the six enneads-第166部分

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into　being　in　any　degree；　This　is　that　by　which　being　is　brought　to　all　the　rest；　its　sequents。　Above　all　origins；　This　can　owe　being　neither　to　an　extern　nor　to　itself。　　　　　11。　But　this　Unoriginating；　what　is　it？　　　　　We　can　but　withdraw；　silent；　hopeless；　and　search　no　further。　What　can　we　look　for　when　we　have　reached　the　furthest？　Every　enquiry　aims　at　a　first　and；　that　attained；　rests。　　　　　Besides；　we　must　remember　that　all　questioning　deals　with　the　nature　of　a　thing；　its　quality；　its　cause　or　its　essential　being。　In　this　case　the　being…　in　so　far　as　we　can　use　the　word…　is　knowable　only　by　its　sequents：　the　question　as　to　cause　asks　for　a　principle　beyond；　but　the　principle　of　all　has　no　principle；　the　question　as　to　quality　would　be　looking　for　an　attribute　in　that　which　has　none：　the　question　as　to　nature　shows　only　that　we　must　ask　nothing　about　it　but　merely　take　it　into　the　mind　if　we　may；　with　the　knowledge　gained　that　nothing　can　be　permissibly　connected　with　it。　　　　　The　difficulty　this　Principle　presents　to　our　mind　in　so　far　as　we　can　approach　to　conception　of　it　may　be　exhibited　thus：　　　　　We　begin　by　posing　space；　a　place；　a　Chaos；　into　this　existing　container；　real　or　fancied；　we　introduce　God　and　proceed　to　enquire：　we　ask；　for　example；　whence　and　how　He　comes　to　be　there：　we　investigate　the　presence　and　quality　of　this　new…comer　projected　into　the　midst　of　things　here　from　some　height　or　depth。　But　the　difficulty　disappears　if　we　eliminate　all　space　before　we　attempt　to　conceive　God：　He　must　not　be　set　in　anything　either　as　enthroned　in　eternal　immanence　or　as　having　made　some　entry　into　things：　He　is　to　be　conceived　as　existing　alone；　in　that　existence　which　the　necessity　of　discussion　forces　us　to　attribute　to　Him；　with　space　and　all　the　rest　as　later　than　Him…　space　latest　of　all。　Thus　we　conceive　as　far　as　we　may；　the　spaceless；　we　abolish　the　notion　of　any　environment：　we　circumscribe　Him　within　no　limit；　we　attribute　no　extension　to　Him；　He　has　no　quality　since　no　shape；　even　shape　Intellectual；　He　holds　no　relationship　but　exists　in　and　for　Himself　before　anything　is。　　　　　How　can　we　think　any　longer　of　that　〃Thus　He　happened　to　be〃？　How　make　this　one　assertion　of　Him　of　whom　all　other　assertion　can　be　no　more　than　negation？　It　is　on　the　contrary　nearer　the　truth　to　say　〃Thus　He　has　happened　not　to　be〃：　that　contains　at　least　the　utter　denial　of　his　happening。　　　　　12。　Yet；　is　not　God　what　He　is？　Can　He；　then；　be　master　of　being　what　He　is　or　master　to　stand　above　Being？　The　mind　utterly　reluctant　returns　to　its　doubt：　some　further　considerations；　therefore；　must　be　offered：　　　　　In　us　the　individual；　viewed　as　body；　is　far　from　reality；　by　soul　which　especially　constitutes　the　being　we　participate　in　reality；　are　in　some　degree　real。　This　is　a　compound　state；　a　mingling　of　Reality　and　Difference；　not；　therefore　reality　in　the　strictest　sense；　not　reality　pure。　Thus　far　we　are　not　masters　of　our　being；　in　some　sense　the　reality　in　us　is　one　thing　and　we　another。　We　are　not　masters　of　our　being；　the　real　in　us　is　the　master；　since　that　is　the　principle　establishing　our　characteristic　difference；　yet　we　are　again　in　some　sense　that　which　is　sovereign　in　us　and　so　even　on　this　level　might　in　spite　of　all　be　described　as　self…disposing。　　　　　