the critique of practical reason-第11部分

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　as　it　is　absolutely　impossible　to　find　in　experience　any　example　in　accordance　with　this　idea；　because　amongst　the　causes　of　things　as　phenomena　it　would　be　impossible　to　meet　with　any　absolutely　unconditioned　determination　of　causality；　we　were　only　able　to　defend　our　supposition　that　a　freely　acting　cause　might　be　a　being　in　the　world　of　sense；　in　so　far　as　it　is　considered　in　the　other　point　of　view　as　a　noumenon；　showing　that　there　is　no　contradiction　in　regarding　all　its　actions　as　subject　to　physical　conditions　so　far　as　they　are　phenomena；　and　yet　regarding　its　causality　as　physically　unconditioned；　in　so　far　as　the　acting　being　belongs　to　the　world　of　understanding；　and　in　thus　making　the　concept　of　freedom　the　regulative　principle　of　reason。　By　this　principle　I　do　not　indeed　learn　what　the　object　is　to　which　that　sort　of　causality　is　attributed；　but　I　remove　the　difficulty；　for；　on　the　one　side；　in　the　explanation　of　events　in　the　world；　and　consequently　also　of　the　actions　of　rational　beings；　I　leave　to　the　mechanism　of　physical　necessity　the　right　of　ascending　from　conditioned　to　condition　ad　infinitum；　while　on　the　other　side　I　keep　open　for　speculative　reason　the　place　which　for　it　is　vacant；　namely；　the　intelligible；　in　order　to　transfer　the　unconditioned　thither。　But　I　was　not　able　to　verify　this　supposition；　that　is；　to　change　it　into　the　knowledge　of　a　being　so　acting；　not　even　into　the　knowledge　of　the　possibility　of　such　a　being。　This　vacant　place　is　now　filled　by　pure　practical　reason　with　a　definite　law　of　causality　in　an　intelligible　world　（causality　with　freedom）；　namely；　the　moral　law。　Speculative　reason　does　not　hereby　gain　anything　as　regards　its　insight；　but　only　as　regards　the　certainty　of　its　problematical　notion　of　freedom；　which　here　obtains　objective　reality；　which；　though　only　practical；　is　nevertheless　undoubted。　Even　the　notion　of　causality…　the　application；　and　consequently　the　signification；　of　which　holds　properly　only　in　relation　to　phenomena；　so　as　to　connect　them　into　experiences　（as　is　shown　by　the　Critique　of　Pure　Reason）…　is　not　so　enlarged　as　to　extend　its　use　beyond　these　limits。　For　if　reason　sought　to　do　this；　it　would　have　to　show　how　the　logical　relation　of　principle　and　consequence　can　be　used　synthetically　in　a　different　sort　of　intuition　from　the　sensible；　that　is　how　a　causa　noumenon　is　possible。　This　it　can　never　do；　and；　as　practical　reason；　it　does　not　even　concern　itself　with　it；　since　it　only　places　the　determining　principle　of　causality　of　man　as　a　sensible　creature　（which　is　given）　in　pure　reason　（which　is　therefore　called　practical）；　and　therefore　it　employs　the　notion　of　cause；　not　in　order　to　know　objects；　but　to　determine　causality　in　relation　to　objects　in　general。　It　can　abstract　altogether　from　the　application　of　this　notion　to　objects　with　a　view　to　theoretical　knowledge　（since　this　concept　is　always　found　a　priori　in　the　understanding　even　independently　of　any　intuition）。　Reason；　then；　employs　it　only　for　a　practical　purpose；　and　hence　we　can　transfer　the　determining　principle　of　the　will　into　the　intelligible　order　of　things；　admitting；　at　the　same　time；　that　we　cannot　understand　how　the　notion　of　cause　can　determine　the　knowledge　of　these　things。　But　reason　must　cognise　causality　with　respect　to　the　actions　of　the　will　in　the　sensible　world　in　a　definite　manner；　otherwise；　practical　reason　could　not　really　produce　any　action。　