the six enneads-第72部分

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exity；　distracted　with　cares；　diminished　in　strength：　the　need　of　deliberation　goes　with　the　less　self…sufficing　intelligence；　craftsmen　faced　by　a　difficulty　stop　to　consider；　where　there　is　no　problem　their　art　works　on　by　its　own　forthright　power。　　　　　But　if　souls　in　the　Supreme　operate　without　reasoning；　how　can　they　be　called　reasoning　souls？　　　　　One　answer　might　be　that　they　have　the　power　of　deliberating　to　happy　issue；　should　occasion　arise：　but　all　is　met　by　repudiating　the　particular　kind　of　reasoning　intended　＇the　earthly　and　discursive　type＇；　we　may　represent　to　ourselves　a　reasoning　that　flows　uninterruptedly　from　the　Intellectual…Principle　in　them；　an　inherent　state；　an　enduring　activity；　an　assertion　that　is　real；　in　this　way　they　would　be　users　of　reason　even　when　in　that　overworld。　We　certainly　cannot　think　of　them；　it　seems　to　me；　as　employing　words　when；　though　they　may　occupy　bodies　in　the　heavenly　region；　they　are　essentially　in　the　Intellectual：　and　very　surely　the　deliberation　of　doubt　and　difficulty　which　they　practise　here　must　be　unknown　to　them　There；　all　their　act　must　fall　into　place　by　sheer　force　of　their　nature；　there　can　be　no　question　of　commanding　or　of　taking　counsel；　they　will　know；　each；　what　is　to　be　communicated　from　another；　by　present　consciousness。　Even　in　our　own　case　here；　eyes　often　know　what　is　not　spoken；　and　There　all　is　pure；　every　being　is；　as　it　were；　an　eye；　nothing　is　concealed　or　sophisticated；　there　is　no　need　of　speech；　everything　is　seen　and　known。　As　for　the　Celestials　＇the　Daimones＇　and　souls　in　the　air；　they　may　well　use　speech；　for　all　such　are　simply　Animate　＇=　Beings＇。　　　　　19。　Are　we　to　think　of　the　indivisible　phase　of　the　soul　and　the　divided　as　making　one　thing　in　a　coalescence；　or　is　the　indivisible　in　a　place　of　its　own　and　under　conditions　of　its　own；　the　divisible　being　a　sequent　upon　it；　a　separate　part　of　it；　as　distinct　as　the　reasoning　phase　is　from　the　unreasoning？　　　　　The　answer　to　this　question　will　emerge　when　we　make　plain　the　nature　and　function　to　be　attributed　to　each。　　　　　The　indivisible　phase　is　mentioned　＇in　the　passage　of　Plato＇　without　further　qualification；　but　not　so　the　divisible；　〃that　soul〃　we　read　〃which　becomes　divisible　in　bodies〃…　and　even　this　last　is　presented　as　becoming　partible；　not　as　being　so　once　for　all。　　　　　〃In　bodies〃：　we　must　then；　satisfy　ourselves　as　to　what　form　of　soul　is　required　to　produce　life　in　the　corporeal；　and　what　there　must　be　of　soul　present　throughout　such　a　body；　such　a　completed　organism。　　　　　Now；　every　sensitive　power…　by　the　fact　of　being　sensitive　throughout…　tends　to　become　a　thing　of　parts：　present　at　every　distinct　point　of　sensitiveness；　it　may　be　thought　of　as　divided。　In　the　sense；　however；　that　it　is　present　as　a　whole　at　every　such　point；　it　cannot　be　said　to　be　wholly　divided；　it　〃becomes　divisible　in　body。〃　We　may　be　told　that　no　such　partition　is　implied　in　any　sensations　but　those　of　touch；　but　this　is　not　so；　where　the　participant　is　body　＇of　itself　insensitive　and　non…transmitting＇　that　divisibility　in　the　sensitive　agent　will　be　a　condition　of　all　other　sensations；　though　in　less　degree　than　in　the　case　of　touch。　Similarly　the　vegetative　function　in　the　soul；　with　that　of　growth；　indicates　divisibility；　and；　admitting　such　locations　as　that　of　desire　at　the　liver　and　emotional　activity　at　the　heart；　we　have　the　same　result。　