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times；　whereby　one　might　refine　the　other；　in　regard　they　had　not
history　to　any　purpose。　　And　the　manner　of　their　traditions　was
utterly　unfit　and　unproper　for　amplification　of　knowledge。　　And　again
the　studies　of　those　times；　you　shall　find；　besides　wars；　incursions；
and　rapines；　which　were　then　almost　every　where　betwixt　states
adjoining　（the　use　of　leagues　and　confederacies　being　not　then　known）；
were　to　populate　by　multitude　of　wives　and　generation；　a　thing　at
this　day　in　the　waster　part　of　the　West…Indies　principally　affected；
and　to　build　sometimes　for　habitation　towns　and　cities；　sometimes　for
fame　and　memory　monuments；　pyramids；　colosses；　and　the　like。　　And　if
there　happened　to　rise　up　any　more　civil　wits；　then　would　he　found
and　erect　some　new　laws；　customs；　and　usages；　such　as　now　of　late
years；　when　the　world　was　revolute　almost　to　the　like　rudeness　and
obscurity；　we　see　both　in　our　own　nation　and　abroad　many　examples　of；
as　well　in　a　number　of　tenures　reserved　upon　men's　lands；　as　in
divers　customs　of　towns　and　manors；　being　the　devices　that　such　wits
wrought　upon　in　such　times　of　deep　ignorance；　etc。

THE　IMPEDIMENTS　OF　KNOWLEDGE　FOR　WANT　OF　A　TRUE　SUCCESSION　OF　WITS；
AND　THAT　HITHERTO　THE　LENGTH　OF　ONE　MAN'S　LIFE　HATH　BEEN　THE　GREATEST
MEASURE　OF　KNOWLEDGE；　BEING　THE　6TH　CHAPTER；　THE　WHOLE　CHAPTER。

In　arts　mechanical　the　first　device　comes　shortest　and　time　addeth
and　perfecteth。　　But　in　sciences　of　conceit　the　first　author　goeth
furthest　and　time　leeseth　and　corrupteth。　　Painting；　artillery；
sailing；　and　the　like；　grossly　managed　at　first；　by　time　accommodate
and　refined。　　The　philosophies　and　sciences　of　Aristotle；　Plato；
Democritus；　Hippocrates；　of　most　vigour　at　first；　by　time　degenerated
and　imbased。　　In　the　former　many　wits　and　industries　contributed　in
one：　In　the　latter　many　men's　wits　spent　to　deprave　the　wit　of　one。

The　error　is　both　in　the　deliverer　and　in　the　receiver。　　He　that
delivereth　knowledge　desireth　to　deliver　it　in　such　form　as　may　be
soonest　believed；　and　not　as　may　be　easiliest　examined。　　He　that
receiveth　knowledge　desireth　rather　present　satisfaction　than
expectant　search；　and　so　rather　not　to　doubt　than　not　to　err。　　Glory
maketh　the　author　not　to　lay　open　his　weakness；　and　sloth　maketh　the
disciple　not　to　know　his　strength。

Then　begin　men　to　aspire　to　the　second　prizes；　to　be　a　profound
interpreter　and　commenter；　to　be　a　sharp　champion　and　defender；　to　be
a　methodical　compounder　and　abridger。　　And　this　is　the　unfortunate
succession　of　wits　which　the　world　hath　yet　had；　whereby　the
patrimony　of　all　knowledge　goeth　not　on　husbanded　or　improved；　but
wasted　and　decayed。　　For　knowledge　is　like　a　water　that　will　never
arise　again　higher　than　the　level　from　which　it　fell；　and　therefore
to　go　beyond　Aristotle　by　the　light　of　Aristotle　is　to　think　that　a
borrowed　light　can　increase　the　original　light　from　whom　it　is　taken。
So　then　no　true　succession　of　wits　having　been　in　the　world；　either
we　must　conclude　that　knowledge　is　but　a　task　for　one　man's　life；　and
then　vain　was　the　complaint　that　LIFE　IS　SHORT；　AND　ART　IS　LONG：　or
else；　that　the　knowledge　that　now　is；　is　but　a　shrub；　and　not　that
tree　which　is　never　dangerous；　but　where　it　is　to　the　purpose　of
knowing　Good　and　Evil；　which　desire　ever　riseth　upon　an　appetite　to
elect　and　not　to　obey；　and　so　containeth　in　it　a　manifest　defection。




