valerius terminus-第6部分

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impression；　or　operation；　as　may　cause　a　precise　and　determinate
passion　of　the　eye；　a　matter　which　is　much　more　easy　to　induce　than
that　which　we　have　passed　through；　but　yet　because　it　hath　a　full
coherence　both　with　that　act　of　radiation　（which　hath　hitherto　been
conceived　and　termed　so　unproperly　and　untruly　by　some　an　effluxion
of　spiritual　species　and　by　others　an　investing　of　the　INTERMEDIUM
with　a　motion　which　successively　is　conveyed　to　the　eye）　and　with　the
act　of　sense；　wherein　I　should　likewise　open　that　which　I　think　good
to　withdraw；　I　will　omit。　　Neither　do　I　contend　but　that　this　motion
which　I　call　the　freeing　of　a　direction；　in　the　received　philosophies
（as　far　as　a　swimming　anticipation　could　take　hold）　might　be
perceived　and　discerned；　being　not　much　other　matter　than　that　which
they　did　not　only　aim　at　in　the　two　rules　of　AXIOMS　before　remembered；
but　more　nearly　also　in　that　which　they　term　the　form　or　formal
cause；　or　that　which　they　call　the　true　difference；　both　which
nevertheless　it　seemeth　they　propound　rather　as　impossibilities　and
wishes　than　as　things　within　the　compass　of　human　comprehension。　　For
Plato　casteth　his　burden　and　saith　THAT　HE　WILL　REVERE　HIM　AS　A　GOD；
THAT　CAN　TRULY　DIVIDE　AND　DEFINE；　which　cannot　be　but　by　true　forms
and　differences。　　Wherein　I　join　hands　with　him；　confessing　as　much
as　yet　assuming　to　myself　little；　for　if　any　man　call　by　the　strength
of　his　ANTICIPATIONS　find　out　forms；　I　will　magnify　him　with　the
foremost。　　But　as　any　of　them　would　say　that　if　divers　things　which
many　men　know　by　instruction　and　observation　another　knew　by
revelation　and　without　those　means；　they　would　take　him　for　somewhat
supernatural　and　divine；　so　I　do　acknowledge　that　if　any　man　can　by
anticipations　reach　to　that　which　a　weak　and　inferior　wit　may　attain
to　by　interpretation；　he　cannot　receive　too　high　a　title。　　Nay　I　for
my　part　do　indeed　admire　to　see　how　far　some　of　them　have　proceeded
by　their　ANTICIPATIONS；　but　how？　　It　is　as　I　wonder　at　some　blind　men；
to　see　what　shift　they　make　without　their　eye…sight；　thinking　with
myself　that　if　I　were　blind　I　could　hardly　do　it。　　Again　Aristotle's
school　confesseth　that　there　is　no　true　knowledge　but　by　causes；　no
true　cause　but　the　form；　no　true　form　known　except　one；　which　they
are　pleased　to　allow；　and　therefore　thus　far　their　evidence　standeth
with　us；　that　both　hitherto　there　hath　been　nothing　but　a　shadow　of
knowledge；　and　that　we　propound　now　that　which　is　agreed　to　be
worthiest　to　be　sought；　and　hardest　to　be　found。　　There　wanteth　now　a
part　very　necessary；　not　by　way　of　supply　but　by　way　of　caution；　for
as　it　is　seen　for　the　most　part　that　the　outward　tokens　and　badges　of
excellency　and　perfection　are　more　incident　to　things　merely
counterfeit　than　to　that　which　is　true；　but　for　a　meaner　and　baser
sort；　as　a　dubline　is　more　like　a　perfect　ruby　than　a　spinel；　and　a
counterfeit　angel　is　made　more　like　a　true　angel　than　if　it　were　an
angel　coined　of　China　gold；　in　like　manner　the　direction　carrieth　a
resemblance　of　a　true　direction　in　verity　and　liberty　which　indeed　is
no　direction　at　all。　　For　though　your　direction　seem　to　be　certain
and　free　by　pointing　you　to　a　nature　that　is　unseparable　from　the
nature　you　inquire　upon；　yet　if　it　do　not　carry　you　on　a　degree　or
remove　nearer　to　action；　operation；　or　light　to　make　or　produce；　it
is　but　superficial　and　counterfeit。　　Wherefore　to　secure　and　warrant
what　is　a　true　direction；　though　that　general　note　I　have　given　be
perspicuous　in　itself　（for　a　man　shall　soon　cast　with　himself　whether
he　be　ever　the　nearer　to　effect　and　operate　or　no；　or　whether　he　have
won　but　an　abstract　or　varied　notion）　yet　for　better　instruction　I
will　deliver　three　particular　notes　of　caution。　　The　first　is　that
the　nature　discovered　be　more　original　than　the　nature　supposed；　and
not　more　secondary　or　of　the　like　degree；　as　to　make　a　stone　bright
or　to　make　it　smooth　it　is　a　good　direction　to　say；　make　it　even；　but
to　make　a　stone　even　it　is　no　good　direction　to　say；　make　it　bright
or　make　it　smooth；　for　the　rule　is　that　the　disposition　of　any　thing
referring　to　the　state　of　it　in　itself　or　the　parts；　is　more　original
than　that　which　is　relative　or　transitive　towards　another　thing。　　So
evenness　is　the　disposition　of　the　stone　in　itself；　but　smooth　is　to
the　hand　and　bright　to　the　eye；　and　yet　nevertheless　they　all　cluster
and　concur；　and　yet　the　direction　is　more　unperfect；　if　it　do　appoint
you　to　such　a　relative　as　is　in　the　same　kind　and　not　in　a　diverse。
For　in　the　direction　to　produce　brightness　by　smoothness；　although
properly　it　win　no　degree；　and　will　never　teach　you　any　new
particulars　before　unknown；　yet　by　way　of　suggestion　or　bringing　to
mind　it　may　draw　your　consideration　to　some　particulars　known　but　not
remembered；　as　you　shall　sooner　remember　some　practical　means　of
making　smoothness；　than　if　you　had　fixed　your　consideration　only　upon
brightness　by　making　reflexion；　as　thus；　make　it　such　as　you　may　see
your　face　in　it；　this　is　merely　secondary；　and　helpeth　neither　by　way
of　informing　nor　by　way　of　suggestion。　　So　if　in　the　inquiry　of
whiteness　you　were　directed　to　make　such　a　colour　as　should　be　seen
furthest　in　a　dark　light；　here　you　are　advanced　nothing　at　all。　　For
these　kinds　of　natures　are　but　proprieties；　effects；　circumstances；
concurrences；　or　what　else　you　shall　like　to　call　them；　and　not
radical　and　formative　natures　towards　the　nature　supposed。　　The
second　caution　is　that　the　nature　inquired　be　collected　by　division
before　composition；　or　to　speak　more　properly；　by　composition
subaltern　before　you　ascend　to　composition　absolute；　etc。



