the idea of justice in political economy-第3部分

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those　which　are　considered　are　such　as　relate　to　the　aims　and
ends　of　the　community。　And　they　may　naturally　be　of　the　greatest
variety；　may　include；　for　instance；　even　physical　strength　or
beauty。　In　an　athletic　club　it　seems　just　to　give　a　prize　to　the
strongest　man；　in　tableaux　vivants　to　favor　a　beautiful　woman。　As
a　rule；　however；　in　social　bodies　of　a　higher　order　those
qualities　are　to　be　considered　which；　like　virtue　and　talent；　are
of　the　greatest　service　to　them；　which　manifest　themselves　in
actions　advantageous　to　the　community。　Often　there　are　very
heterogeneous　qualities　to　be　compared；　as　the　aims　of　the　great
moral　communities；　especially　of　the　State；　are　the　most　various。
The　question　can　arise；　is　the　brave　general　or　the　great
statesman；　the　great　painter　or　the　great　singer；　of　greater
Universal　value？　The　decision　is　given　by　public　sentiment
according　to　that　classification　of　purposes　which　appears　at　the
moment　to　be　the　correct　one；　and　following　it　we　find　a　verdict
of　the　public　which　declares　the　salary　of　a　general；　of　a
secretary　of　state　or　of　a　singer　to　be　just　or　unjust。
　　　　Quite　as　difficult　as　the　comparison　of　different　qualities
or　acts　is　the　valuation　of　the　inequalities　in　the　same　sphere
of　human　action。　That　the　statesman　deserves　a　higher　salary　than
his　secretary；　that　the　head　of　a　great　firm　earns　more　than　his
cashier；　and　the　latter　more　than　the　youngest　clerk；　that　the
designer　in　a　factory　is　more　important　than　the　porter　　in　all
this；　public　sentiment　and　valuation　agree。　But　when　the　grades
of　inequality　are　to　be　measured　and　to　be　expressed　in　figures；
which　is　indispensable　in　all　the　practical　questions；　there　will
be　many　differences　of　opinion；　and　from　this　point　of　view
indeed　the　opinion　might　be　upheld　that　the　psychological
judgments　which　form　the　foundations　of　the　conceptions　of　the
just　are　always　a　chaos　without　unity　and　clearness。　The
objection　which　we　so　often　meet　on　the　field　of　aesthetic
judgment　seems　obvious；　that　there　is　no　general　judgment；　that
all　is　a　matter　of　individual　taste；　that　mere　individual
processes　of　feeling　are　in　question；　which　are　immeasurably
entangled；　and　which　a　fool　alone　could　regard　as　a　basis　of
public　affairs　and　institutions。
　　　　This　would　in　fact　be　true；　if　the　individual　thoughts　and
sentiments　of　men　were；　indeed；　only　the　product　of　independent
and　isolated　individuals。　But　every　disposition　of　mind；　every
word；　every　idea；　every　conception；　more　profoundly　examined；　is
the　result　not　of　an　individual；　but　of　a　social　process。　The
greatest　genius　even　thinks　and　feels　as　a　member　of　the
community；　ninety　per　cent　of　what　he　possesses　is　a　trust
conveyed　to　him　by　forefathers；　teachers；　fellow…creatures；　to　be
cherished　and　bequeathed　to　posterity。　The　majority　of　everyday
persons　are　little　more　than　indifferent　vessels　into　which　flow
the　feelings　and　thoughts　of　preceding　and　contemporary　millions。
Language　is　a　product　of　society。　By　means　of　the　spoken　word；
Herbart　says；　thought　and　feeling　pass　over　into　the　mind　of
another。　There　they　originate　new　fillings　and　thoughts；　which
forthwith　cross　the　same　bridge；　to　enrich　the　ideas　of　the
first。　Thus　it　happens　that　the　smallest　part　of　our　thoughts
originates　in　ourselves；　and　that　we　draw；　as　it　were；　from　a
