战争与和平(上)-第267部分

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ling　the　actions　of　the　multitude；　is　continually　controlled　by　them。　It　may　be　thought　that　it　is　a　matter　of　no　importance　whether　historical　events　are　interpreted　in　one　way　or　in　another。　But　between　the　man　who　says　that　the　peoples　of　the　West　marched　into　the　East；　because　Napoleon　willed　they　should　do　so；　and　the　man　who　says　that　that　movement　came　to　pass　because　it　was　bound　to　come　to　pass；　there　exists　the　same　difference　as　between　the　men　who　maintained　that　the　earth　was　stationary　and　the　planets　revolved　about　it；　and　the　men　who　said　that　they　did　not　know　what　holds　the　earth　in　its　place；　but　they　did　know　that　there　were　laws　controlling　its　motions　and　the　motions　of　the　other　planets。　Causes　of　historical　events—there　are　not　and　cannot　be；　save　the　one　cause　of　all　causes。　But　there　are　laws　controlling　these　events；　laws　partly　unknown；　partly　accessible　to　us。　The　discovery　of　these　laws　is　only　possible　when　we　entirely　give　up　looking　for　a　cause　in　the　will　of　one　man；　just　as　the　discovery　of　the　laws　of　the　motions　of　the　planets　has　only　become　possible　since　men　have　given　up　the　conception　of　the　earth　being　stationary。
After　the　battle　of　Borodino；　and　the　taking　and　burning　of　Moscow；　historians　consider　the　most　important　episode　of　the　war　of　1812　to　be　the　movement　of　the　Russian　army　from　the　Ryazan　to　the　Kaluga　road　and　to　the　Tarutino　camp；　the　so…called　oblique　march　behind　Krasnaya　Pahra。　Historians　ascribe　the　credit　of　this　stroke　of　genius　to　various　persons；　and　dispute　to　whom　it　is　rightfully　due。　Even　foreign；　even　French　historians；　admit　the　genius　of　the　Russian　generals　when　they　mention　this　flank　march。　But　why　military　writers；　and　others　following　their　lead；　assume　this　oblique　movement　to　be　a　project　profoundly　planned　by　some　one　person　for　the　deliverance　of　Russia　and　the　overthrow　of　Napoleon　it　is　very　difficult　to　see。　It　is　difficult　in　the　first　place　to　see　wherein　the　profound　wisdom　and　genius　of　this　march　lies；　for　no　great　intellectual　effort　is　needed　to　guess　that　the　best　position　for　an　army；　when　not　being　attacked；　is　where　supplies　are　most　plentiful。　And　every　one；　even　a　stupid　boy　of　thirteen；　could　have　guessed　that　the　most　advantageous　position　for　the　army　in　1812；　after　the　retreat　from　Moscow；　would　be　on　the　Kaluga　road。　And　so　one　cannot　understand；　in　the　first　place；　what　conclusions　led　the　historians　to　see　some　deep　wisdom　in　this　man？uvre。　Secondly；　it　is　even　more　difficult　to　understand　why　the　historians　ascribe　to　this　man？uvre　the　deliverance　of　Russia　and　the　overthrow　of　the　French；　for；　had　other　circumstances　preceded；　accompanied；　or　followed　it；　this　flank　movement　might　as　well　have　led　to　the　destruction　of　the　Russian　army　and　the　deliverance　of　the　French。　If　the　position　of　the　Russian　army　did；　in　fact；　begin　to　improve　from　the　time　of　that　march；　it　does　not　at　all　follow　that　the　improvement　was　caused　by　it。