CAP。　7。


THAT　THE　PRETENDED　SUCCESSION　OF　WITS　HATH　BEEN　EVIL　PLACED；　FOR
ASMUCH　AS　AFTER　VARIETY　OF　SECTS　AND　OPINIONS；　THE　MOST　POPULAR　AND
NOT　THE　TRUEST　PREVAILETH　AND　WEARETH　OUT　THE　REST；　BEING　THE　7TH
CHAPTER；　A　FRAGMENT。


It　is　sensible　to　think　that　when　men　enter　first　into　search　and
inquiry；　according　to　the　several　frames　and　compositions　of　their
understanding　they　light　upon　different　conceits；　and　so　all　opinions
and　doubts　are　beaten　over；　and　then　men　having　made　a　taste　of　all
wax　weary　of　variety；　and　so　reject　the　worst　and　hold　themselves　to
the　best；　either　some　one　if　it　be　eminent；　or　some　two　or　three　if
they　be　in　some　equality；　which　afterwards　are　received　and　carried
on；　and　the　rest　extinct。

But　truth　is　contrary；　and　that　time　is　like　a　river　which　carrieth
down　things　which　are　light　and　blown　up；　and　sinketh　and　drowneth
that　which　is　sad　and　weighty。　　For　howsoever　governments　have
several　forms；　sometimes　one　governing；　sometimes　few；　sometimes　the
multitude；　yet　the　state　of　knowledge　is　ever　a　DEMOCRATIE；　and　that
prevaileth　which　is　most　agreeable　to　the　senses　and　conceits　of
people。　　As　for　example　there　is　no　great　doubt　but　he　that　did　put
the　beginnings　of　things　to　be　SOLID；　VOID；　AND　MOTION　TO　THE　CENTRE；
was　in　better　earnest　than　he　that　put　MATTER；　FORM；　AND　SHIFT；　or　he
that　put　the　MIND；　MOTION；　AND　MATTER。　For　no　man　shall　enter　into
inquisition　of　nature；　but　shall　pass　by　that　opinion　of　Democritus；
whereas　he　shall　never　come　near　the　other　two　opinions；　but　leave
them　aloof　for　the　schools　and　table…talk。　　Yet　those　of　Aristotle
and　Plato；　because　they　be　both　agreeable　to　popular　sense；　and　the
one　was　uttered　with　subtilty　and　the　spirit　of　contradiction；　and
the　other　with　a　stile　of　ornament　and　majesty；　did　hold　out；　and　the
other　gave　place；　etc。




CAP。　8。


OF　THE　IMPEDIMENTS　OF　KNOWLEDGE　IN　HANDLING　IT　BY　PARTS；　AND　IN
SLIPPING　OFF　PARTICULAR　SCIENCES　FROM　THE　ROOT　AND　STOCK　OF　UNIVERSAL
KNOWLEDGE；　BEING　THE　8TH　CHAPTER；　THE　WHOLE　CHAPTER。