public　storehouse；　and　participate　in　a　universal　generation　of
thoughts　to　which　each　individual　makes　only　a　comparatively
scanty　contribution。
　　　　Supposing　for　the　moment　that　the　feelings　on　which　the
estimating　judgments　of　what　is　just　are　founded；　remain　wholly
in　the　obscure　realm　of　mental　temperaments；　even　in　this　stage
they　are　not　a　psychological　chaos；　but　a　rhythmic　movement　of
masses。　And　the　more　they　rise　to　judgments　and　standards　of
valuation；　the　more　the　mental　temperaments　are　condensed　through
the　medium　of　public　discussion；　to　decisions　which　possess
distinct　characteristics　and　criteria；　the　more　we　have　before　us
mass…judgments　which　are　not　quite　uniform；　it　is　true；　but　still
classed　according　to　masses；　grouped　according　to　centres　and
authorities；　and　which　are　clear；　firm　and　generally　admitted。　On
account　of　the　same　qualities；　in　regard　to　the　same　purposes；
they　give　the　same　results　again　and　again　and　become　the　ruling
standards　of　valuation。
　　　　Every　period　has　prevailing　conventional　standards　of
valuation　for　human　qualities　and　deeds；　virtues　and　vices；　it
conventionally　values　this　kind　of　action　more　highly　than　that；
and　so　demands　accordingly　in　one　case　greater　rewards　or　greater
honors；　in　another　severer　punishments　or　smaller　incomes。　These
conventional　standards　of　valuation　are　more　or　less　the
starting…point　of　every　judgment　of　justice。　A　new　and　changed
conception　is　measured　in　the　first　instance　by　its　deviation
from　the　traditions。　As　every　fixation　of　price　in　society　is　not
anew　the　result　of　demand　and　supply；　but　as　demand　and　supply
only　try　to　modify　traditional　values；　so　it　is　also　with　the
valuing　judgments　of　justice　or　injustice。　The　sum　of　that　which
has　been　handed　down　as　just；　invariably　forms　the　real　basis　of
all　judgments。　A　refined　intuition　of　right　demands　a　change　here
and　there；　in　opposition　to　the　sum　total　of　conceptions　of　the
just；　this　is　only　a　single；　but　an　important　point。
　　　　In　existing　customs　and　in　existing　law；　these　conventional
and　traditional　standards　of　valuation　have　their　real　bulwark；
thus　they　have　assumed　a　form　which　firmly；　rigidly　and　uniformly
governs　wide　circles　of　mankind；　and　in　that　well…defined　form
they　are　handed　down　from　generation　to　generation。　But　they　also
can　be　found　outside　of　this　solid　ground；　they　originate
everywhere　from　repetitions　of　similar　cases　and　form　the　basis
of　judgments　of　what　is　just。　These　judgments；　indeed；　arise
daily　and　hourly　in　the　mind　of　every　thoughtful　man　in　regard　to
all　social　relations　of　life；　they　are　not　confined　to　actual
law。　In　family　life　the　sister　thinks　it　unjust　that　the　brother
is　favored；　in　every　social　circle；　visits；　invitations；　even
smiles；　looks　and　compliments　are　resented　as　unjust　preferences。
The　mental　processes　are　the　same　whether　here　or　on　the　ground
of　actual　law。　Everywhere　it　is　in　the　main　traditional　standards
which　govern　our　judgment。　These　traditional　and　conventional
standards　are　the　historical　precipitate　of　the　conception　of
justice　of　hundreds　of　millions　of　men；　on　whose　shoulders　we
stand。　Through　these　traditions　the　seemingly　irregular；　the
casual　and　individual　takes　firm　body　and　lasting　form　in　spite
of　constant　transformations　and　renewals。
　　　　From　this　standpoint　we　can　easily　refute　the　naive　objection
that　there　is　no　way　to　apply　the　conception　of　the　just　to
