the six enneads-第139部分

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garded　as　a　finished　occurrence；　one　is　considered　to　have　been　moved…　in　other　words；　to　have　been　in　Motion。　But　in　none　of　these　cases　is　it　necessary　to　conceive　of　anything　but　Motion；　the　idea　of　time　should　be　excluded；　even　present　time　has　no　right　to　be　introduced。　　　　　〃Well〃　and　similar　adverbial　expressions　are　to　be　referred　to　the　single　generic　notion　＇of　Quality＇。　　　　　It　remains　to　consider　whether　blushing　should　be　referred　to　Quality；　even　though　the　person　blushing　is　not　included　in　this　category。　The　fact　of　becoming　flushed　is　rightly　not　referred　to　Quality；　for　it　involves　passivity…　in　short；　Motion。　But　if　one　has　ceased　to　become　flushed　and　is　actually　red；　this　is　surely　a　case　of　Quality；　which　is　independent　of　time。　How　indeed　are　we　to　define　Quality　but　by　the　aspect　which　a　substance　presents？　By　predicating　of　a　man　redness；　we　clearly　ascribe　to　him　a　quality。　　　　　We　shall　accordingly　maintain　that　states　alone；　and　not　dispositions；　constitute　qualities：　thus；　〃hot〃　is　a　quality　but　not　〃growing　hot；〃　〃ill〃　but　not　〃turning　ill。〃　　　　　20。　We　have　to　ascertain　whether　there　is　not　to　every　quality　a　contrary。　In　the　case　of　virtue　and　vice；　even　the　mean　appears　to　be　contrary　to　the　extremes。　　　　　But　when　we　turn　to　colours；　we　do　not　find　the　intermediates　so　related。　If　we　regard　the　intermediates　as　blendings　of　the　extremes；　we　must　not　posit　any　contrariety　other　than　that　between　black　and　white；　but　must　show　that　all　other　colours　are　combinations　of　these　two。　Contrariety　however　demands　that　there　be　some　one　distinct　quality　in　the　intermediates；　though　this　quality　may　be　seen　to　arise　from　a　combination。　　　　　It　may　further　be　suggested　that　contraries　not　only　differ　from　each　other；　but　also　entail　the　greatest　possible　difference。　But　〃the　greatest　possible　difference〃　would　seem　to　presuppose　that　intermediates　have　already　been　established：　eliminate　the　series；　and　how　will　you　define　〃the　greatest　possible〃？　Sight；　we　may　be　told；　will　reveal　to　us　that　grey　is　nearer　than　black　to　white；　and　taste　may　be　our　judge　when　we　have　hot；　cold　and　no　intermediate。　　　　　That　we　are　accustomed　to　act　upon　these　assumptions　is　obvious　enough；　but　the　following　considerations　may　perhaps　commend　themselves：　　　　　White　and　yellow　are　entirely　different　from　each　other…　a　statement　which　applies　to　any　colour　whatsoever　as　compared　with　any　other；　they　are　accordingly　contrary　qualities。　Their　contrariety　is　independent　of　the　presence　of　intermediates：　between　health　and　disease　no　intermediate　intrudes；　and　yet　they　are　contraries。　　　　　It　may　be　urged　that　the　products　of　a　contrariety　exhibit　the　greatest　diversity。　But　〃the　greatest　diversity〃　is　clearly　meaningless；　unless　we　can　point　to　lower　degrees　of　diversity　in　the　means。　Thus；　we　cannot　speak　of　〃the　greatest　diversity〃　in　reference　to　health　and　disease。　This　definition　of　contrariety　is　therefore　inadmissible。　　　　　Suppose　that　we　say　〃great　diversity〃　instead　of　〃the　greatest〃：　if　〃great〃　is　equivalent　to　greater　and　implies　a　less；　immediate　contraries　will　again　escape　us；　if；　on　the　other　hand；　we　mean　strictly　〃great〃　and　assume　that　every　quality　shows　a　great　divergence　from　every　other；　we　must　not　suppose　that　the　divergence　can　be　measured　by　a　comparative。　　　　　Nonetheless；　we　must　endeavour　to　find　a　meaning　for　the　term　〃contrary。