the six enneads-第126部分

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he　objects　above　mentioned？　The　animate　and　inanimate　seem　to　possess　in　different　ways；　and　the　term　is　perhaps　equivocal。　Similarly；　〃standing〃　has　not　the　same　connotation　as　applied　to　the　animate　and　the　inanimate。　　　　　Besides；　how　can　it　be　reasonable　for　what　is　found　only　in　a　limited　number　of　cases　to　form　a　distinct　generic　category？　　　　　24。　There　remains　Situation；　which　like　Possession　is　confined　to　a　few　instances　such　as　reclining　and　sitting。　　　　　Even　so；　the　term　is　not　used　without　qualification：　we　say　〃they　are　placed　in　such　and　such　a　manner；〃　〃he　is　situated　in　such　and　such　a　position。〃　The　position　is　added　from　outside　the　genus。　　　　　In　short；　Situation　signifies　〃being　in　a　place〃；　there　are　two　things　involved；　the　position　and　the　place：　why　then　must　two　categories　be　combined　into　one？　　　　　Moreover；　if　sitting　signifies　an　Act；　it　must　be　classed　among　Acts；　if　a　Passion；　it　goes　under　the　category　to　which　belong　Passions　complete　and　incomplete。　　　　　Reclining　is　surely　nothing　but　〃lying　up；〃　and　tallies　with　〃lying　down〃　and　〃lying　midway。〃　But　if　the　reclining　belongs　thus　to　the　category　of　Relation；　why　not　the　recliner　also？　For　as　〃on　the　right〃　belongs　to　the　Relations；　so　does　〃the　thing　on　the　right〃；　and　similarly　with　〃the　thing　on　the　left。〃　　　　　25。　There　are　those　who　lay　down　four　categories　and　make　a　fourfold　division　into　Substrates；　Qualities；　States；　and　Relative　States；　and　find　in　these　a　common　Something；　and　so　include　everything　in　one　genus。　　　　　Against　this　theory　there　is　much　to　be　urged；　but　particularly　against　this　posing　of　a　common　Something　and　a　single　all…embracing　genus。　This　Something；　it　may　be　submitted；　is　unintelligible　to　themselves；　is　indefinable；　and　does　not　account　either　for　bodies　or　for　the　bodiless。　Moreover；　no　room　is　left　for　a　differentia　by　which　this　Something　may　be　distinguished。　Besides；　this　common　Something　is　either　existent　or　non…existent：　if　existent；　it　must　be　one　or　other　of　its　＇four＇　species；…　if　non…existent；　the　existent　is　classed　under　the　non…existent。　But　the　objections　are　countless；　we　must　leave　them　for　the　present　and　consider　the　several　heads　of　the　division。　　　　　To　the　first　genus　are　assigned　Substrates；　including　Matter；　to　which　is　given　a　priority　over　the　others；　so　that　what　is　ranked　as　the　first　principle　comes　under　the　same　head　with　things　which　must　be　posterior　to　it　since　it　is　their　principle。　　　　　First；　then：　the　prior　is　made　homogeneous　with　the　subsequent。　Now　this　is　impossible：　in　this　relation　the　subsequent　owes　its　existence　to　the　prior；　whereas　among　things　belonging　to　one　same　genus　each　must　have；　essentially；　the　equality　implied　by　the　genus；　for　the　very　meaning　of　genus　is　to　be　predicated　of　the　species　in　respect　of　their　essential　character。　And　that　Matter　is　the　basic　source　of　all　the　rest　of　things；　this　school；　we　may　suppose；　would　hardly　deny。　　　　　Secondly：　since　they　treat　the　Substrate　as　one　thing；　they　do　not　enumerate　the　Existents；　they　look　instead　for　principles　of　the　Existents。　There　is　however　a　difference　between　speaking　of　the　actual　Existents　and　of　their　principles。　　　　　If　Matter　is　taken　to　be　the　only　Existent；　and　all　other　things　as　modifications　of　Matter；　it　is　not　legitimate　to　set　up　a　single　genus　to　embrace　both　the　Existent　and　the　other　things；　consistency　requires　that　Being　＇Substance＇　be　distinguished　from　its　modifications　and　that　these　modifications　be　duly　classified。　　　　　