the prince-第17部分

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e　this　difficulty　of　giving　inordinate　satisfaction　to　their　soldiers　in　a　far　less　degree；　because；　notwithstanding　one　has　to　give　them　some　indulgence；　that　is　soon　done；　none　of　these　princes　have　armies　that　are　veterans　in　the　governance　and　administration　of　provinces；　as　were　the　armies　of　the　Roman　Empire；　and　whereas　it　was　then　more　necessary　to　give　satisfaction　to　the　soldiers　than　to　the　people；　it　is　now　more　necessary　to　all　princes；　except　the　Turk　and　the　Soldan；　to　satisfy　the　people　rather　the　soldiers；　because　the　people　are　the　more　powerful。

From　the　above　I　have　excepted　the　Turk；　who　always　keeps　round　him　twelve　thousand　infantry　and　fifteen　thousand　cavalry　on　which　depend　the　security　and　strength　of　the　kingdom；　and　it　is　necessary　that；　putting　aside　every　consideration　for　the　people；　he　should　keep　them　his　friends。　The　kingdom　of　the　Soldan　is　similar；　being　entirely　in　the　hands　of　soldiers；　it　follows　again　that；　without　regard　to　the　people；　he　must　keep　them　his　friends。　But　you　must　note　that　the　state　of　the　Soldan　is　unlike　all　other　principalities；　for　the　reason　that　it　is　like　the　Christian　pontificate；　which　cannot　be　called　either　an　hereditary　or　a　newly　formed　principality；　because　the　sons　of　the　old　prince　are　not　the　heirs；　but　he　who　is　elected　to　that　position　by　those　who　have　authority；　and　the　sons　remain　only　noblemen。　And　this　being　an　ancient　custom；　it　cannot　be　called　a　new　principality；　because　there　are　none　of　those　difficulties　in　it　that　are　met　with　in　new　ones；　for　although　the　prince　is　new；　the　constitution　of　the　state　is　old；　and　it　is　framed　so　as　to　receive　him　as　if　he　were　its　hereditary　lord。

But　returning　to　the　subject　of　our　discourse；　I　say　that　whoever　will　consider　it　will　acknowledge　that　either　hatred　or　contempt　has　been　fatal　to　the　above…named　emperors；　and　it　will　be　recognized　also　how　it　happened　that；　a　number　of　them　acting　in　one　way　and　a　number　in　another；　only　one　in　each　way　came　to　a　happy　end　and　the　rest　to　unhappy　ones。　Because　it　would　have　been　useless　and　dangerous　for　Pertinax　and　Alexander；　being　new　princes；　to　imitate　Marcus；　who　was　heir　to　the　principality；　and　likewise　it　would　have　been　utterly　destructive　to　Caracalla；　Commodus；　and　Maximinus　to　have　imitated　Severus；　they　not　having　sufficient　valour　to　enable　them　to　tread　in　his　footsteps。　Therefore　a　prince；　new　to　the　principality；　cannot　imitate　the　actions　of　Marcus；　nor；　again；　is　it　necessary　to　follow　those　of　Severus；　but　he　ought　to　take　from　Severus　those　parts　which　are　necessary　to　found　his　state；　and　from　Marcus　those　which　are　proper　and　glorious　to　keep　a　state　that　may　already　be　stable　and　firm。



CHAPTER　XX

ARE　FORTRESSES；　AND　MANY　OTHER　THINGS　TO　WHICH　PRINCES　OFTEN　RESORT；　ADVANTAGEOUS　OR　HURTFUL？

1。　　Some　princes；　so　as　to　hold　securely　the　state；　have　disarmed　their　subjects；　others　have　kept　their　subject　towns　distracted　by　factions；　others　have　fostered　enmities　against　themselves；　others　have　laid　themselves　out　to　gain　over　those　whom　they　distrusted　in　the　beginning　of　their　governments；　some　have　built　fortresses；　some　have　overthrown　and　destroyed　them。　And　although　one　cannot　give　a　final　judgment　on　all　of　these　things　unless　one　possesses　the　particulars　of　those　states　in　which　a　decision　has　to　be　made；　nevertheless　I　will　speak　as　comprehensively　as　the　matter　of　itself　will　admit。

