introduction to the metaphysic of morals-第4部分

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right；　by　which　they　are　established。　It　is　not　in　ethics；

therefore；　but　in　jurisprudence；　that　the　principle　of　the　legislation

lies；　that　〃promises　made　and　accepted　must　be　kept。〃　Accordingly；

ethics　specially　teaches　that　if　the　motive…principle　of　external

compulsion　which　juridical　legislation　connects　with　a　duty　is　even

let　go；　the　idea　of　duty　alone　is　sufficient　of　itself　as　a　motive。

For　were　it　not　so；　and　were　the　legislation　itself　not　juridical；　and

consequently　the　duty　arising　from　it　not　specially　a　duty　of　right　as

distinguished　from　a　duty　of　virtue；　then　fidelity　in　the

performance　of　acts；　to　which　the　individual　may　be　bound　by　the　terms

of　a　contract；　would　have　to　be　classified　with　acts　of　benevolence

and　the　obligation　that　underlies　them；　which　cannot　be　correct。　To

keep　one's　promise　is　not　properly　a　duty　of　virtue；　but　a　duty　of

right；　and　the　performance　of　it　can　be　enforced　by　external

compulsion。　But　to　keep　one's　promise；　even　when　no　compulsion　can

be　applied　to　enforce　it；　is；　at　the　same　time；　a　virtuous　action；　and

a　proof　of　virtue。　jurisprudence　as　the　science　of　right；　and　ethics

as　the　science　of　virtue；　are　therefore　distinguished　not　so　much　by

their　different　duties；　as　rather　by　the　difference　Of　the　legislation

which　connects　the　one　or　the　other　kind　of　motive　with　their　laws。

　　Ethical　legislation　is　that　which　cannot　be　external；　although　the

duties　it　prescribes　may　be　external　as　well　as　internal。　Juridical

legislation　is　that　which　may　also　be　external。　Thus　it　is　an　external

duty　to　keep　a　promise　entered　into　by　contract；　but　the　injunction　to

do　this　merely　because　it　is　a　duty；　without　regard　to　any　other

motive；　belongs　exclusively　to　the　internal　legislation。　It　does　not

belong　thus　to　the　ethical　sphere　as　being　a　particular　kind　of　duty

or　a　particular　mode　of　action　to　which　we　are　bound…　for　it　is　an

external　duty　in　ethics　as　well　as　in　jurisprudence…　but　it　is　because

the　legislation　in　the　case　referred　to　is　internal；　and　cannot　have

an　external　lawgiver；　that　the　obligation　is　reckoned　as　belonging

to　ethics。　For　the　same　reason；　the　duties　of　benevolence；　although

they　are　external　duties　as　obligations　to　external　actions；　are；　in

like　manner；　reckoned　as　belonging　to　ethics；　because　they　can　only　be

enjoined　by　legislation　that　is　internal。　Ethics　has　no　doubt　its

own　peculiar　duties…　such　as　those　towards　oneself…　but　it　bas　also

duties　in　common　with　jurisprudence；　only　not　under　the　same　mode　of

obligation。　In　short；　the　peculiarity　of　ethical　legislation　is　to

enjoin　the　performance　of　certain　actions　merely　because　they　are

duties；　and　to　make　the　principle　of　duty　itself…　whatever　be　its

source　or　occasion…　the　sole　sufficing　motive　of　the　activity　of　the

will。　Thus；　then；　there　are　many　ethical　duties　that　are　directly

such；　and　the　inner　legislation　also　makes　the　others…　all　and　each　of

them…　indirectly　ethical。

　　The　deduction　of　the　division　of　a　system　is　the　proof　of　its

completeness　as　well　as　of　its　continuity；　so　that　there　may　be　a

logical　transition　from　the　general　conception　divided　to　the

members　of　the　division；　and　through　the　whole　series　of　the

subdivisions　without　any　break　or　leap　in　the　arrangement　（divisio　per

saltum）。　Such　a　division　is　one　of　the　most　difficult　conditions　for

the　architect　of　a　system　to　fulfil。　There　is　even　some　doubt　as　to

what　is　the　highest　conception　that　is　primarily　divided　into　right

and　wrong　（aut　fas　aut　nefas）。　It　is　assuredly　the　conception　of　the

activity　of　the　free…will　in　general。　In　like　manner；　the　expounders

of　ontology　start　from　something　and　nothing；　without　perceiving

that　these　are　already　members　of　a　division　for　which　the　highest

divided　conception　is　awanting；　and　which　can　be　no　other　than　that　of

thing　in　general。





　　　　　IV。　GENERAL　PRELIMINARY　CONCEPTIONS　DEFINED　AND　EXPLAINED。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　（Philosophia　practica　universalis）。



