战争与和平(上)-第205部分

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n　with　something　else。　…　What　that　something　else　was　Pierre　could　not　have　said；　and　indeed　he　did　not　seek　to　get　a　clear　idea；　for　whose　sake　and　for　what　object　he　found　such　peculiar　joy　in　sacrificing　all。　He　was　not　interested　in　knowing　the　object　of　the　sacrifice；　but　the　sacrifice　itself　afforded　him　a　new　joyful　sensation。


Chapter　19
ON　THE　24th　was　fought　the　battle　before　the　redoubt　of　Shevardino；　on　the　25th　not　a　shot　was　fired　on　either　side；　on　the　26th　was　fought　the　battle　of　Borodino。
How　and　with　what　object　were　the　battles　of　Shevardino　and　Borodino　fought？　Why　was　the　battle　of　Borodino　fought？　There　was　not　the　slightest　sense　in　it；　either　for　the　French　or　for　the　Russians。　The　immediate　result　of　it　was；　and　was　bound　to　be；　for　the　Russians；　that　we　were　brought　nearer　to　the　destruction　of　Moscow　（the　very　thing　we　dreaded　above　everything　in　the　world）；　and　for　the　French；　that　they　were　brought　nearer　to　the　destruction　of　their　army　（which　they；　too；　dreaded　above　everything　in　the　world）。　That　result　was　at　the　time　perfectly　obvious；　and　yet　Napoleon　offered　battle；　and　Kutuzov　accepted　it。
If　military　leaders　were　guided　by　reasonable　considerations　only；　it　would　seem　that　it　must　have　been　clear　to　Napoleon　that　in　advancing　two　thousand　versts　into　the　heart　of　the　country　and　giving　battle；　with　the　probable　contingency　of　losing　a　quarter　of　his　men；　he　was　going　to　certain　destruction；　and　that　it　must　have　been　equally　clear　to　Kutuzov　that　in　accepting　that　battle　and　risking　the　loss　of　a　fourth　of　his　army；　he　would　infallibly　lose　Moscow。　For　Kutuzov　this　was　mathematically　clear；　as　clear　as　it　is　at　chess；　that　if　I　have　one　piece　less　than　my　adversary　and　I　exchange　pieces；　I　am　certain　to　be　a　loser　by　it；　and　therefore　must　avoid　exchanging　pieces。　When　my　adversary　has　sixteen　pieces　and　I　have　fourteen；　I　am　only　one…eighth　weaker　than　he；　but　when　we　have　exchanged　thirteen　pieces；　he　is　three　times　as　strong　as　I　am。
Up　to　the　battle　of　Borodino　our　forces　were　approximately　five…sixths　of　the　French；　but　after　that　battle　they　were　only　one…half—that　is；　before　the　battle　a　hundred　thousand　against　a　hundred　and　twenty　thousand；　and　after　the　battle　fifty　thousand　against　a　hundred　thousand。　And　yet　the　shrewd　and　experienced　Kutuzov　fought　the　battle。　Napoleon；　a　military　genius；　as　he　is　called；　gave　battle；　losing　a　fourth　of　his　army　and　drawing　his　line　of　communications　out　further　than　ever。　If　we　are　told　that　he　expected　the　taking　of　Moscow　to　complete　the　campaign；　as　the　taking　of　Vienna　had　done；　we　may　say　that　there　are　many　evidences　to　the　contrary。　Napoleon’s　historians　themselves　tell　us　that　he　wanted　to　halt　as　soon　as　he　reached　Smolensk；　that　he　knew　the　danger　of　his　extended　line；　and　that　he　knew　that　the　taking　of　Moscow　would　not　be　the　end　of　the　campaign；　because　from　Smolensk　he　had　learned　in　what　condition　the　towns　were　left　when　abandoned　to　him；　and　he　had　not　received　a　single　reply　to　his　reiterated　expressions　of　a　desire　to　open　negotiations。
In　giving　and　accepting　battle　at　Borodino；　Kutuzov　and　Napoleon　acted　without　design　or　rational　plan。　After　the　accomplished　fact　historians　have　brought　forward　cunningly　devised　evidences　of　the　foresight　and　genius　of　the　generals；　who　of　all　the　involuntary　instruments　of　the　world’s　history　were　the　most　slavish　and　least　independent　agents。
