the six enneads-第112部分

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　which　it　is　not　so　capable：　it　does　actually　contain　its　object；　though　as　something　other　than　itself。　　　　　In　the　self…intellective；　there　is　not　even　this　distinction　of　being：　self…conversing；　the　subject　is　its　own　object；　and　thus　takes　the　double　form　while　remaining　essentially　a　unity。　The　intellection　is　the　more　profound　for　this　internal　possession　of　the　object。　　　　　This　principle　is　the　primally　intellective　since　there　can　be　no　intellection　without　duality　in　unity。　If　there　is　no　unity；　perceiving　principle　and　perceived　object　will　be　different；　and　the　intellection；　therefore；　not　primal：　a　principle　concerned　with　something　external　cannot　be　the　primally　intellective　since　it　does　not　possess　the　object　as　integrally　its　own　or　as　itself；　if　it　does　possess　the　object　as　itself…　the　condition　of　true　intellection…　the　two　are　one。　Thus　＇in　order　to　primal　intellection＇　there　must　be　a　unity　in　duality；　while　a　pure　unity　with　no　counterbalancing　duality　can　have　no　object　for　its　intellection　and　ceases　to　be　intellective：　in　other　words　the　primally　intellective　must　be　at　once　simplex　and　something　else。　　　　　But　the　surest　way　of　realizing　that　its　nature　demands　this　combination　of　unity　and　duality　is　to　proceed　upwards　from　the　Soul；　where　the　distinction　can　be　made　more　dearly　since　the　duality　is　exhibited　more　obviously。　　　　　We　can　imagine　the　Soul　as　a　double　light；　a　lesser　corresponding　to　the　soul　proper；　a　purer　representing　its　intellective　phase；　if　now　we　suppose　this　intellective　light　equal　to　the　light　which　is　to　be　its　object；　we　no　longer　distinguish　between　them；　the　two　are　recognised　as　one：　we　know；　indeed；　that　there　are　two；　but　as　we　see　them　they　have　become　one：　this　gives　us　the　relation　between　the　intellective　subject　and　the　object　of　intellection　＇in　the　duality　and　unity　required　by　that　primal　intellection＇：　in　our　thought　we　have　made　the　two　into　one；　but　on　the　other　hand　the　one　thing　has　become　two；　making　itself　into　a　duality　at　the　moment　of　intellection；　or；　to　be　more　exact；　being　dual　by　the　fact　of　intellection　and　single　by　the　fact　that　its　intellectual　object　is　itself。　　　　　2。　Thus　there　is　the　primally　intellective　and　there　is　that　in　which　intellection　has　taken　another　mode；　but　this　indicates　that　what　transcends　the　primarily　intellective　has　no　intellection；　for；　to　have　intellection；　it　must　become　an　Intellectual…Principle；　and；　if　it　is　to　become　that；　it　must　possess　an　intellectual　object　and；　as　primarily　intellective；　it　must　possess　that　intellectual　object　as　something　within　itself。　　　　　But　it　is　not　inevitable　that　every　intellectual　object　should　both　possess　the　intellective　principle　in　itself　and　exercise　intellection：　at　that；　it　would　be　not　merely　object　but　subject　as　well　and；　besides；　being　thus　dual；　could　not　be　primal：　further；　the　intellectual　principle　that　is　to　possess　the　intellectual　object　could　not　cohere　unless　there　existed　an　essence　purely　intellectual；　something　which；　while　standing　as　intellectual　object　to　the　intellectual　principle；　is　in　its　own　essence　neither　an　agent　nor　an　object　of　intellection。　The　intellectual　object　points　to　something　beyond　itself　＇to　a　percipient＇；　and　the　intellectual　agent　has　its　intellection　in　vain　unless　by　seizing　and　holding　an　object…　since；　failing　that；　it　can　have　no　intellection　but　is　consummated　only　when　it　possesses　itself　of　its　natural　term。　　　　　