the six enneads-第90部分

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ion　being　met；　it　certainly　would　be。　But　what　if；　without　being　thus　in　membership；　it　were　a　corporeal　entity；　exhibiting　light　and　colour　and　the　qualities　by　which　we　perceive　things；　and　belonging　to　the　same　ideal　category　as　the　organ　of　vision？　　　　　If　our　supposition　＇of　perception　by　sympathy＇　is　true；　there　would　still　be　no　perception…　though　we　may　be　told　that　the　hypothesis　is　clearly　untenable　since　there　is　absurdity　in　supposing　that　sight　can　fail　in　grasping　an　illuminated　object　lying　before　it；　and　that　the　other　senses　in　the　presence　of　their　particular　objects　remain　unresponsive。　　　　　＇The　following　passage；　to　nearly　the　end；　is　offered　tentatively　as　a　possible　help　to　the　interpretation　of　an　obscure　and　corrupt　place。＇　　　　　＇But　why　does　such　a　failing　appear　impossible　to　us？　We　answer；　because　here　and　now　in　all　the　act　and　experience　of　our　senses；　we　are　within　a　unity；　and　members　of　it。　What　the　conditions　would　be　otherwise；　remains　to　be　considered：　if　living　sympathy　suffices　the　theory　is　established；　if　not；　there　are　other　considerations　to　support　it。　　　　　That　every　living　being　is　self…sensitive　allows　of　no　doubt；　if　the　universe　is　a　living　being；　no　more　need　be　said；　and　what　is　true　of　the　total　must　be　true　of　the　members；　as　inbound　in　that　one　life。　　　　　But　what　if　we　are　invited　to　accept　the　theory　of　knowledge　by　likeness　（rejecting　knowledge　by　the　self…sensitiveness　of　a　living　unity）？　　　　　Awareness　must　be　determined　by　the　nature　and　character　of　the　living　being　in　which　it　occurs；　perception；　then；　means　that　the　likeness　demanded　by　the　hypothesis　is　within　this　self…identical　living　being　（and　not　in　the　object）…　for　the　organ　by　which　the　perception　takes　place　is　in　the　likeness　of　the　living　being　（is　merely　the　agent　adequately　expressing　the　nature　of　the　living　being）：　thus　perception　is　reduced　to　a　mental　awareness　by　means　of　organs　akin　to　the　object。　　　　　If；　then；　something　that　is　a　living　whole　perceives　not　its　own　content　but　things　like　to　its　content；　it　must　perceive　them　under　the　conditions　of　that　living　whole；　this　means　that；　in　so　far　as　it　has　perception；　the　objects　appear　not　as　its　content　but　as　related　to　its　content。　　　　　And　the　objects　are　thus　perceived　as　related　because　the　mind　itself　has　related　them　in　order　to　make　them　amenable　to　its　handling：　in　other　words　the　causative　soul　or　mind　in　that　other　sphere　is　utterly　alien；　and　the　things　there；　supposed　to　be　related　to　the　content　of　this　living　whole；　can　be　nothing　to　our　minds。＇　　　　　This　absurdity　shows　that　the　hypothesis　contains　a　contradiction　which　naturally　leads　to　untenable　results。　In　fact；　under　one　and　the　same　heading；　it　presents　mind　and　no　mind；　it　makes　things　kin　and　no　kin；　it　confuses　similar　and　dissimilar：　containing　these　irreconcilable　elements；　it　amounts　to　no　hypothesis　at　all。　At　one　and　the　same　moment　it　postulates　and　denies　a　soul；　it　tells　of　an　All　that　is　partial；　of　a　something　which　is　at　once　distinct　and　not　distinct；　of　a　nothingness　which　is　no　nothingness；　of　a　complete　thing　that　is　incomplete：　the　hypothesis　therefore　must　be　dismissed；　no　deduction　is　possible　where　a　thesis　cancels　its　own　propositions。　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　SIXTH　TRACTATE。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　PERCEPTION　AND　MEMORY。

