the six enneads-第134部分

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s　in　flux；　the　proper　term　would　be　Becoming。　　　　　But　Becoming　is　not　a　uniform　nature；　bodies　comprise　under　the　single　head　simples　and　composites；　together　with　accidentals　or　consequents；　these　last　themselves　capable　of　separate　classification。　　　　　Alternatively；　Becoming　may　be　divided　into　Matter　and　the　Form　imposed　upon　Matter。　These　may　be　regarded　each　as　a　separate　genus；　or　else　both　may　be　brought　under　a　single　category　and　receive　alike　the　name　of　Substance。　　　　　But　what；　we　may　ask；　have　Matter　and　Form　in　common？　In　what　sense　can　Matter　be　conceived　as　a　genus；　and　what　will　be　its　species？　What　is　the　differentia　of　Matter？　In　which　genus；　Matter　or　Form；　are　we　to　rank　the　composite　of　both？　It　may　be　this　very　composite　which　constitutes　the　Substance　manifested　in　bodies；　neither　of　the　components　by　itself　answering　to　the　conception　of　Body：　how；　then；　can　we　rank　them　in　one　and　the　same　genus　as　the　composite？　How　can　the　elements　of　a　thing　be　brought　within　the　same　genus　as　the　thing　itself？　Yet　if　we　begin　with　bodies；　our　first…principles　will　be　compounds。　　　　　Why　not　resort　to　analogy？　Admitted　that　the　classification　of　the　Sensible　cannot　proceed　along　the　identical　lines　marked　out　for　the　Intellectual：　is　there　any　reason　why　we　should　not　for　Intellectual…Being　substitute　Matter；　and　for　Intellectual　Motion　substitute　Sensible　Form；　which　is　in　a　sense　the　life　and　consummation　of　Matter？　The　inertia　of　Matter　would　correspond　with　Stability；　while　the　Identity　and　Difference　of　the　Intellectual　would　find　their　counterparts　in　the　similarity　and　diversity　which　obtain　in　the　Sensible　realm。　　　　　But；　in　the　first　place；　Matter　does　not　possess　or　acquire　Form　as　its　life　or　its　Act；　Form　enters　it　from　without；　and　remains　foreign　to　its　nature。　Secondly；　Form　in　the　Intellectual　is　an　Act　and　a　motion；　in　the　Sensible　Motion　is　different　from　Form　and　accidental　to　it：　Form　in　relation　to　Matter　approximates　rather　to　Stability　than　to　Motion；　for　by　determining　Matter's　indetermination　it　confers　upon　it　a　sort　of　repose。　　　　　In　the　higher　realm　Identity　and　Difference　presuppose　a　unity　at　once　identical　and　different：　a　thing　in　the　lower　is　different　only　by　participation　in　Difference　and　in　relation　to　some　other　thing；　Identity　and　Difference　are　here　predicated　of　the　particular；　which　is　not；　as　in　that　realm；　a　posterior。　　　　　As　for　Stability；　how　can　it　belong　to　Matter；　which　is　distorted　into　every　variety　of　mass；　receiving　its　forms　from　without；　and　even　with　the　aid　of　these　forms　incapable　of　offspring。　　　　　This　mode　of　division　must　accordingly　be　abandoned。　　　　　3。　How　then　do　we　go　to　work？　　　　　Let　us　begin　by　distinguishing　Matter；　Form；　the　Mixture　of　both；　and　the　Attributes　of　the　Mixture。　The　Attributes　may　be　subdivided　into　those　which　are　mere　predicates；　and　those　serving　also　as　accidents。　The　accidents　may　be　either　inclusive　or　included；　they　may；　further；　be　classified　as　activities；　experiences；　consequents。　　　　　Matter　will　be　found　common　to　all　substances；　not　however　as　a　genus；　since　it　has　no　differentiae…　unless　indeed　differentiae　be　ascribed　to　it　on　the　ground　of　its　taking　such　various　forms　as　fire　and　air。　　　　　It　may　be　held　that　Matter　is　sufficiently　constituted　a　genus　by　the　fact　that　the　things　in　which　it　appears　hold　it　in　common；　or　in　that　it　presents　itself　as　a　whole　of　parts。　