on the soul-第6部分

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l　do　this。　　　It　is　a　fact　of　observation　that　plants　and　certain　insects　go　on　living　when　divided　into　segments；　this　means　that　each　of　the　segments　has　a　soul　in　it　identical　in　species；　though　not　numerically　identical　in　the　different　segments；　for　both　of　the　segments　for　a　time　possess　the　power　of　sensation　and　local　movement。　That　this　does　not　last　is　not　surprising；　for　they　no　longer　possess　the　organs　necessary　for　self…maintenance。　But；　all　the　same；　in　each　of　the　bodily　parts　there　are　present　all　the　parts　of　soul；　and　the　souls　so　present　are　homogeneous　with　one　another　and　with　the　whole；　this　means　that　the　several　parts　of　the　soul　are　indisseverable　from　one　another；　although　the　whole　soul　is　divisible。　It　seems　also　that　the　principle　found　in　plants　is　also　a　kind　of　soul；　for　this　is　the　only　principle　which　is　common　to　both　animals　and　plants；　and　this　exists　in　isolation　from　the　principle　of　sensation；　though　there　nothing　which　has　the　latter　without　the　former。

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　　LET　the　foregoing　suffice　as　our　account　of　the　views　concerning　the　soul　which　have　been　handed　on　by　our　predecessors；　let　us　now　dismiss　them　and　make　as　it　were　a　completely　fresh　start；　endeavouring　to　give　a　precise　answer　to　the　question；　What　is　soul？　i。e。　to　formulate　the　most　general　possible　definition　of　it。　　　We　are　in　the　habit　of　recognizing；　as　one　determinate　kind　of　what　is；　substance；　and　that　in　several　senses；　（a）　in　the　sense　of　matter　or　that　which　in　itself　is　not　'a　this'；　and　（b）　in　the　sense　of　form　or　essence；　which　is　that　precisely　in　virtue　of　which　a　thing　is　called　'a　this'；　and　thirdly　（c）　in　the　sense　of　that　which　is　compounded　of　both　（a）　and　（b）。　Now　matter　is　potentiality；　form　actuality；　of　the　latter　there　are　two　grades　related　to　one　another　as　e。g。　knowledge　to　the　exercise　of　knowledge。　　　Among　substances　are　by　general　consent　reckoned　bodies　and　especially　natural　bodies；　for　they　are　the　principles　of　all　other　bodies。　Of　natural　bodies　some　have　life　in　them；　others　not；　by　life　we　mean　self…nutrition　and　growth　（with　its　correlative　decay）。　It　follows　that　every　natural　body　which　has　life　in　it　is　a　substance　in　the　sense　of　a　composite。　　　But　since　it　is　also　a　body　of　such　and　such　a　kind；　viz。　having　life；　the　body　cannot　be　soul；　the　body　is　the　subject　or　matter；　not　what　is　attributed　to　it。　Hence　the　soul　must　be　a　substance　in　the　sense　of　the　form　of　a　natural　body　having　life　potentially　within　it。　But　substance　is　actuality；　and　thus　soul　is　the　actuality　of　a　body　as　above　characterized。　Now　the　word　actuality　has　two　senses　corresponding　respectively　to　the　possession　of　knowledge　and　the　actual　exercise　of　knowledge。　It　is　obvious　that　the　soul　is　actuality　in　the　first　sense；　viz。　that　of　knowledge　as　possessed；　for　both　sleeping　and　waking　presuppose　the　existence　of　soul；　and　of　these　waking　corresponds　to　actual　knowing；　sleeping　to　knowledge　possessed　but　not　employed；　and；　in　the　history　of　the　individual；　knowledge　comes　before　its　employment　or　exercise。　　　That　is　why　the　soul　is　the　first　grade　of　actuality　of　a　natural　body　having　life　potentially　in　it。　The　body　so　described　is　a　body　which　is　organized。　The　parts　of　plants　in　spite　of　their　extreme　simplicity　are　'organs'；　e。g。　