That　oblique　march　might　have　been　not　simply　of　no　use；　it　might　have　led　to　the　destruction　of　the　Russian　army；　but　for　the　conjunction　of　other　circumstances。　What　would　have　happened　if　Moscow　had　not　been　burnt？　If　Murat　had　not　lost　sight　of　the　Russians？　If　Napoleon　had　not　remained　inactive？　If；　as　Bennigsen　and　Barclay　advised；　the　Russians　had　given　battle　near　Krasnaya　Pahra？　What　would　have　happened　if　the　French　had　attacked　the　Russians　when　they　were　marching　behind　Pahra？　What　would　have　happened　if　later　on　Napoleon；　on　reaching　Tarutino；　had　attacked　the　Russians　with　one…tenth　of　the　energy　with　which　he　had　attacked　them　at　Smolensk？　What　would　have　happened　if　the　French　had　marched　to　Petersburg？　…　On　any　of　these　hypotheses；　the　oblique　march　might　have　led　to　ruin　instead　of　to　safety。
The　third　point；　most　difficult　of　all　to　understand；　is　that　students　of　history　seem　intentionally　to　refuse　to　see　that　this　march　cannot　be　ascribed　to　any　one　man；　that　no　one　foresaw　it　at　any　time；　that；　like　the　retreat　to　Fili；　the　man？uvre　was；　in　reality；　never　conceived　of　by　any　one　in　its　entirety；　but　arose　step　by　step；　incident　by　incident；　moment　by　moment　from　a　countless　multitude　of　the　most　diverse　circumstances；　and　is　only　conceived　of　in　its　entirety；　when　it　is　an　accomplished　fact；　and　has　become　the　past。
At　the　council　at　Fili　the　accepted　idea　among　the　Russians—the　course　taken　for　granted　in　fact—was　retreat　in　a　direct　line　back；　that　is；　along　the　Nizhni　road。　Evidence　of　this　is　that　the　majority　of　votes　at　the　council　were　for　adopting　this　course；　and　the　commander…in…chief’s　famous　conversation　after　the　council　with　Lansky；　the　head　of　the　commissariat　department；　is　an　even　more　striking　proof　of　it。　Lansky　submitted　to　the　commander…in…chief　that　the　chief　supplies　for　the　army　were　stored　along　the　Oka；　in　the　Tula　and　Kazan　provinces；　and　that　if　they　retreated　along　the　Nizhni　road；　the　army　would　be　cut　off　from　its　supplies　by　the　broad　river　Oka；　across　which　transport　in　the　early　winter　was　impossible。　This　was　the　first　proof　of　the　necessity　of　departing　from　the　course　that　had　at　first　seemed　the　most　natural　one；　the　retreat　along　the　Nizhni　road。　The　army　kept　more　to　the　south　along　the　Ryazan　road；　closer　to　its　supplies。　Later　on　the　inactivity　of　the　French；　who　positively　lost　sight　of　the　Russian　army；　anxiety　for　the　defence　of　the　Tula　arsenal；　and　above　all；　the　advantage　of　being　near　their　supplies　led　the　army　to　turn　even　more　to　the　south；　to　the　Tula　road。　After　crossing　by　a　forced　march　behind　Pahra　to　the　Tula　road；　the　generals　of　the　Russian　army　intended　to　remain　at　Podolsk；　and　had　no　idea　of　the　Tarutino　position。　But　an　infinite　number　of　circumstances；　among　them　the　reappearance　of　French　troops　on　the　scene；　and　plans　for　giving　battle；　and　most　of　all；　the　abundance　of　supplies　in　Kaluga；　led　our　army　to　turn　even　more　to　the　south；　and　to　pass　from　the　Tula　to　the　Kaluga　road　to　Tarutino；　a　central　position　between　their　lines　of　communication　with　their　supplies。　Just　as　it　is　impossible　to　answer　the　question　what　date　Moscow　was　abandoned；　it　is　impossible　too　to　say　precisely　when　and　by　whom　it　was　decided　to　move　the　army　to　Tarutino。　It　was　only　after　the　army；　through　the　action　of　innumerable　infinitesimally　small　forces；　had　been　brought　to　Tarutino；　that　people　began　to　protest　to　themselves　that　that　was　the　course　they　had　desired；　and　had　long　foreseen　as　the　right　one。


Chapter　2
THE　FAMOUS　OBLIQUE　MOVEMENT　consisted　simply　in　this。　The　Russian　troops；　which　had　been　retreating　directly　back　from　the　French；　as　soon　as　the　French　attack　ceased；　turned　off　from　that　direction；　and　seeing　they　were　not　pursued；　moved　naturally　in　the　direction　where　they　were　drawn　by　the　abundance　of　supplies。
