战争与和平(上)-第223部分

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This　new　branch　of　mathematics；　unknown　to　the　ancients；　by　assuming　infinitely　small　quantities；　that　is；　such　as　secure　the　chief　condition　of　motion　（absolute　continuity）；　corrects　the　inevitable　error　which　the　human　intellect　cannot　but　make；　when　it　considers　disconnected　units　of　motion　instead　of　continuous　motion。
In　the　investigation　of　the　laws　of　historical　motion　precisely　the　same　mistake　arises。
The　progress　of　humanity；　arising　from　an　innumerable　multitude　of　individual　wills；　is　continuous　in　its　motion。
The　discovery　of　the　laws　of　this　motion　is　the　aim　of　history。　But　in　order　to　arrive　at　the　laws　of　the　continuous　motion　due　to　the　sum　of　all　these　individual　wills；　the　human　mind　assumes　arbitrary；　disconnected　units。　The　first　proceeding　of　the　historian　is　taking　an　arbitrary　series　of　continuous　events　to　examine　it　apart　from　others；　while　in　reality　there　is　not；　and　cannot　be；　a　beginning　to　any　event；　but　one　event　flows　without　any　break　in　continuity　from　another。　The　second　proceeding　is　to　examine　the　action　of　a　single　person；　a　sovereign；　or　a　general；　as　though　it　were　equivalent　to　the　sum　of　many　individual　wills；　though　the　sum　of　individual　wills　never　finds　expression　in　the　action　of　a　single　historical　personage。
Historical　science　as　it　advances　is　continually　taking　smaller　and　smaller　units　for　analysis；　and　in　this　way　strives　to　approximate　the　truth。　But　however　small　the　units　of　which　history　takes　cognisance；　we　feel　that　the　assumption　of　a　unit；　disconnected　from　another；　the　assumption　of　a　beginning　of　any　phenomenon；　and　the　assumption　that　the　individual　wills　of　all　men　find　expression　in　the　actions　of　a　single　historical　personage　are　false　in　themselves。
Every　conclusion　of　history　can；　without　the　slightest　effort　on　the　part　of　the　critic；　be　dissipated　like　dust；　leaving　no　trace；　simply　through　criticism　selecting；　as　the　object　of　its　analysis；　a　greater　or　smaller　disconnected　unit；　which　it　has　a　perfect　right　to　do；　seeing　that　the　unit　of　history　is　always　selected　arbitrarily。
Only　by　assuming　an　infinitely　small　unit　for　observation—a　differential　of　history—that　is；　the　homogeneous　tendencies　of　men；　and　arriving　at　the　integral　calculus　（that　is；　taking　the　sum　of　those　infinitesimal　quantities）；　can　we　hope　to　arrive　at　the　laws　of　history。
The　first　fifteen　years　of　the　nineteenth　century　present　the　spectacle　of　an　extraordinary　movement　of　millions　of　men。　Men　leave　their　habitual　pursuits；　rush　from　one　side　of　Europe　to　the　other；　plunder；　slaughter　one　another；　triumph　and　despair；　and　the　whole　current　of　life　is　transformed　and　presents　a　quickened　activity；　first　moving　at　a　growing　speed；　and　then　slowly　slackening　again。　What　was　the　cause　of　that　activity；　or　from　what　laws　did　it　arise？　asks　the　human　intellect。
The　historians；　in　reply　to　that　inquiry；　lay　before　us　the　sayings　and　doings　of　some　dozens　of　men　in　one　of　the　buildings　of　the　city　of　Paris；　summing　up　those　doings　and　sayings　by　one　word—revolution。　Then　they　give　us　a　detailed　biography　of　Napoleon；　and　of　certain　persons　favourably　or　hostilely　disposed　to　him；　talk　of　the　influence　of　some　of　these　persons　upon　others；　and　then　say　that　this　it　is　to　which　that　activity　is　due；　and　these　are　its　laws。