OF　THE　INTERNAL　AND　PROFOUND　ERRORS　AND　SUPERSTITIONS　IN　THE　NATURE
OF　THE　MIND；　AND　OF　THE　FOUR　SORTS　OF　IDOLS　OR　FICTIONS　WHICH　OFFER
THEMSELVES　TO　THE　UNDERSTANDING　IN　THE　INQUISITION　OF　KNOWLEDGE；
BEING　THE　16TH　CHAPTER；　AND　THIS　A　SMALL　FRAGMENT　THEREOF；　BEING　A
PREFACE　TO　THE　INWARD　ELENCHES　OF　THE　MIND。

The　opinion　of　Epicurus　that　the　gods　were　of　human　shape；　was　rather
justly　derided　than　seriously　confuted　by　the　other　sects；　demanding
whether　every　kind　of　sensible　creatures　did　not　think　their　own
figure　fairest；　as　the　horse；　the　bull；　and　the　like；　which　found　no
beauty　but　in　their　own　forms；　as　in　appetite　of　lust　appeared。　　And
the　heresy　of　the　Anthropomorphites　was　ever　censured　for　a　gross
conceit　bred　in　the　obscure　cells　of　solitary　monks　that　never　looked
abroad。　　Again　the　fable　so　well　known　of　QUIS　PINXIT　LEONEM；　doth
set　forth　well　that　there　is　an　error　of　pride　and　partiality；　as
well　as　of　custom　and　familiarity。　　The　reflexion　also　from　glasses
so　usually　resembled　to　the　imagery　of　the　mind；　every　man　knoweth　to
receive　error　and　variety　both　in　colour；　magnitude；　and　shape；
according　to　the　quality　of　the　glass。　　But　yet　no　use　hath　been　made
of　these　and　many　the　like　observations；　to　move　men　to　search　out
and　upon　search　to　give　true　cautions　of　the　native　and　inherent
errors　in　the　mind　of　man　which　have　coloured　and　corrupted　all　his
notions　and　impressions。