If　we　imagine；　instead　of　generals　of　genius　at　the　head　of　the　Russian　army；　an　army　acting　alone；　without　leadership　of　any　kind；　such　an　army　could　have　done　nothing　else　but　move　back　again　towards　Moscow；　describing　a　semicircle　through　the　country　that　was　best　provided　with　necessaries；　and　where　supplies　were　most　plentiful。
So　natural　was　this　oblique　movement　from　the　Nizhni　to　the　Ryazan；　Tula；　and　Kaluga　road；　that　that　direction　was　the　one　taken　by　the　flying　bands　of　marauders　from　the　Russian　army；　and　the　one　which　the　authorities　in　Petersburg　insisted　upon　Kutuzov’s　taking。　At　Tarutino　Kutuzov　received　what　was　almost　a　reprimand　from　the　Tsar　for　moving　the　army　to　the　Ryazan　road；　and　he　was　directed　to　take　up　the　very　position　facing　Kaluga；　in　which　he　was　encamped　at　the　time　when　the　Tsar’s　letter　reached　him。
After　recoiling　in　the　direction　of　the　shock　received　during　the　whole　campaign；　and　at　the　battle　of　Borodino；　the　ball　of　the　Russian　army；　as　the　force　of　that　blow　spent　itself；　and　no　new　blow　came；　took　the　direction　that　was　natural　for　it。
Kutuzov’s　merit　lay　in　no　sort　of　military　genius；　as　it　is　called；　in　no　strategic　man？uvre；　but　in　the　fact　that　he　alone　grasped　the　significance　of　what　had　taken　place。　He　alone　grasped　even　then　the　significance　of　the　inactivity　of　the　French　army；　he　alone　persisted　in　maintaining　that　the　battle　of　Borodino　was　a　victory；　he　alone—the　man　who　from　his　position　as　commander…in…chief　might　have　been　expected　to　be　the　first　to　be　eager　for　battle—he　alone　did　everything　in　his　power　to　hold　the　Russian　army　back　from　useless　fighting。
The　wild　beast　wounded　at　Borodino　lay　where　the　fleeing　hunter　had　left　him；　but　whether　alive　and　strong；　or　only　feigning；　the　hunter　knew　not。　All　at　once　a　moan　was　heard　from　the　creature。　The　moan　of　that　wounded　creature；　the　French　army；　that　betrayed　its　hopeless　plight；　was　the　despatch　of　Lauriston　to　the　camp　of　Kutuzov　with　overtures　for　peace。
Napoleon；　with　his　conviction　that　not　what　was　right　was　right；　but　whatever　came　into　his　head　was　right；　wrote　to　Kutuzov　the　first　words　that　occurred　to　his　mind；　words　that　had　no　meaning　at　all。
“M。　LE　PRINCE　KOUTOUZOFF；”　he　wrote；　“I　am　sending　you　one　of　my　aides…de…camp　to　converse　with　you　on　various　interesting　subjects。　I　desire　that　your　highness　will　put　faith　in　what　he　says；　especially　when　he　expresses　the　sentiments　of　esteem　and　particular　consideration　that　I　have　long　entertained　for　your　person。　This　letter　having　no　other　object；　I　pray　God　to　have　you　in　His　holy　and　powerful　keeping。
（Signed）　NAPOLEON。
“Moscow；　October　30；　1812。”
“I　should　be　cursed　by　posterity　if　I　were　regarded　as　the　first　instigator　of　any　sort　of　settlement。　Tel　est　l’esprit　actuel　de　ma　nation；”　answered　Kutuzov；　and　went　on　doing　everything　in　his　power　to　hold　the　army　back　from　advance。
A　month　spent　by　the　French　army　in　pillaging　Moscow；　and　by　the　Russian　army　quietly　encamped　at　Tarutino；　brought　about　a　change　in　the　relative　strength　of　the　two　armies；　a　change　both　in　spirit　and　in　numbers；　which　was　all　to　the　advantage　of　the　Russians。　Although　the　position　of　the　French　army　and　its　numbers　were　unknown　to　the　Russians；　as　soon　as　their　relative　strength　had　changed；　a　great　number　of　signs　began　to　show　that　an　attack　would　be　inevitable。　Among　the　causes　that　contributed　to　bring　about　this　result　were　La