the six enneads-第31部分

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　to　speak；　of　magnitude　as　of　all　other　quality。　　　　　Or　it　may　be　that　we　appreciate　the　magnitude　of　an　object　by　observing　the　salience　and　recession　of　its　several　parts；　so　that　to　perceive　its　true　size　we　must　have　it　close　at　hand。　　　　　Or　again；　it　may　be　that　magnitude　is　known　incidentally　＇as　a　deduction＇　from　the　observation　of　colour。　With　an　object　at　hand　we　know　how　much　space　is　covered　by　the　colour；　at　a　distance；　only　that　something　is　coloured；　for　the　parts；　quantitatively　distinct　among　themselves；　do　not　give　us　the　precise　knowledge　of　that　quantity；　the　colours　themselves　reaching　us　only　in　a　blurred　impression。　　　　　What　wonder；　then；　if　size　be　like　sound…　reduced　when　the　form　reaches　us　but　faintly…　for　in　sound　the　hearing　is　concerned　only　about　the　form；　magnitude　is　not　discerned　except　incidentally。　　　　　Well；　in　hearing　magnitude　is　known　incidentally；　but　how？　Touch　conveys　a　direct　impression　of　a　visible　object；　what　gives　us　the　same　direct　impression　of　an　object　of　hearing？　　　　　The　magnitude　of　a　sound　is　known　not　by　actual　quantity　but　by　degree　of　impact；　by　intensity…　and　this　in　no　indirect　knowledge；　the　ear　appreciates　a　certain　degree　of　force；　exactly　as　the　palate　perceives　by　no　indirect　knowledge；　a　certain　degree　of　sweetness。　But　the　true　magnitude　of　a　sound　is　its　extension；　this　the　hearing　may　define　to　itself　incidentally　by　deduction　from　the　degree　of　intensity　but　not　to　the　point　of　precision。　The　intensity　is　merely　the　definite　effect　at　a　particular　spot；　the　magnitude　is　a　matter　of　totality；　the　sum　of　space　occupied。　　　　　Still　the　colours　seen　from　a　distance　are　faint；　but　they　are　not　small　as　the　masses　are。　　　　　True；　but　there　is　the　common　fact　of　diminution。　There　is　colour　with　its　diminution；　faintness；　there　is　magnitude　with　its　diminution；　smallness；　and　magnitude　follows　colour　diminishing　stage　by　stage　with　it。　　　　　But；　the　phenomenon　is　more　easily　explained　by　the　example　of　things　of　wide　variety。　Take　mountains　dotted　with　houses；　woods　and　other　land…marks；　the　observation　of　each　detail　gives　us　the　means　of　calculating；　by　the　single　objects　noted；　the　total　extent　covered：　but；　where　no　such　detail　of　form　reaches　us；　our　vision；　which　deals　with　detail；　has　not　the　means　towards　the　knowledge　of　the　whole　by　measurement　of　any　one　clearly　discerned　magnitude。　This　applies　even　to　objects　of　vision　close　at　hand：　where　there　is　variety　and　the　eye　sweeps　over　all　at　one　glance　so　that　the　forms　are　not　all　caught；　the　total　appears　the　less　in　proportion　to　the　detail　which　has　escaped　the　eye；　observe　each　single　point　and　then　you　can　estimate　the　volume　precisely。　Again；　magnitudes　of　one　colour　and　unbroken　form　trick　the　sense　of　quantity：　the　vision　can　no　longer　estimate　by　the　particular；　it　slips　away；　not　finding　the　stand…by　of　the　difference　between　part　and　part。　　　　　It　was　the　detail　that　prevented　a　near　object　deceiving　our　sense　of　magnitude：　in　the　case　of　the　distant　object；　because　the　eye　does　not　pass　stage　by　stage　through　the　stretch　of　intervening　space　so　as　to　note　its　forms；　therefore　it　cannot　report　the　magnitude　of　that　space。　　　　　2。　The　explanation　by　lesser　angle　of　vision　has　been　elsewhere　dismissed；　one　point；　however；　we　may　urge　here。　　　　　