the six enneads-第29部分

快捷操作: 按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页 按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页 按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部! 如果本书没有阅读完，想下次继续接着阅读，可使用上方 "收藏到我的浏览器" 功能 和 "加入书签" 功能！


？…　that　we　must　define　it　as　a　Potentiality　and　nothing　more…　or　refute　these　considerations。　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　SIXTH　TRACTATE。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　QUALITY　AND　FORM…IDEA。

　　　　1。　Are　not　Being　and　Reality　（to　on　and　he　ousia）　distinct；　must　we　not　envisage　Being　as　the　substance　stripped　of　all　else；　while　Reality　is　this　same　thing；　Being；　accompanied　by　the　others…　Movement；　Rest；　Identity；　Difference…　so　that　these　are　the　specific　constituents　of　Reality？　　　　　The　universal　fabric；　then；　is　Reality　in　which　Being；　Movement；　and　so　on　are　separate　constituents。　　　　　Now　Movement　has　Being　as　an　accident　and　therefore　should　have　Reality　as　an　accident；　or　is　it　something　serving　to　the　completion　of　Reality？　　　　　No：　Movement　is　a　Reality；　everything　in　the　Supreme　is　a　Reality。　　　　　Why；　then；　does　not　Reality　reside；　equally；　in　this　sphere？　　　　　In　the　Supreme　there　is　Reality　because　all　things　are　one；　ours　is　the　sphere　of　images　whose　separation　produces　grades　of　difference。　Thus　in　the　spermatic　unity　all　the　human　members　are　present　undistinguishably；　there　is　no　separation　of　head　and　hand：　their　distinct　existence　begins　in　the　life　here；　whose　content　is　image；　not　Authentic　Existence。　　　　　And　are　the　distinct　Qualities　in　the　Authentic　Realm　to　be　explained　in　the　same　way？　Are　they　differing　Realities　centred　in　one　Reality　or　gathered　round　Being…　differences　which　constitute　Realities　distinct　from　each　other　within　the　common　fact　of　Reality？　　　　　This　is　sound　enough；　but　it　does　not　apply　to　all　the　qualities　of　this　sphere；　some　of　which；　no　doubt；　are　differentiations　of　Reality…　such　as　the　quality　of　two…footedness　or　four…footedness…　but　others　are　not　such　differentiations　of　Reality　and；　because　they　are　not　so；　must　be　called　qualities　and　nothing　more。　　　　　On　the　other　hand；　one　and　the　same　thing　may　be　sometimes　a　differentiation　of　Reality　and　sometimes　not…　a　differentiation　when　it　is　a　constitutive　element；　and　no　differentiation　in　some　other　thing；　where　it　is　not　a　constitutive　element　but　an　accidental。　The　distinction　may　be　seen　in　the　＇constitutive＇　whiteness　of　a　swan　or　of　ceruse　and　the　whiteness　which　in　a　man　is　an　accidental。　　　　　Where　whiteness　belongs　to　the　very　Reason…Form　of　the　thing　it　is　a　constitutive　element　and　not　a　quality；　where　it　is　a　superficial　appearance　it　is　a　quality。　　　　　In　other　words；　qualification　may　be　distinguished。　We　may　think　of　a　qualification　that　is　of　the　very　substance　of　the　thing；　something　exclusively　belonging　to　it。　And　there　is　a　qualifying　that　is　nothing　more；　＇not　constituting　but　simply＇　giving　some　particular　character　to　the　real　thing；　in　this　second　case　the　qualification　does　not　produce　any　alteration　towards　Reality　or　away　from　it；　the　Reality　has　existed　fully　constituted　before　the　incoming　of　the　qualification　which…　whether　in　soul　or　body…　merely　introduces　some　state　from　outside；　and　by　this　addition　elaborates　the　Reality　into　the　particular　thing。　　　　　But　what　if　＇the　superficial　appearance　such　as＇　the　visible　whiteness　in　ceruse　is　constitutive？　In　the　swan　the　whiteness　is　not　constitutive　since　a　swan　need　not　be　white：　it　is　constitutive　in　ceruse；　just　as　warmth　is　constitutive　of　the　Reality；　fire。　　　　　