战争与和平(上)-第185部分

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ver　mournful；　when；　after　all　the　hubbub　that　had　gone　before；　the　old　voices　could　be　heard；　one　at　a　time；　saying　“agreed；”　or　for　the　sake　of　variety；　“I　am　of　the　same　opinion。”
The　secretary　was　told　to　write　down　the　resolution　of　the　Moscow　nobility：　that　the　nobles　of　Moscow；　like　those　of　Smolensk；　would　furnish　a　levy　of　ten　men　in　every　thousand；　with　their　complete　equipment。
The　gentlemen；　who　had　been　sitting；　got　up　with　an　air　of　relief；　there　was　a　scraping　of　chairs　and　the　great　noblemen　walked　about　to　stretch　their　legs；　taking　their　friends’　arms　and　chatting　together。
“The　Tsar！　the　Tsar！”　was　suddenly　heard　all　through　the　rooms；　and　the　whole　crowd　rushed　towards　the　entrance。
The　Tsar　walked　in　along　the　wide；　free　space　left　for　him；　between　walls　of　noblemen　close　packed　on　each　side。　Every　face　expressed　reverent　and　awe…stricken　curiosity。　Pierre　was　at　some　distance；　and　could　not　quite　catch　all　the　Tsar　said。　He　knew　from　what　he　did　hear　that　the　Tsar　was　speaking　of　the　danger　in　which　the　empire　was　placed；　and　the　hopes　he　rested　on　the　Moscow　nobility。　The　Tsar　was　answered　by　a　voice　informing　him　of　the　resolution　just　passed　by　the　nobility。
“Gentlemen！”　said　the　trembling　voice　of　the　Tsar。　A　stir　passed　through　the　crowd；　and　then　a　hush　fell　on　it　again；　and　Pierre　distinctly　heard　the　voice　of　the　Tsar；　warmly　humane　and　deeply　touched：　“I　have　never　doubted　of　the　devotion　of　the　Russian　nobility。　But　this　day　it　has　surpassed　my　expectations。　I　thank　you　in　the　name　of　the　fatherland。　Gentlemen；　let　us　act—time　is　more　precious　than　anything。…”
The　Tsar　ceased　speaking；　the　crowd　began　pressing　round　him；　and　cries　of　enthusiasm　were　heard　on　all　sides。
“Yes；　more　precious　than　anything…a　royal　saying；”　said　the　voice　of　Ilya　Andreitch　with　a　sob。　He　had　heard　nothing；　but　understood　everything　in　his　own　way。
From　the　nobility’s　room　the　Tsar　went　into　the　merchants’　room。　He　was　there　for　about　ten　minutes。　Pierre　amongst　the　rest　saw　the　Tsar　coming　back　from　the　merchants’　room　with　tears　of　emotion　in　his　eyes。　They　learned　afterwards　that　the　Tsar　had　hardly　begun　to　speak　to　the　merchants　when　the　tears　gushed　from　his　eyes　and　he　continued　in　a　trembling　voice。　When　Pierre　saw　the　Tsar　come　out；　he　was　accompanied　by　two　merchants。　One　of　them　Pierre　knew；　a　stout　contractor；　the　other　was　the　mayor；　with　a　thin；　yellow　face　and　narrow　beard。　Both　were　weeping。　The　tears　stood　in　the　thin　man’s　eyes；　but　the　stout　contractor　was　sobbing　like　a　child　and　continually　repeating：
“Take　life　and　property　too；　your　majesty！”
Pierre　felt　nothing　at　that　moment　but　the　desire　to　show　that　nothing　was　too　much　for　him　and　that　he　was　ready　to　sacrifice　everything。　The　constitutional　tenor　of　his　speech　weighed　on　him　like　a　sin；　he　sought　an　opportunity　of　glossing　it　over。　On　hearing　that　Count　Mamonov　was　furnishing　a　regiment；　Bezuhov　at　once　told　Count　Rastoptchin　that　he　would　furnish　one　thousand　men　and　their　equipment。
Old　Rostov　could　not　tell　his　wife　what　had　passed　without　tears；　and　he　agreed　at　once　to　Petya’s　wishes；　and　went　himself　to　enter　his　name。
Next　day　the　Tsar　went　away。　All　the　assembled　noblemen　went　back　to　their　homes　and　their　clubs；　took　off　their　uniforms；　and　with　some　groans　gave　orders　to　their　stewards　to　raise　the　levy；　wondering　themselves　at　what　they　had　done。


