战争与和平(上)-第279部分

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story　（so　far　as　we　know　it）　confirm　the　truth　of　the　statement；　that　the　successes　or　defeats　of　a　nation’s　army　are　the　causes　or；　at　least；　the　invariable　symptoms　of　the　increase　or　diminution　of　the　power　of　a　nation。　An　army　gains　a　victory；　and　immediately　the　claims　of　the　conquering　people　are　increased　to　the　detriment　of　the　conquered。　An　army　is　defeated；　and　at　once　the　people　loses　its　rights　in　proportion　to　the　magnitude　of　the　defeat；　and　if　its　army　is　utterly　defeated；　the　people　is　completely　conquered。　So　（according　to　history）　it　has　been　from　the　most　ancient　times　up　to　the　present。　All　Napoleon’s　earlier　wars　serve　as　illustrations　of　the　rule。　As　the　Austrian　armies　were　defeated；　Austria　was　deprived　of　her　rights；　and　the　rights　and　power　of　France　were　increased。　The　victories　of　the　French　at　Jena　and　at　Auerstadt　destroyed　the　independent　existence　of　Prussia。
But　suddenly；　in　1812；　the　French　gained　a　victory　before　Moscow。　Moscow　was　taken；　and　in　consequence　of　that；　with　no　subsequent　battles；　not　Russia；　but　the　French　army　of　six　hundred　thousand；　and　then　Napoleonic　France　itself　ceased　to　exist。　To　strain　the　facts　to　fit　the　rules　of　history；　to　maintain　that　the　field　of　Borodino　was　left　in　the　hands　of　the　Russians；　or　that　after　the　evacuation　of　Moscow；　there　were　battles　that　destroyed　Napoleon’s　army—is　impossible。
After　the　victory　of　the　French　at　Borodino；　there　was　no　general　engagement；　nor　even　a　skirmish　of　any　great　importance；　yet　the　French　army　ceased　to　exist。　What　is　the　meaning　of　it？　If　it　had　been　an　example　from　the　history　of　China；　we　could　have　said　it　was　not　an　historical　fact　（the　resource　of　historians　when　anything　will　not　fit　in　with　their　rules）。　If　it　had　occurred　in　a　conflict　on　a　small　scale；　in　which　only　small　numbers　of　soldiers　had　taken　part；　we　might　have　looked　upon　it　as　an　exception。　But　all　this　took　place　before　the　eyes　of　our　fathers；　for　whom　it　was　a　question　of　life　and　death　for　their　country；　and　the　war　was　on　a　larger　scale　than　any　wars　we　know　of。
The　sequel　of　the　campaign　of　1812—from　Borodino　to　the　final　expulsion　of　the　French—has　proved　that　victories　are　not　always　a　cause　nor　even　an　invariable　sign　of　conquest；　it　has　proved　that　the　force　that　decides　the　fate　of　peoples　does　not　lie　in　military　leaders；　nor　even　in　armies　and　battles；　but　in　something　else。
The　French　historians；　who　describe　the　position　of　the　French　troops　before　they　marched　out　of　Moscow；　assert　that　everything　was　in　good　order　in　the　Grande　Armée；　except　the　cavalry；　the　artillery；　and　the　transport；　and　that　there　was　no　forage　for　the　horses　and　cattle。　There　was　no　remedy　for　this　defect；　because　the　peasants　of　the　surrounding　country　burned　their　hay　rather　than　let　the　French　have　it。
Victory　did　not　bring　forth　its　usual　results；　because　the　peasants；　Karp　and　Vlas；　by　no　means　persons　of　heroic　feelings　（after　the　French　evacuation；　they　hurried　with　their　carts　to　pillage　Moscow）；　and　the　immense　multitude　of　others　like　them　burnt　their　hay　rather　than　bring　it　to　Moscow；　however　high　the　prices　offered　them。
