on the soul-第15部分

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occur　in　beings　that　are　percipient　and　to　have　for　its　content　what　can　be　perceived；　and　since　movement　may　be　produced　by　actual　sensation　and　that　movement　is　necessarily　similar　in　character　to　the　sensation　itself；　this　movement　must　be　（1）　necessarily　（a）　incapable　of　existing　apart　from　sensation；　（b）　incapable　of　existing　except　when　we　perceive；　（such　that　in　virtue　of　its　possession　that　in　which　it　is　found　may　present　various　phenomena　both　active　and　passive；　and　（such　that　it　may　be　either　true　or　false。　　　The　reason　of　the　last　characteristic　is　as　follows。　Perception　（1）　of　the　special　objects　of　sense　is　never　in　error　or　admits　the　least　possible　amount　of　falsehood。　（2）　That　of　the　concomitance　of　the　objects　concomitant　with　the　sensible　qualities　comes　next：　in　this　case　certainly　we　may　be　deceived；　for　while　the　perception　that　there　is　white　before　us　cannot　be　false；　the　perception　that　what　is　white　is　this　or　that　may　be　false。　（3）　Third　comes　the　perception　of　the　universal　attributes　which　accompany　the　concomitant　objects　to　which　the　special　sensibles　attach　（I　mean　e。g。　of　movement　and　magnitude）；　it　is　in　respect　of　these　that　the　greatest　amount　of　sense…illusion　is　possible。　　　The　motion　which　is　due　to　the　activity　of　sense　in　these　three　modes　of　its　exercise　will　differ　from　the　activity　of　sense；　（1）　the　first　kind　of　derived　motion　is　free　from　error　while　the　sensation　is　present；　（2）　and　（3）　the　others　may　be　erroneous　whether　it　is　present　or　absent；　especially　when　the　object　of　perception　is　far　off。　If　then　imagination　presents　no　other　features　than　those　enumerated　and　is　what　we　have　described；　then　imagination　must　be　a　movement　resulting　from　an　actual　exercise　of　a　power　of　sense。　　　As　sight　is　the　most　highly　developed　sense；　the　name　Phantasia　（imagination）　has　been　formed　from　Phaos　（light）　because　it　is　not　possible　to　see　without　light。　　　And　because　imaginations　remain　in　the　organs　of　sense　and　resemble　sensations；　animals　in　their　actions　are　largely　guided　by　them；　some　（i。e。　the　brutes）　because　of　the　non…existence　in　them　of　mind；　others　（i。e。　men）　because　of　the　temporary　eclipse　in　them　of　mind　by　feeling　or　disease　or　sleep。　　　About　imagination；　what　it　is　and　why　it　exists；　let　so　much　suffice。

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　　Turning　now　to　the　part　of　the　soul　with　which　the　soul　knows　and　thinks　（whether　this　is　separable　from　the　others　in　definition　only；　or　spatially　as　well）　we　have　to　inquire　（1）　what　differentiates　this　part；　and　（2）　how　thinking　can　take　place。　　　If　thinking　is　like　perceiving；　it　must　be　either　a　process　in　which　the　soul　is　acted　upon　by　what　is　capable　of　being　thought；　or　a　process　different　from　but　analogous　to　that。　The　thinking　part　of　the　soul　must　therefore　be；　while　impassible；　capable　of　receiving　the　form　of　an　object；　that　is；　must　be　potentially　identical　in　character　with　its　object　without　being　the　object。　Mind　must　be　related　to　what　is　thinkable；　as　sense　is　to　what　is　sensible。　　　Therefore；　since　everything　is　a　possible　object　of　thought；　mind　in　order；　as　Anaxagoras　says；　to　dominate；　that　is；　to　know；　must　be　pure　from　all　admixture；　for　the　co…presence　of　what　is　alien　to　its　nature　is　a　hindrance　and　a　block：　it　follows　that　it　too；　like　the　sensitive　part；　can　have　no　nature　of　its　own；　other　than　that　of　having　a　certain　capacity。　