the six enneads-第66部分

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not　mean　self…ownership；　it　means　turning　the　gaze　towards　the　Primal：　now　the　act　of　intellection　is　itself　the　Primal　Act；　and　there　is　therefore　no　place　for　any　earlier　one。　The　Being　projecting　this　Act　transcends　the　Act　so　that　Intellection　is　secondary　to　the　Being　in　which　it　resides。　Intellection　is　not　the　transcendently　venerable　thing…　neither　Intellection　in　general　nor　even　the　Intellection　of　The　Good。　Apart　from　and　over　any　Intellection　stands　The　Good　itself。　　　　　The　Good　therefore　needs　no　consciousness。　　　　　What　sort　of　consciousness　can　be　conceived　in　it？　　　　　Consciousness　of　the　Good　as　existent　or　non…existent？　　　　　If　of　existent　Good；　that　Good　exists　before　and　without　any　such　consciousness：　if　the　act　of　consciousness　produces　that　Good；　then　The　Good　was　not　previously　in　existence…　and；　at　once；　the　very　consciousness　falls　to　the　ground　since　it　is；　no　longer　consciousness　of　The　Good。　　　　　But　would　not　all　this　mean　that　the　First　does　not　even　live？　　　　　The　First　cannot　be　said　to　live　since　it　is　the　source　of　Life。　　　　　All　that　has　self…consciousness　and　self…intellection　is　derivative；　it　observes　itself　in　order；　by　that　activity；　to　become　master　of　its　Being：　and　if　it　study　itself　this　can　mean　only　that　ignorance　inheres　in　it　and　that　it　is　of　its　own　nature　lacking　and　to　be　made　perfect　by　Intellection。　　　　　All　thinking　and　knowing　must；　here；　be　eliminated：　the　addition　introduces　deprivation　and　deficiency。　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　THE　FOURTH　ENNEAD。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　FIRST　TRACTATE。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　ON　THE　ESSENCE　OF　THE　SOUL　（1）。

　　　　1。　In　the　Intellectual　Kosmos　dwells　Authentic　Essence；　with　the　Intellectual…Principle　＇Divine　Mind＇　as　the　noblest　of　its　content；　but　containing　also　souls；　since　every　soul　in　this　lower　sphere　has　come　thence：　that　is　the　world　of　unembodied　spirits　while　to　our　world　belong　those　that　have　entered　body　and　undergone　bodily　division。　　　　　There　the　Intellectual…Principle　is　a　concentrated　all…　nothing　of　it　distinguished　or　divided…　and　in　that　kosmos　of　unity　all　souls　are　concentrated　also；　with　no　spatial　discrimination。　　　　　But　there　is　a　difference：　　　　　The　Intellectual…Principle　is　for　ever　repugnant　to　distinction　and　to　partition。　Soul；　there　without　distinction　and　partition；　has　yet　a　nature　lending　itself　to　divisional　existence：　its　division　is　secession；　entry　into　body。　　　　　In　view　of　this　seceding　and　the　ensuing　partition　we　may　legitimately　speak　of　it　as　a　partible　thing。　　　　　But　if　so；　how　can　it　still　be　described　as　indivisible？　　　　　In　that　the　secession　is　not　of　the　soul　entire；　something　of　it　holds　its　ground；　that　in　it　which　recoils　from　separate　existence。　　　　　The　entity；　therefore；　described　as　〃consisting　of　the　undivided　soul　and　of　the　soul　divided　among　bodies；〃　contains　a　soul　which　is　at　once　above　and　below；　attached　to　the　Supreme　and　yet　reaching　down　to　this　sphere；　like　a　radius　from　a　centre。　　　　　Thus　it　is　that；　entering　this　realm；　it　possesses　still　the　vision　inherent　to　that　superior　phase　in　virtue　of　which　it　unchangingly　maintains　its　integral　nature。　Even　here　it　is　not　exclusively　the　partible　soul：　it　is　still　the　impartible　as　well：　what　in　it　knows　partition　is　parted　without　partibility；　undivided　as　giving　itself　to　the　entire　body；　a　whole　to　a　whole；　it　is　divided　as　being　effective　in　every　part。　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　SECOND　TRACTATE。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　ON　THE　ESSENCE　OF　THE　SOUL　（2）。

