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cyprus, as i saw it in 1879-第76部分

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If Cyprus belonged to England or any other Power; it would be a valuable
acquisition。 We have seen that under the Turkish administration it was a
small mine of wealth; and remains in the same position to its recent
masters。

We pay 96;000 pounds sterling per annum to the Turks; out of an assumed
revenue of 170;000 pounds。 Therefore; without any trouble or risk; the
Turk is receiving 3。25 per cent。 interest upon three millions。 This
establishes an unfortunate precedent in the valuation of the island
should England eventually become a purchaser。

If Cyprus can; without undue taxation; afford a revenue of 170;000
pounds; it is palpable that a large margin would be available for those
absolutely necessary public worksirrigation; the control of the Pedias
river; road…making; harbour…works; bridges; extension of forests and
guardians; and a host of minor improvements; such as district schools
for the teaching of English; &c。 &c。 In fact; if we held Cyprus without
purchase as a conquered country; such as Ceylon; Mauritius; or other of
our colonies; it would occupy the extraordinary position of a colony
that could advance and pay its way entirely by its own surplus revenue;
without a public loan! This is a fact of great importancethat; in
spite of the usual Turkish mal…administration; the island has no debt;
but that England has acknowledged the success of the Turkish rule by
paying 96;000 pounds per annum as the accepted surplus revenue of this
misgoverned island!which holds upon these data a better financial
condition than any of our own colonies。

If the total gross revenue is 170;000 pounds a year; and we can afford
to pay 96;000 pounds to the Porte; and at the same time allow the home
government to boast in the House of Commons of 〃a surplus;〃 Cyprus is
one of the most lucrative positions; and the Turks can fairly claim a
success instead of admitting the blame of mal…administration。

If the Turks by mismanagement can obtain a nett revenue of 96;000 pounds
a year; how much should England obtain by good management?

The fact is that; as usual; the English government has been hoodwinked
in their hasty bargain。 The island can pay its way; and; if free from
Turkey; would become most prosperous; but we have inherited an estate so
heavily mortgaged by our foolish Convention; that the revenue is all
absorbed in interest; which leaves nothing for the necessities of
development。 The commissioners of districts are over…worked and
ill…paid; their allowance of interpreters is quite insufficient to
secure the necessary check; and their position is incompatible with the
importance of their official status。 There is no money for any
improvements; and the boasted surplus will just suffice for the payment
of salaries and the absolutely necessary items of carrying on a
government more in accordance with the position of Greece or Denmark
than with the historical reputation of Great Britain。

This financial embarrassment has disappointed the expectations of the
inhabitants; who naturally had anticipated brilliant advantages from the
reform between Turkish and English administrations。 My own opinion may
be valueless; but it is shared by many; Cyprus should belong absolutely
to England; or we should have nothing to do with it。 I repeat the dictum
expressed in the introduction; if England is the ally of Turkey and she
can depend upon the integrity of that defensive alliance against Russia;
there is no need for any station that incurs the obligations of Cyprus;
all the Turkish ports would be open to our ships。 The occupation of
Cyprus would therefore suggest that a far…seeing government had doubted
the integrity of Turkey; and had therefore determined to secure a
pied…a…terre in a strategical position that would command the east of
the Mediterranean。 Upon this point opinions will again differ; and I
quote the words of one of the most experienced statesmen and an
ex…minister of the Upper House; who writes:

〃The objections to Cyprus as a military and naval station are shortly
these。 It will oblige us to establish a garrison; and therefore to
increase and divide our forces in the Mediterranean。 There must be
barracks; hospitals; store…houses; &c。 After all this expenditure Cyprus
will weaken rather than strengthen our power。

〃Famagousta may be made a good harbour; but how can it be defended? The
ships will not be; as in Malta; defended by batteries projecting far
beyond the anchorage; Famagousta will require ships of war to defend it;
or batteries constructed on the breakwatera most costly undertaking。
As a coaling…station it is not wanted; because colliers accompanying the
fleet are much more convenient。 If; in short; we are supreme at sea;
Cyprus is not wanted; if we are not supreme; Cyprus will be an
incumbrance。〃