Thus　that　in　the　soul　which　is　called　mind　（by　mind　I　mean　that　whereby　the　soul　thinks　and　judges）　is；　before　it　thinks；　not　actually　any　real　thing。　For　this　reason　it　cannot　reasonably　be　regarded　as　blended　with　the　body：　if　so；　it　would　acquire　some　quality；　e。g。　warmth　or　cold；　or　even　have　an　organ　like　the　sensitive　faculty：　as　it　is；　it　has　none。　It　was　a　good　idea　to　call　the　soul　'the　place　of　forms'；　though　（1）　this　description　holds　only　of　the　intellective　soul；　and　（2）　even　this　is　the　forms　only　potentially；　not　actually。　　　Observation　of　the　sense…organs　and　their　employment　reveals　a　distinction　between　the　impassibility　of　the　sensitive　and　that　of　the　intellective　faculty。　After　strong　stimulation　of　a　sense　we　are　less　able　to　exercise　it　than　before；　as　e。g。　in　the　case　of　a　loud　sound　we　cannot　hear　easily　immediately　after；　or　in　the　case　of　a　bright　colour　or　a　powerful　odour　we　cannot　see　or　smell；　but　in　the　case　of　mind　thought　about　an　object　that　is　highly　intelligible　renders　it　more　and　not　less　able　afterwards　to　think　objects　that　are　less　intelligible：　the　reason　is　that　while　the　faculty　of　sensation　is　dependent　upon　the　body；　mind　is　separable　from　it。　　　Once　the　mind　has　become　each　set　of　its　possible　objects；　as　a　man　of　science　has；　when　this　phrase　is　used　of　one　who　is　actually　a　man　of　science　（this　happens　when　he　is　now　able　to　exercise　the　power　on　his　own　initiative）；　its　condition　is　still　one　of　potentiality；　but　in　a　different　sense　from　the　potentiality　which　preceded　the　acquisition　of　knowledge　by　learning　or　discovery：　the　mind　too　is　then　able　to　think　itself。　　　Since　we　can　distinguish　between　a　spatial　magnitude　and　what　it　is　to　be　such；　and　between　water　and　what　it　is　to　be　water；　and　so　in　many　other　cases　（though　not　in　all；　for　in　certain　cases　the　thing　and　its　form　are　identical）；　flesh　and　what　it　is　to　be　flesh　are　discriminated　either　by　different　faculties；　or　by　the　same　faculty　in　two　different　states：　for　flesh　necessarily　involves　matter　and　is　like　what　is　snub…nosed；　a　this　in　a　this。　Now　it　is　by　means　of　the　sensitive　faculty　that　we　discriminate　the　hot　and　the　cold；　i。e。　the　factors　which　combined　in　a　certain　ratio　constitute　flesh：　the　essential　character　of　flesh　is　apprehended　by　something　different　either　wholly　separate　from　the　sensitive　faculty　or　related　to　it　as　a　bent　line　to　the　same　line　when　it　has　been　straightened　out。　　　Again　in　the　case　of　abstract　objects　what　is　straight　is　analogous　to　what　is　snub…nosed；　for　it　necessarily　implies　a　continuum　as　its　matter：　its　constitutive　essence　is　different；　if　we　may　distinguish　between　straightness　and　what　is　straight：　let　us　take　it　to　be　two…ness。　It　must　be　apprehended；　therefore；　by　a　different　power　or　by　the　same　power　in　a　different　state。　To　sum　up；　in　so　far　as　the　realities　it　knows　are　capable　of　being　separated　from　their　matter；　so　it　is　also　with　the　powers　of　mind。　　　The　problem　might　be　suggested：　if　thinking　is　a　passive　affection；　then　if　mind　is　simple　and　impassible　and　has　nothing　in　common　with　anything　else；　as　Anaxagoras　says；　how　can　it　come　to　think　at　all？　For　interaction　between　two　factors　is　held　to　require　a　precedent　community　of　nature　between　the　factors。　Again　it　might　be　asked；　is　mind　a　possible　object　of　thought　to　itself？　