But　the　human　intellect　not　only　refuses　to　believe　in　that　explanation；　but　flatly　declares　that　the　method　of　explanation　is　not　a　correct　one；　because　in　this　explanation　a　smaller　phenomenon　is　taken　as　the　cause　of　a　greater　phenomenon。　The　sum　of　men’s　individual　wills　produced　both　the　revolution　and　Napoleon；　and　only　the　sum　of　those　wills　endured　them　and　then　destroyed　them。
“But　whenever　there　have　been　wars；　there　have　been　great　military　leaders；　whenever　there　have　been　revolutions　in　states；　there　have　been　great　men；”　says　history。　“Whenever　there　have　been　great　military　leaders　there　have；　indeed；　been　wars；”　replies　the　human　reason；　“but　that　does　not　prove　that　the　generals　were　the　cause　of　the　wars；　and　that　the　factors　leading　to　warfare　can　be　found　in　the　personal　activity　of　one　man。”
Whenever；　looking　at　my　watch；　I　see　the　hand　has　reached　the　figure　x；　I　hear　the　bells　beginning　to　ring　in　the　church　close　by。　But　from　the　fact　that　the　watch　hand　points　to　ten　whenever　the　bells　begin　to　ring；　I　have　not　the　right　to　infer　that　the　position　of　the　hands　of　my　watch　is　the　cause　of　the　vibration　of　the　bells。
Whenever　I　see　a　steam…engine　move；　I　hear　the　whistle；　I　see　the　valve　open　and　the　wheels　turn；　but　I　have　no　right　to　conclude　from　that　that　the　whistle　and　the　turning　of　the　wheels　are　the　causes　of　the　steam…engine’s　moving。
The　peasants　say　that　in　the　late　spring　a　cold　wind　blows　because　the　oak…buds　are　opening；　and；　as　a　fact；　a　cold　wind　does　blow　every　spring　when　the　oak　is　coming　out。　But　though　the　cause　of　a　cold　wind’s　blowing　just　when　the　oaks　are　coming　out　is　unknown　to　me；　I　cannot　agree　with　the　peasants　that　the　cause　of　the　cold　wind　is　the　opening　of　the　oak…buds；　because　the　force　of　the　wind　is　altogether　outside　the　influence　of　the　buds。　I　see　in　this　simply　such　a　coincidence　of　events　as　is　common　in　every　phenomenon　of　life；　and　I　see　that　however　long　and　minutely　I　might　examine　the　watch　hand；　the　valve；　and　the　wheel　of　the　steam…engine　and　the　oak…bud；　I　shall　not　discover　the　cause　of　the　bells　ringing；　of　the　steam…engine　moving；　and　of　the　spring　wind。　To　do　that　I　must　completely　change　my　point　of　observation　and　study　the　laws　of　the　motion　of　steam；　of　the　bells；　and　of　the　wind。　History　must　do　the　same。　And　efforts　have　already　been　made　in　this　direction。
For　the　investigation　of　the　laws　of　history；　we　must　completely　change　the　subject　of　observations；　must　let　kings　and　ministers　and　generals　alone；　and　study　the　homogeneous；　infinitesimal　elements　by　which　masses　are　led。　No　one　can　say　how　far　it　has　been　given　to　man　to　advance　in　that　direction　in　understanding　of　the　laws　of　history。　But　it　is　obvious　that　only　in　that　direction　lies　any　possibility　of　discovering　historical　laws；　and　that　the　human　intellect　has　hitherto　not　devoted　to　that　method　of　research　one　millionth　part　of　the　energy　that　historians　have　put　into　the　description　of　the　doings　of　various　kings；　ministers；　and　generals；　and　the　exposition　of　their　own　views　on　those　doings。


Chapter　2
THE　ARMED　FORCES　of　twelve　different　nationalities　of　Europe　invade　Russia。　The　Russian　army　and　population　fall　back；　avoiding　a　battle；　to　Smolensk；　and　from　Smolensk　to　Borodino。　The　French　army　moves　on　to　Moscow；　its　goal；　with　continually　increasing　impetus。　The　impetus　of　its　advance　is　increased　as　it　approaches　its　goal；　just　as　the　velocity　of　a　falling　body　increases　as　it　gets　nearer　the　earth。　Behind　them　thousands　of　versts　of　famine…stricken；　hostile　country；　before　them　some　dozens　of　versts　between　them　and　their　goal。　Every　soldier　of　Napoleon’s　army　feels　it；　and　the　expedition　advances　of　itself；　by　the　force　of　its　own　impetus。