Even　the　distinction　which　this　theory　makes　between　Substrates　and　the　rest　of　things　is　questionable。　The　Substrate　is　＇necessarily＇　one　thing　and　admits　of　no　differentia…　except　perhaps　in　so　far　as　it　is　split　up　like　one　mass　into　its　various　parts；　and　yet　not　even　so；　since　the　notion　of　Being　implies　continuity：　it　would　be　better；　therefore；　to　speak　of　the　Substrate；　in　the　singular。　　　　　26。　But　the　error　in　this　theory　is　fundamental。　To　set　Matter　the　potential　above　everything；　instead　of　recognising　the　primacy　of　actuality；　is　in　the　highest　degree　perverse。　If　the　potential　holds　the　primacy　among　the　Existents；　its　actualization　becomes　impossible；　it　certainly　cannot　bring　itself　into　actuality：　either　the　actual　exists　previously；　and　so　the　potential　is　not　the　first…principle；　or；　if　the　two　are　to　be　regarded　as　existing　simultaneously；　the　first…principles　must　be　attributed　to　hazard。　Besides；　if　they　are　simultaneous；　why　is　not　actuality　given　the　primacy？　Why　is　the　potential　more　truly　real　than　the　actual？　　　　　Supposing　however　that　the　actual　does　come　later　than　the　potential；　how　must　the　theory　proceed？　Obviously　Matter　does　not　produce　Form：　the　unqualified　does　not　produce　Quality；　nor　does　actuality　take　its　origin　in　the　potential；　for　that　would　mean　that　the　actual　was　inherent　in　the　potential；　which　at　once　becomes　a　dual　thing。　　　　　Furthermore；　God　becomes　a　secondary　to　Matter；　inasmuch　as　even　he　is　regarded　as　a　body　composed　of　Matter　and　Form…　though　how　he　acquires　the　Form　is　not　revealed。　If　however　he　be　admitted　to　exist　apart　from　Matter　in　virtue　of　his　character　as　a　principle　and　a　rational　law　＇logos＇；　God　will　be　bodiless；　the　Creative　Power　bodiless。　If　we　are　told　that　he　is　without　Matter　but　is　composite　in　essence　by　the　fact　of　being　a　body；　this　amounts　to　introducing　another　Matter；　the　Matter　of　God。　　　　　Again；　how　can　Matter　be　a　first…principle；　seeing　that　it　is　body？　Body　must　necessarily　be　a　plurality；　since　all　bodies　are　composite　of　Matter　and　Quality。　If　however　body　in　this　case　is　to　be　understood　in　some　different　way；　then　Matter　is　identified　with　body　only　by　an　equivocation。　　　　　If　the　possession　of　three　dimensions　is　given　as　the　characteristic　of　body；　then　we　are　dealing　simply　with　mathematical　body。　If　resistance　is　added；　we　are　no　longer　considering　a　unity：　besides；　resistance　is　a　quality　or　at　least　derived　from　Quality。　　　　　And　whence　is　this　resistance　supposed　to　come？　Whence　the　three　dimensions？　What　is　the　source　of　their　existence？　Matter　is　not　comprised　in　the　concept　of　the　three…dimensional；　nor　the　three…dimensional　in　the　concept　of　Matter；　if　Matter　partakes　thus　of　extension；　it　can　no　longer　be　a　simplex。　　　　　Again；　whence　does　Matter　derive　its　unifying　power？　It　is　assuredly　not　the　Absolute　Unity；　but　has　only　that　of　participation　in　Unity。　　　　　We　inevitably　conclude　that　Mass　or　Extension　cannot　be　ranked　as　the　first　of　things；　Non…Extension　and　Unity　must　be　prior。　We　must　begin　with　the　One　and　conclude　with　the　Many；　proceed　to　magnitude　from　that　which　is　free　from　magnitude：　a　One　is　necessary　to　the　existence　of　a　Many；　Non…Magnitude　to　that　of　Magnitude。　