2。　　There　never　was　a　new　prince　who　has　disarmed　his　subjects；　rather　when　he　has　found　them　disarmed　he　has　always　armed　them；　because；　by　arming　them；　those　arms　become　yours；　those　men　who　were　distrusted　become　faithful；　and　those　who　were　faithful　are　kept　so；　and　your　subjects　become　your　adherents。　And　whereas　all　subjects　cannot　be　armed；　yet　when　those　whom　you　do　arm　are　benefited；　the　others　can　be　handled　more　freely；　and　this　difference　in　their　treatment；　which　they　quite　understand；　makes　the　former　your　dependents；　and　the　latter；　considering　it　to　be　necessary　that　those　who　have　the　most　danger　and　service　should　have　the　most　reward；　excuse　you。　But　when　you　disarm　them；　you　at　once　offend　them　by　showing　that　you　distrust　them；　either　for　cowardice　or　for　want　of　loyalty；　and　either　of　these　opinions　breeds　hatred　against　you。　And　because　you　cannot　remain　unarmed；　it　follows　that　you　turn　to　mercenaries；　which　are　of　the　character　already　shown；　even　if　they　should　be　good　they　would　not　be　sufficient　to　defend　you　against　powerful　enemies　and　distrusted　subjects。　Therefore；　as　I　have　said；　a　new　prince　in　a　new　principality　has　always　distributed　arms。　Histories　are　full　of　examples。　But　when　a　prince　acquires　a　new　state；　which　he　adds　as　a　province　to　his　old　one；　then　it　is　necessary　to　disarm　the　men　of　that　state；　except　those　who　have　been　his　adherents　in　acquiring　it；　and　these　again；　with　time　and　opportunity；　should　be　rendered　soft　and　effeminate；　and　matters　should　be　managed　in　such　a　way　that　all　the　armed　men　in　the　state　shall　be　your　own　soldiers　who　in　your　old　state　were　living　near　you。

3。　　Our　forefathers；　and　those　who　were　reckoned　wise；　were　accustomed　to　say　that　it　was　necessary　to　hold　Pistoia　by　factions　and　Pisa　by　fortresses；　and　with　this　idea　they　fostered　quarrels　in　some　of　their　tributary　towns　so　as　to　keep　possession　of　them　the　more　easily。　This　may　have　been　well　enough　in　those　times　when　Italy　was　in　a　way　balanced；　but　I　do　not　believe　that　it　can　be　accepted　as　a　precept　for　to…day；　because　I　do　not　believe　that　factions　can　ever　be　of　use；　rather　it　is　certain　that　when　the　enemy　comes　upon　you　in　divided　cities　you　are　quickly　lost；　because　the　weakest　party　will　always　assist　the　outside　forces　and　the　other　will　not　be　able　to　resist。　The　Venetians；　moved；　as　I　believe；　by　the　above　reasons；　fostered　the　Guelph　and　Ghibelline　factions　in　their　tributary　cities；　and　although　they　never　allowed　them　to　come　to　bloodshed；　yet　they　nursed　these　disputes　amongst　them；　so　that　the　citizens；　distracted　by　their　differences；　should　not　unite　against　them。　Which；　as　we　saw；　did　not　afterwards　turn　out　as　expected；　because；　after　the　rout　at　Vaila；　one　party　at　once　took　courage　and　seized　the　state。　Such　methods　argue；　therefore；　weakness　in　the　prince；　because　these　factions　will　never　be　permitted　in　a　vigorous　principality；　such　methods　for　enabling　one　the　more　easily　to　manage　subjects　are　only　useful　in　times　of　peace；　but　if　war　comes　this　policy　proves　fallacious。

4。　　Without　doubt　princes　become　great　when　they　overcome　the　difficulties　and　obstacles　by　which　they　are　confronted；　and　therefore　fortune；　especially　when　she　desires　to　make　a　new　prince　great；　who　has　a　greater　necessity　to　earn　renown　than　an　hereditary　one；　causes　enemies　to　arise　and　form　designs　against　him；　in　order　that　he　may　have　the　opportunity　of　overcoming　them；　and　by　them　to　mount　higher；　as　by　a　ladder　which　his　enemies　have　raised。　For　this　reason　many　consider　that　a　wise　prince；　when　he　has　the　opportunity；　ought　with　craft　to　foster　some　animosity　against　himself；　so　that；　having　crushed　it；　his　renown　may　rise　higher。

