the six enneads-第127部分

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of　its　parts？　　　　　It　is　no　less　paradoxical　that　the　living　form　should　owe　existence　not　to　its　soul　but　to　its　Matter　only；　the　soul　being　but　an　affection　of　Matter　and　posterior　to　it。　From　what　source　then　did　Matter　receive　ensoulment？　Whence；　in　short；　is　soul's　entity　derived？　How　does　it　occur　that　Matter　sometimes　turns　into　bodies；　while　another　part　of　it　turns　into　Soul？　Even　supposing　that　Form　might　come　to　it　from　elsewhere；　that　accession　of　Quality　to　Matter　would　account　not　for　Soul；　but　simply　for　organized　body　soulless。　If；　on　the　contrary；　there　is　something　which　both　moulds　Matter　and　produces　Soul；　then　prior　to　the　produced　there　must　be　Soul　the　producer。　　　　　28。　Many　as　are　the　objections　to　this　theory；　we　pass　on　for　fear　of　the　ridicule　we　might　incur　by　arguing　against　a　position　itself　so　manifestly　ridiculous。　We　may　be　content　with　pointing　out　that　it　assigns　the　primacy　to　the　Non…existent　and　treats　it　as　the　very　summit　of　Existence：　in　short；　it　places　the　last　thing　first。　The　reason　for　this　procedure　lies　in　the　acceptance　of　sense…perception　as　a　trustworthy　guide　to　first…principles　and　to　all　other　entities。　　　　　This　philosophy　began　by　identifying　the　Real　with　body；　then；　viewing　with　apprehension　the　transmutations　of　bodies；　decided　that　Reality　was　that　which　is　permanent　beneath　the　superficial　changes…　which　is　much　as　if　one　regarded　space　as　having　more　title　to　Reality　than　the　bodies　within　it；　on　the　principle　that　space　does　not　perish　with　them。　They　found　a　permanent　in　space；　but　it　was　a　fault　to　take　mere　permanence　as　in　itself　a　sufficient　definition　of　the　Real；　the　right　method　would　have　been　to　consider　what　properties　must　characterize　Reality；　by　the　presence　of　which　properties　it　has　also　that　of　unfailing　permanence。　Thus　if　a　shadow　had　permanence；　accompanying　an　object　through　every　change；　that　would　not　make　it　more　real　than　the　object　itself。　The　sensible　universe；　as　including　the　Substrate　and　a　multitude　of　attributes；　will　thus　have　more　claim　to　be　Reality　entire　than　has　any　one　of　its　component　entities　（such　as　Matter）：　and　if　the　sensible　were　in　very　truth　the　whole　of　Reality；　Matter；　the　mere　base　and　not　the　total；　could　not　be　that　whole。　　　　　Most　surprising　of　all　is　that；　while　they　make　sense…perception　their　guarantee　of　everything；　they　hold　that　the　Real　cannot　be　grasped　by　sensation；…　for　they　have　no　right　to　assign　to　Matter　even　so　much　as　resistance；　since　resistance　is　a　quality。　If　however　they　profess　to　grasp　Reality　by　Intellect；　is　it　not　a　strange　Intellect　which　ranks　Matter　above　itself；　giving　Reality　to　Matter　and　not　to　itself？　And　as　their　〃Intellect〃　has；　thus；　no　Real…Existence；　how　can　it　be　trustworthy　when　it　speaks　of　things　higher　than　itself；　things　to　which　it　has　no　affinity　whatever？　　　　　But　an　adequate　treatment　of　this　entity　＇Matter＇　and　of　substrates　will　be　found　elsewhere。　　　　　29。　Qualities　must　be　for　this　school　distinct　from　Substrates。　This　in　fact　they　acknowledge　by　counting　them　as　the　second　category。　If　then　they　form　a　distinct　category；　they　must　be　simplex；　that　is　to　say　they　are　not　composite；　that　is　to　say　that　as　qualities；　pure　and　simple；　they　are　devoid　of　Matter：　hence　they　are　bodiless　and　active；　since　Matter　is　their　substrate…　a　relation　of　passivity。　　　　　