〃　Can　we　accept　the　principle　that　when　things　have　a　certain　similarity　which　is　not　generic　nor　in　any　sense　due　to　admixture；　but　a　similarity　residing　in　their　forms…　if　the　term　be　permitted…　they　differ　in　degree　but　are　not　contraries；　contraries　being　rather　those　things　which　have　no　specific　identity？　It　would　be　necessary　to　stipulate　that　they　belong　to　the　same　genus；　Quality；　in　order　to　cover　those　immediate　contraries　which　＇apparently＇　have　nothing　conducing　to　similarity；　inasmuch　as　there　are　no　intermediates　looking　both　ways；　as　it　were；　and　having　a　mutual　similarity　to　each　other；　some　contraries　are　precluded　by　their　isolation　from　similarity。　　　　　If　these　observations　be　sound；　colours　which　have　a　common　ground　will　not　be　contraries。　But　there　will　be　nothing　to　prevent；　not　indeed　every　colour　from　being　contrary　to　every　other；　but　any　one　colour　from　being　contrary　to　any　other；　and　similarly　with　tastes。　This　will　serve　as　a　statement　of　the　problem。　　　　　As　for　Degree　＇subsisting　in　Quality＇；　it　was　given　as　our　opinion　that　it　exists　in　the　objects　participating　in　Quality；　though　whether　it　enters　into　qualities　as　such…　into　health　and　justice…　was　left　open　to　question。　If　indeed　these　qualities　possess　an　extension　quite　apart　from　their　participants；　we　must　actually　ascribe　to　them　degrees：　but　in　truth　they　belong　to　a　sphere　where　each　entity　is　the　whole　and　does　not　admit　of　degree。　　　　　21。　The　claim　of　Motion　to　be　established　as　a　genus　will　depend　upon　three　conditions：　first；　that　it　cannot　rightly　be　referred　to　any　other　genus；　second；　that　nothing　higher　than　itself　can　be　predicated　of　it　in　respect　of　its　essence；　third；　that　by　assuming　differences　it　will　produce　species。　These　conditions　satisfied；　we　may　consider　the　nature　of　the　genus　to　which　we　shall　refer　it。　　　　　Clearly　it　cannot　be　identified　with　either　the　Substance　or　the　Quality　of　the　things　which　possess　it。　It　cannot；　further；　be　consigned　to　Action；　for　Passivity　also　comprises　a　variety　of　motions；　nor　again　to　Passivity　itself；　because　many　motions　are　actions：　on　the　contrary；　actions　and　passions　are　to　be　referred　to　Motion。　　　　　Furthermore；　it　cannot　lay　claim　to　the　category　of　Relation　on　the　mere　ground　that　it　has　an　attributive　and　not　a　self…centred　existence：　on　this　ground；　Quality　too　would　find　itself　in　that　same　category；　for　Quality　is　an　attribute　and　contained　in　an　external：　and　the　same　is　true　of　Quantity。　　　　　If　we　are　agreed　that　Quality　and　Quantity；　though　attributive；　are　real　entities；　and　on　the　basis　of　this　reality　distinguishable　as　Quality　and　Quantity　respectively：　then；　on　the　same　principle；　since　Motion；　though　an　attribute　has　a　reality　prior　to　its　attribution；　it　is　incumbent　upon　us　to　discover　the　intrinsic　nature　of　this　reality。　We　must　never　be　content　to　regard　as　a　relative　something　which　exists　prior　to　its　attribution；　but　only　that　which　is　engendered　by　Relation　and　has　no　existence　apart　from　the　relation　to　which　it　owes　its　name：　the　double；　strictly　so　called；　takes　birth　and　actuality　in　juxtaposition　with　a　yard's　length；　and　by　this　very　process　of　being　juxtaposed　with　a　correlative　acquires　the　name　and　exhibits　the　fact　of　being　double。　　　　　What；　then；　is　that　entity；　called　Motion；　which；　though　attributive；　has　an　independent　reality；　which　makes　its　attribution　possible…　the　entity　corresponding　to　Quality；　Quantity　and　Substance？　　　　　