Part　Ten
Chapter　1
NAPOLEON　BEGAN　THE　WAR　with　Russia　because　he　could　not　help　going　to　Dresden；　being　dazzled　by　the　homage　paid　him　there；　putting　on　the　Polish　uniform；　yielding　to　the　stimulating　influence　of　a　June　morning；　and　giving　way　to　an　outburst　of　fury　in　the　presence　of　Kurakin　and　afterwards　of　Balashev。
Alexander　refused　all　negotiations　because　he　felt　himself　personally　insulted。　Barclay　de　Tolly　did　his　utmost　to　command　the　army　in　the　best　way　possible；　so　as　to　do　his　duty　and　gain　the　reputation　of　a　great　general。　Rostov　charged　the　French　because　he　could　not　resist　the　temptation　to　gallop　across　the　level　plain。　And　all　the　innumerable　persons　who　took　part　in　the　war　acted　similarly；　in　accordance　with　their　personal　peculiarities；　habits；　circumstances；　and　aims。　They　were　all　impelled　by　fear　or　vanity；　enjoyment；　indignation；　or　national　consideration；　supposing　that　they　knew　what　they　were　about　and　that　they　were　acting　independently；　while　they　were　all　the　involuntary　tools　of　history　and　were　working　out　a　result　concealed　from　themselves　but　comprehensible　to　us。　Such　is　the　invariable　fate　of　all　practical　leaders；　and　the　higher　their　place　in　the　social　hierarchy；　the　less　free　they　are。
Now　the　leading　men　of　1812　have　long　left　their　places；　their　personal　interests　have　vanished；　leaving　no　trace；　and　nothing　remains　before　us　but　the　historical　results　of　the　time。
But　once　let　us　admit　that　the　people　of　Europe　under　Napoleon’s　leadership　had　to　make　their　way　into　the　heart　of　Russia　and　there　to　perish；　and　all　the　self…contradictory；　meaningless；　cruel　actions　of　the　men　who　took　part　in　this　war　become　intelligible　to　us。
Providence　compelled　all　those　men　in　striving　for　the　attainment　of　their　personal　aims　to　combine　in　accomplishing　one　immense　result；　of　which　no　one　individual　man　（not　Napoleon；　not　Alexander；　still　less　any　one　taking　practical　part　in　the　campaign）　had　the　slightest　inkling。
Now　it　is　clear　to　us　what　was　the　cause　of　the　destruction　of　the　French　army　in　1812。　No　one　disputes　that　the　cause　of　the　loss　of　Napoleon’s　French　forces　was；　on　one　hand；　their　entering　at　too　late　a　season　upon　a　winter　march　in　the　heart　of　Russia　without　sufficient　preparation；　and　on　the　other；　the　character　the　war　had　assumed　from　the　burning　of　Russian　towns　and　the　hatred　the　enemy　aroused　in　the　peasantry。　But　obvious　as　it　seems　now；　no　one　at　the　time　foresaw　that　this　was　the　only　means　by　which　the　best　army　in　the　world；　eight　hundred　thousand　strong；　led　by　the　best　of　generals；　could　be　defeated　in　a　conflict　with　the　inexperienced　Russian　army　of　half　the　strength；　led　by　inexperienced　generals。　Not　only　was　this　utterly　unforeseen；　but　every　effort　indeed　was　being　continually　made　on　the　Russian　side　to　hinder　the　one　means　that　could　save　Russia；　and　in　spite　of　the　experience　and　so…called　military　genius　of　Napoleon；　every　effort　was　made　on　the　French　side　to　push　on　to　Moscow　at　the　end　of　the　summer；　that　is　to　do　the　very　thing　bound　to　bring　about　their　ruin。