It　is　to　be　noted；　however；　as　regards　these　＇the　less　corporeal＇　sensations；　that　the　body　may　possibly　not　experience　them　as　a　fact　of　the　conjoint　thing　but　in　another　mode；　as　rising　within　some　one　of　the　elements　of　which　it　has　been　participant　＇as　inherent；　purely；　in　some　phase　of　the　associated　soul＇：　reasoning　and　the　act　of　the　intellect；　for　instance；　are　not　vested　in　the　body；　their　task　is　not　accomplished　by　means　of　the　body　which　in　fact　is　detrimental　to　any　thinking　on　which　it　is　allowed　to　intrude。　　　　　Thus　the　indivisible　phase　of　the　soul　stands　distinct　from　the　divisible；　they　do　not　form　a　unity；　but；　on　the　contrary；　a　whole　consisting　of　parts；　each　part　a　self…standing　thing　having　its　own　peculiar　virtue。　None　the　less；　if　that　phase　which　becomes　divisible　in　body　holds　indivisibility　by　communication　from　the　superior　power；　then　this　one　same　thing　＇the　soul　in　body＇　may　be　at　once　indivisible　and　divisible；　it　will　be；　as　it　were；　a　blend；　a　thing　made　up　of　its　own　divisible　self　with；　in　addition；　the　quality　that　it　derives　from　above　itself。　　　　　20。　Here　a　question　rises　to　which　we　must　find　an　answer：　whether　these　and　the　other　powers　which　we　call　〃parts〃　of　the　Soul　are　situated；　all；　in　place；　or　whether　some　have　place　and　standpoint；　others　not；　or　whether　again　none　are　situated　in　place。　　　　　The　matter　is　difficult：　if　we　do　not　allot　to　each　of　the　parts　of　the　Soul　some　form　of　Place；　but　leave　all　unallocated…　no　more　within　the　body　than　outside　it…　we　leave　the　body　soulless；　and　are　at　a　loss　to　explain　plausibly　the　origin　of　acts　performed　by　means　of　the　bodily　organs：　if；　on　the　other　hand；　we　suppose　some　of　those　phases　to　be　＇capable　of　situation＇　in　place　but　others　not　so；　we　will　be　supposing　that　those　parts　to　which　we　deny　place　are　ineffective　in　us；　or；　in　other　words；　that　we　do　not　possess　our　entire　soul。　　　　　This　simply　shows　that　neither　the　soul　entire　nor　any　part　of　it　may　be　considered　to　be　within　the　body　as　in　a　space：　space　is　a　container；　a　container　of　body；　it　is　the　home　of　such　things　as　consist　of　isolated　parts；　things；　therefore；　in　which　at　no　point　is　there　an　entirety；　now；　the　soul　is　not　a　body　and　is　no　more　contained　than　containing。　　　　　Neither　is　it　in　body　as　in　some　vessel：　whether　as　vessel　or　as　place　of　location；　the　body　would　remain；　in　itself；　unensouled。　If　we　are　to　think　of　some　passing…over　from　the　soul…　that　self…gathered　thing…　to　the　containing　vessel；　then　soul　is　diminished　by　just　as　much　as　the　vessel　takes。　　　　　Space；　again；　in　the　strict　sense　is　unembodied；　and　is　not；　itself；　body；　why；　then；　should　it　need　soul？　　　　　Besides　＇if　the　soul　were　contained　as　in　space＇　contact　would　be　only　at　the　surface　of　the　body；　not　throughout　the　entire　mass。　　　　　Many　other　considerations　equally　refute　the　notion　that　the　soul　is　in　body　as　＇an　object＇　in　space；　for　example；　this　space　would　be　shifted　with　every　movement；　and　a　thing　itself　would　carry　its　own　space　about。　　　　　Of　course　if　by　space　we　understand　the　interval　separating　objects；　it　is　still　less　possible　that　the　soul　be　in　body　as　in　space：　such　a　separating　interval　must　be　a　void；　but　body　is　not　a　void；　the　void　must　be　that　in　which　body　is　placed；　body　＇not　soul＇　will　be　in　the　void。　　　　　Nor　can　it　be　in　the　body　as　in　some　substratum：　anything　in　a　substratum　is　a　condition　affecting　that…　a　colour；　a　form…　but　the　soul　is　a　separate　existence。　　　　　