the critique of practical reason-第16部分

快捷操作: 按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页 按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页 按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部! 如果本书没有阅读完，想下次继续接着阅读，可使用上方 "收藏到我的浏览器" 功能 和 "加入书签" 功能！


l　nature　（in　its　pure　form　as　an　object　of　the　understanding）　as　the　type　of　the　judgement；　hence；　the　present　remark　will　serve　to　guard　against　reckoning　amongst　concepts　themselves　that　which　belongs　only　to　the　typic　of　concepts。　This；　namely；　as　a　typic　of　the　judgement；　guards　against　the　empiricism　of　practical　reason；　which　founds　the　practical　notions　of　good　and　evil　merely　on　experienced　consequences　（so…called　happiness）。　No　doubt　happiness　and　the　infinite　advantages　which　would　result　from　a　will　determined　by　self…love；　if　this　will　at　the　same　time　erected　itself　into　a　universal　law　of　nature；　may　certainly　serve　as　a　perfectly　suitable　type　of　the　morally　good；　but　it　is　not　identical　with　it。　The　same　typic　guards　also　against　the　mysticism　of　practical　reason；　which　turns　what　served　only　as　a　symbol　into　a　schema；　that　is；　proposes　to　provide　for　the　moral　concepts　actual　intuitions；　which；　however；　are　not　sensible　（intuitions　of　an　invisible　Kingdom　of　God）；　and　thus　plunges　into　the　transcendent。　What　is　befitting　the　use　of　the　moral　concepts　is　only　the　rationalism　of　the　judgement；　which　takes　from　the　sensible　system　of　nature　only　what　pure　reason　can　also　conceive　of　itself；　that　is；　conformity　to　law；　and　transfers　into　the　supersensible　nothing　but　what　can　conversely　be　actually　exhibited　by　actions　in　the　world　of　sense　according　to　the　formal　rule　of　a　law　of　nature。　However；　the　caution　against　empiricism　of　practical　reason　is　much　more　important；　for　mysticism　is　quite　reconcilable　with　the　purity　and　sublimity　of　the　moral　law；　and；　besides；　it　is　not　very　natural　or　agreeable　to　common　habits　of　thought　to　strain　one's　imagination　to　supersensible　intuitions；　and　hence　the　danger　on　this　side　is　not　so　general。　Empiricism；　on　the　contrary；　cuts　up　at　the　roots　the　morality　of　intentions　（in　which；　and　not　in　actions　only；　consists　the　high　worth　that　men　can　and　ought　to　give　to　themselves）；　and　substitutes　for　duty　something　quite　different；　namely；　an　empirical　interest；　with　which　the　inclinations　generally　are　secretly　leagued；　and　empiricism；　moreover；　being　on　this　account　allied　with　all　the　inclinations　which　（no　matter　what　fashion　they　put　on）　degrade　humanity　when　they　are　raised　to　the　dignity　of　a　supreme　practical　principle；　and　as　these；　nevertheless；　are　so　favourable　to　everyone's　feelings；　it　is　for　that　reason　much　more　dangerous　than　mysticism；　which　can　never　constitute　a　lasting　condition　of　any　great　number　of　persons。　　　　　CHAPTER　III。　Of　the　Motives　of　Pure　Practical　Reason。

　　What　is　essential　in　the　moral　worth　of　actions　is　that　the　moral　law　should　directly　determine　the　will。　If　the　determination　of　the　will　takes　place　in　conformity　indeed　to　the　moral　law；　but　only　by　means　of　a　feeling；　no　matter　of　what　kind；　which　has　to　be　presupposed　in　order　that　the　law　may　be　sufficient　to　determine　the　will；　and　therefore　not　for　the　sake　of　the　law；　then　the　action　will　possess　legality；　but　not　morality。　Now；　if　we　understand　by　motive　（elater　animi）　the　subjective　ground　of　determination　of　the　will　of　a　being　whose　reason　does　not　necessarily　conform　to　the　objective　law；　by　virtue　of　its　own　nature；　then　it　will　follow；　first；　that　not　motives　can　be　attributed　to　the　Divine　will；　and　that　the　motives　of　the　human　will　（as　well　as　that　of　every　created　rational　being）　can　never　be　anything　else　than　the　moral　law；　and　consequently　that　the　objective　principle　of　determination　must　always　and　alone　be　also　the　subjectively　sufficient　determining　principle　of　the　action；　if　this　is　not　merely　to　fulfil　the　letter　of　the　law；　without　containing　its　spirit。*

