the critique of practical reason-第14部分

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　purpose　that　instinct　serves　in　them；　it　would　in　that　case　be　only　a　particular　method　which　nature　had　employed　to　equip　man　for　the　same　ends　for　which　it　has　qualified　brutes；　without　qualifying　him　for　any　higher　purpose。　No　doubt　once　this　arrangement　of　nature　has　been　made　for　him　he　requires　reason　in　order　to　take　into　consideration　his　weal　and　woe；　but　besides　this　he　possesses　it　for　a　higher　purpose　also；　namely；　not　only　to　take　into　consideration　what　is　good　or　evil　in　itself；　about　which　only　pure　reason；　uninfluenced　by　any　sensible　interest；　can　judge；　but　also　to　distinguish　this　estimate　thoroughly　from　the　former　and　to　make　it　the　supreme　condition　thereof。　　　In　estimating　what　is　good　or　evil　in　itself；　as　distinguished　from　what　can　be　so　called　only　relatively；　the　following　points　are　to　be　considered。　Either　a　rational　principle　is　already　conceived；　as　of　itself　the　determining　principle　of　the　will；　without　regard　to　possible　objects　of　desire　（and　therefore　by　the　more　legislative　form　of　the　maxim）；　and　in　that　case　that　principle　is　a　practical　a　priori　law；　and　pure　reason　is　supposed　to　be　practical　of　itself。　The　law　in　that　case　determines　the　will　directly；　the　action　conformed　to　it　is　good　in　itself；　a　will　whose　maxim　always　conforms　to　this　law　is　good　absolutely　in　every　respect　and　is　the　supreme　condition　of　all　good。　Or　the　maxim　of　the　will　is　consequent　on　a　determining　principle　of　desire　which　presupposes　an　object　of　pleasure　or　pain；　something　therefore　that　pleases　or　displeases；　and　the　maxim　of　reason　that　we　should　pursue　the　former　and　avoid　the　latter　determines　our　actions　as　good　relatively　to　our　inclination；　that　is；　good　indirectly；　i。e。；　relatively　to　a　different　end　to　which　they　are　means）；　and　in　that　case　these　maxims　can　never　be　called　laws；　but　may　be　called　rational　practical　precepts。　The　end　itself；　the　pleasure　that　we　seek；　is　in　the　latter　case　not　a　good　but　a　welfare；　not　a　concept　of　reason；　but　an　empirical　concept　of　an　object　of　sensation；　but　the　use　of　the　means　thereto；　that　is；　the　action；　is　nevertheless　called　good　（because　rational　deliberation　is　required　for　it）；　not　however；　good　absolutely；　but　only　relatively　to　our　sensuous　nature；　with　regard　to　its　feelings　of　pleasure　and　displeasure；　but　the　will　whose　maxim　is　affected　thereby　is　not　a　pure　will；　this　is　directed　only　to　that　in　which　pure　reason　by　itself　can　be　practical。　　　This　is　the　proper　place　to　explain　the　paradox　of　method　in　a　critique　of　practical　reason；　namely；　that　the　concept　of　good　and　evil　must　not　be　determined　before　the　moral　law　（of　which　it　seems　as　if　it　must　be　the　foundation）；　but　only　after　it　and　by　means　of　it。　In　fact；　even　if　we　did　not　know　that　the　principle　of　morality　is　a　pure　a　priori　law　determining　the　will；　yet；　that　we　may　not　assume　principles　quite　gratuitously；　we　must；　at　least　at　first；　leave　it　undecided；　whether　the　will　has　merely　empirical　principles　of　determination；　or　whether　it　has　not　also　pure　a　priori　principles；　for　it　is　contrary　to　all　rules　of　philosophical　method　to　assume　as　decided　that　which　is　the　very　point　in　question。　Supposing　that　we　wished　to　begin　with　the　concept　of　good；　in　order　to　deduce　from　it　the　laws　of　the　will；　then　this　concept　of　an　object　（as　a　good）　would　at　the　same　time　assign　to　us　this　object　as　the　sole　determining　principle　of　the　will。　