　　　　1。　Perceptions　are　no　imprints；　we　have　said；　are　not　to　be　thought　of　as　seal…impressions　on　soul　or　mind：　accepting　this　statement；　there　is　one　theory　of　memory　which　must　be　definitely　rejected。　　　　　Memory　is　not　to　be　explained　as　the　retaining　of　information　in　virtue　of　the　lingering　of　an　impression　which　in　fact　was　never　made；　the　two　things　stand　or　fall　together；　either　an　impression　is　made　upon　the　mind　and　lingers　when　there　is　remembrance；　or；　denying　the　impression；　we　cannot　hold　that　memory　is　its　lingering。　Since　we　reject　equally　the　impression　and　the　retention　we　are　obliged　to　seek　for　another　explanation　of　perception　and　memory；　one　excluding　the　notions　that　the　sensible　object　striking　upon　soul　or　mind　makes　a　mark　upon　it；　and　that　the　retention　of　this　mark　is　memory。　　　　　If　we　study　what　occurs　in　the　case　of　the　most　vivid　form　of　perception；　we　can　transfer　our　results　to　the　other　cases；　and　so　solve　our　problem。　　　　　In　any　perception　we　attain　by　sight；　the　object　is　grasped　there　where　it　lies　in　the　direct　line　of　vision；　it　is　there　that　we　attack　it；　there；　then；　the　perception　is　formed；　the　mind　looks　outward；　this　is　ample　proof　that　it　has　taken　and　takes　no　inner　imprint；　and　does　not　see　in　virtue　of　some　mark　made　upon　it　like　that　of　the　ring　on　the　wax；　it　need　not　look　outward　at　all　if；　even　as　it　looked；　it　already　held　the　image　of　the　object；　seeing　by　virtue　of　an　impression　made　upon　itself。　It　includes　with　the　object　the　interval；　for　it　tells　at　what　distance　the　vision　takes　place：　how　could　it　see　as　outlying　an　impression　within　itself；　separated　by　no　interval　from　itself？　Then；　the　point　of　magnitude：　how　could　the　mind；　on　this　hypothesis；　define　the　external　size　of　the　object　or　perceive　that　it　has　any…　the　magnitude　of　the　sky；　for　instance；　whose　stamped　imprint　would　be　too　vast　for　it　to　contain？　And；　most　convincing　of　all；　if　to　see　is　to　accept　imprints　of　the　objects　of　our　vision；　we　can　never　see　these　objects　themselves；　we　see　only　vestiges　they　leave　within　us；　shadows：　the　things　themselves　would　be　very　different　from　our　vision　of　them。　And；　for　a　conclusive　consideration；　we　cannot　see　if　the　living　object　is　in　contact　with　the　eye；　we　must　look　from　a　certain　distance；　this　must　be　more　applicable　to　the　mind；　supposing　the　mind　to　be　stamped　with　an　imprint　of　the　object；　it　could　not　grasp　as　an　object　of　vision　what　is　stamped　upon　itself。　For　vision　demands　a　duality；　of　seen　and　seeing：　the　seeing　agent　must　be　distinct　and　act　upon　an　impression　outside　it；　not　upon　one　occupying　the　same　point　with　it：　sight　can　deal　only　with　an　object　not　inset　but　outlying。　　　　　2。　But　if　perception　does　not　go　by　impression；　what　is　the　process？　　　　　The　mind　affirms　something　not　contained　within　it：　this　is　precisely　the　characteristic　of　a　power…　not　to　accept　impression　but；　within　its　allotted　sphere；　to　act。　　　　　Besides；　the　very　condition　of　the　mind　being　able　to　exercise　discrimination　upon　what　it　is　to　see　and　hear　is　not；　of　course；　that　these　objects　be　equally　impressions　made　upon　it；　on　the　contrary；　there　must　be　no　impressions；　nothing　to　which　the　mind　is　passive；　there　can　be　only　acts　of　that　in　which　the　objects　become　known。　　　　　Our　tendency　is　to　think　of　any　of　the　faculties　as　unable　to　know　its　appropriate　object　by　its　own　uncompelled　act；　to　us　it　seems　to　submit　to　its　environment　rather　than　simply　to　perceive　it；　though　in　reality　it　is　the　master；　not　the　victim。　　　　　