But　first；　perhaps；　we　should　make　sure　that　there　is　nothing　prior　to　Motion　and　predicated　of　it　as　its　genus。　　　　　Change　may　be　suggested　as　a　prior。　But；　in　the　first　place；　either　it　is　identical　with　Motion；　or　else；　if　change　be　claimed　as　a　genus；　it　will　stand　distinct　from　the　genera　so　far　considered：　secondly；　Motion　will　evidently　take　rank　as　a　species　and　have　some　other　species　opposed　to　it…　becoming；　say…　which　will　be　regarded　as　a　change　but　not　as　a　motion。　　　　　What；　then；　is　the　ground　for　denying　that　becoming　is　a　motion？　The　fact；　perhaps；　that　what　comes　to　be　does　not　yet　exist；　whereas　Motion　has　no　dealings　with　the　non…existent。　But；　on　that　ground；　becoming　will　not　be　a　change　either。　If　however　it　be　alleged　that　becoming　is　merely　a　type　of　alteration　or　growth　since　it　takes　place　when　things　alter　and　grow；　the　antecedents　of　becoming　are　being　confused　with　becoming　itself。　Yet　becoming；　entailing　as　it　does　these　antecedents；　must　necessarily　be　a　distinct　species；　for　the　event　and　process　of　becoming　cannot　be　identified　with　merely　passive　alteration；　like　turning　hot　or　white：　it　is　possible　for　the　antecedents　to　take　place　without　becoming　as　such　being　accomplished；　except　in　so　far　as　the　actual　alteration　＇implied　in　the　antecedents＇　has　〃come　to　be〃；　where；　however；　an　animal　or　a　vegetal　life　is　concerned；　becoming　＇or　birth＇　takes　place　only　upon　its　acquisition　of　a　Form。　　　　　The　contrary　might　be　maintained：　that　change　is　more　plausibly　ranked　as　a　species　than　is　Motion；　because　change　signifies　merely　the　substitution　of　one　thing　for　another；　whereas　Motion　involves　also　the　removal　of　a　thing　from　the　place　to　which　it　belongs；　as　is　shown　by　locomotion。　Even　rejecting　this　distinction；　we　must　accept　as　types　of　Motion　knowledge　and　musical　performance…　in　short；　changes　of　condition：　thus；　alteration　will　come　to　be　regarded　as　a　species　of　Motion…　namely；　motion　displacing。　　　　　22。　But　suppose　that　we　identify　alteration　with　Motion　on　the　ground　that　Motion　itself　results　in　difference：　how　then　do　we　proceed　to　define　Motion？　　　　　It　may　roughly　be　characterized　as　the　passage　from　the　potentiality　to　its　realization。　That　is　potential　which　can　either　pass　into　a　Form…　for　example；　the　potential　statue…　or　else　pass　into　actuality…　such　as　the　ability　to　walk：　whenever　progress　is　made　towards　the　statue；　this　progress　is　Motion；　and　when　the　ability　to　walk　is　actualized　in　walking；　this　walking　is　itself　Motion：　dancing　is；　similarly；　the　motion　produced　by　the　potential　dancer　taking　his　steps。　　　　　In　the　one　type　of　Motion　a　new　Form　comes　into　existence　created　by　the　motion；　the　other　constitutes；　as　it　were；　the　pure　Form　of　the　potentiality；　and　leaves　nothing　behind　it　when　once　the　motion　has　ceased。　Accordingly；　the　view　would　not　be　unreasonable　which；　taking　some　Forms　to　be　active；　others　inactive；　regarded　Motion　as　a　dynamic　Form　in　opposition　to　the　other　Forms　which　are　static；　and　further　as　the　cause　of　whatever　new　Form　ensues　upon　it。　To　proceed　to　identify　this　bodily　motion　with　life　would　however　be　unwarrantable；　it　must　be　considered　as　identical　only　in　name　with　the　motions　of　Intellect　and　Soul。　　　　　That　Motion　is　a　genus　we　may　be　all　the　more　confident　in　virtue　of　the　difficulty…　the　impossibility　even…　of　confining　it　within　a　definition。　　　　　But　how　can　it　be　a　Form　in　cases　where　the　mot