Now；　since　this　concept　had　not　any　practical　a　priori　law　for　its　standard；　the　criterion　of　good　or　evil　could　not　be　placed　in　anything　but　the　agreement　of　the　object　with　our　feeling　of　pleasure　or　pain；　and　the　use　of　reason　could　only　consist　in　determining　in　the　first　place　this　pleasure　or　pain　in　connexion　with　all　the　sensations　of　my　existence；　and　in　the　second　place　the　means　of　securing　to　myself　the　object　of　the　pleasure。　Now；　as　experience　alone　can　decide　what　conforms　to　the　feeling　of　pleasure；　and　by　hypothesis　the　practical　law　is　to　be　based　on　this　as　a　condition；　it　follows　that　the　possibility　of　a　priori　practical　laws　would　be　at　once　excluded；　because　it　was　imagined　to　be　necessary　first　of　all　to　find　an　object　the　concept　of　which；　as　a　good；　should　constitute　the　universal　though　empirical　principle　of　determination　of　the　will。　But　what　it　was　necessary　to　inquire　first　of　all　was　whether　there　is　not　an　a　priori　determining　principle　of　the　will　（and　this　could　never　be　found　anywhere　but　in　a　pure　practical　law；　in　so　far　as　this　law　prescribes　to　maxims　merely　their　form　without　regard　to　an　object）。　Since；　however；　we　laid　the　foundation　of　all　practical　law　in　an　object　determined　by　our　conceptions　of　good　and　evil；　whereas　without　a　previous　law　that　object　could　not　be　conceived　by　empirical　concepts；　we　have　deprived　ourselves　beforehand　of　the　possibility　of　even　conceiving　a　pure　practical　law。　On　the　other　hand；　if　we　had　first　investigated　the　latter　analytically；　we　should　have　found　that　it　is　not　the　concept　of　good　as　an　object　that　determines　the　moral　law　and　makes　it　possible；　but　that；　on　the　contrary；　it　is　the　moral　law　that　first　determines　the　concept　of　good　and　makes　it　possible；　so　far　as　it　deserves　the　name　of　good　absolutely。　　　This　remark；　which　only　concerns　the　method　of　ultimate　ethical　inquiries；　is　of　importance。　It　explains　at　once　the　occasion　of　all　the　mistakes　of　philosophers　with　respect　to　the　supreme　principle　of　morals。　For　they　sought　for　an　object　of　the　will　which　they　could　make　the　matter　and　principle　of　a　law　（which　consequently　could　not　determine　the　will　directly；　but　by　means　of　that　object　referred　to　the　feeling　of　pleasure　or　pain；　whereas　they　ought　first　to　have　searched　for　a　law　that　would　determine　the　will　a　priori　and　directly；　and　afterwards　determine　the　object　in　accordance　with　the　will）。　Now；　whether　they　placed　this　object　of　pleasure；　which　was　to　supply　the　supreme　conception　of　goodness；　in　happiness；　in　perfection；　in　moral　＇feeling＇；　or　in　the　will　of　God；　their　principle　in　every　case　implied　heteronomy；　and　they　must　inevitably　come　upon　empirical　conditions　of　a　moral　law；　since　their　object；　which　was　to　be　the　immediate　principle　of　the　will；　could　not　be　called　good　or　bad　except　in　its　immediate　relation　to　feeling；　which　is　always　empirical。　It　is　only　a　formal　law…　that　is；　one　which　prescribes　to　reason　nothing　more　than　the　form　of　its　universal　legislation　as　the　supreme　condition　of　its　maxims…　that　can　be　a　priori　a　determining　principle　of　practical　reason。　The　ancients　avowed　this　error　without　concealment　by　directing　all　their　moral　inquiries　to　the　determination　of　the　notion　of　the　summum　bonum；　which　they　intended　afterwards　to　make　the　determining　principle　of　the　will　in　the　moral　law；　whereas　it　is　only　far　later；　when　the　moral　law　has　been　first　established　for　itself；　and　shown　to　be　the　direct　determining　principle　of　the　will；　that　this　object　can　be　presented　to　the　will；　whose　form　is　now　determined　a　priori；　and　this　we　shall　undertake　in　the　Dialectic　of　the　pure　practical　reason。　