Let　us　imagine　two　men；　who　have　come　out　to　fight　a　duel　with　swords　in　accordance　with　all　the　rules　of　the　art　of　swordsmanship。　The　fencing　has　lasted　for　some　time。　All　at　once　one　of　the　combatants；　feeling　that　he　is　wounded；　grasping　that　it　is　no　joking　matter；　but　a　question　of　life　and　death；　flings　away　his　sword；　and　snatching　up　the　first　cudgel　that　comes　handy；　begins　to　brandish　that。　But　let　us　imagine　that　the　combatant；　who　has　so　sensibly　made　use　of　the　best　and　simplest　means　for　the　attainment　of　his　object；　should　be　inspired　by　the　traditions　of　chivalry　to　try　and　disguise　the　real　cause　of　the　conflict　and　should　persist　in　declaring　that　he　had　been　victor　in　the　duel　in　accordance　with　all　the　rules　of　swordsmanship。　One　can　imagine　what　confusion　and　obscurity　would　arise　from　his　description　of　the　duel！
The　duellist；　who　insisted　on　the　conflict　being　fought　in　accordance　with　the　principles　of　the　fencer’s　art；　stands　for　the　French；　his　opponent；　who　flung　away　his　sword　and　snatched　up　a　cudgel；　did　like　the　Russians；　and　the　attempted　description　of　the　duel　in　accordance　with　the　rules　of　swordsmanship　has　been　given　us　by　the　historians　of　the　war。
From　the　time　of　the　burning　of　Smolensk　a　war　began　which　did　not　follow　any　of　the　old　traditions　of　warfare。　The　burning　of　towns　and　villages；　the　retreat　after　every　battle；　the　blow　dealt　at　Borodino　and　followed　by　retreat；　the　burning　of　Moscow；　the　capture　of　marauders；　the　seizing　of　transports；—the　whole　of　the　irregular　warfare　was　a　departure　from　the　rules。
Napoleon　was　aware　of　it；　and　from　the　time　when　he　stood　waiting　in　Moscow　in　the　correct　pose　of　the　victorious　fencer；　and　instead　of　his　opponent’s　sword；　saw　the　bludgeon　raised　against　him；　he　never　ceased　complaining　to　Kutuzov　and　to　the　Emperor　Alexander　that　the　war　was　being　conducted　contrary　to　all　the　rules　of　war。　（As　though　any　rules　existed　for　the　slaughter　of　men！）
In　spite　of　the　complaints　of　the　French　that　they　did　not　keep　to　the　rules；　in　spite　of　the　fact　that　the　Russians　in　the　highest　positions　felt　it　somehow　shameful　to　be　fighting　with　a　cudgel；　and　wanted　to　take　up　the　correct　position　en　quarte　or　en　tierce；　to　make　a　skilful　thrust；　en　prime　and　so　on；　the　cudgel　of　the　people’s　war　was　raised　in　all　its　menacing　and　majestic　power；　and　troubling　itself　about　no　question　of　any　one’s　tastes　or　rules；　about　no　fine　distinctions；　with　stupid　simplicity；　with　perfect　consistency；　it　rose　and　fell　and　belaboured　the　French　till　the　whole　invading　army　had　been　driven　out。
And　happy　the　people　that　will　not；　as　the　French　did　in　1813；　saluting　according　to　the　rules；　gracefully　and　cautiously　offer　the　sword　hilt　to　the　magnanimous　conqueror。　Happy　the　people　who；　in　the　moment　of　trial；　asks　no　questions　how　others　would　act　by　the　recognised　rules　in　such　cases；　but　with　ease　and　directness　picks　up　the　first　cudgel　that　comes　handy　and　deals　blows　with　it；　till　resentment　and　revenge　give　way　to　contempt　and　pity。


Chapter　2
ONE　of　the　most　conspicuous　and　advantageous　departures　from　the　so…called　rules　of　warfare　is　the　independent　action　of　men　acting　separately　against　men　huddled　together　in　a　mass。　Such　independent　activity　is　always　seen　in　a　war　that　assumes　a　national　character。　In　this　kind　of　warfare；　instead　of　forming　in　a　crowd　to　attack　a　crowd；　men　disperse　in　small　groups；　attack　singly　and　at　once　fly；　when　attacked　by　superior　forces；　and　then　attack　again；　when　an　opportunity　presents　itself。　Such　were　the　methods　of　the　guerillas　in　Spain；　of　the　mountain　tribes　in　the　Caucasus；　and　of　the　Russians　in　1812。