Cicero；　the　orator；　willing　to　magnify　his　own　profession；　and
thereupon　spending　many　words　to　maintain　that　eloquence　was　not　a
shop　of　good　words　and　elegancies　but　a　treasury　and　receipt　of　all
knowledges；　so　far　forth　as　may　appertain　to　the　handling　and　moving
of　the　minds　and　affections　of　men　by　speech；　maketh　great　complaint
of　the　school　of　Socrates；　that　whereas　before　his　time　the　same
professors　of　wisdom　in　Greece　did　pretend　to　teach　an　universal
SAPIENCE　and　knowledge　both　of　matter　and　words；　Socrates　divorced
them　and　withdrew　philosophy　and　left　rhetoric　to　itself；　which　by
that　destitution　became　but　a　barren　and　unnoble　science。　　And　in
particular　sciences　we　see　that　if　men　fall　to　subdivide　their
labours；　as　to　be　an　oculist　in　physic；　or　to　be　perfect　in　some　one
title　of　the　law；　or　the　like；　they　may　prove　ready　and　subtile；　but
not　deep　or　sufficient；　no　not　in　that　subject　which　they　do
particularly　attend；　because　of　that　consent　which　it　hath　with　the
rest。　　And　it　is　a　matter　of　common　discourse　of　the　chain　of
sciences　how　they　are　linked　together；　insomuch　as　the　Grecians；　who
had　terms　at　will；　have　fitted　it　of　a　name　of　CIRCLE　LEARNING。
Nevertheless　I　that　hold　it　for　a　great　impediment　towards　the
advancement　and　further　invention　of　knowledge；　that　particular　arts
and　sciences　have　been　disincorporated　from　general　knowledge；　do　not
understand　one　and　the　same　thing　which　Cicero's　discourse　and　the
note　and　conceit　of　the　Grecians　in　their　word　CIRCLE　LEARNING　do
intend。　　For　I　mean　not　that　use　which　one　science　hath　of　another
for　ornament　or　help　in　practice；　as　the　orator　hath　of　knowledge　of
affections　for　moving；　or　as　military　science　may　have　use　of
geometry　for　fortifications；　but　I　mean　it　directly　of　that　use　by
way　of　supply　of　light　and　information　which　the　particulars　and
instances　of　one　science　do　yield　and　present　for　the　framing　or
correcting　of　the　axioms　of　another　science　in　their　very　truth　and
notion。　　And　therefore　that　example　of　OCULISTS　and　TITLE　LAWYERS
doth　come　nearer　my　conceit　than　the　other　two；　for　sciences
distinguished　have　a　dependence　upon　universal　knowledge　to　be
augmented　and　rectified　by　the　superior　light　thereof；　as　well　as　the
parts　and　members　of　a　science　have　upon　the　MAXIMS　of　the　same
science；　and　the　mutual　light　and　consent　which　one　part　receiveth　of
another。　　And　therefore　the　opinion　of　Copernicus　in　astronomy；　which
astronomy　itself　cannot　correct　because　it　is　not　repugnant　to　any　of
the　appearances；　yet　natural　philosophy　doth　correct。　　On　the　other
side　if　some　of　the　ancient　philosophers　had　been　perfect　in　the
observations　of　astronomy；　and　had　called　them　to　counsel　when　they
made　their　principles　and　first　axioms；　they　would　never　have　divided
their　philosophy　as　the　Cosmographers　do　their　descriptions　by　globes；
making　one　philosophy　for　heaven　and　another　for　under　heaven；　as　in
effect　they　do。

So　if　the　moral　philosophers　that　have　spent　such　an　infinite
quantity　of　debate　touching　Good　and　the　highest　good；　had　cast　their
eye　abroad　upon　nature　and　beheld　the　appetite　that　is　in　all　things
to　receive　and　to　give；　the　one　motion　affecting　preservation　and　the
other　multiplication；　which　appetites　are　most　evidently　seen　in
living　creatures　in　the　pleasure　of　nourishment　and　generation；　and
in　man　do　make　the　aptest　and　most　natural　division　of　all　his
desires；　being　either　of　sense　of　pleasure　or　sense　of　power；　and　in
the　universal　frame　of　the　world　are　figured；　the　one　in　the　beams　of
heaven　which　issue　forth；　and　the　other　in　the　lap　of　the　earth　which
takes　in：　and　again　if　they　had　observed　the　motion　of　congruity　or
situation　of　the　parts　in　respect　of　the　whole；　evident　in　so　many
particulars；　and　lastly　if　they　had　considered　the　motion　（familiar
in　attraction　of　things）　to　approach　to　that　which　is　higher　in　the
same　kind；　when　by　these　observations　so　easy　and　concurring　in
natural　philosophy；　they　should　have　found　out　this　quaternion　of
good；　in　enjoying　or　fruition；　effecting　or　operation；　consenting　or
proportion；　and　approach　or　assumption；　they　would　have　saved　and
abridged　much　of　their　long　and　wandering　discourses　of　pleasure；
virtue；　duty；　and　religion。　　So　likewise　in　this　same　logic　and
rhetoric；　or　arts　of　argument　and　grace　of　speech；　if　the　great
masters　of　them　would　but　have　gone　a　form　lower；　and　looked　but　into
the　observations　of　Grammar　concerning　the　kinds　of　words；　their
derivations；　deflexions；　and　syntax；　specially　enriching　the　same
with　the　helps　of　several　languages；　with　their　differing　proprieties
of　words；　phrases；　and　tropes；　they　might　have　found　out　more　and
better　footsteps　of　common　reason；