The　moderns；　with　whom　the　question　of　the　summum　bonum　has　gone　out　of　fashion；　or　at　least　seems　to　have　become　a　secondary　matter；　hide　the　same　error　under　vague　（expressions　as　in　many　other　cases）。　It　shows　itself；　nevertheless；　in　their　systems；　as　it　always　produces　heteronomy　of　practical　reason；　and　from　this　can　never　be　derived　a　moral　law　giving　universal　commands。　　　Now；　since　the　notions　of　good　and　evil；　as　consequences　of　the　a　priori　determination　of　the　will；　imply　also　a　pure　practical　principle；　and　therefore　a　causality　of　pure　reason；　hence　they　do　not　originally　refer　to　objects　（so　as　to　be；　for　instance；　special　modes　of　the　synthetic　unity　of　the　manifold　of　given　intuitions　in　one　consciousness）　like　the　pure　concepts　of　the　understanding　or　categories　of　reason　in　its　theoretic　employment；　on　the　contrary；　they　presuppose　that　objects　are　given；　but　they　are　all　modes　（modi）　of　a　single　category；　namely；　that　of　causality；　the　determining　principle　of　which　consists　in　the　rational　conception　of　a　law；　which　as　a　law　of　freedom　reason　gives　to　itself；　thereby　a　priori　proving　itself　practical。　However；　as　the　actions　on　the　one　side　come　under　a　law　which　is　not　a　physical　law；　but　a　law　of　freedom；　and　consequently　belong　to　the　conduct　of　beings　in　and　consequently　the　consequently　belong　to　the　beings　in　the　world　of　intelligence；　yet　on　the　other　side　as　events　in　the　world　of　sense　they　belong　to　phenomena；　hence　the　determinations　of　a　practical　reason　are　only　possible　in　reference　to　the　latter　and；　therefore；　in　accordance　with　the　categories　of　the　understanding；　not　indeed　with　a　view　to　any　theoretic　employment　of　it；　i。e。；　so　as　to　bring　the　manifold　of　（sensible）　intuition　under　one　consciousness　a　priori；　but　only　to　subject　the　manifold　of　desires　to　the　unity　of　consciousness　of　a　practical　reason；　giving　it　commands　in　the　moral　law；　i。e。；　to　a　pure　will　a　priori。　　　These　categories　of　freedom…　for　so　we　choose　to　call　them　in　contrast　to　those　theoretic　categories　which　are　categories　of　physical　nature…　have　an　obvious　advantage　over　the　latter；　inasmuch　as　the　latter　are　only　forms　of　thought　which　designate　objects　in　an　indefinite　manner　by　means　of　universal　concept　of　every　possible　intuition；　the　former；　on　the　contrary；　refer　to　the　determination　of　a　free　elective　will　（to　which　indeed　no　exactly　corresponding　intuition　can　be　assigned；　but　which　has　as　its　foundation　a　pure　practical　a　priori　law；　which　is　not　the　case　with　any　concepts　belonging　to　the　theoretic　use　of　our　cognitive　faculties）；　hence；　instead　of　the　form　of　intuition　（space　and　time）；　which　does　not　lie　in　reason　itself；　but　has　to　be　drawn　from　another　source；　namely；　the　sensibility；　these　being　elementary　practical　concepts　have　as　their　foundation　the　form　of　a　pure　will；　which　is　given　in　reason　and；　therefore；　in　the　thinking　faculty　itself。　From　this　it　happens　that　as　all　precepts　of　pure　practical　reason　have　to　do　only　with　the　determination　of　the　will；　not　with　the　physical　conditions　（of　practical　ability）　of　the　execution　of　one's　purpose；　the　practical　a　priori　principles　in　relation　to　the　supreme　principl