But　in　That　which　is　wholly　what　it　is…　self…existing　reality；　without　distinction　between　the　total　thing　and　its　essence…　the　being　is　a　unit　and　is　sovereign　over　itself；　neither　the　being　nor　the　essence　is　to　be　referred　to　any　extern。　Besides；　the　very　question　as　to　self。　disposal　falls　in　the　case　of　what　is　First　in　reality；　if　it　can　be　raised　at　all；　we　must　declare　that　there　can　be　no　subjection　whatever　in　That　to　which　reality　owes　its　freedom；　That　in　whose　nature　the　conferring　of　freedom　must　clearly　be　vested；　preeminently　to　be　known　as　the　liberator。　　　　　Still；　is　not　this　Principle　subject　to　its　essential　Being？　On　the　contrary；　it　is　the　source　of　freedom　to　Being。　　　　　Even　if　there　be　Act　in　the　Supreme…　an　Act　with　which　it　is　to　be　identified…　this　is　not　enough　to　set　up　a　duality　within　it　and　prevent　it　being　entirely　master　of　that　self　from　which　the　Act　springs；　for　the　Act　is　not　distinct　from　that　self。　If　we　utterly　deny　Act　in　it…　holding　that　Act　begins　with　others　moving　about　it…　we　are　all　the　less　able　to　allow　either　self…mastery　or　subjection　in　it：　even　self…mastery　is　absent　here；　not　that　anything　else　is　master　over　it　but　that　self…mastery　begins　with　Being　while　the　Supreme　is　to　be　set　in　a　higher　order。　　　　　But　what　can　there　be　higher　than　that　which　is　its　own　master？　　　　　Where　we　speak　of　self…mastery　there　is　a　certain　duality；　Act　against　essence；　from　the　exercise　of　the　Act　arises　the　conception　of　the　mastering　principle…　though　one　identical　with　the　essence…　hence　arises　the　separate　idea　of　mastery；　and　the　being　concerned　is　said　to　possess　self…mastery。　Where　there　is　no　such　duality　joining　to　unity　but　solely　a　unity　pure…　either　because　the　Act　is　the　whole　being　or　because　there　is　no　Act　at　all…　then　we　cannot　strictly　say　that　the　being　has　this　mastery　of　self。　　　　　13。　Our　enquiry　obliges　us　to　use　terms　not　strictly　applicable：　we　insist；　once　more；　that　not　even　for　the　purpose　of　forming　the　concept　of　the　Supreme　may　we　make　it　a　duality；　if　now　we　do；　it　is　merely　for　the　sake　of　conveying　conviction；　at　the　cost　of　verbal　accuracy。　　　　　If；　then；　we　are　to　allow　Activities　in　the　Supreme　and　make　them　depend　upon　will…　and　certainly　Act　cannot　There　be　will…less　and　these　Activities　are　to　be　the　very　essence；　then　will　and　essence　in　the　Supreme　must　be　identical。　This　admitted；　as　He　willed　to　be　so　He　is；　it　is　no　more　true　to　say　that　He　wills　and　acts　as　His　nature　determines　than　that　His　essence　is　as　He　wills　and　acts。　Thus　He　is　wholly　master　of　Himself　and　holds　His　very　being　at　His　will。　　　　　Consider　also　that　every　being　in　its　pursuit　of　its　good　seeks　to　be　that　good　rather　than　what　it　is　it　judges　itself　most　truly　to　be　when　it　partakes　of　its　good：　in　so　far　as　it　thus　draws　on　its　good　its　being　is　its　choice：　much　more；　then；　must　the　very　Principle；　The　Good；　be　desirable　in　itself　when　any　fragment　of　it　is　very　desirable　to　the　extern　and　becomes　the　chosen　essence　promoting　that　extern's　will　and　identical　with　the　will　that　gave　the　existence？　　　　　As　long　as　a　thing　is　apart　from　its　good　it　seeks　outside　itself；　when　it　holds　its　good　it　itself　as　it　is：　and　this　is　no　matter　of　chance；　the　essence　now　is　not　outside　of　the　will；　by　the　good　it　is　determined；　by　the　good　it　is　in　self…possession。　　　　　