the　leaf　serves　to　shelter　the　pericarp；　the　pericarp　to　shelter　the　fruit；　while　the　roots　of　plants　are　analogous　to　the　mouth　of　animals；　both　serving　for　the　absorption　of　food。　If；　then；　we　have　to　give　a　general　formula　applicable　to　all　kinds　of　soul；　we　must　describe　it　as　the　first　grade　of　actuality　of　a　natural　organized　body。　That　is　why　we　can　wholly　dismiss　as　unnecessary　the　question　whether　the　soul　and　the　body　are　one：　it　is　as　meaningless　as　to　ask　whether　the　wax　and　the　shape　given　to　it　by　the　stamp　are　one；　or　generally　the　matter　of　a　thing　and　that　of　which　it　is　the　matter。　Unity　has　many　senses　（as　many　as　'is'　has）；　but　the　most　proper　and　fundamental　sense　of　both　is　the　relation　of　an　actuality　to　that　of　which　it　is　the　actuality。　We　have　now　given　an　answer　to　the　question；　What　is　soul？…an　answer　which　applies　to　it　in　its　full　extent。　It　is　substance　in　the　sense　which　corresponds　to　the　definitive　formula　of　a　thing's　essence。　That　means　that　it　is　'the　essential　whatness'　of　a　body　of　the　character　just　assigned。　Suppose　that　what　is　literally　an　'organ'；　like　an　axe；　were　a　natural　body；　its　'essential　whatness'；　would　have　been　its　essence；　and　so　its　soul；　if　this　disappeared　from　it；　it　would　have　ceased　to　be　an　axe；　except　in　name。　As　it　is；　it　is　just　an　axe；　it　wants　the　character　which　is　required　to　make　its　whatness　or　formulable　essence　a　soul；　for　that；　it　would　have　had　to　be　a　natural　body　of　a　particular　kind；　viz。　one　having　in　itself　the　power　of　setting　itself　in　movement　and　arresting　itself。　Next；　apply　this　doctrine　in　the　case　of　the　'parts'　of　the　living　body。　Suppose　that　the　eye　were　an　animal…sight　would　have　been　its　soul；　for　sight　is　the　substance　or　essence　of　the　eye　which　corresponds　to　the　formula；　the　eye　being　merely　the　matter　of　seeing；　when　seeing　is　removed　the　eye　is　no　longer　an　eye；　except　in　name…it　is　no　more　a　real　eye　than　the　eye　of　a　statue　or　of　a　painted　figure。　We　must　now　extend　our　consideration　from　the　'parts'　to　the　whole　living　body；　for　what　the　departmental　sense　is　to　the　bodily　part　which　is　its　organ；　that　the　whole　faculty　of　sense　is　to　the　whole　sensitive　body　as　such。　　　We　must　not　understand　by　that　which　is　'potentially　capable　of　living'　what　has　lost　the　soul　it　had；　but　only　what　still　retains　it；　but　seeds　and　fruits　are　bodies　which　possess　the　qualification。　Consequently；　while　waking　is　actuality　in　a　sense　corresponding　to　the　cutting　and　the　seeing；　the　soul　is　actuality　in　the　sense　corresponding　to　the　power　of　sight　and　the　power　in　the　tool；　the　body　corresponds　to　what　exists　in　potentiality；　as　the　pupil　plus　the　power　of　sight　constitutes　the　eye；　so　the　soul　plus　the　body　constitutes　the　animal。　　　From　this　it　indubitably　follows　that　the　soul　is　inseparable　from　its　body；　or　at　any　rate　that　certain　parts　of　it　are　（if　it　has　parts）　for　the　actuality　of　some　of　them　is　nothing　but　the　actualities　of　their　bodily　parts。　Yet　some　may　be　separable　because　they　are　not　the　actualities　of　any　body　at　all。　Further；　we　have　no　light　on　the　problem　whether　the　soul　may　not　be　the　actuality　of　its　body　in　the　sense　in　which　the　sailor　is　the　actuality　of　the　ship。　　　This　must　suffice　as　our　sketch　or　outline　determination　of　the　nature　of　soul。