The　ancients　have　transmitted　to　us　examples　of　epic　poems　in　which　the　whole　interest　of　history　is　concentrated　in　a　few　heroic　figures；　and　under　their　influence　we　are　still　unable　to　accustom　our　minds　to　the　idea　that　history　of　that　kind　is　meaningless　at　our　stage　in　the　development　of　humanity。
In　answer　to　the　next　question；　how　the　battles　of　Borodino　and　Shevardino　came　to　be　fought；　we　have　also　a　very　definite；　well…known；　and　utterly　false　account。　All　the　historians　describe　the　affair　thus：
The　Russian　army；　they　say；　in　its　retreat　from　Smolensk　sought　out　the　best　position　for　a　general　engagement；　and　such　a　position　they　found　in　Borodino。　The　Russians；　they　say；　fortified　the　position　beforehand；　to　the　left　of　the　road　（from　Moscow　to　Smolensk）　at　right　angles　to　it；　from　Borodino　to　Utitsa；　at　the　very　place　where　the　battle　was　fought。
In　front　of　this　position；　they　tell　us；　a　fortified　earthwork　was　thrown　up　on　the　Shevardino　redoubt　as　an　outpost　for　observation　of　the　enemy’s　movements。
On　the　24th；　we　are　told；　Napoleon　attacked　this　redoubt；　and　took　it。　On　the　26th　he　attacked　the　whole　Russian　army；　which　had　taken　up　its　position　on　the　plain　of　Borodino。
This　is　what　we　are　told　in　the　histories；　and　all　that　is　perfectly　incorrect；　as　any　one　may　easily　see　who　cares　to　go　into　the　matter。
The　Russians　did　not　seek　out　the　best　position；　on　the　contrary；　on　their　retreat　they　had　passed　by　many　positions　better　than　Borodino。　They　did　not　make　a　stand　at　one　of　these　positions；　because　Kutuzov　did　not　care　to　take　up　a　position　he　had　not　himself　selected；　because　the　popular　clamour　for　a　battle　had　not　yet　been　so　strongly　expressed；　because　Miloradovitch　had　not　yet　arrived　with　reinforcements　of　militia；　and　for　countless　other　reasons。
The　fact　remains　that　there　were　stronger　positions　on　the　road　the　Russian　army　had　passed　along；　and　that　the　plain　of　Borodino；　on　which　the　battle　was　fought；　is　in　no　respect　a　more　suitable　position　than　any　other　spot　in　the　Russian　empire　to　which　one　might　point　at　hazard　on　the　map。
Far　from　having　fortified　the　position　on　the　left　at　right　angles　to　the　road—that　is　the　spot　on　which　the　battle　was　fought—the　Russians　never；　till　the　25th　of　August；　1812；　dreamed　of　a　battle　being　possible　on　that　spot。　The　proof　of　this　is；　first；　that　there　were　no　fortifications　there　before　the　25th；　and　that　the　earthworks　begun　on　that　day　were　not　completed　by　the　26th；　and；　secondly；　the　Shevardino　redoubt；　owing　to　its　situation　in　front　of　the　position　on　which　the　battle　was　actually　fought；　was　of　no　real　value。　With　what　object　was　that　redoubt　more　strongly　fortified　than　any　of　the　other　points？　And　with　what　object　was　every　effort　exhausted　and　six　thousand　men　sacrificed　to　defend　it　till　late　at　night　on　the　24th？　A　picket　of　Cossacks　would　have　been　enough　to　keep　watch　on　the　enemy’s　movements。　And　a　third　proof　that　the　position　of　the　battlefield　was　not　foreseen；　and　that　the　redoubt　of　Shevardino　was　not　the　foremost　point　of　that　position；　is　to　be　found　in　the　fact　that　Barclay　de　Tolly　and　Bagration　were；　till　the　25th；　under　the　impression　that　the　Shevardino　redoubt　was　the　left　flank　of　the　position；　and　that　Kutuzov　himself；　in　the　report　written　in　hot　haste　after　the　battle；　speaks　of　Shevardino　as　the　left　flank　of　the　position。　