In　the　Russian　troops　the　spirit　of　fury；　of　hatred　of　the　foe；　burns　more　and　more　fiercely　during　their　retreat；　it　gathers　strength　and　concentration　as　they　draw　back。　At　Borodino　the　armies　meet。　Neither　army　is　destroyed；　but　the　Russian　army；　immediately　after　the　conflict；　retreats　as　inevitably　as　a　ball　rebounds　after　contact　with　another　ball　flying　with　greater　impetus　to　meet　it。　And　just　as　inevitably　（though　parting　with　its　force　in　the　contact）　the　ball　of　the　invading　army　is　carried　for　a　space　further　by　the　energy；　not　yet　fully　spent；　within　it。
The　Russians　retreat　one　hundred　and　twenty　versts　beyond　Moscow；　the　French　reach　Moscow　and　there　halt。　For　five　weeks　after　this　there　is　not　a　single　battle。　The　French　do　not　move。　Like　a　wild　beast　mortally　wounded；　bleeding　and　licking　its　wounds；　for　five　weeks　the　French　remain　in　Moscow；　attempting　nothing；　and　all　at　once；　with　nothing　new　to　account　for　it；　they　flee　back；　they　make　a　dash　for　the　Kaluga　road　（after　a　victory；　too；　for　they　remained　in　possession　of　the　field　of　battle　at　Maley　Yaroslavets）；　and　then；　without　a　single　serious　engagement；　fly　more　and　more　rapidly　back　to　Smolensk；　to　Vilna；　to　the　Berezina；　and　beyond　it。
On　the　evening　of　the　26th　of　August；　Kutuzov　and　the　whole　Russian　army　were　convinced　that　the　battle　of　Borodino　was　a　victory。　Kutuzov　wrote　to　that　effect　to　the　Tsar。　He　ordered　the　troops　to　be　in　readiness　for　another　battle；　to　complete　the　defeat　of　the　enemy；　not　because　he　wanted　to　deceive　any　one；　but　because　he　knew　that　the　enemy　was　vanquished；　as　every　one　who　had　taken　part　in　the　battle　knew　it。
But　all　that　evening　and　next　day　news　was　coming　in　of　unheard…of　losses；　of　the　loss　of　one…half　of　the　army；　and　another　battle　turned　out　to　be　physically　impossible。
It　was　impossible　to　give　battle　when　information　had　not　yet　come　in；　the　wounded　had　not　been　removed；　the　ammunition　stores　had　not　been　filled　up；　the　slain　had　not　been　counted；　new　officers　had　not　been　appointed　to　replace　the　dead；　and　the　men　had　had　neither　food　nor　sleep。　And　meanwhile；　the　very　next　morning　after　the　battle；　the　French　army　of　itself　moved　down　upon　the　Russians；　carried　on　by　the　force　of　its　own　impetus；　accelerated　now　in　inverse　ratio　to　the　square　of　the　distance　from　its　goal。　Kutuzov’s　wish　was　to　attack　next　day；　and　all　the　army　shared　this　desire。　But　to　make　an　attack　it　is　not　sufficient　to　desire　to　do　so；　there　must　also　be　a　possibility　of　doing　so；　and　this　possibility　there　was　not。　It　was　impossible　not　to　retreat　one　day’s　march；　and　then　it　was　as　impossible　not　to　retreat　a　second　and　a　third　day’s　march；　and　finally；　on　the　1st　of　September；　when　the　army　reached　Moscow；　despite　the　force　of　the　growing　feeling　in　the　troops；　the　force　of　circumstances　compelled　those　troops　to　retreat　beyond　Moscow。　And　the　troops　retreated　one　more　last　day’s　march；　and　abandoned　Moscow　to　the　enemy。
Persons　who　are　accustomed　to　suppose　that　plans　of　campaigns　and　of　battles　are　made　by　generals　in　the　same　way　as　any　of　us　sitting　over　a　map　in　our　study　make　plans　of　how　we　would　have　acted　in　such　and　such　a　position；　will　be　per