There　must　have　been　something　standing　consummate　independently　of　any　intellectual　act；　something　perfect　in　its　own　essence：　thus　that　in　which　this　completion　is　inherent　must　exist　before　intellection；　in　other　words　it　has　no　need　of　intellection；　having　been　always　self…sufficing：　this；　then；　will　have　no　intellectual　act。　　　　　Thus　we　arrive　at：　a　principle　having　no　intellection；　a　principle　having　intellection　primarily；　a　principle　having　it　secondarily。　　　　　It　may　be　added　that；　supposing　The　First　to　be　intellective；　it　thereby　possesses　something　＇some　object；　some　attribute＇：　at　once　it　ceases　to　be　a　first；　it　is　a　secondary；　and　not　even　a　unity；　it　is　a　many；　it　is　all　of　which　it　takes　intellectual　possession；　even　though　its　intellection　fell　solely　upon　its　own　content；　it　must　still　be　a　manifold。　　　　　3。　We　may　be　told　that　nothing　prevents　an　identity　being　thus　multiple。　But　there　must　be　a　unity　underlying　the　aggregate：　a　manifold　is　impossible　without　a　unity　for　its　source　or　ground；　or　at　least；　failing　some　unity；　related　or　unrelated。　This　unity　must　be　numbered　as　first　before　all　and　can　be　apprehended　only　as　solitary　and　self…existent。　　　　　When　we　recognize　it；　resident　among　the　mass　of　things；　our　business　is　to　see　it　for　what　it　is…　present　to　the　items　but　essentially　distinguished　from　them…　and；　while　not　denying　it　there；　to　seek　this　underly　of　all　no　longer　as　it　appears　in　those　other　things　but　as　it　stands　in　its　pure　identity　by　itself。　The　identity　resident　in　the　rest　of　things　is　no　doubt　close　to　authentic　identity　but　cannot　be　it；　and；　if　the　identity　of　unity　is　to　be　displayed　beyond　itself；　it　must　also　exist　within　itself　alone。　　　　　It　may　be　suggested　that　its　existence　takes　substantial　form　only　by　its　being　resident　among　outside　things：　but；　at　this；　it　is　itself　no　longer　simplex　nor　could　any　coherence　of　manifolds　occur。　On　the　one　hand　things　could　take　substantial　existence　only　if　they　were　in　their　own　virtue　simplex。　On　the　other　hand；　failing　a　simplex；　the　aggregate　of　multiples　is　itself　impossible：　for　the　simplex　individual　thing　could　not　exist　if　there　were　no　simplex　unity　independent　of　the　individual；　＇a　principle　of　identity＇　and；　not　existing；　much　less　could　it　enter　into　composition　with　any　other　such：　it　becomes　impossible　then　for　the　compound　universe；　the　aggregate　of　all；　to　exist；　it　would　be　the　coming　together　of　things　that　are　not；　things　not　merely　lacking　an　identity　of　their　own　but　utterly　non…existent。　　　　　Once　there　is　any　manifold；　there　must　be　a　precedent　unity：　since　any　intellection　implies　multiplicity　in　the　intellective　subject；　the　non…multiple　must　be　without　intellection；　that　non…multiple　will　be　the　First：　intellection　and　the　Intellectual…Principle　must　be　characteristic　of　beings　coming　later。　　　　　4。　Another　consideration　is　that　if　The　Good　＇and　First＇　is　simplex　and　without　need；　it　can　neither　need　the　intellective　act　nor　possess　what　it　does　not　need：　it　will　therefore　not　have　intellection。　（Interpolation　or　corruption：　It　is　without　intellection　because；　also；　it　contains　no　duality。）　　　　　Again；　an　Intellectual…Principle　is　distinct　from　The　Good　and　takes　a　certain　goodness　only　by　its　intellection　of　The　Good。　　　　　