5。　　Princes；　especially　new　ones；　have　found　more　fidelity　and　assistance　in　those　men　who　in　the　beginning　of　their　rule　were　distrusted　than　among　those　who　in　the　beginning　were　trusted。　Pandolfo　Petrucci；　Prince　of　Siena；　ruled　his　state　more　by　those　who　had　been　distrusted　than　by　others。　But　on　this　question　one　cannot　speak　generally；　for　it　varies　so　much　with　the　individual；　I　will　only　say　this；　that　those　men　who　at　the　commencement　of　a　princedom　have　been　hostile；　if　they　are　of　a　description　to　need　assistance　to　support　themselves；　can　always　be　gained　over　with　the　greatest　ease；　and　they　will　be　tightly　held　to　serve　the　prince　with　fidelity；　inasmuch　as　they　know　it　to　be　very　necessary　for　them　to　cancel　by　deeds　the　bad　impression　which　he　had　formed　of　them；　and　thus　the　prince　always　extracts　more　profit　from　them　than　from　those　who；　serving　him　in　too　much　security；　may　neglect　his　affairs。　And　since　the　matter　demands　it；　I　must　not　fail　to　warn　a　prince；　who　by　means　of　secret　favours　has　acquired　a　new　state；　that　he　must　well　consider　the　reasons　which　induced　those　to　favour　him　who　did　so；　and　if　it　be　not　a　natural　affection　towards　him；　but　only　discontent　with　their　government；　then　he　will　only　keep　them　friendly　with　great　trouble　and　difficulty；　for　it　will　be　impossible　to　satisfy　them。　And　weighing　well　the　reasons　for　this　in　those　examples　which　can　be　taken　from　ancient　and　modern　affairs；　we　shall　find　that　it　is　easier　for　the　prince　to　make　friends　of　those　men　who　were　contented　under　the　former　government；　and　are　therefore　his　enemies；　than　of　those　who；　being　discontented　with　it；　were　favourable　to　him　and　encouraged　him　to　seize　it。

6。　　It　has　been　a　custom　with　princes；　in　order　to　hold　their　states　more　securely；　to　build　fortresses　that　may　serve　as　a　bridle　and　bit　to　those　who　might　design　to　work　against　them；　and　as　a　place　of　refuge　from　a　first　attack。　I　praise　this　system　because　it　has　been　made　use　of　formerly。　Notwithstanding　that；　Messer　Nicolo　Vitelli　in　our　times　has　been　seen　to　demolish　two　fortresses　in　Citta　di　Castello　so　that　he　might　keep　that　state；　Guido　Ubaldo；　Duke　of　Urbino；　on　returning　to　his　dominion；　whence　he　had　been　driven　by　Cesare　Borgia；　razed　to　the　foundations　all　the　fortresses　in　that　province；　and　considered　that　without　them　it　would　be　more　difficult　to　lose　it；　the　Bentivogli　returning　to　Bologna　came　to　a　similar　decision。　Fortresses；　therefore；　are　useful　or　not　according　to　circumstances；　if　they　do　you　good　in　one　way　they　injure　you　in　another。　And　this　question　can　be　reasoned　thus：　the　prince　who　has　more　to　fear　from　the　people　than　from　foreigners　ought　to　build　fortresses；　but　he　who　has　more　to　fear　from　foreigners　than　from　the　people　ought　to　leave　them　alone。　The　castle　of　Milan；　built　by　Francesco　Sforza；　has　made；　and　will　make；　more　trouble　for　the　house　of　Sforza　than　any　other　disorder　in　the　state。　For　this　reason　the　best　possible　fortress　isnot　to　be　hated　by　the　people；　because；　although　you　may　hold　the　fortresses；　yet　they　will　not　save　you　if　the　p