the critique of practical reason-第15部分

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he　execution　of　one's　purpose；　the　practical　a　priori　principles　in　relation　to　the　supreme　principle　of　freedom　are　at　once　cognitions；　and　have　not　to　wait　for　intuitions　in　order　to　acquire　significance；　and　that　for　this　remarkable　reason；　because　they　themselves　produce　the　reality　of　that　to　which　they　refer　（the　intention　of　the　will）；　which　is　not　the　case　with　theoretical　concepts。　Only　we　must　be　careful　to　observe　that　these　categories　only　apply　to　the　practical　reason；　and　thus　they　proceed　in　order　from　those　which　are　as　yet　subject　to　sensible　conditions　and　morally　indeterminate　to　those　which　are　free　from　sensible　conditions　and　determined　merely　by　the　moral　law。

　　Table　of　the　Categories　of　Freedom　relatively　to　the　Notions　of　Good　and　Evil。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　I。　QUANTITY。　　　　Subjective；　according　to　maxims　（practical　opinions　of　the　　　　　　individual）　　　　Objective；　according　to　principles　（Precepts）　　　　A　priori　both　objective　and　subjective　principles　of　freedom　　　　　　（laws）

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　II。　QUALITY。　　　　Practical　rules　of　action　（praeceptivae）　　　　Practical　rules　of　omission　（prohibitivae）　　　　Practical　rules　of　exceptions　（exceptivae）

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　III。　RELATION。　　　　To　personality　To　the　condition　of　the　person。　　　　Reciprocal；　of　one　person　to　the　others　of　the　others。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　IV。　MODALITY。　　　　The　Permitted　and　the　Forbidden　　　　Duty　and　the　contrary　to　duty。　　　　Perfect　and　imperfect　duty。

　　It　will　at　once　be　observed　that　in　this　table　freedom　is　considered　as　a　sort　of　causality　not　subject　to　empirical　principles　of　determination；　in　regard　to　actions　possible　by　it；　which　are　phenomena　in　the　world　of　sense；　and　that　consequently　it　is　referred　to　the　categories　which　concern　its　physical　possibility；　whilst　yet　each　category　is　taken　so　universally　that　the　determining　principle　of　that　causality　can　be　placed　outside　the　world　of　sense　in　freedom　as　a　property　of　a　being　in　the　world　of　intelligence；　and　finally　the　categories　of　modality　introduce　the　transition　from　practical　principles　generally　to　those　of　morality；　but　only　problematically。　These　can　be　established　dogmatically　only　by　the　moral　law。　　　I　add　nothing　further　here　in　explanation　of　the　present　table；　since　it　is　intelligible　enough　of　itself。　A　division　of　this　kind　based　on　principles　is　very　useful　in　any　science；　both　for　the　sake　of　thoroughness　and　intelligibility。　Thus；　for　instance；　we　know　from　the　preceding　table　and　its　first　number　what　we　must　begin　from　in　practical　inquiries；　namely；　from　the　maxims　which　every　one　founds　on　his　own　inclinations；　the　precepts　which　hold　for　a　species　of　rational　beings　so　far　as　they　agree　in　certain　inclinations；　and　finally　the　law　which　holds　for　all　without　regard　to　their　inclinations；　etc。　In　this　way　we　survey　the　whole　plan　of　what　has　to　be　done；　every　question　of　practical　philosophy　that　has　to　be　answered；　and　also　the　order　that　is　to　be　followed。