Only　a　good　time　later；　when　reports　of　the　battle　were　written　at　leisure；　the　incorrect　and　strange　statement　was　invented　（probably　to　cover　the　blunders　of　the　commander…in…chief；　who　had；　of　course；　to　appear　infallible）　that　the　Shevardino　redoubt　served　as　an　advance　post；　though　it　was　in　reality　simply　the　fortified　point　of　the　left　flank；　and　that　the　battle　of　Borodino　was　fought　by　us　on　a　fortified　position　selected　beforehand　for　it；　though　it　was　in　reality　fought　on　a　position　quite　unforeseen；　and　almost　unfortified。
The　affair　obviously　took　place　in　this　way。　A　position　had　been　pitched　upon　on　the　stream　Kolotcha；　which　intersects　the　high…road；　not　at　a　right　angle；　but　at　an　acute　angle；　so　that　the　left　flank　was　at　Shevardino；　the　right　near　the　village　of　Novoe；　and　the　centre　at　Borodino；　near　the　confluence　of　the　Kolotcha　and　the　Voina。　Any　one　looking　at　the　plain　of　Borodino；　and　not　considering　how　the　battle　actually　was　fought；　would　pick　out　this　position；　covered　by　the　Kolotcha；　as　the　obvious　one　for　an　army；　whose　object　was　to　check　the　advance　of　an　enemy　marching　along　the　Smolensk　road　towards　Moscow。
Napoleon；　riding　up　on　the　24th　to　Valuev；　did　not　（we　are　told　in　the　histories）　see　the　position　of　the　Russians　from　Utitsa　to　Borodino　（he　could　not　have　seen　that　position　since　it　did　not　exist）；　and　did　not　see　the　advance　posts　of　the　Russian　army；　but　in　the　pursuit　of　the　Russian　rearguard　stumbled　upon　the　left　flank　of　the　Russian　position　at　the　redoubt　of　Shevardino；　and；　to　the　surprise　of　the　Russians；　his　troops　crossed　the　Kolotcha。　And　the　Russians；　since　it　was　too　late　for　a　general　engagement；　withdrew　their　left　wing　from　the　position　they　had　intended　to　occupy；　and　took　up　a　new　position；　which　had　not　been　foreseen；　and　was　not　fortified。　By　crossing　to　the　left　bank　of　the　Kolotcha；　on　the　left　of　the　road；　Napoleon　shifted　the　whole　battle　from　right　to　left　（looking　from　the　Russian　side）；　and　transferred　it　to　the　plain　between　Utitsa；　Semyonovskoye　and　Borodino—a　plain　which　in　itself　was　a　no　more　favourable　position　than　any　other　plain　in　Russia—and　on　that　plain　was　fought　the　whole　battle　of　the　26th。
Had　Napoleon　not　reached　the　Kolotcha　on　the　evening　of　the　24th；　and　had　he　not　ordered　the　redoubt　to　be　attacked　at　once　that　evening；　had　he　begun　the　attack　next　morning；　no　one　could　have　doubted　that　the　Shevardino　redoubt　was　the　left　flank　of　the　Russian　position；　and　the　battle　would　have　been　fought　as　we　expected。　In　that　case　we　should　probably　have　defended　the　Shevardino　redoubt　by　our　left　flank　even　more　obstinately；　we　should　have　attacked　Napoleon　in　the　centre　or　on　the　right；　and　the　general　engagement　would　have　been　fought　on　the　24th　on　the　position　prepared　and　fortified　for　it。　But　as　the　attack　was　made　on　our　left　flank　in　the　evening　after　the　retreat　of　our　rearguard；　that　is；　immediately　after　the　action　at　Gridnevo；　and　as　the　Russian　generals　would　not；　or　could　not；　begin　the　general　engagement　on　the　evening　of　the　24th；　the　first　and　most　important　action　of　the　battle　of　Borodino　was　lost　on　the　24th；　and　that　loss　led　inevitably　to　the　loss　of　the　battle　fought　on　the　26th。
After　the　loss　of　the　Shevardino　redoubt；　we　found　ourselves　on　the　morning　of　the　25th　with　our　left　flank　driven　from　its　position；　and　were　forced　to　draw　in　the　left　wing　of　our　position　and　hurriedly　fortify　it　were　we　c