Those　attributing　the　reduced　appearance　to　the　lesser　angle　occupied　allow　by　their　very　theory　that　the　unoccupied　portion　of　the　eye　still　sees　something　beyond　or　something　quite　apart　from　the　object　of　vision；　if　only　air…space。　　　　　Now　consider　some　very　large　object　of　vision；　that　mountain　for　example。　No　part　of　the　eye　is　unoccupied；　the　mountain　adequately　fills　it　so　that　it　can　take　in　nothing　beyond；　for　the　mountain　as　seen　either　corresponds　exactly　to　the　eye…space　or　stretches　away　out　of　range　to　right　and　to　left。　How　does　the　explanation　by　lesser　angle　of　vision　hold　good　in　this　case；　where　the　object　still　appears　smaller；　far；　than　it　is　and　yet　occupies　the　eye　entire？　　　　　Or　look　up　to　the　sky　and　no　hesitation　can　remain。　Of　course　we　cannot　take　in　the　entire　hemisphere　at　one　glance；　the　eye　directed　to　it　could　not　cover　so　vast　an　expanse。　But　suppose　the　possibility：　the　entire　eye；　then；　embraces　the　hemisphere　entire；　but　the　expanse　of　the　heavens　is　far　greater　than　it　appears；　how　can　its　appearing　far　less　than　it　is　be　explained　by　a　lessening　of　the　angle　of　vision？　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　NINTH　TRACTATE。

　　　　　　AGAINST　THOSE　THAT　AFFIRM　THE　CREATOR　OF　THE　KOSMOS　AND　　　　　　　　　　THE　KOSMOS　ITSELF　TO　BE　EVIL：　＇GENERALLY　QUOTED　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　AS　〃AGAINST　THE　GNOSTICS〃＇。

　　　　1。　We　have　seen　elsewhere　that　the　Good；　the　Principle；　is　simplex；　and；　correspondingly；　primal…　for　the　secondary　can　never　be　simplex…　that　it　contains　nothing：　that　it　is　an　integral　Unity。　　　　　Now　the　same　Nature　belongs　to　the　Principle　we　know　as　The　One。　just　as　the　goodness　of　The　Good　is　essential　and　not　the　outgrowth　of　some　prior　substance　so　the　Unity　of　The　One　is　its　essential。　　　　　Therefore：　　　　　When　we　speak　of　The　One　and　when　we　speak　of　The　Good　we　must　recognize　an　Identical　Nature；　we　must　affirm　that　they　are　the　same…　not；　it　is　true；　as　venturing　any　predication　with　regard　to　that　＇unknowable＇　Hypostasis　but　simply　as　indicating　it　to　ourselves　in　the　best　terms　we　find。　　　　　Even　in　calling　it　〃The　First〃　we　mean　no　more　than　to　express　that　it　is　the　most　absolutely　simplex：　it　is　the　Self…Sufficing　only　in　the　sense　that　it　is　not　of　that　compound　nature　which　would　make　it　dependent　upon　any　constituent；　it　is　〃the　Self…Contained〃　because　everything　contained　in　something　alien　must　also　exist　by　that　alien。　　　　　Deriving；　then；　from　nothing　alien；　entering　into　nothing　alien；　in　no　way　a　made…up　thing；　there　can　be　nothing　above　it。　　　　　We　need　not；　then；　go　seeking　any　other　Principles；　this…　the　One　and　the　Good…　is　our　First；　next　to　it　follows　the　Intellectual　Principle；　the　Primal　Thinker；　and　upon　this　follows　Soul。　Such　is　the　order　in　nature。　The　Intellectual　Realm　allows　no　more　than　these　and　no　fewer。　　　　　Those　who　hold　to　fewer　Principles　must　hold　the　identity　of　either　Intellectual…Principle　and　Soul　or　of　Intellectual…Principle　and　The　First；　but　we　have　abundantly　shown　that　these　are　distinct。　　　　　It　remains　for　us　to　consider　whether　there　are　more　than　these　Three。　　　　　Now　what　other　＇Divine＇　Kinds　could　there　be？　No　Principles　of　the　universe　could　be　found　at　once　simpler　and　more　transcendent　than　this　whose　existence　we　have　affirmed　and　described。　　　　　They　will　scarcely　urge　upon　us　the　doubling　of　the　Principle　in　Act　by　a　Principle　in　Potentiality。　