　　Of　the　Typic　of　the　Pure　Practical　Judgement。

　　It　is　the　notions　of　good　and　evil　that　first　determine　an　object　of　the　will。　They　themselves；　however；　are　subject　to　a　practical　rule　of　reason　which；　if　it　is　pure　reason；　determines　the　will　a　priori　relatively　to　its　object。　Now；　whether　an　action　which　is　possible　to　us　in　the　world　of　sense；　comes　under　the　rule　or　not；　is　a　question　to　be　decided　by　the　practical　judgement；　by　which　what　is　said　in　the　rule　universally　（in　abstracto）　is　applied　to　an　action　in　concreto。　But　since　a　practical　rule　of　pure　reason　in　the　first　place　as　practical　concerns　the　existence　of　an　object；　and　in　the　second　place　as　a　practical　rule　of　pure　reason　implies　necessity　as　regards　the　existence　of　the　action　and；　therefore；　is　a　practical　law；　not　a　physical　law　depending　on　empirical　principles　of　determination；　but　a　law　of　freedom　by　which　the　will　is　to　be　determined　independently　on　anything　empirical　（merely　by　the　conception　of　a　law　and　its　form）；　whereas　all　instances　that　can　occur　of　possible　actions　can　only　be　empirical；　that　is；　belong　to　the　experience　of　physical　nature；　hence；　it　seems　absurd　to　expect　to　find　in　the　world　of　sense　a　case　which；　while　as　such　it　depends　only　on　the　law　of　nature；　yet　admits　of　the　application　to　it　of　a　law　of　freedom；　and　to　which　we　can　apply　the　supersensible　idea　of　the　morally　good　which　is　to　be　exhibited　in　it　in　concreto。　Thus；　the　judgement　of　the　pure　practical　reason　is　subject　to　the　same　difficulties　as　that　of　the　pure　theoretical　reason。　The　latter；　however；　had　means　at　hand　of　escaping　from　these　difficulties；　because；　in　regard　to　the　theoretical　employment；　intuitions　were　required　to　which　pure　concepts　of　the　understanding　could　be　applied；　and　such　intuitions　（though　only　of　objects　of　the　senses）　can　be　given　a　priori　and；　therefore；　as　far　as　regards　the　union　of　the　manifold　in　them；　conforming　to　the　pure　a　priori　concepts　of　the　understanding　as　schemata。　On　the　other　hand；　the　morally　good　is　something　whose　object　is　supersensible；　for　which；　therefore；　nothing　corresponding　can　be　found　in　any　sensible　intuition。　Judgement　depending　on　laws　of　pure　practical　reason　seems；　therefore；　to　be　subject　to　special　difficulties　arising　from　this；　that　a　law　of　freedom　is　to　be　applied　to　actions；　which　are　events　taking　place　in　the　world　of　sense；　and　which；　so　far；　belong　to　physical　nature。　　　But　here　again　is　opened　a　favourable　prospect　for　the　pure　practical　judgement。　When　I　subsume　under　a　pure　practical　law　an　action　possible　to　me　in　the　world　of　sense；　I　am　not　concerned　with　the　possibility　of　the　action　as　an　event　in　the　world　of　sense。　This　is　a　matter　that　belongs　to　the　decision　of　reason　in　its　theoretic　use　according　to　the　law　of　causality；　which　is　a　pure　concept　of　the　understanding；　for　which　reason　has　a　schema　in　the　sensible　intuition。　Physical　causality；　or　the　condition　under　which　it　takes　place；　belongs　to　the　physical　concepts；　the　schema　of　which　is　sketched　by　transcendental　imagination。　Here；　however；　we　have　to　do；　not　with　the　schema　of　a　case　that　occurs　according　to　laws；　but　with　the　schema　of　a　law　itself　（if　the　word　is　allowable　here）；　since　the　fact　that　the　will　（not　the　action　relatively　to　its　effect）　is　determined　by　the　law　alone　without　any　other　principle；　connects　the　notion　of　causality　with　quite　different　conditions　from　those　which　constitute　physical　connection。　　　The　physical　law　being　a　law　to　which　the　objects　of　sensible　intuition；　as　such；　are　subject；　must　have　a　schema　corresponding　to　it…　that　is；　a　general　procedure　of　the　imagination　（by　which　it　exhibits　a　priori　to　the　senses　the　pure　concept　of　the　understanding　which　the　law　determines）。　