War　of　this　kind　has　been　called　partisan　warfare　on　the　supposition　that　this　name　defined　its　special　significance。　But　this　kind　of　warfare　does　not　follow　any　rules　of　war；　but　is　in　direct　contradiction　to　a　well…known　rule　of　tactics；　regarded　as　infallible。　That　rule　lays　it　down　that　the　attacking　party　must　concentrate　his　forces　in　order　to　be　stronger　than　his　opponent　at　the　moment　of　conflict。
Partisan　warfare　（always　successful；　as　history　testifies）　acts　in　direct　contradiction　of　this　rule。
Military　science　assumes　that　the　relative　strength　of　forces　is　identical　with　their　numerical　proportions。　Military　science　maintains　that　the　greater　the　number　of　soldiers；　the　greater　their　strength。　Les　gros　bataillons　ont　toujours　raison。
To　say　this　is　as　though　one　were　in　mechanics　to　say　that　forces　were　equal　or　unequal　simply　because　the　masses　of　the　moving　bodies　were　equal　or　unequal。
Force　（the　volume　of　motion）　is　the　product　of　the　mass　into　the　velocity。
In　warfare　the　force　of　armies　is　the　product　of　the　mass　multiplied　by　something　else；　an　unknown　x。
Military　science；　seeing　in　history　an　immense　number　of　examples　in　which　the　mass　of　an　army　does　not　correspond　with　its　force；　and　in　which　small　numbers　conquer　large　ones；　vaguely　recognises　the　existence　of　this　unknown　factor；　and　tries　to　find　it　sometimes　in　some　geometrical　disposition　of　the　troops；　sometimes　in　the　superiority　of　weapons；　and　most　often　in　the　genius　of　the　leaders。　But　none　of　those　factors　yield　results　that　agree　with　the　historical　facts。
One　has　but　to　renounce　the　false　view　that　glorifies　the　effect　of　the　activity　of　the　heroes　of　history　in　warfare　in　order　to　discover　this　unknown　quantity；　x。
X　is　the　spirit　of　the　army；　the　greater　or　less　desire　to　fight　and　to　face　dangers　on　the　part　of　all　the　men　composing　the　army；　which　is　quite　apart　from　the　question　whether　they　are　fighting　under　leaders　of　genius　or　not；　with　cudgels　or　with　guns　that　fire　thirty　times　a　minute。　The　men　who　have　the　greater　desire　to　fight　always　put　themselves；　too；　in　the　more　advantageous　position　for　fighting。　The　spirit　of　the　army　is　the　factor　which　multiplied　by　the　mass　gives　the　product　of　the　force。　To　define　and　express　the　significance　of　this　unknown　factor；　the　spirit　of　the　army；　is　the　problem　of　science。
This　problem　can　only　be　solved　when　we　cease　arbitrarily　substituting　for　that　unknown　factor　x　the　conditions　under　which　the　force　is　manifested；　such　as　the　plans　of　the　general；　the　arming　of　the　men　and　so　on；　and　recognise　this　unknown　factor　in　its　entirety　as　the　greater　or　less　desire　to　fight　and　face　danger。　Then　only　by　expressing　known　historical　facts　in　equations　can　one　hope　from　comparison　of　the　relative　value　of　this　unknown　factor　to　approach　its　definition。　Ten　men；　or　battalions　or　divisions　are　victorious　fighting　with　fifteen　men　or　battalions　or　divisions；　that　is；　they　kill　or　take　prisoner　all　of　them　while　losing　four　of　their　own　side；　so　that　the　loss　has　been　four　on　one　side　and　fifteen　on　the　other。　Consequently；　four　on　one　side　have　been　equivalent　to　fifteen　on　the　other；　and　consequently　4x　=　15y。　Consequently　x/y　=　15/4。　This　equation　does　not　give　us　the　value　of　the　unknown　factors；　but　it　does　give　us　the　ratio　between　their　values。　And　from　the　reduction　to　such　equations　of　various　historical　units　（battles；　campaigns；　periods　of　warfare）　a　series　o