If　however　they　hold　Qualities　to　be　composite；　that　is　a　strange　classification　which　first　contrasts　simple　and　composite　qualities；　then　proceeds　to　include　them　in　one　genus；　and　finally　includes　one　of　the　two　species　＇simple＇　in　the　other　＇composite＇；　it　is　like　dividing　knowledge　into　two　species；　the　first　comprising　grammatical　knowledge；　the　second　made　up　of　grammatical　and　other　knowledge。　　　　　Again；　if　they　identify　Qualities　with　qualifications　of　Matter；　then　in　the　first　place　even　their　Seminal　Principles　＇Logoi＇　will　be　material　and　will　not　have　to　reside　in　Matter　to　produce　a　composite；　but　prior　to　the　composite　thus　produced　they　will　themselves　be　composed　of　Matter　and　Form：　in　other　words；　they　will　not　be　Forms　or　Principles。　Further；　if　they　maintain　that　the　Seminal　Principles　are　nothing　but　Matter　in　a　certain　state；　they　evidently　identify　Qualities　with　States；　and　should　accordingly　classify　them　in　their　fourth　genus。　If　this　is　a　state　of　some　peculiar　kind；　what　precisely　is　its　differentia？　Clearly　the　state　by　its　association　with　Matter　receives　an　accession　of　Reality：　yet　if　that　means　that　when　divorced　from　Matter　it　is　not　a　Reality；　how　can　State　be　treated　as　a　single　genus　or　species？　Certainly　one　genus　cannot　embrace　the　Existent　and　the　Non…existent。　　　　　And　what　is　this　state　implanted　in　Matter？　It　is　either　real；　or　unreal：　if　real；　absolutely　bodiless：　if　unreal；　it　is　introduced　to　no　purpose；　Matter　is　all　there　is；　Quality　therefore　is　nothing。　The　same　is　true　of　State；　for　that　is　even　more　unreal；　the　alleged　Fourth　Category　more　so。　　　　　Matter　then　is　the　sole　Reality。　But　how　do　we　come　to　know　this？　Certainly　not　from　Matter　itself。　How；　then？　From　Intellect？　But　Intellect　is　merely　a　state　of　Matter；　and　even　the　〃state〃　is　an　empty　qualification。　We　are　left　after　all　with　Matter　alone　competent　to　make　these　assertions；　to　fathom　these　problems。　And　if　its　assertions　were　intelligent；　we　must　wonder　how　it　thinks　and　performs　the　functions　of　Soul　without　possessing　either　Intellect　or　Soul。　If；　then；　it　were　to　make　foolish　assertions；　affirming　itself　to　be　what　it　is　not　and　cannot　be；　to　what　should　we　ascribe　this　folly？　Doubtless　to　Matter；　if　it　was　in　truth　Matter　that　spoke。　But　Matter　does　not　speak；　anyone　who　says　that　it　does　proclaims　the　predominance　of　Matter　in　himself；　he　may　have　a　soul；　but　he　is　utterly　devoid　of　Intellect；　and　lives　in　ignorance　of　himself　and　of　the　faculty　alone　capable　of　uttering　the　truth　in　these　things。　　　　　30。　With　regard　to　States：　　　　　It　may　seem　strange　that　States　should　be　set　up　as　a　third　class…　or　whatever　class　it　is…　since　all　States　are　referable　to　Matter。　We　shall　be　told　that　there　is　a　difference　among　States；　and　that　a　State　as　in　Matter　has　definite　characteristics　distinguishing　it　from　all　other　States　and　further　that；　whereas　Qualities　are　States　of　Matter；　States　properly　so…called　belong　to　Qualities。　But　if　Qualities　are　nothing　but　States　of　Matter；　States　＇in　the　strict　sense　of　the　term＇　are　ultimately　reducible　to　Matter；　and　under　Matter　they　must　be　classed。　　　　　Further；　how　can　States　constitute　a　single　genus；　when　there　is　such　manifold　diversity　among　them？　How　can　we　group　together　three　yards　long〃　and　〃white〃…　Quantity　and　Quality　respectively？　Or　again　Time　and　Place？　How　can　〃yesterday；〃　〃last　year；〃　〃in　the　Lyceum；〃　〃in　the　Academy；〃　be　States　at　all？　How　can　Time　be　in　any　sense　a　State？　