　　　　1。　In　our　attempt　to　elucidate　the　Essence　of　the　soul；　we　show　it　to　be　neither　a　material　fabric　nor；　among　immaterial　things；　a　harmony。　The　theory　that　it　is　some　final　development；　some　entelechy；　we　pass　by；　holding　this　to　be　neither　true　as　presented　nor　practically　definitive。　　　　　No　doubt　we　make　a　very　positive　statement　about　it　when　we　declare　it　to　belong　to　the　Intellectual　Kind；　to　be　of　the　divine　order；　but　a　deeper　penetration　of　its　nature　is　demanded。　　　　　In　that　allocation　we　were　distinguishing　things　as　they　fall　under　the　Intellectual　or　the　sensible；　and　we　placed　the　soul　in　the　former　class；　now；　taking　its　membership　of　the　Intellectual　for　granted；　we　must　investigate　by　another　path　the　more　specific　characteristics　of　its　nature。　　　　　There　are；　we　hold；　things　primarily　apt　to　partition；　tending　by　sheer　nature　towards　separate　existence：　they　are　things　in　which　no　part　is　identical　either　with　another　part　or　with　the　whole；　while；　also　their　part　is　necessarily　less　than　the　total　and　whole：　these　are　magnitudes　of　the　realm　of　sense；　masses；　each　of　which　has　a　station　of　its　own　so　that　none　can　be　identically　present　in　entirety　at　more　than　one　point　at　one　time。　　　　　But　to　that　order　is　opposed　Essence　＇Real…Being＇；　this　is　in　no　degree　susceptible　of　partition；　it　is　unparted　and　impartible；　interval　is　foreign　to　it；　cannot　enter　into　our　idea　of　it：　it　has　no　need　of　place　and　is　not；　in　diffusion　or　as　an　entirety；　situated　within　any　other　being：　it　is　poised　over　all　beings　at　once；　and　this　is　not　in　the　sense　of　using　them　as　a　base　but　in　their　being　neither　capable　nor　desirous　of　existing　independently　of　it；　it　is　an　essence　eternally　unvaried：　it　is　common　to　all　that　follows　upon　it：　it　is　like　the　circle's　centre　to　which　all　the　radii　are　attached　while　leaving　it　unbrokenly　in　possession　of　itself；　the　starting　point　of　their　course　and　of　their　essential　being；　the　ground　in　which　they　all　participate：　thus　the　indivisible　is　the　principle　of　these　divided　existences　and　in　their　very　outgoing　they　remain　enduringly　in　contact　with　that　stationary　essence。　　　　　So　far　we　have　the　primarily　indivisible…　supreme　among　the　Intellectual　and　Authentically　Existent…　and　we　have　its　contrary；　the　Kind　definitely　divisible　in　things　of　sense；　but　there　is　also　another　Kind；　of　earlier　rank　than　the　sensible　yet　near　to　it　and　resident　within　it…　an　order；　not；　like　body；　primarily　a　thing　of　part；　but　becoming　so　upon　incorporation。　The　bodies　are　separate；　and　the　ideal　form　which　enters　them　is　correspondingly　sundered　while；　still；　it　is　present　as　one　whole　in　each　of　its　severed　parts；　since　amid　that　multiplicity　in　which　complete　individuality　has　entailed　complete　partition；　there　is　a　permanent　identity；　we　may　think　of　colour；　qualities　of　all　kinds；　some　particular　shape；　which　can　be　present　in　many　unrelated　objects　at　the　one　moment；　each　entire　and　yet　with　no　community　of　experience　among　the　various　manifestations。　In　the　case　of　such　ideal…forms　we　may　affirm　complete　partibility。　　　　　