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simple　natures　sheweth　well　that　works　were　not　sought；　because　by
the　former　knowledge　some　small　and　superficial　deflexions　from　the
ordinary　generations　and　productions　may　be　found　out；　but　the
discovery　of　all　profound　and　radical　alteration　must　arise　out　of
the　latter　knowledge。




CAP。　14。


Of　the　error　in　propounding　the　search　of　the　materials　or　dead
beginnings　or　principles　of　things；　and　not　the　nature　of　motions；
inclinations；　and　applications。　　That　the　whole　scope　of　the　former
search　is　impertinent　and　vain；　both　because　there　are　no　such
beginnings；　and　if　there　were　they　could　not　be　known。　　That　the
latter　manner　of　search　（which　is　all）　they　pass　over　compendiously
and　slightly　as　a　by…matter。　　That　the　several　conceits　in　that　kind；
as　that　the　lively　and　moving　beginnings　of　things　should　be　shift　or
appetite　of　matter　to　privation；　the　spirit　of　the　world　working　in
matter　according　to　platform；　the　proceeding　or　fructifying　of
distinct　kinds　according　to　their　proprieties；　the　intercourse　of　the
elements　by　mediation　of　their　common　qualities；　the　appetite　of　like
portions　to　unite　themselves；　amity　and　discord；　or　sympathy　and
antipathy；　motion　to　the　centre；　with　motion　of　stripe　or　press；　the
casual　agitation；　aggregation；　and　essays　of　the　solid　portions　in
the　void　space；　motion　of　shuttings　and　openings；　are　all　mere
nugations；　and　that　the　calculating　and　ordination　of　the　true
degrees；　moments；　limits；　and　laws　of　motions　and　alterations　（by
means　whereof　all　works　and　effects　are　produced）；　is　a　matter　of　a
far　other　nature　than　to　consist　in　such　easy　and　wild　generalities。




CAP。　15。


Of　the　great　error　of　inquiring　knowledge　in　Anticipations。　　That　I
call　Anticipations　the　voluntary　collections　that　the　mind　maketh　of
knowledge；　which　is　every　man's　reason。　　That　though　this　be　a　solemn
thing；　and　serves　the　turn　to　negotiate　between　man　and　man　（because
of　the　conformity　and　participation　of　men's　minds　in　the　like
errors）；　yet　towards　inquiry　of　the　truth　of　things　and　works　it　is
of　no　value。　　That　civil　respects　are　a　lett　that　this　pretended
reason　should　not　be　so　contemptibly　spoken　of　as　were　fit　and
medicinable；　in　regard　that　hath　been　too　much　exalted　and　glorified；
to　the　infinite　detriment　of　man's　estate。　　Of　the　nature　of　words
and　their　facility　and　aptness　to　cover　and　grace　the　defects　of
Anticipations。　　That　it　is　no　marvel　if　these　Anticipations　have
brought　forth　such　diversity　and　repugnance　in　opinions；　theories；　or
philosophies；　as　so　many　fables　of　several　arguments。　　That　had　not
the　nature　of　civil　customs　and　government　been　in　most　times
somewhat　adverse　to　such　innovations；　though　contemplative；　there
might　have　been　and　would　have　been　many　more。　　That　the　second
school　of　the　Academics　and　the　sect　of　Pyrrho；　or　the　considerers
that　denied　comprehension；　as　to　the　disabling　of　man's　knowledge
（entertained　in　Anticipations）　is　well　to　be　allowed；　but　that　they
ought　when　they　had　overthrown　and　purged　the　floor　of　the　ruins　to
have　sought　to　build　better　in　place。　　And　more　especially　that　they
did　unjustly　and　prejudicially　to　charge　the　deceit　upon　the　report
of　the　senses；　which　admitteth　very　sparing　remedy；　being　indeed　to
have　been　charged　upon　the　Anticipations　of　the　mind；　which　admitteth
a　perfect　remedy。　　That　the　information　of　the　senses　is　sufficient；
not　because　they　err　not；　but　because　the　use　of　the　sense　in
discovering　of　knowledge　is　for　the　most　part　not　immediate。　　So　that
it　is　the　work；　effect；　or　instance；　that　trieth　the　Axiom；　and　the
sense　doth　but　try　the　work　done　or　not　done；　being　or　not　being。
That　the　mind　of　man　in　collecting　knowledge　needeth　great　variety　of
helps；　as　well　as　the　hand　of　man　in　manual　and　mechanical　practices
needeth　great　variety　of　instruments。　　And　that　it　were　a　poor　work
that　if　instruments　were　removed　men　would　overcome　with　their　naked
hands。　　And　of　the　distinct　points　of　want　and　insufficiency　in　the
mind　of　man。