In　this　sense　Matter　will　indeed　be　a　genus；　though　not　in　the　accepted　sense　of　the　term。　Matter；　we　may　remark；　is　also　a　single　element；　if　the　element　as　such　is　able　to　constitute　a　genus。　　　　　Further；　if　to　a　Form　be　added　the　qualification　〃bound　up　with；　involved　in　Matter；〃　Matter　separates　that　Form　from　other　Forms：　it　does　not　however　embrace　the　whole　of　Substantial　Form　＇as；　to　be　the　genus　of　Form；　it　must＇。　　　　　We　may；　again；　regard　Form　as　the　creator　of　Substance　and　make　the　Reason…Principle　of　Substance　dependent　upon　Form：　yet　we　do　not　come　thereby　to　an　understanding　of　the　nature　of　Substance。　　　　　We　may；　also；　restrict　Substance　to　the　Composite。　Matter　and　Form　then　cease　to　be　substances。　If　they　are　Substance　equally　with　the　Composite；　it　remains　to　enquire　what　there　is　common　to　all　three。　　　　　The　〃mere　predicates〃　fall　under　the　category　of　Relation：　such　are　cause　and　element。　The　accidents　included　in　the　composite　substances　ire　found　to　be　either　Quality　or　Quantity；　those　which　are　inclusive　are　of　the　nature　of　Space　and　Time。　Activities　and　experiences　comprise　Motions；　consequents　Space　and　Time；　which　are　consequents　respectively　of　the　Composites　and　of　Motion。　　　　　The　first　three　entities　＇Matter；　Form；　Composite＇　go；　as　we　have　discovered；　to　make　a　single　common　genus；　the　Sensible　counterpart　of　Substance。　Then　follow　in　order　Relation；　Quantity；　Quality；　Time…during…which；　Place…in…which；　Motion；　though；　with　Time　and　Space　already　included　＇under　Relation＇；　Time…during…which　and　Place…in…which　become　superfluous。　　　　　Thus　we　have　five　genera；　counting　the　first　three　entities　as　one。　If　the　first　three　are　not　massed　into　a　unity；　the　series　will　be　Matter；　Form；　Composite；　Relation；　Quantity；　Quality；　Motion。　The　last　three　may；　again；　be　included　in　Relation；　which　is　capable　of　bearing　this　wider　extension。　　　　　4。　What；　then；　we　have　to　ask；　is　the　constant　element　in　the　first　three　entities？　What　is　it　that　identifies　them　with　their　inherent　Substance？　　　　　Is　it　the　capacity　to　serve　as　a　base？　But　Matter；　we　maintain；　serves　as　the　base　and　seat　of　Form：　Form；　thus；　will　be　excluded　from　the　category　of　Substance。　Again；　the　Composite　is　the　base　and　seat　of　attributes：　hence；　Form　combined　with　Matter　will　be　the　basic　ground　of　Composites；　or　at　any　rate　of　all　posteriors　of　the　Composite…　Quantity；　Quality；　Motion；　and　the　rest。　　　　　But　perhaps　we　may　think　Substance　validly　defined　as　that　which　is　not　predicated　of　anything　else。　White　and　black　are　predicated　of　an　object　having　one　or　other　of　these　qualities；　double　presupposes　something　distinct　from　itself…　we　refer　not　to　the　half；　but　to　the　length　of　wood　of　which　doubleness　is　affirmed。　father　qua　father　is　a　predicate；　knowledge　is　predicated　of　the　subject　in　whom　the　knowledge　exists；　space　is　the　limit　of　something；　time　the　measure　of　something。　Fire；　on　the　other　hand；　is　predicated　of　nothing；　wood　as　such　is　predicated　of　nothing；　and　so　with　man；　Socrates；　and　the　composite　substance　in　general。　　　　　Equally　the　Substantial　Form　is　never　a　predicate；　since　it　never　acts　as　a　modification　of　anything。　Form　is　not　an　attribute　of　Matter　hence；　is　not　predicable　of　Matter　it　is　simply　a　constituent　of　the　Couplement。　On　the　other　hand；　the　Form　of　a　man　is　not　different　from　the　man　himself　＇and　so　does　not　〃modify〃　the　Couplement＇。　　　　　