one　sense；　it　is　what　is　divided　that　perceives　two　separate　objects　at　once；　but　in　another　sense　it　does　so　qua　undivided；　for　it　is　divisible　in　its　being　but　spatially　and　numerically　undivided。　is　not　this　impossible？　For　while　it　is　true　that　what　is　self…identical　and　undivided　may　be　both　contraries　at　once　potentially；　it　cannot　be　self…identical　in　its　being…it　must　lose　its　unity　by　being　put　into　activity。　It　is　not　possible　to　be　at　once　white　and　black；　and　therefore　it　must　also　be　impossible　for　a　thing　to　be　affected　at　one　and　the　same　moment　by　the　forms　of　both；　assuming　it　to　be　the　case　that　sensation　and　thinking　are　properly　so　described。　　　The　answer　is　that　just　as　what　is　called　a　'point'　is；　as　being　at　once　one　and　two；　properly　said　to　be　divisible；　so　here；　that　which　discriminates　is　qua　undivided　one；　and　active　in　a　single　moment　of　time；　while　so　far　forth　as　it　is　divisible　it　twice　over　uses　the　same　dot　at　one　and　the　same　time。　So　far　forth　then　as　it　takes　the　limit　as　two'　it　discriminates　two　separate　objects　with　what　in　a　sense　is　divided：　while　so　far　as　it　takes　it　as　one；　it　does　so　with　what　is　one　and　occupies　in　its　activity　a　single　moment　of　time。　　　About　the　principle　in　virtue　of　which　we　say　that　animals　are　percipient；　let　this　discussion　suffice。

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　　There　are　two　distinctive　peculiarities　by　reference　to　which　we　characterize　the　soul　（1）　local　movement　and　（2）　thinking；　discriminating；　and　perceiving。　Thinking　both　speculative　and　practical　is　regarded　as　akin　to　a　form　of　perceiving；　for　in　the　one　as　well　as　the　other　the　soul　discriminates　and　is　cognizant　of　something　which　is。　Indeed　the　ancients　go　so　far　as　to　identify　thinking　and　perceiving；　e。g。　Empedocles　says　'For　'tis　in　respect　of　what　is　present　that　man's　wit　is　increased'；　and　again　'Whence　it　befalls　them　from　time　to　time　to　think　diverse　thoughts'；　and　Homer's　phrase　'For　suchlike　is　man's　mind'　means　the　same。　They　all　look　upon　thinking　as　a　bodily　process　like　perceiving；　and　hold　that　like　is　known　as　well　as　perceived　by　like；　as　I　explained　at　the　beginning　of　our　discussion。　Yet　they　ought　at　the　same　time　to　have　accounted　for　error　also；　for　it　is　more　intimately　connected　with　animal　existence　and　the　soul　continues　longer　in　the　state　of　error　than　in　that　of　truth。　They　cannot　escape　the　dilemma：　either　（1）　whatever　seems　is　true　（and　there　are　some　who　accept　this）　or　（2）　error　is　contact　with　the　unlike；　for　that　is　the　opposite　of　the　knowing　of　like　by　like。　　　But　it　is　a　received　principle　that　error　as　well　as　knowledge　in　respect　to　contraries　is　one　and　the　same。　　　That　perceiving　and　practical　thinking　are　not　identical　is　therefore　obvious；　for　the　former　is　universal　in　the　animal　world；　the　latter　is　found　in　only　a　small　division　of　it。　Further；　speculative　thinking　is　also　distinct　from　perceiving…I　mean　that　in　which　we　find　rightness　and　wrongness…rightness　in　prudence；　knowledge；　true　opinion；　wrongness　in　their　opposites；　for　perception　of　the　special　objects　of　sense　is　always　free　from　error；　and　is　found　in　all　animals；　while　it　is　possible　to　think　falsely　as　well　as　truly；　and　thought　is　found　only　where　there　is　discourse　of　reason　as　well　as　sensibility。　For　imagination　is　different　from　either　perceiving　or　discursive　thinking；　though　it　is　not　found　without　sensation；　or　judgement　without　it。　That　this　activity　is　not　the　same　kind　of　thinking　as　judgement　is　obvious。　For　imagining　lies　within　our　own　power　whenever　we　wish　（e。g。　we　can　call　up　a　picture；　as　in　the　practice　of　mnemonics　by　the　use　of　mental　images）；　but　in　forming　opinions　we　are　not　free：　we　cannot　escape　the　alternative　of　falsehood　or　truth。　