the critique of practical reason-第20部分

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es　unworthy　of　life。　This　inward　peace　is　therefore　merely　negative　as　regards　what　can　make　life　pleasant；　it　is；　in　fact；　only　the　escaping　the　danger　of　sinking　in　personal　worth；　after　everything　else　that　is　valuable　has　been　lost。　It　is　the　effect　of　a　respect　for　something　quite　different　from　life；　something　in　comparison　and　contrast　with　which　life　with　all　its　enjoyment　has　no　value。　He　still　lives　only　because　it　is　his　duty；　not　because　he　finds　anything　pleasant　in　life。　　　Such　is　the　nature　of　the　true　motive　of　pure　practical　reason；　it　is　no　other　than　the　pure　moral　law　itself；　inasmuch　as　it　makes　us　conscious　of　the　sublimity　of　our　own　supersensible　existence　and　subjectively　produces　respect　for　their　higher　nature　in　men　who　are　also　conscious　of　their　sensible　existence　and　of　the　consequent　dependence　of　their　pathologically　very　susceptible　nature。　Now　with　this　motive　may　be　combined　so　many　charms　and　satisfactions　of　life　that　even　on　this　account　alone　the　most　prudent　choice　of　a　rational　Epicurean　reflecting　on　the　greatest　advantage　of　life　would　declare　itself　on　the　side　of　moral　conduct；　and　it　may　even　be　advisable　to　join　this　prospect　of　a　cheerful　enjoyment　of　life　with　that　supreme　motive　which　is　already　sufficient　of　itself；　but　only　as　a　counterpoise　to　the　attractions　which　vice　does　not　fail　to　exhibit　on　the　opposite　side；　and　not　so　as；　even　in　the　smallest　degree；　to　place　in　this　the　proper　moving　power　when　duty　is　in　question。　For　that　would　be　just　the　same　as　to　wish　to　taint　the　purity　of　the　moral　disposition　in　its　source。　The　majesty　of　duty　has　nothing　to　do　with　enjoyment　of　life；　it　has　its　special　law　and　its　special　tribunal；　and　though　the　two　should　be　never　so　well　shaken　together　to　be　given　well　mixed；　like　medicine；　to　the　sick　soul；　yet　they　will　soon　separate　of　themselves；　and　if　they　do　not；　the　former　will　not　act；　and　although　physical　life　might　gain　somewhat　in　force；　the　moral　life　would　fade　away　irrecoverably。