If　then　this　Principle　is　the　means　of　determination　to　everything　else；　we　see　at　once　that　self…possession　must　belong　primally　to　it；　so　that；　through　it；　others　in　their　turn　may　be　self…belonging：　what　we　must　call　its　essence　comports　its　will　to　possess　such　a　manner　of　being；　we　can　form　no　idea　of　it　without　including　in　it　the　will　towards　itself　as　it　is。　It　must　be　a　consistent　self　willing　its　being　and　being　what　it　wills；　its　will　and　itself　must　be　one　thing；　all　the　more　one　from　the　absence　of　distinction　between　a　given　nature　and　one　which　would　be　preferred。　What　could　The　Good　have　wished　to　be　other　than　what　it　is？　Suppose　it　had　the　choice　of　being　what　it　preferred；　power　to　alter　the　nature；　it　could　not　prefer　to　be　something　else；　it　could　have　no　fault　to　find　with　anything　in　its　nature；　as　if　that　nature　were　imposed　by　force；　The　Good　is　what　from　always　it　wished　and　wishes　to　be。　For　the　really　existent　Good　is　a　willing　towards　itself；　towards　a　good　not　gained　by　any　wiles　or　even　attracted　to　it　by　force　of　its　nature；　The　Good　is　what　it　chose　to　be　and；　in　fact；　there　was　never　anything　outside　it　to　which　it　could　be　drawn。　　　　　It　may　be　added　that　nothing　else　contains　in　its　essence　the　principle　of　its　own　satisfaction；　there　will　be　inner　discord：　but　this　hypostasis　of　the　Good　must　necessarily　have　self…option；　the　will　towards　the　self；　if　it　had　not；　it　could　not　bring　satisfaction　to　the　beings　whose　contentment　demands　participation　in　it　or　imagination　of　it。　　　　　Once　more；　we　must　be　patient　with　language；　we　are　forced　to　apply　to　the　Supreme　terms　which　strictly　are　ruled　out；　everywhere　we　must　read　〃So　to　speak。〃　The　Good；　then；　exists；　it　holds　its　existence　through　choice　and　will；　conditions　of　its　very　being：　yet　it　cannot　be　a　manifold；　therefore　the　will　and　the　essential　being　must　be　taken　as　one　identity；　the　act　of　the　will　must　be　self…determined　and　the　being　self…caused；　thus　reason　shows　the　Supreme　to　be　its　own　Author。　For　if　the　act　of　will　springs　from　God　Himself　and　is　as　it　were　His　operation　and　the　same　will　is　identical　with　His　essence；　He　must　be　self…established。　He　is　not；　therefore；　〃what　He　has　happened　to　be〃　but　what　He　has　willed　to　be。　　　　　14。　Another　approach：　Everything　to　which　existence　may　be　attributed　is　either　one　with　its　essence　or　distinct　from　it。　Thus　any　given　man　is　distinct　from　essential　man　though　belonging　to　the　order　Man：　a　soul　and　a　soul's　essence　are　the　same…　that　is；　in　case　of　soul　pure　and　unmingled…　Man　as　type　is　the　same　as　man's　essence；　where　the　thing；　man；　and　the　essence　are　different；　the　particular　man　may　be　considered　as　accidental；　but　man；　the　essence；　cannot　be　so；　the　type；　Man；　has　Real　Being。　Now　if　the　essence　of　man　is　real；　not　chanced　or　accidental；　how　can　we　think　That　to　be　accidental　which　transcends　the　order　man；　author　of　the　type；　source　of　all　being；　a　principle　more　nearly　simplex　than　man's　being　or　being　of　any　kind？　As　we　approach　the　simplex；　accident　recedes；　what　is　utterly　simplex　accident　never　touches　at　all。　　　　　Further　we　must　remember　what　has　been　already　said；　that　where　there　is　true　being；　where　things　have　been　brought　to　reality　by　that　Principle…　and　this　is　true　of　whatsoever　has　determined　condition　within　the　order　of　sense…　all　that　reality　is　brought　about　in　virtue　of　something　emanating　from　the　divine。　By　things　of　determined　condition　I　mean　such　as　contain；　inbound　with　their　essence；　the　reason　of　their　being　as　they　are；　so　that；　later；　an　observer　can　state　the　use　for　each　of　the　constituent　parts…　why　the　ey