　　*We　may　say　of　every　action　that　conforms　to　the　law；　but　is　not　done　for　the　sake　of　the　law；　that　it　is　morally　good　in　the　letter；　not　in　the　spirit　（the　intention）。

　　Since；　then；　for　the　purpose　of　giving　the　moral　law　influence　over　the　will；　we　must　not　seek　for　any　other　motives　that　might　enable　us　to　dispense　with　the　motive　of　the　law　itself；　because　that　would　produce　mere　hypocrisy；　without　consistency；　and　it　is　even　dangerous　to　allow　other　motives　（for　instance；　that　of　interest）　even　to　co…operate　along　with　the　moral　law；　hence　nothing　is　left　us　but　to　determine　carefully　in　what　way　the　moral　law　becomes　a　motive；　and　what　effect　this　has　upon　the　faculty　of　desire。　For　as　to　the　question　how　a　law　can　be　directly　and　of　itself　a　determining　principle　of　the　will　（which　is　the　essence　of　morality）；　this　is；　for　human　reason；　an　insoluble　problem　and　identical　with　the　question：　how　a　free　will　is　possible。　Therefore　what　we　have　to　show　a　priori　is　not　why　the　moral　law　in　itself　supplies　a　motive；　but　what　effect　it；　as　such；　produces　（or；　more　correctly　speaking；　must　produce）　on　the　mind。　　　The　essential　point　in　every　determination　of　the　will　by　the　moral　law　is　that　being　a　free　will　it　is　determined　simply　by　the　moral　law；　not　only　without　the　co…operation　of　sensible　impulses；　but　even　to　the　rejection　of　all　such；　and　to　the　checking　of　all　inclinations　so　far　as　they　might　be　opposed　to　that　law。　So　far；　then；　the　effect　of　the　moral　law　as　a　motive　is　only　negative；　and　this　motive　can　be　known　a　priori　to　be　such。　For　all　inclination　and　every　sensible　impulse　is　founded　on　feeling；　and　the　negative　effect　produced　on　feeling　（by　the　check　on　the　inclinations）　is　itself　feeling；　consequently；　we　can　see　a　priori　that　the　moral　law；　as　a　determining　principle　of　the　will；　must　by　thwarting　all　our　inclinations　produce　a　feeling　which　may　be　called　pain；　and　in　this　we　have　the　first；　perhaps　the　only；　instance　in　which　we　are　able　from　a　priori　considerations　to　determine　the　relation　of　a　cognition　（in　this　case　of　pure　practical　reason）　to　the　feeling　of　pleasure　or　displeasure。　All　the　inclinations　together　（which　can　be　reduced　to　a　tolerable　system；　in　which　case　their　satisfaction　is　called　happiness）　constitute　self…regard　（solipsismus）。　This　is　either　the　self…love　that　consists　in　an　excessive　fondness　for　oneself　（philautia）；　or　satisfaction　with　oneself　（arrogantia）。　The　former　is　called　particularly　selfishness；　the　latter　self…conceit。　Pure　practical　reason　only　checks　selfishness；　looking　on　it　as　natural　and　active　in　us　even　prior　to　the　moral　law；　so　far　as　to　limit　it　to　the　condition　of　agreement　with　this　law；　and　then　it　is　called　rational　self…love。　But　self…conceit　reason　strikes　down　altogether；　since　all　claims　to　self…esteem　which　precede　agreement　with　the　moral　law　are　vain　and　unjustifiable；　for　the　certainty　of　a　state　of　mind　that　coincides　with　this　law　is　the　first　condition　of　personal　worth　（as　we　shall　presently　show　more　clearly）；　and　prior　to　this　conformity　any　pretension　to　worth　is　false　and　unlawful。　Now　the　propensity　to　self…esteem　is　one　of　the　inclinations　which　the　moral　law　checks；　inasmuch　as　that　esteem　rests　only　on　morality。　Therefore　the　moral　law　breaks　down　self…conceit。　