But　as　to　the　notion　which　it　forms　of　its　own　causality　as　noumenon；　it　need　not　determine　it　theoretically　with　a　view　to　the　cognition　of　its　supersensible　existence；　so　as　to　give　it　significance　in　this　way。　For　it　acquires　significance　apart　from　this；　though　only　for　practical　use；　namely；　through　the　moral　law。　Theoretically　viewed；　it　remains　always　a　pure　a　priori　concept　of　the　understanding；　which　can　be　applied　to　objects　whether　they　have　been　given　sensibly　or　not；　although　in　the　latter　case　it　has　no　definite　theoretical　significance　or　application；　but　is　only　a　formal；　though　essential；　conception　of　the　understanding　relating　to　an　object　in　general。　The　significance　which　reason　gives　it　through　the　moral　law　is　merely　practical；　inasmuch　as　the　idea　of　the　idea　of　the　law　of　causality　（of　the　will）　has　self　causality；　or　is　its　determining　principle。

　　II。　Of　the　Right　that　Pure　Reason　in　its　Practical　use　has　to　an　Extension　which　is　not　possible　to　it　in　its　Speculative　Use。

　　We　have　in　the　moral　principle　set　forth　a　law　of　causality；　the　determining　principle　of　which　is　set　above　all　the　conditions　of　the　sensible　world；　we　have　it　conceived　how　the　will；　as　belonging　to　the　intelligible　world；　is　determinable；　and　therefore　we　therefore　we　have　its　subject　（man）　not　merely　conceived　as　belonging　to　a　world　of　pure　understanding；　and　in　this　respect　unknown　（which　the　critique　of　speculative　reason　enabled　us　to　do）；　but　also　defined　as　regards　his　causality　by　means　of　a　law　which　cannot　be　reduced　to　any　physical　law　of　the　sensible　world；　and　therefore　our　knowledge　is　extended　beyond　the　limits　of　that　world；　a　pretension　which　the　Critique　of　Pure　Reason　declared　to　be　futile　in　all　speculation。　Now；　how　is　the　practical　use　of　pure　reason　here　to　be　reconciled　with　the　theoretical；　as　to　the　determination　of　the　limits　of　its　faculty？　　　David　Hume；　of　whom　we　may　say　that　he　commenced　the　assault　on　the　claims　of　pure　reason；　which　made　a　thorough　investigation　of　it　necessary；　argued　thus：　The　notion　of　cause　is　a　notion　that　involves　the　necessity　of　the　connexion　of　the　existence　of　different　things　（and　that；　in　so　far　as　they　are　different）；　so　that；　given　A；　I　know　that　something　quite　distinct　there　from；　namely　B；　must　necessarily　also　exist。　Now　necessity　can　be　attributed　to　a　connection；　only　in　so　far　as　it　is　known　a　priori；　for　experience　would　only　enable　us　to　know　of　such　a　connection　that　it　exists；　not　that　it　necessarily　exists。　Now；　it　is　impossible；　says　he；　to　know　a　priori　and　as　necessary　the　connection　between　one　thing　and　another　（or　between　one　attribute　and　another　quite　distinct）　when　they　have　not　been　given　in　experience。　Therefore　the　notion　of　a　cause　is　fictitious　and　delusive　and；　to　speak　in　the　mildest　way；　is　an　illusion；　only　excusable　inasmuch　as　the　custom　（a　subjective　necessity）　of　perceiving　certain　things；　or　their　attributes　as　often　associated　in　existence　along　with　or　in　succession　to　one　another；　is　insensibly　taken　for　an　objective　necessity　of　supposing　such　a　connection　in　the　objects　themselves；　and　thus　the　notion　of　a　cause　has　been　acquired　surreptitiously　and　not　legitimately；　nay；　it　can　never　be　so　acquired　or　authenticated；　since　it　demands　a　connection　in　itself　vain；　chimerical；　and　untenable　in　presence　of　reason；　and　to　which　no　object　can　ever　correspond。　