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　　Since　what　is　clear　or　logically　more　evident　emerges　from　what　in　itself　is　confused　but　more　observable　by　us；　we　must　reconsider　our　results　from　this　point　of　view。　For　it　is　not　enough　for　a　definitive　formula　to　express　as　most　now　do　the　mere　fact；　it　must　include　and　exhibit　the　ground　also。　At　present　definitions　are　given　in　a　form　analogous　to　the　conclusion　of　a　syllogism；　e。g。　What　is　squaring？　The　construction　of　an　equilateral　rectangle　equal　to　a　given　oblong　rectangle。　Such　a　definition　is　in　form　equivalent　to　a　conclusion。　One　that　tells　us　that　squaring　is　the　discovery　of　a　line　which　is　a　mean　proportional　between　the　two　unequal　sides　of　the　given　rectangle　discloses　the　ground　of　what　is　defined。　　　We　resume　our　inquiry　from　a　fresh　starting…point　by　calling　attention　to　the　fact　that　what　has　soul　in　it　differs　from　what　has　not；　in　that　the　former　displays　life。　Now　this　word　has　more　than　one　sense；　and　provided　any　one　alone　of　these　is　found　in　a　thing　we　say　that　thing　is　living。　Living；　that　is；　may　mean　thinking　or　perception　or　local　movement　and　rest；　or　movement　in　the　sense　of　nutrition；　decay　and　growth。　Hence　we　think　of　plants　also　as　living；　for　they　are　observed　to　possess　in　themselves　an　originative　power　through　which　they　increase　or　decrease　in　all　spatial　directions；　they　grow　up　and　down；　and　everything　that　grows　increases　its　bulk　alike　in　both　directions　or　indeed　in　all；　and　continues　to　live　so　long　as　it　can　absorb　nutriment。　　　This　power　of　self…nutrition　can　be　isolated　from　the　other　powers　mentioned；　but　not　they　from　it…in　mortal　beings　at　least。　The　fact　is　obvious　in　plants；　for　it　is　the　only　psychic　power　they　possess。　　　This　is　the　originative　power　the　possession　of　which　leads　us　to　speak　of　things　as　living　at　all；　but　it　is　the　possession　of　sensation　that　leads　us　for　the　first　time　to　speak　of　living　things　as　animals；　for　even　those　beings　which　possess　no　power　of　local　movement　but　do　possess　the　power　of　sensation　we　call　animals　and　not　merely　living　things。　　　The　primary　form　of　sense　is　touch；　which　belongs　to　all　animals。　just　as　the　power　of　self…nutrition　can　be　isolated　from　touch　and　sensation　generally；　so　touch　can　be　isolated　from　all　other　forms　of　sense。　（By　the　power　of　self…nutrition　we　mean　that　departmental　power　of　the　soul　which　is　common　to　plants　and　animals：　all　animals　whatsoever　are　observed　to　have　the　sense　of　touch。）　What　the　explanation　of　these　two　facts　is；　we　must　discuss　later。　At　present　we　must　confine　ourselves　to　saying　that　soul　is　the　source　of　these　phenomena　and　is　characterized　by　them；　viz。　by　the　powers　of　self…nutrition；　sensation；　thinking；　and　motivity。　　　Is　each　of　these　a　soul　or　a　part　of　a　soul？　And　if　a　part；　a　part　in　what　sense？　A　part　merely　distinguishable　by　definition　or　a　part　distinct　in　local　situation　as　well？　In　the　case　of　certain　of　these　powers；　the　answers　to　these　questions　are　easy；　in　the　case　of　others　we　are　puzzled　what　to　say。　just　as　in　the　case　of　plants　which　when　divided　are　observed　to　continue　to　live　though　removed　to　a　distance　from　one　another　（thus　showing　that　in　their　case　the　soul　of　each　individual　plant　before　division　was　actually　one；　potentially　many）；　so　we　notice　a　similar　result　in　other　varieties　of　soul；　i。e。　in　insects　which　have　been　cut　in　two；　each　of　the　segments　possesses　both　sensation　and　local　movement；　and　if　sensation；　necessarily　also　imagination　and　appetition；　for；　where　there　is　sensation；　there　is　also　pleasure　and　pain；　and；　where　these；　necessari