economic　matters；　because；　it　is　said；　incomparable　quantities
and　qualities　are　in　question；　the　different　kinds　of　work；　the
functions　of　the　employer　and　the　day…laborer　being　immeasurable
by　any　common　standard。　They　forget　that　the　formation　of　prices
in　the　market　equalizes　that　which　is　seemingly　incomparable；　as；
for　instance；　an　edition　of　Goethe　and　a　bottle　of　champagne；
that　in　every　penal　code　two　things　which　appear　to　be　still　more
heterogeneous；　a　fine　of　so　and　so　much　money　and　a　day's
imprisonment　are　in　a　fixed　ratio　according　to　a　conventional
standard。　Everywhere　in　the　questions　of　prices　and　of　law　the
traditional　and　conventional　judgment；　that　this　is　to　be　called
equal　and　not　that；　is　fundamental。　Only　should　we　have　to　begin
every　moment　to　form　our　judgments　anew　would　this　objection　be
reasonable。　As　things　are；　the　fact　remains　that　the　average
earnings　of　the　employer；　compared　to　the　wages　of　the　laborer；
can　be　raised　or　lowered　by　a　change　in　demand　and　supply　within
such　an　economic　organization　as　exists　to…day；　that
independently　thereof；　in　consequence　of　traditional　standards　on
the　one　hand　and　of　the　modern　sentiments　and　ideals　on　the
other；　this　change；　as　soon　as　it　has　reached　a　certain　extent；
will　appear　just　or　unjust。
　　　　And　whenever　these　and　similar　questions　are　discussed；　when
opinions　differ　about　them；　the　controversy　is　not；　as　a　rule；
between　those　who　wish　to　apply　the　categories　of　justice　to
these　phenomena；　and　those　who　deny　their　applicability；　but　the
struggle　is　between　older　and　traditional　standards　of　judgment
and　new　ones；　the　ideals　of　the　eighteenth　century　with　those　of
the　nineteenth；　the　struggle　is　between　a　cruder　conception　of
right　and　a　more　refined　one；　between　ideals　whose　realization　is
to…day　impossible　and　those　that　are　attainable　through　the
customs　and　the　law　of　our　age；　finally　ideal　conceptions　of
justice　which　have　already　been　co…ordinated　with　other　not　less
justified　ideals　are　arrayed　against　those　which　have　chosen
principles　of　justice　exclusively　for　their　battle…cry。
　　　　And　just　because　this　struggle　never　ceases　there　is；　as　we
have　seen　above；　no　simple；　universally　intelligible；　familiar
and　applicable　formula　of　justice。　The　conceptions　in　question
may　all　be　reduced　to　this　fundamental　idea：　everyone　according
to　his　merit；　〃suum　cuique〃；　but　the　possible　application　of　this
rule　is　always　different　according　to　the　possibility　of
innumerable　conceptions　of　value；　estimations；　groupings　and
classifications。　The　abstract　pretension；　for　example；　that　in
labor　or　even　in　handiwork　rests　the　unique　standard　of　justice
is　in　equal　right　with　the　other　pretense　that　talent；　virtue　or
even　the　human　face　must　be　taken　into　account。　In　certain
spheres　and　in　respect　to　certain　aims　only　will　one　formula　or
the　other　gradually　prove　its　justification　and　thus　gain
recognition。
　　　　But　what　is　it　that　gives　the　final　decision　in　this　contest
of　opinions？　Is　it　logical　reasoning？　Apparently　not；　or　at　least
not　primarily。　Much　as　in　the　struggle　for　public　and　social
institutions；　all　kinds　of　logical　reasons　for　the　justice　of　a
cause　are　appealed　to；　they　seldom　convince　and　always　seem　more
or　less　flat。　At　least　they　do　not　convince　the　opponent；
although　they　are　capable　of　inciting　their　followers　to
enthusiastic　and　desperate　struggle