It　is　absurd　to　seek　such　a　plurality　by　distinguishing　between　potentiality　and　actuality　in　the　case　of　immaterial　beings　whose　existence　is　in　Act…　even　in　lower　forms　no　such　division　can　be　made　and　we　cannot　conceive　a　duality　in　the　Intellectual…Principle；　one　phase　in　some　vague　calm；　another　all　astir。　Under　what　form　can　we　think　of　repose　in　the　Intellectual　Principle　as　contrasted　with　its　movement　or　utterance？　What　would　the　quiescence　of　the　one　phase　be　as　against　the　energy　of　the　others？　　　　　No：　the　Intellectual…Principle　is　continuously　itself；　unchangeably　constituted　in　stable　Act。　With　movement…　towards　it　or　within　it…　we　are　in　the　realm　of　the　Soul's　operation：　such　act　is　a　Reason…Principle　emanating　from　it　and　entering　into　Soul；　thus　made　an　Intellectual　Soul；　but　in　no　sense　creating　an　intermediate　Principle　to　stand　between　the　two。　　　　　Nor　are　we　warranted　in　affirming　a　plurality　of　Intellectual　Principles　on　the　ground　that　there　is　one　that　knows　and　thinks　and　another　knowing　that　it　knows　and　thinks。　For　whatever　distinction　be　possible　in　the　Divine　between　its　Intellectual　Act　and　its　Consciousness　of　that　Act；　still　all　must　be　one　projection　not　unaware　of　its　own　operation：　it　would　be　absurd　to　imagine　any　such　unconsciousness　in　the　Authentic　Intelligence；　the　knowing　principle　must　be　one　and　the　selfsame　with　that　which　knows　of　the　knowing。　　　　　The　contrary　supposition　would　give　us　two　beings；　one　that　merely　knows；　and　another　separate　being　that　knows　of　the　act　of　knowing。　　　　　If　we　are　answered　that　the　distinction　is　merely　a　process　of　our　thought；　then；　at　once；　the　theory　of　a　plurality　in　the　Divine　Hypostasis　is　abandoned：　further；　the　question　is　opened　whether　our　thought　can　entertain　a　knowing　principle　so　narrowed　to　its　knowing　as　not　to　know　that　it　knows…　a　limitation　which　would　be　charged　as　imbecility　even　in　ourselves；　who　if　but　of　very　ordinary　moral　force　are　always　master　of　our　emotions　and　mental　processes。　　　　　No：　The　Divine　Mind　in　its　mentation　thinks　itself；　the　object　of　the　thought　is　nothing　external：　Thinker　and　Thought　are　one；　therefore　in　its　thinking　and　knowing　it　possesses　itself；　observes　itself　and　sees　itself　not　as　something　unconscious　but　as　knowing：　in　this　Primal　Knowing　it　must　include；　as　one　and　the　same　Act；　the　knowledge　of　the　knowing；　and　even　the　logical　distinction　mentioned　above　cannot　be　made　in　the　case　of　the　Divine；　the　very　eternity　of　its　self…thinking　precludes　any　such　separation　between　that　intellective　act　and　the　consciousness　of　the　act。　　　　　The　absurdity　becomes　still　more　blatant　if　we　introduce　yet　a　further　distinction…　after　that　which　affirms　the　knowledge　of　the　knowing；　a　third　distinction　affirming　the　knowing　of　the　knowledge　of　the　knowing：　yet　there　is　no　reason　against　carrying　on　the　division　for　ever　and　ever。　　　　　To　increase　the　Primals　by　making　the　Supreme　Mind　engender　the　Reason…Principle；　and　this　again　engender　in　the　Soul　a　distinct　power　to　act　as　mediator　between　Soul　and　the　Supreme　Mind；　this　is　to　deny　intellection　to　the　Soul；　which　would　no　longer　derive　its　Reason　from　the　Intellectual…Principle　but　from　an　intermediate：　the　Soul　then　would　possess　not　the　Reason…Principle　but　an　image　of　it：　the　Soul　could　not　know　the　Intellectual…Principle；　it　could　have　no　intellection。　　　　　2。　Therefore　we　must　affirm　no　more　than　these　three　Primals：　we　are　not　to　introduce　superfluous　distinctions　which　their　nature　rejects。　We　are　to　proclaim　one　Intellectual…Principle　unchangeably　the　same；　in　no　way　subject　to　decline；　actin