orthodoxy-第8部分

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get　into。







　　　　　The　main　point　here；　however；　is　that　this　idea　of　a　fundamental



alteration　in　the　standard　is　one　of　the　things　that　make　thought



about　the　past　or　future　simply　impossible。　　The　theory　of　a



complete　change　of　standards　in　human　history　does　not　merely



deprive　us　of　the　pleasure　of　honouring　our　fathers；　it　deprives



us　even　of　the　more　modern　and　aristocratic　pleasure　of　despising　them。







　　　　　This　bald　summary　of　the　thought…destroying　forces　of　our



time　would　not　be　complete　without　some　reference　to　pragmatism；



for　though　I　have　here　used　and　should　everywhere　defend　the



pragmatist　method　as　a　preliminary　guide　to　truth；　there　is　an　extreme



application　of　it　which　involves　the　absence　of　all　truth　whatever。　



My　meaning　can　be　put　shortly　thus。　　I　agree　with　the　pragmatists



that　apparent　objective　truth　is　not　the　whole　matter；　that　there



is　an　authoritative　need　to　believe　the　things　that　are　necessary



to　the　human　mind。　　But　I　say　that　one　of　those　necessities



precisely　is　a　belief　in　objective　truth。　　The　pragmatist　tells



a　man　to　think　what　he　must　think　and　never　mind　the　Absolute。　



But　precisely　one　of　the　things　that　he　must　think　is　the　Absolute。　



This　philosophy；　indeed；　is　a　kind　of　verbal　paradox。　　Pragmatism　is



a　matter　of　human　needs；　and　one　of　the　first　of　human　needs



is　to　be　something　more　than　a　pragmatist。　　Extreme　pragmatism



is　just　as　inhuman　as　the　determinism　it　so　powerfully　attacks。　



The　determinist　（who；　to　do　him　justice；　does　not　pretend　to　be



a　human　being）　makes　nonsense　of　the　human　sense　of　actual　choice。　



The　pragmatist；　who　professes　to　be　specially　human；　makes　nonsense



of　the　human　sense　of　actual　fact。







　　　　　To　sum　up　our　contention　so　far；　we　may　say　that　the　most



characteristic　current　philosophies　have　not　only　a　touch　of　mania；



but　a　touch　of　suicidal　mania。　　The　mere　questioner　has　knocked



his　head　against　the　limits　of　human　thought；　and　cracked　it。　



This　is　what　makes　so　futile　the　warnings　of　the　orthodox　and　the



boasts　of　the　advanced　about　the　dangerous　boyhood　of　free　thought。　



What　we　are　looking　at　is　not　the　boyhood　of　free　thought；　it　is



the　old　age　and　ultimate　dissolution　of　free　thought。　　It　is　vain



for　bishops　and　pious　bigwigs　to　discuss　what　dreadful　things　will



happen　if　wild　scepticism　runs　its　course。　　It　has　run　its　course。　



It　is　vain　for　eloquent　atheists　to　talk　of　the　great　truths　that



will　be　revealed　if　once　we　see　free　thought　begin。　　We　have　seen



it　end。　　It　has　no　more　questions　to　ask；　it　has　questioned　itself。　



You　cannot　call　up　any　wilder　vision　than　a　city　in　which　men



ask　themselves　if　they　have　any　selves。　　You　cannot　fancy　a　more



sceptical　world　than　that　in　which　men　doubt　if　there　is　a　world。　



It　might　certainly　have　reached　its　bankruptcy　more　quickly



and　cleanly　if　it　had　not　been　feebly　hampered　by　the　application



of　indefensible　laws　of　blasphemy　or　by　the　absurd　pretence



that　modern　England　is　Christian。　　But　it　would　have　reached　the



bankruptcy　anyhow。　　Militant　atheists　are　still　unjustly　persecuted；



