on the soul-第4部分

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　　There　is　yet　another　theory　about　soul；　which　has　commended　itself　to　many　as　no　less　probable　than　any　of　those　we　have　hitherto　mentioned；　and　has　rendered　public　account　of　itself　in　the　court　of　popular　discussion。　Its　supporters　say　that　the　soul　is　a　kind　of　harmony；　for　（a）　harmony　is　a　blend　or　composition　of　contraries；　and　（b）　the　body　is　compounded　out　of　contraries。　Harmony；　however；　is　a　certain　proportion　or　composition　of　the　constituents　blended；　and　soul　can　be　neither　the　one　nor　the　other　of　these。　Further；　the　power　of　originating　movement　cannot　belong　to　a　harmony；　while　almost　all　concur　in　regarding　this　as　a　principal　attribute　of　soul。　It　is　more　appropriate　to　call　health　（or　generally　one　of　the　good　states　of　the　body）　a　harmony　than　to　predicate　it　of　the　soul。　The　absurdity　becomes　most　apparent　when　we　try　to　attribute　the　active　and　passive　affections　of　the　soul　to　a　harmony；　the　necessary　readjustment　of　their　conceptions　is　difficult。　Further；　in　using　the　word　'harmony'　we　have　one　or　other　of　two　cases　in　our　mind；　the　most　proper　sense　is　in　relation　to　spatial　magnitudes　which　have　motion　and　position；　where　harmony　means　the　disposition　and　cohesion　of　their　parts　in　such　a　manner　as　to　prevent　the　introduction　into　the　whole　of　anything　homogeneous　with　it；　and　the　secondary　sense；　derived　from　the　former；　is　that　in　which　it　means　the　ratio　between　the　constituents　so　blended；　in　neither　of　these　senses　is　it　plausible　to　predicate　it　of　soul。　That　soul　is　a　harmony　in　the　sense　of　the　mode　of　composition　of　the　parts　of　the　body　is　a　view　easily　refutable；　for　there　are　many　composite　parts　and　those　variously　compounded；　of　what　bodily　part　is　mind　or　the　sensitive　or　the　appetitive　faculty　the　mode　of　composition？　And　what　is　the　mode　of　composition　which　constitutes　each　of　them？　It　is　equally　absurd　to　identify　the　soul　with　the　ratio　of　the　mixture；　for　the　mixture　which　makes　flesh　has　a　different　ratio　between　the　elements　from　that　which　makes　bone。　The　consequence　of　this　view　will　therefore　be　that　distributed　throughout　the　whole　body　there　will　be　many　souls；　since　every　one　of　the　bodily　parts　is　a　different　mixture　of　the　elements；　and　the　ratio　of　mixture　is　in　each　case　a　harmony；　i。e。　a　soul。　　　From　Empedocles　at　any　rate　we　might　demand　an　answer　to　the　following　question　for　he　says　that　each　of　the　parts　of　the　body　is　what　it　is　in　virtue　of　a　ratio　between　the　elements：　is　the　soul　identical　with　this　ratio；　or　is　it　not　rather　something　over　and　above　this　which　is　formed　in　the　parts？　Is　love　the　cause　of　any　and　every　mixture；　or　only　of　those　that　are　in　the　right　ratio？　Is　love　this　ratio　itself；　or　is　love　something　over　and　above　this？　Such　are　the　problems　raised　by　this　account。　But；　on　the　other　hand；　if　the　soul　is　different　from　the　mixture；　why　does　it　disappear　at　one　and　the　same　moment　with　that　relation　between　the　elements　which　constitutes　flesh　or　the　other　parts　of　the　animal　body？　Further；　if　the　soul　is　not　identical　with　the　ratio　of　mixture；　and　it　is　consequently　not　the　case　that　each　of　the　parts　has　a　soul；　what　is　that　which　perishes　when　the　soul　quits　the　body？　　　That　the　soul　cannot　either　be　a　harmony；　or　be　moved　in　a　circle；　is　clear　from　what　we　have　said。　Yet　that　it　can　be　moved　incidentally　is；　as　we　said　above；　possible；　and　even　that　in　a　sense　it　can　move　itself；　i。