Yet　again：　In　any　dual　object　there　is　the　unity　＇the　principle　of　identity＇　side　by　side　with　the　rest　of　the　thing；　an　associated　member　cannot　be　the　unity　of　the　two　and　there　must　be　a　self…standing　unity　＇within　the　duality＇　before　this　unity　of　members　can　exist：　by　the　same　reasoning　there　must　be　also　the　supreme　unity　entering　into　no　association　whatever；　something　which　is　unity…simplex　by　its　very　being；　utterly　devoid　of　all　that　belongs　to　the　thing　capable　of　association。　　　　　How　could　anything　be　present　in　anything　else　unless　in　virtue　of　a　source　existing　independently　of　association？　The　simplex　＇or　absolute＇　requires　no　derivation；　but　any　manifold；　or　any　dual；　must　be　dependent。　　　　　We　may　use　the　figure　of；　first；　light；　then；　following　it；　the　sun；　as　a　third；　the　orb　of　the　moon　taking　its　light　from　the　sun：　Soul　carries　the　Intellectual…Principle　as　something　imparted　and　lending　the　light　which　makes　it　essentially　intellective；　Intellectual…Principle　carries　the　light　as　its　own　though　it　is　not　purely　the　light　but　is　the　being　into　whose　very　essence　the　light　has　been　received；　highest　is　That　which；　giving　forth　the　light　to　its　sequent；　is　no　other　than　the　pure　light　itself　by　whose　power　the　Intellectual…Principle　takes　character。　　　　　How　can　this　highest　have　need　of　any　other？　It　is　not　to　be　identified　with　any　of　the　things　that　enter　into　association；　the　self…standing　is　of　a　very　different　order。　　　　　5。　And　again：　the　multiple　must　be　always　seeking　its　identity；　desiring　self…accord　and　self…awareness：　but　what　scope　is　there　within　what　is　an　absolute　unity　in　which　to　move　towards　its　identity　or　at　what　term　may　it　hope　for　self…knowing？　It　holds　its　identity　in　its　very　essence　and　is　above　consciousness　and　all　intellective　act。　Intellection　is　not　a　primal　either　in　the　fact　of　being　or　in　the　value　of　being；　it　is　secondary　and　derived：　for　there　exists　The　Good；　and　this　moves　towards　itself　while　its　sequent　is　moved　and　by　that　movement　has　its　characteristic　vision。　The　intellective　act　may　be　defined　as　a　movement　towards　The　Good　in　some　being　that　aspires　towards　it；　the　effort　produces　the　fact；　the　two　are　coincident；　to　see　is　to　have　desired　to　see：　hence　again　the　Authentic　Good　has　no　need　of　intellection　since　itself　and　nothing　else　is　its　good。　　　　　The　intellective　act　is　a　movement　towards　the　unmoved　Good：　thus　the　self…intellection　in　all　save　the　Absolute　Good　is　the　working　of　the　imaged　Good　within　them：　the　intellectual　principle　recognises　the　likeness；　sees　itself　as　a　good　to　itself；　an　object　of　attraction：　it　grasps　at　that　manifestation　of　The　Good　and；　in　holding　that；　holds　self…vision：　if　the　state　of　goodness　is　constant；　it　remains　constantly　self…attractive　and　self…intellective。　The　self…intellection　is　not　deliberate：　it　sees　itself　as　an　incident　in　its　contemplation　of　The　Good；　for　it　sees　itself　in　virtue　of　its　Act；　and；　in　all　that　exists；　the　Act　is　towards　The　Good。　　　　　6。　If　this　reasoning　is　valid；　The　Good　has　no　scope　whatever　for　intellection　which　demands　something　attractive　from　outside。　The　Good；　then；　is　without　Act。　What　Act　indeed；　could　be　vested　in　Activity's　self？　No　activity　has　yet　again　an　activity；　and　whatever　we　may　add　to　such　Activities　as　depend　from　something　else；　at　least　we　must　leave　the　first　Activity　of　them　all；　that　from　which　all　depend；　as　an　uncontaminated　identity；　one　to　which　no　such　addition　can　be　made。　　　　　That　primal　Activity；　then；　is　not　an　intellection；　for　t