but　rather　because　they　are　an　old　minority　than　because　they



are　a　new　one。　　Free　thought　has　exhausted　its　own　freedom。　



It　is　weary　of　its　own　success。　　If　any　eager　freethinker　now　hails



philosophic　freedom　as　the　dawn；　he　is　only　like　the　man　in　Mark



Twain　who　came　out　wrapped　in　blankets　to　see　the　sun　rise　and　was



just　in　time　to　see　it　set。　　If　any　frightened　curate　still　says



that　it　will　be　awful　if　the　darkness　of　free　thought　should　spread；



we　can　only　answer　him　in　the　high　and　powerful　words　of　Mr。　Belloc；



〃Do　not；　I　beseech　you；　be　troubled　about　the　increase　of　forces



already　in　dissolution。　　You　have　mistaken　the　hour　of　the　night：　



it　is　already　morning。〃　　We　have　no　more　questions　left　to　ask。　



We　have　looked　for　questions　in　the　darkest　corners　and　on　the



wildest　peaks。　　We　have　found　all　the　questions　that　can　be　found。　



It　is　time　we　gave　up　looking　for　questions　and　began　looking



for　answers。







　　　　　But　one　more　word　must　be　added。　　At　the　beginning　of　this



preliminary　negative　sketch　I　said　that　our　mental　ruin　has



been　wrought　by　wild　reason；　not　by　wild　imagination。　　A　man



does　not　go　mad　because　he　makes　a　statue　a　mile　high；　but　he



may　go　mad　by　thinking　it　out　in　square　inches。　　Now；　one　school



of　thinkers　has　seen　this　and　jumped　at　it　as　a　way　of　renewing



the　pagan　health　of　the　world。　　They　see　that　reason　destroys；



but　Will；　they　say；　creates。　　The　ultimate　authority；　they　say；



is　in　will；　not　in　reason。　　The　supreme　point　is　not　why



a　man　demands　a　thing；　but　the　fact　that　he　does　demand　it。　



I　have　no　space　to　trace　or　expound　this　philosophy　of　Will。　



It　came；　I　suppose；　through　Nietzsche；　who　preached　something



that　is　called　egoism。　　That；　indeed；　was　simpleminded　enough；



for　Nietzsche　denied　egoism　simply　by　preaching　it。　　To　preach



anything　is　to　give　it　away。　　First；　the　egoist　calls　life　a　war



without　mercy；　and　then　he　takes　the　greatest　possible　trouble　to



drill　his　enemies　in　war。　　To　preach　egoism　is　to　practise　altruism。　



But　however　it　began；　the　view　is　common　enough　in　current　literature。　



The　main　defence　of　these　thinkers　is　that　they　are　not　thinkers；



they　are　makers。　　They　say　that　choice　is　itself　the　divine　thing。　



Thus　Mr。　Bernard　Shaw　has　attacked　the　old　idea　that　men's　acts



are　to　be　judged　by　the　standard　of　the　desire　of　happiness。　



He　says　that　a　man　does　not　act　for　his　happiness；　but　from　his　will。　



He　does　not　say；　〃Jam　will　make　me　happy；〃　but　〃I　want　jam。〃　



And　in　all　this　others　follow　him　with　yet　greater　enthusiasm。　



Mr。　John　Davidson；　a　remarkable　poet；　is　so　passionately　excited



about　it　that　he　is　obliged　to　write　prose。　　He　publishes　a　short



play　with　several　long　prefaces。　　This　is　natural　enough　in　Mr。　Shaw；



for　all　his　plays　are　prefaces：　　Mr。　Shaw　is　（I　suspect）　the　only　man



on　earth　who　has　never　written　any　poetry。　　But　that　Mr。　Davidson　（who



can　write　excellent　poetry）　should　write　instead　laborious　metaphysics



in　defence　of　this　doctrine　of　will；　does　show　that　the　doctrine



of　will　has　taken　hold　of　men。　　Even　Mr。　H。G。Wells　has　half　spoken