For　if　mind　is　thinkable　per　se　and　what　is　thinkable　is　in　kind　one　and　the　same；　then　either　（a）　mind　will　belong　to　everything；　or　（b）　mind　will　contain　some　element　common　to　it　with　all　other　realities　which　makes　them　all　thinkable。　　　（1）　Have　not　we　already　disposed　of　the　difficulty　about　interaction　involving　a　common　element；　when　we　said　that　mind　is　in　a　sense　potentially　whatever　is　thinkable；　though　actually　it　is　nothing　until　it　has　thought？　What　it　thinks　must　be　in　it　just　as　characters　may　be　said　to　be　on　a　writingtablet　on　which　as　yet　nothing　actually　stands　written：　this　is　exactly　what　happens　with　mind。　　　（Mind　is　itself　thinkable　in　exactly　the　same　way　as　its　objects　are。　For　（a）　in　the　case　of　objects　which　involve　no　matter；　what　thinks　and　what　is　thought　are　identical；　for　speculative　knowledge　and　its　object　are　identical。　（Why　mind　is　not　always　thinking　we　must　consider　later。）　（b）　In　the　case　of　those　which　contain　matter　each　of　the　objects　of　thought　is　only　potentially　present。　It　follows　that　while　they　will　not　have　mind　in　them　（for　mind　is　a　potentiality　of　them　only　in　so　far　as　they　are　capable　of　being　disengaged　from　matter）　mind　may　yet　be　thinkable。　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　5

　　Since　in　every　class　of　things；　as　in　nature　as　a　whole；　we　find　two　factors　involved；　（1）　a　matter　which　is　potentially　all　the　particulars　included　in　the　class；　（2）　a　cause　which　is　productive　in　the　sense　that　it　makes　them　all　（the　latter　standing　to　the　former；　as　e。g。　an　art　to　its　material）；　these　distinct　elements　must　likewise　be　found　within　the　soul。　　　And　in　fact　mind　as　we　have　described　it　is　what　it　is　what　it　is　by　virtue　of　becoming　all　things；　while　there　is　another　which　is　what　it　is　by　virtue　of　making　all　things：　this　is　a　sort　of　positive　state　like　light；　for　in　a　sense　light　makes　potential　colours　into　actual　colours。　　　Mind　in　this　sense　of　it　is　separable；　impassible；　unmixed；　since　it　is　in　its　essential　nature　activity　（for　always　the　active　is　superior　to　the　passive　factor；　the　originating　force　to　the　matter　which　it　forms）。　　　Actual　knowledge　is　identical　with　its　object：　in　the　individual；　potential　knowledge　is　in　time　prior　to　actual　knowledge；　but　in　the　universe　as　a　whole　it　is　not　prior　even　in　time。　Mind　is　not　at　one　time　knowing　and　at　another　not。　When　mind　is　set　free　from　its　present　conditions　it　appears　as　just　what　it　is　and　nothing　more：　this　alone　is　immortal　and　eternal　（we　do　not；　however；　remember　its　former　activity　because；　while　mind　in　this　sense　is　impassible；　mind　as　passive　is　destructible）；　and　without　it　nothing　thinks。

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　　The　thinking　then　of　the　simple　objects　of　thought　is　found　in　those　cases　where　falsehood　is　impossible：　where　the　alternative　of　true　or　false　applies；　there　we　always　find　a　putting　together　of　objects　of　thought　in　a　quasi…unity。　As　Empedocles　said　that　'where　heads　of　many　a　creature　sprouted　without　necks'　they　afterwards　by　Love's　power　were　combined；　so　here　too　objects　of　thought　which　were　given　separate　are　combined；　e。g。　'incommensurate'　and　'diagonal'：　if　the　combination　be　of　objects　past　or　future　the　combination　of　thought　includes　in　its　content　the　date。　For　falsehood　always　involves　a　synthesis；　for　even　if　you　assert　that　what　is　white　is　not　white　you　have　included　not　white　in　a　synthesis。　It　is　possible　also　to　call　all　these　cases　division　as　well　as　combination。　However　that　may　be；　there　is　not　only　the　true　o