Further；　when　we　think　something　to　be　fearful　or　threatening；　emotion　is　immediately　produced；　and　so　too　with　what　is　encouraging；　but　when　we　merely　imagine　we　remain　as　unaffected　as　persons　who　are　looking　at　a　painting　of　some　dreadful　or　encouraging　scene。　Again　within　the　field　of　judgement　itself　we　find　varieties；　knowledge；　opinion；　prudence；　and　their　opposites；　of　the　differences　between　these　I　must　speak　elsewhere。　　　Thinking　is　different　from　perceiving　and　is　held　to　be　in　part　imagination；　in　part　judgement：　we　must　therefore　first　mark　off　the　sphere　of　imagination　and　then　speak　of　judgement。　If　then　imagination　is　that　in　virtue　of　which　an　image　arises　for　us；　excluding　metaphorical　uses　of　the　term；　is　it　a　single　faculty　or　disposition　relative　to　images；　in　virtue　of　which　we　discriminate　and　are　either　in　error　or　not？　The　faculties　in　virtue　of　which　we　do　this　are　sense；　opinion；　science；　intelligence。　　　That　imagination　is　not　sense　is　clear　from　the　following　considerations：　Sense　is　either　a　faculty　or　an　activity；　e。g。　sight　or　seeing：　imagination　takes　place　in　the　absence　of　both；　as　e。g。　in　dreams。　（Again；　sense　is　always　present；　imagination　not。　If　actual　imagination　and　actual　sensation　were　the　same；　imagination　would　be　found　in　all　the　brutes：　this　is　held　not　to　be　the　case；　e。g。　it　is　not　found　in　ants　or　bees　or　grubs。　（Again；　sensations　are　always　true；　imaginations　are　for　the　most　part　false。　（Once　more；　even　in　ordinary　speech；　we　do　not；　when　sense　functions　precisely　with　regard　to　its　object；　say　that　we　imagine　it　to　be　a　man；　but　rather　when　there　is　some　failure　of　accuracy　in　its　exercise。　And　as　we　were　saying　before；　visions　appear　to　us　even　when　our　eyes　are　shut。　Neither　is　imagination　any　of　the　things　that　are　never　in　error：　e。g。　knowledge　or　intelligence；　for　imagination　may　be　false。　　　It　remains　therefore　to　see　if　it　is　opinion；　for　opinion　may　be　either　true　or　false。　　　But　opinion　involves　belief　（for　without　belief　in　what　we　opine　we　cannot　have　an　opinion）；　and　in　the　brutes　though　we　often　find　imagination　we　never　find　belief。　Further；　every　opinion　is　accompanied　by　belief；　belief　by　conviction；　and　conviction　by　discourse　of　reason：　while　there　are　some　of　the　brutes　in　which　we　find　imagination；　without　discourse　of　reason。　It　is　clear　then　that　imagination　cannot；　again；　be　（1）　opinion　plus　sensation；　or　（2）　opinion　mediated　by　sensation；　or　（3）　a　blend　of　opinion　and　sensation；　this　is　impossible　both　for　these　reasons　and　because　the　content　of　the　supposed　opinion　cannot　be　different　from　that　of　the　sensation　（I　mean　that　imagination　must　be　the　blending　of　the　perception　of　white　with　the　opinion　that　it　is　white：　it　could　scarcely　be　a　blend　of　the　opinion　that　it　is　good　with　the　perception　that　it　is　white）：　to　imagine　is　therefore　（on　this　view）　identical　with　the　thinking　of　exactly　the　same　as　what　one　in　the　strictest　sense　perceives。　But　what　we　imagine　is　sometimes　false　though　our　contemporaneous　judgement　about　it　is　true；　e。g。　we　imagine　the　sun　to　be　a　foot　in　diameter　though　we　are　convinced　that　it　is　larger　than　the　inhabited　part　of　the　earth；　and　the　following　dilemma　presents　itself。　Either　（a　while　the　fact　has　not　changed　and　the　（observer　has　neither　forgotten　nor　lost　belief　in　the　true　opinion　which　he　had；　that　opinion　has　disappeared；　or　（b）　if　he　retains　it　then　his　opinion　is　at　once　true　and　false。　A　true　opinion；　however；　becomes　false　only　when　the　fact　alters　without　being　noticed。　　　Imagination　is　therefore　neither　any　one　of　the　states　enumerated；　nor　compounded　out　of　them。　　　But　since　when　one　thing　has　been　set　in　motion　another　thing　may　be　moved　by　it；　and　imagination　is　held　to　be　a　movement　and　to　be　impossible　without　sensation；　i。e。　to　occur　in　beings　that　are　percipient　and　to　have　for　its　content　what　can　be　perceived；　and　since　mov