In　historical　works　on　the　year　1812；　the　French　writers　are　very　fond　of　saying　that　Napoleon　was　aware　of　the　danger　of　lengthening　out　his　line；　that　he　sought　a　decisive　engagement；　that　his　marshals　advised　him　to　stay　at　Smolensk；　and　similar　statements　to　show　that　even　at　the　time　the　real　danger　of　the　campaign　was　seen。　The　Russian　historians　are　still　fonder　of　declaring　that　from　the　beginning　of　the　campaign　there　existed　a　plan　of　Scythian　warfare　by　leading　Napoleon　on　into　the　heart　of　Russia。　And　this　plan　is　ascribed　by　some　writers　to　Pfuhl；　by　others　to　some　Frenchman；　and　by　others　to　Barclay　de　Tolly；　while　other　writers　give　the　credit　of　this　supposed　scheme　to　the　Emperor　Alexander　himself；　supporting　their　view　by　documents；　proclamations；　and　letters；　in　which　such　a　course　of　action　certainly　is　hinted　at。　But　all　these　hints　at　foreseeing　what　actually　did　happen　on　the　French　as　well　as　on　the　Russian　side　are　only　conspicuous　now　because　the　event　justified　them。　If　the　event　had　not　come　to　pass；　these　hints　would　have　been　forgotten；　as　thousands　and　millions　of　suggestions　and　suppositions　are　now　forgotten　that　were　current　at　the　period；　but　have　been　shown　by　time　to　be　unfounded　and　so　have　been　consigned　to　oblivion。　There　are　always　so　many　presuppositions　as　to　the　cause　of　every　event　that；　however　the　matter　ends；　there　are　always　people　who　will　say：　“I　said　at　the　time　that　it　would　be　so”：　quite　oblivious　of　the　fact　that　among　the　numerous　suppositions　they　made　there　were　others　too　suggesting　just　the　opposite　course　of　events。
The　notion　that　Napoleon　was　aware　of　the　danger　of　extending　his　line；　and　that　the　Russians　had　a　scheme　for　drawing　the　enemy　into　the　heart　of　Russia；　obviously　belong　to　the　same　category；　and　only　historians　with　a　great　bias　can　ascribe　such　reflections　to　Napoleon　and　his　marshals；　or　such　plans　to　the　Russian　generals。　All　the　facts　are　directly　opposed　to　such　a　view。　Far　from　desiring　to　lure　the　French　into　the　heart　of　Russia；　the　Russians　did　their　utmost　to　arrest　their　progress　throughout　the　war　from　the　time　they　crossed　the　frontier。　And　far　from　dreading　the　extension　of　his　line　of　communications；　Napoleon　rejoiced　at　every　step　forward　as　a　triumph；　and　did　not　seek　pitched　battles　as　eagerly　as　he　had　done　in　his　previous　campaigns。
At　the　very　beginning　of　the　campaign；　our　armies　were　divided　up；　and　the　sole　aim　for　which　we　strove　was　to　unite　them；　though　there　was　no　benefit　to　be　derived　from　uniting　them　if　our　object　was　to　retreat　and　draw　the　enemy　into　the　heart　of　the　country。　The　Emperor　was　with　the　army　to　inspire　it　not　to　yield　an　inch　of　Russian　soil　and　on　no　account　to　retreat。　An　immense　camp　was　fortified　at　Drissa　in　accordance　with　Pfuhl’s　plan；　and　it　was　not　proposed　to　retreat　further。　The　Tsar　reprimanded　the　commander…in…chief　for　every　retreat。　The　Tsar　can　never　have　anticipated　the　burning　of　Moscow；　or　even　the　enemy’s　presence　at　Smolensk；　and　when　the　armies　had　been　reunited；　the　Tsar　was　indignant　at　the　taking　and　burning　of　Smolensk　without　a　general　engagement　having　been　fought　before　its　walls。　Such　was　the　Tsar’s　feeling；　but　the　Russian　generals；　and　the　whole　Russian　people；　were　even　more　indignant　at　the　idea　of　our　men　retreating。
Napoleon；　after　dividing　up　the　army；　moved　on　into　the　heart　of　the　country；　letting　slip　several　opportunities　of　an　engagement。　In　August　he　was　in　Smolensk　and　thinking　of　nothing　but　advancing　further；　though；　as　we　see　now；　that　advance　meant　inevitable　ruin。
The　fact　shows　perfectly　clearly　that　Napoleon　foresaw　no　danger　in　the　advance　on　Moscow；　and　that　Alexander　and　the　Russian　generals　did　not　dream　at　the　time　of　luring　Napoleon