Nor　is　it　present　as　a　part　in　the　whole；　soul　is　no　part　of　body。　If　we　are　asked　to　think　of　soul　as　a　part　in　the　living　total　we　are　faced　with　the　old　difficulty：　How　it　is　in　that　whole。　It　is　certainly　not　there　as　the　wine　is　in　the　wine　jar；　or　as　the　jar　in　the　jar；　or　as　some　absolute　is　self…present。　　　　　Nor　can　the　presence　be　that　of　a　whole　in　its　part：　It　would　be　absurd　to　think　of　the　soul　as　a　total　of　which　the　body　should　represent　the　parts。　　　　　It　is　not　present　as　Form　is　in　Matter；　for　the　Form　as　in　Matter　is　inseparable　and；　further；　is　something　superimposed　upon　an　already　existent　thing；　soul；　on　the　contrary；　is　that　which　engenders　the　Form　residing　within　the　Matter　and　therefore　is　not　the　Form。　If　the　reference　is　not　to　the　Form　actually　present；　but　to　Form　as　a　thing　existing　apart　from　all　formed　objects；　it　is　hard　to　see　how　such　an　entity　has　found　its　way　into　body；　and　at　any　rate　this　makes　the　soul　separable。　　　　　How　comes　it　then　that　everyone　speaks　of　soul　as　being　in　body？　　　　　Because　the　soul　is　not　seen　and　the　body　is：　we　perceive　the　body；　and　by　its　movement　and　sensation　we　understand　that　it　is　ensouled；　and　we　say　that　it　possesses　a　soul；　to　speak　of　residence　is　a　natural　sequence。　If　the　soul　were　visible；　an　object　of　the　senses；　radiating　throughout　the　entire　life；　if　it　were　manifest　in　full　force　to　the　very　outermost　surface；　we　would　no　longer　speak　of　soul　as　in　body；　we　would　say　the　minor　was　within　the　major；　the　contained　within　the　container；　the　fleeting　within　the　perdurable。　　　　　21。　What　does　all　this　come　to？　What　answer　do　we　give　to　him　who；　with　no　opinion　of　his　own　to　assert；　asks　us　to　explain　this　presence？　And　what　do　we　say　to　the　question　whether　there　is　one　only　mode　of　presence　of　the　entire　soul　or　different　modes；　phase　and　phase？　　　　　Of　the　modes　currently　accepted　for　the　presence　of　one　thing　in　another；　none　really　meets　the　case　of　the　soul's　relation　to　the　body。　Thus　we　are　given　as　a　parallel　the　steersman　in　the　ship；　this　serves　adequately　to　indicate　that　the　soul　is　potentially　separable；　but　the　mode　of　presence；　which　is　what　we　are　seeking；　it　does　not　exhibit。　　　　　We　can　imagine　it　within　the　body　in　some　incidental　way…　for　example；　as　a　voyager　in　a　ship…　but　scarcely　as　the　steersman：　and；　of　course；　too；　the　steersman　is　not　omnipresent　to　the　ship　as　the　soul　is　to　the　body。　　　　　May　we；　perhaps；　compare　it　to　the　science　or　skill　that　acts　through　its　appropriate　instruments…　through　a　helm；　let　us　say；　which　should　happen　to　be　a　live　thing…　so　that　the　soul　effecting　the　movements　dictated　by　seamanship　is　an　indwelling　directive　force？　　　　　No：　the　comparison　breaks　down；　since　the　science　is　something　outside　of　helm　and　ship。　　　　　Is　it　any　help　to　adopt　the　illustration　of　the　steersman　taking　the　helm；　and　to　station　the　soul　within　the　body　as　the　steersman　may　be　thought　to　be　within　the　material　instrument　through　which　he　works？　Soul；　whenever　and　wherever　it　chooses　to　operate；　does　in　much　that　way　move　the　body。　　　　　No；　even　in　this　parallel　we　have　no　explanation　of　the　mode　of　presence　within　the　instrument；　we　cannot　be　satisfied　without　further　search；　a　closer　approach。　　　　　22。　May　we　think　that　the　mode　of　the　soul's　presence　to　body　is　that　of　the　presence　of　light　to　the　air？　　　　　This　certainly　is　presence　with　distincti