No　doubt　we　may　be　told　that　the　Reality　in　fire　is　＇not　warmth　but＇　fieriness　and　in　ceruse　an　analogous　abstraction：　yet　the　fact　remains　that　in　visible　fire　warmth　or　fieriness　is　constitutive　and　in　the　ceruse　whiteness。　　　　　Thus　the　same　entities　are　represented　at　once　as　being　not　qualities　but　constituents　of　Reality　and　not　constituents　but　qualities。　　　　　Now　it　is　absurd　to　talk　as　if　one　identical　thing　changed　its　own　nature　according　to　whether　it　is　present　as　a　constituent　or　as　an　accidental。　　　　　The　truth　is　that　while　the　Reason…Principles　producing　these　entities　contain　nothing　but　what　is　of　the　nature　of　Reality；　yet　only　in　the　Intellectual　Realm　do　the　produced　things　possess　real　existence：　here　they　are　not　real；　they　are　qualified。　　　　　And　this　is　the　starting…point　of　an　error　we　constantly　make：　in　our　enquiries　into　things　we　let　realities　escape　us　and　fasten　on　what　is　mere　quality。　Thus　fire　is　not　the　thing　we　so　name　from　the　observation　of　certain　qualities　present；　fire　is　a　Reality　＇not　a　combination　of　material　phenomena＇；　the　phenomena　observed　here　and　leading　us　to　name　fire　call　us　away　from　the　authentic　thing；　a　quality　is　erected　into　the　very　matter　of　definition…　a　procedure；　however；　reasonable　enough　in　regard　to　things　of　the　realm　of　sense　which　are　in　no　case　realities　but　accidents　of　Reality。　　　　　And　this　raises　the　question　how　Reality　can　ever　spring　from　what　are　not　Realities。　　　　　It　has　been　shown　that　a　thing　coming　into　being　cannot　be　identical　with　its　origins：　it　must　here　be　added　that　nothing　thus　coming　into　being　＇no　〃thing　of　process〃＇　can　be　a　Reality。　　　　　Then　how　do　we　assert　the　rising　in　the　Supreme　of　what　we　have　called　Reality　from　what　is　not　Reality　＇i。e。；　from　the　pure　Being　which　is　above　Reality＇？　　　　　The　Reality　there…　possessing　Authentic　Being　in　the　strictest　sense；　with　the　least　admixture…　is　Reality　by　existing　among　the　differentiations　of　the　Authentic　Being；　or；　better；　Reality　is　affirmed　in　the　sense　that　with　the　existence　of　the　Supreme　is　included　its　Act　so　that　Reality　seems　to　be　a　perfectionment　of　the　Authentic　Being；　though　in　the　truth　it　is　a　diminution；　the　produced　thing　is　deficient　by　the　very　addition；　by　being　less　simplex；　by　standing　one　step　away　from　the　Authentic。　　　　　2。　But　we　must　enquire　into　Quality　in　itself：　to　know　its　nature　is　certainly　the　way　to　settle　our　general　question。　　　　　The　first　point　is　to　assure　ourselves　whether　or　not　one　and　the　same　thing　may　be　held　to　be　sometimes　a　mere　qualification　and　sometimes　a　constituent　of　Reality…　not　staying　on　the　point　that　qualification　could　not　be　constitutive　of　a　Reality　but　of　a　qualified　Reality　only。　　　　　Now　in　a　Reality　possessing　a　determined　quality；　the　Reality　and　the　fact　of　existence　precede　the　qualified　Reality。　　　　　What；　then；　in　the　case　of　fire　is　the　Reality　which　precedes　the　qualified　Reality？　　　　　Its　mere　body；　perhaps？　If　so；　body　being　the　Reality；　fire　is　a　warmed　body；　and　the　total　thing　is　not　the　Reality；　and　the　fire　has　warmth　as　a　man　might　have　a　snub　nose。　　　　　Rejecting　its　warmth；　its　glow；　its　lightness…　all　which　certainly　do　seem　to　be　qualities…　and　its　resistance；　there　is　left　only　its　extension　by　three　dimensions：　in　other　words；　its　Matter　is　its　Reality。　　　　　But　that　cannot　be　held：　surely　the　form　is　much　more　likely　than　the　Matter　to　be　the　Reality。　　　　　But　is　not　the　Form　of　Quality？　　　　　