CAP。　16。


That　the　mind　of　a　man；　as　it　is　not　a　vessel　of　that　content　or
receipt　to　comprehend　knowledge　without　helps　and　supplies；　so　again
it　is　not　sincere；　but　of　an　ill　and　corrupt　tincture。　　Of　the
inherent　and　profound　errors　and　superstitions　in　the　nature　of　the
mind；　and　of　the　four　sorts　of　Idols　or　false　appearances　that　offer
themselves　to　the　understanding　in　the　inquisition　of　knowledge；　that
is　to　say；　the　Idols　of　the　Tribe；　the　Idols　of　the　Palace；　the　Idols
of　the　Cave；　and　the　Idols　of　the　Theatre。　　That　these　four；　added　to
the　incapacity　of　the　mind　and　the　vanity　and　malignity　of　the
affections；　leave　nothing　but　impotency　and　confusion。　　A　recital　of
the　particular　kinds　of　these　four　Idols；　with　some　chosen　examples
of　the　opinions　they　have　begot；　such　of　them　as　have　supplanted　the
state　of　knowledge　most。




CAP。　17。


Of　the　errors　of　such　as　have　descended　and　applied　themselves　to
experience；　and　attempted　to　induce　knowledge　upon　particulars。　　That
they　have　not　had　the　resolution　and　strength　of　mind　to　free
themselves　wholly　from　Anticipations；　but　have　made　a　confusion　and
intermixture　of　Anticipations　and　observations；　and　so　vanished。
That　if　any　have　had　the　strength　of　mind　generally　to　purge　away　and
discharge　all　Anticipations；　they　have　not　had　that　greater　and
double　strength　and　patience　of　mind；　as　well　to　repel　new
Anticipations　after　the　view　and　search　of　particulars；　as　to　reject
old　which　were　in　their　mind　before；　but　have　from　particulars　and
history　flown　up　to　principles　without　the　mean　degrees；　and　so
framed　all　the　middle　generalities　or　axioms；　not　by　way　of　scale　or
ascension　from　particulars；　but　by　way　of　derivation　from　principles；
whence　hath　issued　the　infinite　chaos　of　shadows　and　notions；
wherewith　both　books　and　minds　have　been　hitherto；　and　may　be　yet
hereafter　much　more　pestered。　　That　in　the　course　of　those
derivations；　to　make　them　yet　the　more　unprofitable；　they　have　used
when　any　light　of　new　instance　opposite　to　any　assertion　appeared；
rather　to　reconcile　the　instance　than　to　amend　the　rule。　　That　if　any
have　had　or　shall　have　the　power　and　resolution　to　fortify　and
inclose　his　mind　against　all　Anticipations；　yet　if　he　have　not　been
or　shall　not　be　cautioned　by　the　full　understanding　of　the　nature　of
the　mind　and　spirit　of　man；　and　therein　of　the　seats；　pores　and
passages　both　of　knowledge　and　error；　he　hath　not　been　nor　shall　not
be　possibly　able　to　guide　or　keep　on　his　course　aright。　　That　those
that　have　been　conversant　in　experience　and　observation　have　used；
when　they　have　intended　to　discover　the　cause　of　any　effect；　to　fix
their　consideration　narrowly　and　exactly　upon　that　effect　itself　with
all　the　circumstances　thereof；　and　to　vary　the　trial　thereof　as　many
ways　as　can　be　devised；　which　course　amounteth　but　to　a　tedious
curiosity；　and　ever　breaketh　off　in　wondering　and　not　in　knowing；　and
that　they　have　not　used　to　enlarge　their　observation　to　match　and
sort　that　effect　with　instances　of　a　diverse　subject；　which　must　of