In　this　way　was　empiricism　first　introduced　as　the　sole　source　of　principles；　as　far　as　all　knowledge　of　the　existence　of　things　is　concerned　（mathematics　therefore　remaining　excepted）；　and　with　empiricism　the　most　thorough　scepticism；　even　with　regard　to　the　whole　science　of　nature（　as　philosophy）。　For　on　such　principles　we　can　never　conclude　from　given　attributes　of　things　as　existing　to　a　consequence　（for　this　would　require　the　notion　of　cause；　which　involves　the　necessity　of　such　a　connection）；　we　can　only；　guided　by　imagination；　expect　similar　cases…　an　expectation　which　is　never　certain；　however　of　ten　it　has　been　fulfilled。　Of　no　event　could　we　say：　a　certain　thing　must　have　preceded　it；　on　which　it　necessarily　followed；　that　is；　it　must　have　a　cause；　and　therefore；　however　frequent　the　cases　we　have　known　in　which　there　was　such　an　antecedent；　so　that　a　rule　could　be　derived　from　them；　yet　we　never　could　suppose　it　as　always　and　necessarily　so　happening；　we　should；　therefore；　be　obliged　to　leave　its　share　to　blind　chance；　with　which　all　use　of　reason　comes　to　an　end；　and　this　firmly　establishes　scepticism　in　reference　to　arguments　ascending　from　effects　to　causes　and　makes　it　impregnable。　　　Mathematics　escaped　well；　so　far；　because　Hume　thought　that　its　propositions　were　analytical；　that　is；　proceeded　from　one　property　to　another；　by　virtue　of　identity　and；　consequently；　according　to　the　principle　of　contradiction。　This；　however；　is　not　the　case；　since；　on　the　contrary；　they　are　synthetical；　and　although　geometry；　for　example；　has　not　to　do　with　the　existence　of　things；　but　only　with　their　a　priori　properties　in　a　possible　intuition；　yet　it　proceeds　just　as　in　the　case　of　the　causal　notion；　from　one　property　（A）　to　another　wholly　distinct　（B）；　as　necessarily　connected　with　the　former。　Nevertheless；　mathematical　science；　so　highly　vaunted　for　its　apodeictic　certainty；　must　at　last　fall　under　this　empiricism　for　the　same　reason　for　which　Hume　put　custom　in　the　place　of　objective　necessity　in　the　notion　of　cause　and；　in　spite　of　all　its　pride；　must　consent　to　lower　its　bold　pretension　of　claiming　assent　a　priori　and　depend　for　assent　to　the　universality　of　its　propositions　on　the　kindness　of　observers；　who；　when　called　as　witnesses；　would　surely　not　hesitate　to　admit　that　what　the　geometer　propounds　as　a　theorem　they　have　always　perceived　to　be　the　fact；　and；　consequently；　although　it　be　not　necessarily　true；　yet　they　would　permit　us　to　expect　it　to　be　true　in　the　future。　In　this　manner　Hume's　empiricism　leads　inevitably　to　scepticism；　even　with　regard　to　mathematics；　and　consequently　in　every　scientific　theoretical　use　of　reason　（for　this　belongs　either　to　philosophy　or　mathematics）。　Whether　with　such　a　terrible　overthrow　of　the　chief　branches　of　knowledge；　common　reason　will　escape　better；　and　will　not　rather　become　irrecoverably　involved　in　this　destruction　of　all　knowledge；　so　that　from　the　same　principles　a　universal　scepticism　should　follow　（affecting；　indeed；　only　the　learned）；　this　I　will　leave　everyone　to　judge　for　himself。　　　As　regards　my　own　labours　in　the　critical　examination　of　pure　reason；　which　were　occasioned　by　Hume's　sceptical　teaching；　but　went　much　further　and　embraced　the　whole　field　of　pure　theoretical　reason　in　its　synthetic　use　and；　consequently；　the　field　of　what　is　called　metaphysics　in　general；　I　proceeded　in　the　following　manner　with　respect　to　the　doubts　rais