No；　the　Form　is　not　a　Quality：　it　is　a　Reason…Principle。　　　　　And　the　outcome　of　this　Reason…Principle　entering　into　the　underlying　Matter；　what　is　that？　　　　　Certainly　not　what　is　seen　and　burns；　for　that　is　the　something　in　which　these　qualities　inhere。　　　　　We　might　define　the　burning　as　an　Act　springing　from　the　Reason…Principle：　then　the　warming　and　lighting　and　other　effects　of　fire　will　be　its　Acts　and　we　still　have　found　no　foothold　for　its　quality。　　　　　Such　completions　of　a　Reality　cannot　be　called　qualities　since　they　are　its　Acts　emanating　from　the　Reason…Principles　and　from　the　essential　powers。　A　quality　is　something　persistently　outside　Reality；　it　cannot　appear　as　Reality　in　one　place　after　having　figured　in　another　as　quality；　its　function　is　to　bring　in　the　something　more　after　the　Reality　is　established；　such　additions　as　virtue；　vice；　ugliness；　beauty；　health；　a　certain　shape。　On　this　last；　however；　it　may　be　remarked　that　triangularity　and　quadrangularity　are　not　in　themselves　qualities；　but　there　is　quality　when　a　thing　is　triangular　by　having　been　brought　to　that　shape；　the　quality　is　not　the　triangularity　but　the　patterning　to　it。　The　case　is　the　same　with　the　arts　and　avocations。　　　　　Thus：　Quality　is　a　condition　superadded　to　a　Reality　whose　existence　does　not　depend　upon　it；　whether　this　something　more　be　a　later　acquirement　or　an　accompaniment　from　the　first；　it　is　something　in　whose　absence　the　Reality　would　still　be　complete。　It　will　sometimes　come　and　go；　sometimes　be　inextricably　attached；　so　that　there　are　two　forms　of　Quality；　the　moveable　and　the　fixed。　　　　　3。　The　Whiteness；　therefore；　in　a　human　being　is；　clearly；　to　be　classed　not　as　a　quality　but　as　an　activity…　the　act　of　a　power　which　can　make　white；　and　similarly　what　we　think　of　as　qualities　in　the　Intellectual　Realm　should　be　known　as　activities；　they　are　activities　which　to　our　minds　take　the　appearance　of　quality　from　the　fact　that；　differing　in　character　among　themselves；　each　of　them　is　a　particularity　which；　so　to　speak；　distinguishes　those　Realities　from　each　other。　　　　　What；　then；　distinguishes　Quality　in　the　Intellectual　Realm　from　that　here；　if　both　are　Acts？　　　　　The　difference　is　that　these　＇〃Quality…Activities〃＇　in　the　Supreme　do　not　indicate　the　very　nature　of　the　Reality　＇as　do　the　corresponding　Activities　here＇　nor　do　they　indicate　variations　of　substance　or　of　＇essential＇　character；　they　merely　indicate　what　we　think　of　as　Quality　but　in　the　Intellectual　Realm　must　still　be　Activity。　　　　　In　other　words　this　thing；　considered　in　its　aspect　as　possessing　the　characteristic　property　of　Reality　is　by　that　alone　recognised　as　no　mere　Quality。　But　when　our　reason　separates　what　is　distinctive　in　these　＇〃Quality…Activities〃＇…　not　in　the　sense　of　abolishing　them　but　rather　as　taking　them　to　itself　and　making　something　new　of　them…　this　new　something　is　Quality：　reason　has；　so　to　speak；　appropriated　a　portion　of　Reality；　that　portion　manifest　to　it　on　the　surface。　　　　　By　this　analogy；　warmth；　as　a　concomitant　of　the　specific　nature　of　fire；　may　very　well　be　no　quality　in　fire　but　an　Idea…Form　belonging　to　it；　one　of　its　activities；　while　being　merely　a　Quality　in　other　things　than　fire：　as　it　is　manifested　in　any　warm　object；　it　is　not　a　mode　of　Reality　but　merely　a　trace；　a　shadow；　an　image；　something　that　has　gone　forth　from　its　own　Reality…　where　it　was　an　Act…　and　in　the　warm　object　is　a　quality。　　　　　All；　then；　that　is　accident　and　not　Act；　all　but　what　is　Idea…form　of　the　Reality；　all　that　merely　confers　pattern；