As　with　sight；　so　with　hearing。　It　is　the　air　which　takes　the　impression；　a　kind　of　articulated　stroke　which　may　be　compared　to　letters　traced　upon　it　by　the　object　causing　the　sound；　but　it　belongs　to　the　faculty；　and　the　soul…essence；　to　read　the　imprints　thus　appearing　before　it；　as　they　reach　the　point　at　which　they　become　matter　of　its　knowledge。　　　　　In　taste　and　smell　also　we　distinguish　between　the　impressions　received　and　the　sensations　and　judgements；　these　last　are　mental　acts；　and　belong　to　an　order　apart　from　the　experiences　upon　which　they　are　exercised。　　　　　The　knowing　of　the　things　belonging　to　the　Intellectual　is　not　in　any　such　degree　attended　by　impact　or　impression：　they　come　forward；　on　the　contrary；　as　from　within；　unlike　the　sense…objects　known　as　from　without：　they　have　more　emphatically　the　character　of　acts；　they　are　acts　in　the　stricter　sense；　for　their　origin　is　in　the　soul；　and　every　concept　of　this　Intellectual　order　is　the　soul　about　its　Act。　　　　　Whether；　in　this　self…vision；　the　soul　is　a　duality　and　views　itself　as　from　the　outside…　while　seeing　the　Intellectual…Principal　as　a　unity；　and　itself　with　the　Intellectual…Principle　as　a　unity…　this　question　is　investigated　elsewhere。　　　　　3。　With　this　prologue　we　come　to　our　discussion　of　Memory。　　　　　That　the　soul；　or　mind；　having　taken　no　imprint；　yet　achieves　perception　of　what　it　in　no　way　contains　need　not　surprise　us；　or　rather；　surprising　though　it　is；　we　cannot　refuse　to　believe　in　this　remarkable　power。　　　　　The　Soul　is　the　Reason…Principle　of　the　universe；　ultimate　among　the　Intellectual　Beings…　its　own　essential　Nature　is　one　of　the　Beings　of　the　Intellectual　Realm…　but　it　is　the　primal　Reason…Principle　of　the　entire　realm　of　sense。　　　　　Thus　it　has　dealings　with　both　orders…　benefited　and　quickened　by　the　one；　but　by　the　other　beguiled；　falling　before　resemblances；　and　so　led　downwards　as　under　spell。　Poised　midway；　it　is　aware　of　both　spheres。　　　　　Of　the　Intellectual　it　is　said　to　have　intuition　by　memory　upon　approach；　for　it　knows　them　by　a　certain　natural　identity　with　them；　its　knowledge　is　not　attained　by　besetting　them；　so　to　speak；　but　by　in　a　definite　degree　possessing　them；　they　are　its　natural　vision；　they　are　itself　in　a　more　radiant　mode；　and　it　rises　from　its　duller　pitch　to　that　greater　brilliance　in　a　sort　of　awakening；　a　progress　from　its　latency　to　its　act。　　　　　To　the　sense…order　it　stands　in　a　similar　nearness　and　to　such　things　it　gives　a　radiance　out　of　its　own　store　and；　as　it　were；　elaborates　them　to　visibility：　the　power　is　always　ripe　and；　so　to　say；　in　travail　towards　them；　so　that；　whenever　it　puts　out　its　strength　in　the　direction　of　what　has　once　been　present　in　it；　it　sees　that　object　as　present　still；　and　the　more　intent　its　effort　the　more　durable　is　the　presence。　This　is　why；　it　is　agreed；　children　have　long　memory；　the　things　presented　to　them　are　not　constantly　withdrawn　but　remain　in　sight；　in　their　case　the　attention　is　limited　but　not　scattered：　those　whose　faculty　and　mental　activity　are　busied　upon　a　multitude　of　subjects　pass　quickly　over　all；　lingering　on　none。　　　　　Now；　if　memory　were　a　matter　of　seal…impressions　retained；　the　multiplicity　of　objects　would　have　no　weakening　effect　on　the　memory。　Further；　on　the　same　hypothesis；　we　would　have　no　need　of　thinking　back　to　revive　remembrance；　nor　would　we　be　subject　to　forgetting　and　recalling；　all　would　lie　e