But　as　this　law　is　something　positive　in　itself；　namely；　the　form　of　an　intellectual　causality；　that　is；　of　freedom；　it　must　be　an　object　of　respect；　for；　by　opposing　the　subjective　antagonism　of　the　inclinations；　it　weakens　self…conceit；　and　since　it　even　breaks　down；　that　is；　humiliates；　this　conceit；　it　is　an　object　of　the　highest　respect　and；　consequently；　is　the　foundation　of　a　positive　feeling　which　is　not　of　empirical　origin；　but　is　known　a　priori。　Therefore　respect　for　the　moral　law　is　a　feeling　which　is　produced　by　an　intellectual　cause；　and　this　feeling　is　the　only　one　that　we　know　quite　a　priori　and　the　necessity　of　which　we　can　perceive。　　　In　the　preceding　chapter　we　have　seen　that　everything　that　presents　itself　as　an　object　of　the　will　prior　to　the　moral　law　is　by　that　law　itself；　which　is　the　supreme　condition　of　practical　reason；　excluded　from　the　determining　principles　of　the　will　which　we　have　called　the　unconditionally　good；　and　that　the　mere　practical　form　which　consists　in　the　adaptation　of　the　maxims　to　universal　legislation　first　determines　what　is　good　in　itself　and　absolutely；　and　is　the　basis　of　the　maxims　of　a　pure　will；　which　alone　is　good　in　every　respect。　However；　we　find　that　our　nature　as　sensible　beings　is　such　that　the　matter　of　desire　（objects　of　inclination；　whether　of　hope　or　fear）　first　presents　itself　to　us；　and　our　pathologically　affected　self；　although　it　is　in　its　maxims　quite　unfit　for　universal　legislation；　yet；　just　as　if　it　constituted　our　entire　self；　strives　to　put　its　pretensions　forward　first；　and　to　have　them　acknowledged　as　the　first　and　original。　This　propensity　to　make　ourselves　in　the　subjective　determining　principles　of　our　choice　serve　as　the　objective　determining　principle　of　the　will　generally　may　be　called　self…love；　and　if　this　pretends　to　be　legislative　as　an　unconditional　practical　principle　it　may　be　called　self…conceit。　Now　the　moral　law；　which　alone　is　truly　objective　（namely；　in　every　respect）；　entirely　excludes　the　influence　of　self…love　on　the　supreme　practical　principle；　and　indefinitely　checks　the　self…conceit　that　prescribes　the　subjective　conditions　of　the　former　as　laws。　Now　whatever　checks　our　self…conceit　in　our　own　judgement　humiliates；　therefore　the　moral　law　inevitably　humbles　every　man　when　he　compares　with　it　the　physical　propensities　of　his　nature。　That；　the　idea　of　which　as　a　determining　principle　of　our　will　humbles　us　in　our　self…consciousness；　awakes　respect　for　itself；　so　far　as　it　is　itself　positive　and　a　determining　principle。　Therefore　the　moral　law　is　even　subjectively　a　cause　of　respect。　Now　since　everything　that　enters　into　self…love　belongs　to　inclination；　and　all　inclination　rests　on　feelings；　and　consequently　whatever　checks　all　the　feelings　together　in　self…love　has　necessarily；　by　this　very　circumstance；　an　influence　on　feeling；　hence　we　comprehend　how　it　is　possible　to　perceive　a　priori　that　the　moral　law　can　produce　an　effect　on　feeling；　in　that　it　excludes　the　inclinations　and　the　propensity　to　make　them　the　supreme　practical　condition；　i。e。；　self…love；　from　all　participation　in　the　supreme　legislation。　This　effect　is　on　one　side　merely　negative；　but　on　the　other　side；　relatively　to　the　restricting　principle　of　pure　practical　reason；　it　is　positive。　No　special　kin