e。　in　the　sense　that　the　vehicle　in　which　it　is　can　be　moved；　and　moved　by　it；　in　no　other　sense　can　the　soul　be　moved　in　space。　　　More　legitimate　doubts　might　remain　as　to　its　movement　in　view　of　the　following　facts。　We　speak　of　the　soul　as　being　pained　or　pleased；　being　bold　or　fearful；　being　angry；　perceiving；　thinking。　All　these　are　regarded　as　modes　of　movement；　and　hence　it　might　be　inferred　that　the　soul　is　moved。　This；　however；　does　not　necessarily　follow。　We　may　admit　to　the　full　that　being　pained　or　pleased；　or　thinking；　are　movements　（each　of　them　a　'being　moved'）；　and　that　the　movement　is　originated　by　the　soul。　For　example　we　may　regard　anger　or　fear　as　such　and　such　movements　of　the　heart；　and　thinking　as　such　and　such　another　movement　of　that　organ；　or　of　some　other；　these　modifications　may　arise　either　from　changes　of　place　in　certain　parts　or　from　qualitative　alterations　（the　special　nature　of　the　parts　and　the　special　modes　of　their　changes　being　for　our　present　purpose　irrelevant）。　Yet　to　say　that　it　is　the　soul　which　is　angry　is　as　inexact　as　it　would　be　to　say　that　it　is　the　soul　that　weaves　webs　or　builds　houses。　It　is　doubtless　better　to　avoid　saying　that　the　soul　pities　or　learns　or　thinks　and　rather　to　say　that　it　is　the　man　who　does　this　with　his　soul。　What　we　mean　is　not　that　the　movement　is　in　the　soul；　but　that　sometimes　it　terminates　in　the　soul　and　sometimes　starts　from　it；　sensation　e。g。　coming　from　without　inwards；　and　reminiscence　starting　from　the　soul　and　terminating　with　the　movements；　actual　or　residual；　in　the　sense　organs。　　　The　case　of　mind　is　different；　it　seems　to　be　an　independent　substance　implanted　within　the　soul　and　to　be　incapable　of　being　destroyed。　If　it　could　be　destroyed　at　all；　it　would　be　under　the　blunting　influence　of　old　age。　What　really　happens　in　respect　of　mind　in　old　age　is；　however；　exactly　parallel　to　what　happens　in　the　case　of　the　sense　organs；　if　the　old　man　could　recover　the　proper　kind　of　eye；　he　would　see　just　as　well　as　the　young　man。　The　incapacity　of　old　age　is　due　to　an　affection　not　of　the　soul　but　of　its　vehicle；　as　occurs　in　drunkenness　or　disease。　Thus　it　is　that　in　old　age　the　activity　of　mind　or　intellectual　apprehension　declines　only　through　the　decay　of　some　other　inward　part；　mind　itself　is　impassible。　Thinking；　loving；　and　hating　are　affections　not　of　mind；　but　of　that　which　has　mind；　so　far　as　it　has　it。　That　is　why；　when　this　vehicle　decays；　memory　and　love　cease；　they　were　activities　not　of　mind；　but　of　the　composite　which　has　perished；　mind　is；　no　doubt；　something　more　divine　and　impassible。　That　the　soul　cannot　be　moved　is　therefore　clear　from　what　we　have　said；　and　if　it　cannot　be　moved　at　all；　manifestly　it　cannot　be　moved　by　itself。　　　Of　all　the　opinions　we　have　enumerated；　by　far　the　most　unreasonable　is　that　which　declares　the　soul　to　be　a　self…moving　number；　it　involves　in　the　first　place　all　the　impossibilities　which　follow　from　regarding　the　soul　as　moved；　and　in　the　second　special　absurdities　which　follow　from　calling　it　a　number。　How　we　to　imagine　a　unit　being　moved？　By　what　agency？　What　sort　of　movement　can　be　attributed　to　what　is　without　parts　or　internal　differences？　If　the　unit　is　both　originative　of　movement　and　itself　capable　of　being　moved；　it　must　contain　difference。　　　