necessity　be　before　any　cause　be　found　out。　　That　they　have　passed
over　the　observation　of　instances　vulgar　and　ignoble；　and　stayed
their　attention　chiefly　upon　instances　of　mark；　whereas　the　other
sort　are　for　the　most　part　more　significant　and　of　better　height　and
information。　　That　every　particular　that　worketh　any　effect　is　a
thing　compounded　（more　or　less）　of　diverse　single　natures；　（more
manifest　and　more　obscure；）　and　that　it　appeareth　not　to　whether　of
the　natures　the　effect　is　to　be　ascribed；　and　yet　notwithstanding
they　have　taken　a　course　without　breaking　particulars　and　reducing
them　by　exclusions　and　inclusions　to　a　definite　point；　to　conclude
upon　inductions　in　gross；　which　empirical　course　is　no　less　vain　than
the　scholastical。　　That　all　such　as　have　sought　action　and　work　out
of　their　inquiry　have　been　hasty　and　pressing　to　discover　some
practices　for　present　use；　and　not　to　discover　Axioms；　joining　with
them　the　new　assignations　as　their　sureties。　　That　the　forerunning　of
the　mind　to　frame　recipes　upon　Axioms　at　the　entrance；　is　like
Atalanta's　golden　ball　that　hindereth　and　interrupteth　the　course；
and　is　to　be　inhibited　till　you　have　ascended　to　a　certain　stage　and
degree　of　generalities；　which　forbearance　will　be　liberally
recompensed　in　the　end；　and　that　chance　discovereth　new　inventions　by
one　and　one；　but　science　by　knots　and　clusters。　　That　they　have　not
collected　sufficient　quantity　of　particulars；　nor　them　in　sufficient
certainty　and　subtilty；　nor　of　all　several　kinds；　nor　with　those
advantages　and　discretions　in　the　entry　and　sorting　which　are
requisite；　and　of　the　weak　manner　of　collecting　natural　history　which
hath　been　used。　　Lastly　that　they　had　no　knowledge　of　the　formulary
of　interpretation；　the　work　whereof　is　to　abridge　experience　and　to
make　things　as　certainly　found　out　by　Axiom　in　short　time；　as　by
infinite　experiences　in　ages。




CAP。　18。


That　the　cautels　and　devices　put　in　practice　in　the　delivery　of
knowledge　for　the　covering　and　palliating　of　ignorance；　and　the
gracing　and　overvaluing　of　that　they　utter；　are　without　number；　but
none　more　bold　and　more　hurtful　than　two；　the　one　that　men　have　used
of　a　few　observations　upon　any　subject　to　make　a　solemn　and　formal
art；　by　filling　it　up　with　discourse；　accommodating　it　with　some
circumstances　and　directions　to　practice；　and　digesting　it　into
method；　whereby　men　grow　satisfied　and　secure；　as　if　no　more　inquiry
were　to　be　made　of　that　matter；　the　other；　that　men　have　used　to
discharge　ignorance　with　credit；　in　defining　all　those　effects　which
they　cannot　attain　unto　to　be　out　of　the　compass　of　art　and　human
endeavour。　　That　the　very　styles　and　forms　of　utterance　are　so　many
characters　of　imposture；　some　choosing　a　style　of　pugnacity　and
contention；　some　of　satire　and　reprehension；　some　of　plausible　and
tempting　similitudes　and　examples；　some　of　great　words　and　high
discourse；　some　of　short　and　dark　sentences；　some　of　exactness　of
method；　all　of　positive　affirmation；　without　disclosing　the　true
motives　and　proofs　of　their