I acknowledge the force of a portion of the argument; and no one can
more highly respect the distinguished authority I have quoted; who; as
an ex…First Lord of the Admiralty of practical experience; must carry
the great weight of his ability and position; but I would suggest that
Famagousta is underrated。 I have already described that powerful
fortress; and in its present condition; if mounted with forty…ton guns
upon the sea…face; I doubt the possibility of an attack from seaward。
The natural reefs which form the sea…wall afford the greatest facilities
for batteries a…fleur…d'eau; as their solid foundations require the
simple levelling of cement; and a facing of steel plates would complete
an impregnable line of casemates that would render the approach by sea
impossible。

The advantages of attendant colliers is great as a continuous
coal…supply to a fleet; especially during the blockade of an enemy's
port; but for a cruising fleet; or for independent vessels; the speed of
the colliers would be insufficient; and a line of coaling…stations; at
intervals of five days' steaming is in my opinion highly important; in
addition to the necessity of docks where ironclad vessels could obtain
the necessary repairs after a naval engagement。 It is a serious result
of modern improvements that the cumbrous and complicated ironclads
cannot be repaired in a few days after an action with the enemy by their
own carpenters and crews; like the wooden vessels of old; but that docks
must be within reach; and all the appliances of the engineers' yards and
an arsenal。 Without this advantage; Famagousta would be a useless
acquisition; and Cyprus would be worthless as a strategical position。

In my opinion the entire question hangs upon the integrity of Turkey as
an ally。 England has done but little for her; and we may expect too
much。 The Turks are thoroughly aware that an Anglo…Turkish defensive
alliance; and the 〃Protectorate of Asia Minor by Great Britain;〃 are
political arrangements based upon self…interest; for which they owe us
no personal gratitude; in the hour of their distress we declined
material assistance; but seized the opportunity for occupying one of
their important positionsCyprus; their only satisfaction remained in
the knowledge that they had 〃done us〃 in the bargain。 We have quickly
discovered the painful fact; and one party to the alliance already feels
aggrieved; and seeks for an alteration in the terms of the Convention。

I cannot conceive any more dangerous risk to friendships than an
interference in the private affairs of individuals; or in the public
administration of governments。 We have assumed the enormous
responsibility of the Protectorate of Asia Minor under conditions which
we must know will never be fulfilled; Turkey promises to reform the
abuses of her internal administration; &c。 &c。! Anybody who knows Turkey
must be aware that such a reform is impossible: the honest
administrative material does not exist in the Ottoman Empire; and the
promises of the Porte have been tolerably exemplified since the Crimean
war。 Under these circumstances the Anglo…Turkish alliance is in a
questionable position。 We have assumed the Protectorate of Asia Minor
conditionally; we occupy Cyprus conditionally; and should Turkey fail to
perform her promises in the government of her Asiatic provinces; we have
a back…door for an escape from our onerous engagement。 Unfortunately
English diplomacy is celebrated for back…doors。 In the Berlin Treaty we
entered Cyprus through a back…door; and we may possibly retire by the
same exit; but there is little doubt that the Turk does not believe in
our professed determination to defend him by force of arms in the event
of a future conflict between Russia and the Sultan in Asia Minor。
Notwithstanding our professed sincerity; the Turk has become an
unbeliever in the faith of treaties and political engagements; he
believes most thoroughly that should 〃British interests〃 require the
sacrifice of honour; England will somehow or other manage to slip
through the Ottoman fingers; and escape from her alliance when called
upon to meet Russia in the field。 Of course the ignorant Turk is wrong;
and his suspicions are unfounded。

With a mutual want of confidence in the integrity of an alliance; it
would hardly be surprising should the Sultan attach more importance to
the practical force of Russia than to the moral rectitude and high
political principles of England。 The power of Russia has been felt; and
the position of European Turkey is that of a dislocated and dismembered
Empire; which upon the next explosion will reduce the Sultan to the
small extremity on the Bosphorus between Constantinople and the lines of
Tchataldja。 Turkey will cease to be a European Power; and upon the
outbreak of the next Russian war she will be discovered as represented
by Asia Minor; in which the claws of the Eagle are already fixed in the
vital pointsBatoum; Kars; and Ardahan。 A Russian advance from those
positions will; according to the terms of the alliance; compel Great
Britain to exhibit herself as the champion of Turkish rights in armed
defence of Asia Minor。

When we reflect upon the prodigious responsibility of such an alliance
with a crippled Power that has been completely subdued; the victorious
army of the Czar retired from the gates of the capital; the nation
bankrupt beyond all hopes of liquidati
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