But；　on　the　other　hand；　that　first　utterly　indivisible　Kind　must　be　accompanied　by　a　subsequent　Essence；　engendered　by　it　and　holding　indivisibility　from　it　but；　in　virtue　of　the　necessary　outgo　from　source；　tending　firmly　towards　the　contrary；　the　wholly　partible；　this　secondary　Essence　will　take　an　intermediate　Place　between　the　first　substance；　the　undivided；　and　that　which　is　divisible　in　material　things　and　resides　in　them。　Its　presence；　however；　will　differ　in　one　respect　from　that　of　colour　and　quantity；　these；　no　doubt；　are　present　identically　and　entire　throughout　diverse　material　masses；　but　each　several　manifestation　of　them　is　as　distinct　from　every　other　as　the　mass　is　from　the　mass。　　　　　The　magnitude　present　in　any　mass　is　definitely　one　thing；　yet　its　identity　from　part　to　part　does　not　imply　any　such　community　as　would　entail　common　experience；　within　that　identity　there　is　diversity；　for　it　is　a　condition　only；　not　the　actual　Essence。　　　　　The　Essence；　very　near　to　the　impartible；　which　we　assert　to　belong　to　the　Kind　we　are　now　dealing　with；　is　at　once　an　Essence　and　an　entrant　into　body；　upon　embodiment；　it　experiences　a　partition　unknown　before　it　thus　bestowed　itself。　　　　　In　whatsoever　bodies　it　occupies…　even　the　vastest　of　all；　that　in　which　the　entire　universe　is　included…　it　gives　itself　to　the　whole　without　abdicating　its　unity。　　　　　This　unity　of　an　Essence　is　not　like　that　of　body；　which　is　a　unit　by　the　mode　of　continuous　extension；　the　mode　of　distinct　parts　each　occupying　its　own　space。　Nor　is　it　such　a　unity　as　we　have　dealt　with　in　the　case　of　quality。　　　　　The　nature；　at　once　divisible　and　indivisible；　which　we　affirm　to　be　soul　has　not　the　unity　of　an　extended　thing：　it　does　not　consist　of　separate　sections；　its　divisibility　lies　in　its　presence　at　every　point　of　the　recipient；　but　it　is　indivisible　as　dwelling　entire　in　the　total　and　entire　in　any　part。　　　　　To　have　penetrated　this　idea　is　to　know　the　greatness　of　the　soul　and　its　power；　the　divinity　and　wonder　of　its　being；　as　a　nature　transcending　the　sphere　of　Things。　　　　　Itself　devoid　of　mass；　it　is　present　to　all　mass：　it　exists　here　and　yet　is　There；　and　this　not　in　distinct　phases　but　with　unsundered　identity：　thus　it　is　〃parted　and　not　parted；〃　or；　better；　it　has　never　known　partition；　never　become　a　parted　thing；　but　remains　a　self…gathered　integral；　and　is　〃parted　among　bodies〃　merely　in　the　sense　that　bodies；　in　virtue　of　their　own　sundered　existence；　cannot　receive　it　unless　in　some　partitive　mode；　the　partition；　in　other　words；　is　an　occurrence　in　body　not　in　soul。　　　　　2。　It　can　be　demonstrated　that　soul　must；　necessarily；　be　of　just　this　nature　and　that　there　can　be　no　other　soul　than　such　a　being；　one　neither　wholly　partible　but　both　at　once。　　　　　If　it　had　the　nature　of　body　it　would　consist　of　isolated　members　each　unaware　of　the　conditions　of　every　other；　there　would　be　a　particular　soul…　say　a　soul　of　the　finger…　answering　as　a　distinct　and　independent　entity　to　every　local　experience；　in　general　terms；　there　would　be　a　multiplicity　of　souls　administering　each　individual；　and；　moreover；　the　universe　would　be　governed　not　by　one　soul　but　by　an　incalculable　number；　each　standing　apart　to　itself。　But；　without　a　dominant　unity；　continuity　is　meaningless。　　　　　The　theory　that　〃Impressions　reach　the　leading…principle　by　progressive　stages〃　must　be　dismissed　as　mere　illusion。　　　　　In　the　first　place；　it　affirms　without　investigation　a　〃leading〃　phase　of　the　soul。　　　　　What　can　justify　this　assigning　of　parts　to　the　soul；　the　distinguishing　one　part　from　another？　What　quantity；　or　what　difference　of　quality；　can　apply　to　a　thing　defined　as　a　self…consistent　whole　o