Neither　is　Time　a　State　nor　the　events　in　Time；　neither　the　objects　in　Space　nor　Space　itself。　　　　　And　how　can　Action　be　a　State？　One　acting　is　not　in　a　state　of　being　but　in　a　state　of　Action；　or　rather　in　Action　simply：　no　state　is　involved。　Similarly；　what　is　predicated　of　the　patient　is　not　a　state　of　being　but　a　state　of　Passion；　or　strictly；　Passion　unqualified　by　state。　　　　　But　it　would　seem　that　State　was　the　right　category　at　least　for　cases　of　Situation　and　Possession：　yet　Possession　does　not　imply　possession　of　some　particular　state；　but　is　Possession　absolute。　　　　　As　for　the　Relative　State；　if　the　theory　does　not　include　it　in　the　same　genus　as　the　other　States；　another　question　arises：　we　must　enquire　whether　any　actuality　is　attributed　to　this　particular　type　of　relation；　for　to　many　types　actuality　is　denied。　　　　　It　is；　moreover；　absurd　that　an　entity　which　depends　upon　the　prior　existence　of　other　entities　should　be　classed　in　the　same　genus　with　those　priors：　one　and　two　must；　clearly；　exist；　before　half　and　double　can。　　　　　The　various　speculations　on　the　subject　of　the　Existents　and　the　principles　of　the　Existents；　whether　they　have　entailed　an　infinite　or　a　finite　number；　bodily　or　bodiless；　or　even　supposed　the　Composite　to　be　the　Authentic　Existent；　may　well　be　considered　separately　with　the　help　of　the　criticisms　made　by　the　ancients　upon　them。　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　SECOND　TRACTATE。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　ON　THE　KINDS　OF　BEING　（2）。

　　　　1。　We　have　examined　the　proposed　〃ten　genera〃：　we　have　discussed　also　the　theory　which　gathers　the　total　of　things　into　one　genus　and　to　this　subordinates　what　may　be　thought　of　as　its　four　species。　The　next　step　is；　naturally；　to　expound　our　own　views　and　to　try　to　show　the　agreement　of　our　conclusions　with　those　of　Plato。　　　　　Now　if　we　were　obliged　to　consider　Being　as　a　unity；　the　following　questions　would　be　unnecessary：　　　　　Is　there　one　genus　embracing　everything；　or　are　there　genera　which　cannot　be　subsumed　under　such　a　unity？　Are　there　first…principles？　Are　first…principles　to　be　identified　with　genera；　or　genera　with　first…principles？　Or　is　it　perhaps　rather　the　case　that　while　not　all　genera　are　first…principles；　all　first…principles　are　at　the　same　time　genera？　Or　is　the　converse　true？　Or　again；　do　both　classes　overlap；　some　principles　being　also　genera；　and　some　genera　also　principles？　And　do　both　the　sets　of　categories　we　have　been　examining　imply　that　only　some　principles　are　genera　and　some　genera　principles？　or　does　one　of　them　presuppose　that　all　that　belongs　to　the　class　of　genera　belongs　also　to　the　class　of　principles？　　　　　Since；　however；　we　affirm　that　Being　is　not　a　unity…　the　reason　for　this　affirmation　is　stated　by　Plato　and　others…　these　questions　become　imperative；　once　we　are　satisfied　as　to　the　number　of　genera　to　be　posited　and　the　grounds　for　our　choice。　　　　　The　subject　of　our　enquiry；　then；　is　the　Existent　or　Existents；　and　it　presents　immediately　two　problems　demanding　separate　analysis：　　　　　What　do　we　mean　by　the　Existent？　This　is　naturally　the　first　question　to　be　examined。　　　　　What　is　that　which；　often　taken　for　Being　＇for　the　Existent＇；　is　in　our　view　Becoming　and　never　really　Being？　Note　however　that　these　concepts　are　not　to　be　taken　as　distinguished　from　each　other　in　the　sense　of　belonging　to　a　genus；　Something；　divided　into　Being　and　Becoming；　and　we　must　not　suppose　that　Plato　took　this　view。　It