　　The　conception　of　freedom　is　a　conception　of　pure　reason。　It　is

therefore　transcendent　in　so　far　as　regards　theoretical　philosophy；

for　it　is　a　conception　for　which　no　corresponding　instance　or

example　can　be　found　or　supplied　in　any　possible　experience。

Accordingly　freedom　is　not　presented　as　an　object　of　any　theoretical

knowledge　that　is　possible　for　us。　It　is　in　no　respect　a　constitutive；

but　only　a　regulative　conception；　and　it　can　be　accepted　by　the

speculative　reason　as　at　most　a　merely　negative　principle。　In　the

practical　sphere　of　reason；　however；　the　reality　of　freedom　may　be

demonstrated　by　certain　practical　principles　which；　as　laws；　prove　a

causality　of　the　pure　reason　in　the　process　of　determining　the

activity　of　the　will　that　is　independent　of　all　empirical　and　sensible

conditions。　And　thus　there　is　established　the　fact　of　a　pure　will

existing　in　us　as　the　source　of　all　moral　conceptions　and　laws。

　　On　this　positive　conception　of　freedom　in　the　practical　relation

certain　unconditional　practical　laws　are　founded；　and　they　specially

constitute　moral　laws。　In　relation　to　us　as　human　beings；　with　an

activity　of　will　modified　by　sensible　influences　so　as　not　to　be

conformable　to　the　pure　will；　but　as　often　contrary　to　it；　these

laws　appear　as　imperatives　commanding　or　prohibiting　certain

actions；　and　as　such　they　are　categorical　or　unconditional

imperatives。　Their　categorical　and　unconditional　character

distinguishes　them　from　the　technical　imperatives　which　express　the

prescriptions　of　art；　and　which　always　command　only　conditionally。

According　to　these　categorical　imperatives；　certain　actions　are

allowed　or　disallowed　as　being　morally　possible　or　impossible；　and

certain　of　them　or　their　opposites　are　morally　necessary　and

obligatory。　Hence；　in　reference　to　such　actions；　there　arises　the

conception　of　a　duty　whose　observance　or　transgression　is

accompanied　with　a　pleasure　or　pain　of　a　peculiar　kind；　known　as　moral

feeling。　We　do　not；　however；　take　the　moral　feelings　or　sentiments

into　account　in　considering　the　practical　laws　of　reason。　For　they

do　not　form　the　foundation　or　principle　of　practical　laws　of　reason；

but　only　the　subjective　effects　that　arise　in　the　mind　on　the　occasion

of　our　voluntary　activity　being　determined　by　these　laws。　And　while

they　neither　add　to　nor　take　from　the　objective　validity　or

influence　of　the　moral　laws　in　the　judgement　of　reason；　such

sentiments　may　vary　according　to　the　differences　of　the　individuals

who　experience　them。

　　The　following　conceptions　are　common　to　jurisprudence　and　ethics

as　the　two　main　divisions　of　the　metaphysic　of　morals。

　　Obligation　is　the　necessity　of　a　free　action　when　viewed　in　relation

to　a　categorical　imperative　of　reason。　An　imperative　is　a　practical

rule　by　which　an　action；　otherwise　contingent　in　itself；　is　made

necessary。　It　is　distinguished　from　a　practical　law　in　that　such　a

law；　while　likewise　representing　the　action　as　necessary；　does　not

consider　whether　it　is　internally　necessary　as　involved　in　the

nature　of　the　agent…　say　as　a　holy　being…　or　is　contingent　to　him；

as　in　the　case　of　man　as　we　find　him；　for　where　the　first　condition

holds　good；　there　is　in　fact　no　imperative。　Hence　an　imperative　is　a

rule　which　not　only　represents　but　makes　a　subjectively　contingent

action　necessary；　and　it；　accordingly；　represents　the　subject　as　being

（morally）　necessitated　to　act　in　accordance　with　this　rule。　A

categorical　or　unconditional　imperative　is　one　which　does　not

represent　the　action　in　any　way　immediately　through　the　conception

of　an　end　that　is　to　be　attained　by　it；　but　it　presents　the　action

to　the　mind　as　objectively　necessary　by　the　mere　representation　of　its

form　as　an　action；　and　thus　makes　it　necessary。　Such　imperatives

cannot　be　put　forward　by　any　other　practical　science　than　that　which

prescribes　obligations；　and　it　is　only　the　science　of　morals　that　does

this。　All　other　imperatives　are　technical；　and　they　are　altogether

conditional。　The　ground　of　the　possibility　of　categorical

imperatives　lies　in　the　fact　that　they　refer　to　no　determination　of

the　activity　of　the　will　by　which　a　purpose　might　be　assigned　to　it；

but　solely　to　its　freedom。

　　Every　action　is　allowed　（licitum）　which　is　not　contrary　to

obligation；　and　this　freedom　not　being　limited　by　an　opposing

imperative；　constitutes　a　moral　right　as　a　warrant　or　title　of

action　（facultas　moralis）。　From　this　it　is　at　once　evident　what

actions　are　disallowed　or　illicit　（illicita）。

　　Duty　is　the　designation　of　any　action　to　which　anyone　is　bound　by　an

obligation。　It　is　therefore　the　subject…matter　of　all　obligation。　Duty

as　regards　the　action　concerned　may　be　one　and　the　same；　and　yet　we

may　be　bound　to　it　in　various　ways。

　　The　categorical　imperative；　as　expressing　an　obligation　in　respect

to　certain　actions；　is　a　morally　practical　law。　But　because　obligation

involves　not　merely　practical　necessity　expressed　in　a　law　as　such；

but　also　actual　necessitation；　the　categorical　imperative　is　a　law

either　of　command　or　prohibition；　according　as　the　doing　or　not

doing　of　an　action　is　represented　as　a　duty。　An　action　which　is

neither　commanded　nor　forbidden　is　merely　allowed；　because　there　is　no

law　restricting　freedom；　nor　any　duty　in　respect　of　it。　Such　an　action

is　said　to　be　morally　indifferent　（indifferens；　adiaphoron；　res

merae　facultatis）。　It　may　be　asked　whether　there　are　such　morally

indifferent　actions；　and　if　there　are；　whether　in　addition　to　the

preceptive　and　prohibitive　law　（lex　praeceptiva　et　prohibitiva；　lex

mandati　et　vetiti）；　there　is　also　required　a　permissive　law　（lex

permissiva）；　in　order　that　one　may　be　free　in　such　relations　to　act；

or　to　forbear　from　acting；　at　his　pleasure？　If　it　were　so；　the　moral

right　in　question　would　not；　in　all　cases；　refer　to　actions　that　are

indifferent　in　themselves　（adiaphora）；　for　no　special　law　would　be

required　to　establish　such　a　right；