Further；　since　they　say　a　moving　line　generates　a　surface　and　a　moving　point　a　line；　the　movements　of　the　psychic　units　must　be　lines　（for　a　point　is　a　unit　having　position；　and　the　number　of　the　soul　is；　of　course；　somewhere　and　has　position）。　　　Again；　if　from　a　number　a　number　or　a　unit　is　subtracted；　the　remainder　is　another　number；　but　plants　and　many　animals　when　divided　continue　to　live；　and　each　segment　is　thought　to　retain　the　same　kind　of　soul。　　　It　must　be　all　the　same　whether　we　speak　of　units　or　corpuscles；　for　if　the　spherical　atoms　of　Democritus　became　points；　nothing　being　retained　but　their　being　a　quantum；　there　must　remain　in　each　a　moving　and　a　moved　part；　just　as　there　is　in　what　is　continuous；　what　happens　has　nothing　to　do　with　the　size　of　the　atoms；　it　depends　solely　upon　their　being　a　quantum。　That　is　why　there　must　be　something　to　originate　movement　in　the　units。　If　in　the　animal　what　originates　movement　is　the　soul；　so　also　must　it　be　in　the　case　of　the　number；　so　that　not　the　mover　and　the　moved　together；　but　the　mover　only；　will　be　the　soul。　But　how　is　it　possible　for　one　of　the　units　to　fulfil　this　function　of　originating　movement？　There　must　be　some　difference　between　such　a　unit　and　all　the　other　units；　and　what　difference　can　there　be　between　one　placed　unit　and　another　except　a　difference　of　position？　If　then；　on　the　other　hand；　these　psychic　units　within　the　body　are　different　from　the　points　of　the　body；　there　will　be　two　sets　of　units　both　occupying　the　same　place；　for　each　unit　will　occupy　a　point。　And　yet；　if　there　can　be　two；　why　cannot　there　be　an　infinite　number？　For　if　things　can　occupy　an　indivisible　lace；　they　must　themselves　be　indivisible。　If；　on　the　other　hand；　the　points　of　the　body　are　identical　with　the　units　whose　number　is　the　soul；　or　if　the　number　of　the　points　in　the　body　is　the　soul；　why　have　not　all　bodies　souls？　For　all　bodies　contain　points　or　an　infinity　of　points。　　　Further；　how　is　it　possible　for　these　points　to　be　isolated　or　separated　from　their　bodies；　seeing　that　lines　cannot　be　resolved　into　points？

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　　The　result　is；　as　we　have　said；　that　this　view；　while　on　the　one　side　identical　with　that　of　those　who　maintain　that　soul　is　a　subtle　kind　of　body；　is　on　the　other　entangled　in　the　absurdity　peculiar　to　Democritus'　way　of　describing　the　manner　in　which　movement　is　originated　by　soul。　For　if　the　soul　is　present　throughout　the　whole　percipient　body；　there　must；　if　the　soul　be　a　kind　of　body；　be　two　bodies　in　the　same　place；　and　for　those　who　call　it　a　number；　there　must　be　many　points　at　one　point；　or　every　body　must　have　a　soul；　unless　the　soul　be　a　different　sort　of　number…other；　that　is；　than　the　sum　of　the　points　existing　in　a　body。　Another　consequence　that　follows　is　that　the　animal　must　be　moved　by　its　number　precisely　in　the　way　that　Democritus　explained　its　being　moved　by　his　spherical　psychic　atoms。　What　difference　does　it　make　whether　we　speak　of　small　spheres　or　of　large　units；　or；　quite　simply；　of　units　in　movement？　One　way　or　another；　the　movements　of　the　animal　must　be　due　to　their　movements。　Hence　those　who　combine　movement　and　number　in　the　same　subject　lay　themselves　open　to　these　and　many　other　similar　absurdities。　It　is　impossible　not　only　that　these　characters　should　give　the　definition　of　soul…it　is　impossible　that　they　should　even　be　attributes　of　it。　The　point　is　clear　if　the　attempt　be　made　to　start　from　this　as　the　account　of　soul　and　ex