Matter；　similarly；　is　part　of　a　whole；　and　belongs　to　something　else　only　as　to　a　whole　and　not　as　to　a　separate　thing　of　which　it　is　predicated。　White；　on　the　contrary；　essentially　belongs　to　something　distinct　from　itself。　　　　　We　conclude　that　nothing　belonging　to　something　else　and　predicated　of　it　can　be　Substance。　Substance　is　that　which　belongs　essentially　to　itself；　or；　in　so　far　as　it　is　a　part　of　the　differentiated　object；　serves　only　to　complete　the　Composite。　Each　or　either　part　of　the　Composite　belongs　to　itself；　and　is　only　affirmed　of　the　Composite　in　a　special　sense：　only　qua　part　of　the　whole　is　it　predicated　of　something　else；　qua　individual　it　is　never　in　its　essential　nature　predicated　of　an　external。　　　　　It　may　be　claimed　as　a　common　element　in　Matter；　Form　and　the　Couplement　that　they　are　all　substrates。　But　the　mode　in　which　Matter　is　the　substrate　of　Form　is　different　from　that　in　which　Form　and　the　Couplement　are　substrates　of　their　modifications。　　　　　And　is　it　strictly　true　to　say　that　Matter　is　the　substrate　of　Form？　Form　is　rather　the　completion　which　Matter's　nature　as　pure　potentiality　demands。　　　　　Moreover；　Form　cannot　be　said　to　reside　in　Matter　＇as　in　a　substrate＇。　When　one　thing　combines　with　another　to　form　a　unity；　the　one　does　not　reside　in　the　other；　both　alike　are　substrates　of　a　third：　thus；　Man　＇the　Form＇　and　a　man　＇the　Composite＇　are　substrates　of　their　experiences；　and　are　prior　to　their　activities　and　consequents。　　　　　Substance；　then；　is　that　from　which　all　other　things　proceed　and　to　which　they　owe　their　existence；　it　is　the　centre　of　passivity　and　the　source　of　action。　　　　　5。　These　are　incontrovertible　facts　in　regard　to　the　pseudo…substance　of　the　Sensible　realm：　if　they　apply　also　in　some　degree　to　the　True　Substance　of　the　Intellectual；　the　coincidence　is；　doubtless；　to　be　attributed　to　analogy　and　ambiguity　of　terms。　　　　　We　are　aware　that　〃the　first〃　is　so　called　only　in　relation　to　the　things　which　come　after　it：　〃first〃　has　no　absolute　significance；　the　first　of　one　series　is　subsequent　to　the　last　of　another。　〃Substrate；〃　similarly；　varies　in　meaning　＇as　applied　to　the　higher　and　to　the　lower＇；　while　as　for　passivity　its　very　existence　in　the　Intellectual　is　questionable；　if　it　does　exist　there；　it　is　not　the　passivity　of　the　Sensible。　　　　　It　follows　that　the　fact　of　〃not　being　present　in　a　subject　＇or　substrate＇　is　not　universally　true　of　Substance；　unless　presence　in　a　subject　be　stipulated　as　not　including　the　case　of　the　part　present　in　the　whole　or　of　one　thing　combining　with　another　to　form　a　distinct　unity；　a　thing　will　not　be　present　as　in　a　subject　in　that　with　which　it　co…operates　in　the　information　of　a　composite　substance。　Form；　therefore；　is　not　present　in　Matter　as　in　a　subject；　nor　is　Man　so　present　in　Socrates；　since　Man　is　part　of　Socrates。　　　　　Substance；　then；　is　that　which　is　not　present　in　a　subject。　But　if　we　adopt　the　definition　〃neither　present　in　a　subject　nor　predicated　of　a　subject；〃　we　must　add　to　the　second　〃subject〃　the　qualification　〃distinct；〃　in　order　that　we　may　not　exclude　the　case　of　Man　predicated　of　a　particular　man。　When　I　predicate　Man　of　Socrates；　it　is　as　though　I　affirmed；　not　that　a　piece　of　wood　is　white；　but　that　whiteness　is　white；　for　in　asserting　that　Socrates　is　a　man；　I　predicate　Man　＇the　universal＇　of　a　particular　man；　I　affirm　Man　of　the　manhood　in　Socrates；　I　am　really　saying　only　that　Socrates　is　Socrates；　or　that