I　do　find　therefore　in　this　enchanted　glass　four　Idols　or　false
appearances　of　several　and　distinct　sorts；　every　sort　comprehending
many　subdivisions：　the　first　sort；　I　call　idols　of　the　NATION　or
TRIBE；　the　second；　idols　of　the　PALACE；　the　third；　idols　of　the　CAVE；
and　the　fourth；　idols　of　the　THEATRE；　etc。




HERE　FOLLOWETH　AN　ABRIDGMENT　OF　DIVERS　CHAPTERS　OF　THE　FIRST　BOOK　OF
INTERPRETATION　OF　NATURE。



CAP。　12。


That　in　deciding　and　determining　of　the　truth　of　knowledge；　men　have
put　themselves　upon　trials　not　competent。　　That　antiquity　and
authority；　common　and　confessed　notions；　the　natural　and　yielding
consent　of　the　mind；　the　harmony　and　coherence　of　a　knowledge　in
itself；　the　establishing　of　principles　with　the　touch　and　reduction
of　other　propositions　unto　them；　inductions　without　instances
contradictory；　and　the　report　of　the　senses；　are　none　of　them
absolute　and　infallible　evidence　of　truth；　and　bring　no　security
sufficient　for　effects　and　operations。　　That　the　discovery　of　new
works　and　active　directions　not　known　before；　is　the　only　trial　to　be
accepted　of；　and　yet　not　that　neither；　in　ease　where　one　particular
giveth　light　to　another；　but　where　particulars　induce　an　axiom　or
observation；　which　axiom　found　out　discovereth　and　designeth　new
particulars。　　That　the　nature　of　this　trial　is　not　only　upon　the
point；　whether　the　knowledge　be　profitable　or　no；　but　even　upon　the
point　whether　the　knowledge　be　true　or　no；　not　because　you　may　always
conclude　that　the　Axiom　which　discovereth　new　instances　is　true；　but
contrariwise　you　may　safely　conclude　that　if　it　discover　not　any　new
instance　it　is　in　vain　and　untrue。　　That　by　new　instances　are　not
always　to　be　understood　new　recipes　but　new　assignations；　and　of　the
diversity　between　these　two。　　That　the　subtilty　of　words；　arguments；
notions；　yea　of　the　senses　themselves；　is　but　rude　and　gross　in
comparison　of　the　subtilty　of　things；　and　of　the　slothful　and
flattering　opinions　of　those　which　pretend　to　honour　the　mind　of　man
in　withdrawing　and　abstracting　it　from　particulars；　and　of　the
inducements　and　motives　whereupon　such　opinions　have　been　conceived
and　received。




CAP。　13。


Of　the　error　in　propounding　chiefly　the　search　of　causes　and
productions　of　things　concrete；　which　are　infinite　and　transitory；
and　not　of　abstract　natures；　which　are　few　and　permanent。　　That　these
natures　are　as　the　alphabet　or　simple　letters；　whereof　the　variety　of
things　consisteth；　or　as　the　colours　mingled　in　the　painter's　shell；
wherewith　he　is　able　to　make　infinite　variety　of　faces　or　shapes。　　An
enumeration　of　them　according　to　popular　note。　　That　at　the　first　one
would　conceive　that　in　the　schools　by　natural　philosophy　were　meant
the　knowledge　of　the　efficients　of　things　concrete；　and　by　metaphysic
the　knowledge　of　the　forms　of　natures　simple；　which　is　a　good　and　fit
division　of　knowledge：　but　upon　examination　there　is　no　such　matter
by　them　intended。　　That　the　little　inquiry　into　the　production　of
simple　natures　sheweth　well　that　works　were　not　sought；　because　by
the