in　its　language；　saying　that　one　should　test　acts　not　like　a　thinker；



but　like　an　artist；　saying；　〃I　FEEL　this　curve　is　right；〃　or　〃that



line　SHALL　go　thus。〃　　They　are　all　excited；　and　well　they　may　be。　



For　by　this　doctrine　of　the　divine　authority　of　will；　they　think　they



can　break　out　of　the　doomed　fortress　of　rationalism。　　They　think　they



can　escape。







　　　　　But　they　cannot　escape。　　This　pure　praise　of　volition　ends



in　the　same　break　up　and　blank　as　the　mere　pursuit　of　logic。　



Exactly　as　complete　free　thought　involves　the　doubting　of　thought　itself；



so　the　acceptation　of　mere　〃willing〃　really　paralyzes　the　will。　



Mr。　Bernard　Shaw　has　not　perceived　the　real　difference　between　the　old



utilitarian　test　of　pleasure　（clumsy；　of　course；　and　easily　misstated）



and　that　which　he　propounds。　　The　real　difference　between　the　test



of　happiness　and　the　test　of　will　is　simply　that　the　test　of



happiness　is　a　test　and　the　other　isn't。　You　can　discuss　whether



a　man's　act　in　jumping　over　a　cliff　was　directed　towards　happiness；



you　cannot　discuss　whether　it　was　derived　from　will。　　Of　course



it　was。　　You　can　praise　an　action　by　saying　that　it　is　calculated



to　bring　pleasure　or　pain　to　discover　truth　or　to　save　the　soul。　



But　you　cannot　praise　an　action　because　it　shows　will；　for　to　say



that　is　merely　to　say　that　it　is　an　action。　　By　this　praise　of　will



you　cannot　really　choose　one　course　as　better　than　another。　　And　yet



choosing　one　course　as　better　than　another　is　the　very　definition



of　the　will　you　are　praising。







　　　　　The　worship　of　will　is　the　negation　of　will。　　To　admire　mere



choice　is　to　refuse　to　choose。　　If　Mr。　Bernard　Shaw　comes　up



to　me　and　says；　〃Will　something；〃　that　is　tantamount　to　saying；



〃I　do　not　mind　what　you　will；〃　and　that　is　tantamount　to　saying；



〃I　have　no　will　in　the　matter。〃　　You　cannot　admire　will　in　general；



because　the　essence　of　will　is　that　it　is　particular。　



A　brilliant　anarchist　like　Mr。　John　Davidson　feels　an　irritation



against　ordinary　morality；　and　therefore　he　invokes　will



will　to　anything。　　He　only　wants　humanity　to　want　something。　



But　humanity　does　want　something。　　It　wants　ordinary　morality。　



He　rebels　against　the　law　and　tells　us　to　will　something　or　anything。　



But　we　have　willed　something。　　We　have　willed　the　law　against　which



he　rebels。







　　　　　All　the　will…worshippers；　from　Nietzsche　to　Mr。　Davidson；



are　really　quite　empty　of　volition。　　They　cannot　will；　they　can



hardly　wish。　　And　if　any　one　wants　a　proof　of　this；　it　can　be　found



quite　easily。　　It　can　be　found　in　this　fact：　　that　they　always　talk



of　will　as　something　that　expands　and　breaks　out。　　But　it　is　quite



the　opposite。　　Every　act　of　will　is　an　act　of　self…limitation。　To



desire　action　is　to　desire　limitation。　　In　that　sense　every　act



is　an　act　of　self…sacrifice。　When　you　choose　anything；　you　reject



everything　else。　　That　objection；　which　men　of　this　school　used



to　make　to　the　act　of　marriage；　is　really　an　objection　to　every　act。　



Every　act　is　an　irrevocable　selection　and　exclusion。　　Just　as　when



you　marry　one　woman　you　give　up　all　the　others；　so　when　you　take



one　course　of　action　you　give　up　all　the　ot