Magnitude　is　a　unity　not　by　being　Unity…Absolute；　but　by　participation　and　in　an　accidental　mode：　there　must　be　a　primary　and　absolute　preceding　the　accidental；　or　the　accidental　relation　is　left　unexplained。　　　　　The　manner　of　this　relation　demands　investigation。　Had　this　been　undertaken；　the　thinkers　of　this　school　would　probably　have　lighted　upon　that　Unity　which　is　not　accidental　but　essential　and　underived。　　　　　27。　On　other　grounds　also；　it　is　indefensible　not　to　have　reserved　the　high　place　for　the　true　first…principle　of　things　but　to　have　set　up　in　its　stead　the　formless；　passive　and　lifeless；　the　irrational；　dark　and　indeterminate；　and　to　have　made　this　the　source　of　Being。　In　this　theory　God　is　introduced　merely　for　the　sake　of　appearance：　deriving　existence　from　Matter　he　is　a　composite；　a　derivative；　or；　worse；　a　mere　state　of　Matter。　　　　　Another　consideration　is　that；　if　Matter　is　a　substrate；　there　must　be　something　outside　it；　which；　acting　on　it　and　distinct　from　it；　makes　it　the　substrate　of　what　is　poured　into　it。　But　if　God　is　lodged　in　Matter　and　by　being　involved　in　Matter　is　himself　no　more　than　a　substrate；　he　will　no　longer　make　Matter　a　substrate　nor　be　himself　a　substrate　in　conjunction　with　Matter。　For　of　what　will　they　be　substrates；　when　that　which　could　make　them　substrates　is　eliminated？　This　so…called　substrate　turns　out　to　have　swallowed　up　all　that　is；　but　a　substrate　must　be　relative；　and　relative　not　to　its　content　but　to　something　which　acts　upon　it　as　upon　a　datum。　　　　　Again；　the　substrate　comports　a　relation　to　that　which　is　not　substrate；　hence；　to　something　external　to　it：　there　must；　then；　be　something　apart　from　the　substrate。　If　nothing　distinct　and　external　is　considered　necessary；　but　the　substrate　itself　can　become　everything　and　adopt　every　character；　like　the　versatile　dancer　in　the　pantomime；　it　ceases　to　be　a　substrate：　it　is；　essentially；　everything。　The　mime　is　not　a　substrate　of　the　characters　he　puts　on；　these　are　in　fact　the　realisation　of　his　own　personality：　similarly；　if　the　Matter　with　which　this　theory　presents　us　comports　in　its　own　being　all　the　realities；　it　is　no　longer　the　substrate　of　all：　on　the　contrary；　the　other　things　can　have　no　reality　whatever；　if　they　are　no　more　than　states　of　Matter　in　the　sense　that　the　poses　of　the　mime　are　states　through　which　he　passes。　　　　　Then；　those　other　things　not　existing；　Matter　will　not　be　a　substrate；　nor　will　it　have　a　place　among　the　Existents；　it　will　be　Matter　bare；　and　for　that　reason　not　even　Matter；　since　Matter　is　a　relative。　The　relative　is　relative　to　something　else：　it　must；　further；　be　homogeneous　with　that　something　else：　double　is　relative　to　half；　but　not　Substance　to　double。　　　　　How　then　can　an　Existent　be　relative　to　a　Non…existent；　except　accidentally？　But　the　True…Existent；　or　Matter；　is　related　（to　what　emerges　from　it）　as　Existent　to　Non…Existent。　For　if　potentiality　is　that　which　holds　the　promise　of　existence　and　that　promise　does　not　constitute　Reality；　the　potentiality　cannot　be　a　Reality。　In　sum；　these　very　teachers　who　deprecate　the　production　of　Realities　from　Nonrealities；　themselves　produce　Non…reality　from　Reality；　for　to　them　the　universe　as　such　is　not　a　Reality。　　　　　But　is　it　not　a　paradox　that；　while　Matter；　the　Substrate；　is　to　them　an　existence；　bodies　should　not　have　more　claim　to　existence；　the　universe　yet　more；　and　not　merely　a　claim　grounded　on　the　reality　of　one　of　its　parts？　　　　　It　is　no　less　paradoxical　that　the　living　form　should　owe　existence　not　to　its　sou