But　the　law　of　freedom　（that　is；　of　a　causality　not　subject　to　sensible　conditions）；　and　consequently　the　concept　of　the　unconditionally　good；　cannot　have　any　intuition；　nor　consequently　any　schema　supplied　to　it　for　the　purpose　of　its　application　in　concreto。　Consequently　the　moral　law　has　no　faculty　but　the　understanding　to　aid　its　application　to　physical　objects　（not　the　imagination）；　and　the　understanding　for　the　purposes　of　the　judgement　can　provide　for　an　idea　of　the　reason；　not　a　schema　of　the　sensibility；　but　a　law；　though　only　as　to　its　form　as　law；　such　a　law；　however；　as　can　be　exhibited　in　concreto　in　objects　of　the　senses；　and　therefore　a　law　of　nature。　We　can　therefore　call　this　law　the　type　of　the　moral　law。　　　The　rule　of　the　judgement　according　to　laws　of　pure　practical　reason　is　this：　ask　yourself　whether；　if　the　action　you　propose　were　to　take　place　by　a　law　of　the　system　of　nature　of　which　you　were　yourself　a　part；　you　could　regard　it　as　possible　by　your　own　will。　Everyone　does；　in　fact；　decide　by　this　rule　whether　actions　are　morally　good　or　evil。　Thus；　people　say：　〃If　everyone　permitted　himself　to　deceive；　when　he　thought　it　to　his　advantage；　or　thought　himself　justified　in　shortening　his　life　as　soon　as　he　was　thoroughly　weary　of　it；　or　looked　with　perfect　indifference　on　the　necessity　of　others；　and　if　you　belonged　to　such　an　order　of　things；　would　you　do　so　with　the　assent　of　your　own　will？〃　Now　everyone　knows　well　that　if　he　secretly　allows　himself　to　deceive；　it　does　not　follow　that　everyone　else　does　so；　or　if；　unobserved；　he　is　destitute　of　compassion；　others　would　not　necessarily　be　so　to　him；　hence；　this　comparison　of　the　maxim　of　his　actions　with　a　universal　law　of　nature　is　not　the　determining　principle　of　his　will。　Such　a　law　is；　nevertheless；　a　type　of　the　estimation　of　the　maxim　on　moral　principles。　If　the　maxim　of　the　action　is　not　such　as　to　stand　the　test　of　the　form　of　a　universal　law　of　nature；　then　it　is　morally　impossible。　This　is　the　judgement　even　of　common　sense；　for　its　ordinary　judgements；　even　those　of　experience；　are　always　based　on　the　law　of　nature。　It　has　it　therefore　always　at　hand；　only　that　in　cases　where　causality　from　freedom　is　to　be　criticised；　it　makes　that　law　of　nature　only　the　type　of　a　law　of　freedom；　because；　without　something　which　it　could　use　as　an　example　in　a　case　of　experience；　it　could　not　give　the　law　of　a　pure　practical　reason　its　proper　use　in　practice。　　　It　is　therefore　allowable　to　use　the　system　of　the　world　of　sense　as　the　type　of　a　supersensible　system　of　things；　provided　I　do　not　transfer　to　the　latter　the　intuitions；　and　what　depends　on　them；　but　merely　apply　to　it　the　form　of　law　in　general　（the　notion　of　which　occurs　even　in　the　commonest　use　of　reason；　but　cannot　be　definitely　known　a　priori　for　any　other　purpose　than　the　pure　practical　use　of　reason）；　for　laws；　as　such；　are　so　far　identical；　no　matter　from　what　they　derive　their　determining　principles。　　　Further；　since　of　all　the　supersensible　absolutely　nothing　＇is　known＇　except　freedom　（through　the　moral　law）；　and　this　only　so　far　as　it　is　inseparably　implied　in　that　law；　and　moreover　all　supersensible　objects　to　which　reason　might　lead　us；　following　the　guidance　of　that　law；　have　still　no　reality　for　us；　except　for　the　purpose　of　that　law；　and　for　the　use　of　mere　practical　reason；　and　as　reason　is　authorized　and　even　compelled　to　use　physical　nature　（in　its　pure　form　as　an　object　of　the　understanding）　as　the　type　of　the　judgement；　hence；　t