　　Critical　Examination　of　the　Analytic　of　Pure　Practical　Reason。

　　By　the　critical　examination　of　a　science；　or　of　a　portion　of　it；　which　constitutes　a　system　by　itself；　I　understand　the　inquiry　and　proof　why　it　must　have　this　and　no　other　systematic　form；　when　we　compare　it　with　another　system　which　is　based　on　a　similar　faculty　of　knowledge。　Now　practical　and　speculative　reason　are　based　on　the　same　faculty；　so　far　as　both　are　pure　reason。　Therefore　the　difference　in　their　systematic　form　must　be　determined　by　the　comparison　of　both；　and　the　ground　of　this　must　be　assigned。　　　The　Analytic　of　pure　theoretic　reason　had　to　do　with　the　knowledge　of　such　objects　as　may　have　been　given　to　the　understanding；　and　was　obliged　therefore　to　begin　from　intuition　and　consequently　（as　this　is　always　sensible）　from　sensibility；　and　only　after　that　could　advance　to　concepts　（of　the　objects　of　this　intuition）；　and　could　only　end　with　principles　after　both　these　had　preceded。　On　the　contrary；　since　practical　reason　has　not　to　do　with　objects　so　as　to　know　them；　but　with　its　own　faculty　of　realizing　them　（in　accordance　with　the　knowledge　of　them）；　that　is；　with　a　will　which　is　a　causality；　inasmuch　as　reason　contains　its　determining　principle；　since；　consequently；　it　has　not　to　furnish　an　object　of　intuition；　but　as　practical　reason　has　to　furnish　only　a　law　（because　the　notion　of　causality　always　implies　the　reference　to　a　law　which　determines　the　existence　of　the　many　in　relation　to　one　another）；　hence　a　critical　examination　of　the　Analytic　of　reason；　if　this　is　to　be　practical　reason　（and　this　is　properly　the　problem）；　must　begin　with　the　possibility　of　practical　principles　a　priori。　Only　after　that　can　it　proceed　to　concepts　of　the　objects　of　a　practical　reason；　namely；　those　of　absolute　good　and　evil；　in　order　to　assign　them　in　accordance　with　those　principles　（for　prior　to　those　principles　they　cannot　possibly　be　given　as　good　and　evil　by　any　faculty　of　knowledge）；　and　only　then　could　the　section　be　concluded　with　the　last　chapter；　that；　namely；　which　treats　of　the　relation　of　the　pure　practical　reason　to　the　sensibility　and　of　its　necessary　influence　thereon；　which　is　a　priori　cognisable；　that　is；　of　the　moral　sentiment。　Thus　the　Analytic　of　the　practical　pure　reason　has　the　whole　extent　of　the　conditions　of　its　use　in　common　with　the　theoretical；　but　in　reverse　order。　The　Analytic　of　pure　theoretic　reason　was　divided　into　transcendental　Aesthetic　and　transcendental　Logic；　that　of　the　practical　reversely　into　Logic　and　Aesthetic　of　pure　practical　reason　（if　I　may；　for　the　sake　of　analogy　merely；　use　these　designations；　which　are　not　quite　suitable）。　This　logic　again　was　there　divided　into　the　Analytic　of　concepts　and　that　of　principles：　here　into　that　of　principles　and　concepts。　The　Aesthetic　also　had　in　the　former　case　two　parts；　on　account　of　the　two　kinds　of　sensible　intuition；　here　the　sensibility　is　not　considered　as　a　capacity　of　intuition　at　all；　but　merely　as　feeling　（which　can　be　a　subjective　ground　of　desire）；　and　in　regard　to　it　pure　practical　reason　admits　no　further　division。　　　It　is　also　easy　to　see　the　reason　why　this　division　into　two　parts　with　its　subdivision　was　not　actually　adopted　here　（as　one　might　have　been　induced　to　attempt　by　the　example　of　the　former　critique）。　For　since　it　is　pure　reason　that　is　here　considered　in　its　practical　use；　and　consequently　as　proceeding　from　a　priori　principles；　and　not　from　empirical　principles　of　determination；　hence　the　division　of　the　analytic　of　pure　practical　reason　must　resemble　that　of　a　syllogism；　namely；　proceeding　from　the　universal　in　the　major　premiss　（the　moral　principle）；　through　a　minor　premiss　containing　a　subsumption　of　possible　actions　（as　good　or　evil）　under　the　former；　to　the　conclusion；　namely；　the　subjective　determination　of　the　will　（an　interest　in　the　possible　practical　good；　and　in　the　maxim　founded　on　it）。　He　who　has　been　able　to　convince　himself　of　the　truth　of　the　positions　occurring　in　the　Analytic　will　take　pleasure　in　such　comparisons；　for　they　justly　suggest　the　expectation　that　we　may　perhaps　some　day　be　able　to　discern　the　unity　of　the　whole　faculty　of　reason　（theoretical　as　well　as　practical）　and　be　able　to　derive　all　from　one　principle；　which；　is　what　human　reason　inevitably　demands；　as　it　finds　complete　satisfaction　only　in　a　perfectly　systematic　unity　of　its　knowledge。　　　If　now　we　consider　also　the　contents　of　the　knowledge　that　we　can　have　of　a　pure　practical　reason；　and　by　means　of　it；　as　shown　by　the　Analytic；　we　find；　along　with　a　remarkable　analogy　between　it　and　the　theoretical；　no　less　remarkable　differences。　As　regards　the　theoretical；　the　faculty　of　a　pure　rational　cognition　a　priori　could　be　easily　and　evidently　proved　by　examples　from　sciences　（in　which；　as　they　put　their　principles　to　the　test　in　so　many　ways　by　methodical　use；　there　is　not　so　much　reason　as　in　common　knowledge　to　fear　a　secret　mixture　of　empirical　principles　of　cognition）。　But；　that　pure　reason　without　the　admixture　of　any　empirical　principle　is　practical　of　itself；　this　could　only　be　shown　from　the　commonest　practical　use　of　reason；　by　verifying　the　fact；　that　every　man's　natural　reason　acknowledges　the　supreme　practical　principle　as　the　supreme　law　of　his　will…　a　law　completely　a　priori　and　not　depending　on　any　sensible　data。　It　was　necessary　first　to　establish　and　verify　the　purity　of　its　origin；　even　in　the　judgement　of　this　common　reason；　before　science　could　take　it　in　hand　to　make　use　of　it；　as　a　fact；　that　is；　prior　to　all　disputation　about　its　possibility；　and　all　the　consequences　that　may　be　drawn　from　it。　But　this　circumstance　may　be　readily　explained　from　what　has　just　been　said；　because　practical　pure　reason　must　necessarily　begin　with　principles；　which　therefore　must　be　the　first　data；　the　foundation　of　all　science；　and　cannot　be　derived　from　it。　It　was　possible　to　effect　this　verification　of　moral　principles　as　principles　of　a　pure　reason　quite　well；　and　with　sufficient　certainty；　by　a　single　appeal　to　the　judgement　of　common　sense；　for　this　reason；　that　anything　empirical　which　might　slip　into　our　maxims　as　a　determining　principle　of　the　will　can　be　detected　at　once　by　the　feeling　of　pleasure　or　pain　which　necessarily　attaches　to　it　as　exciting　desire；　whereas　pure　practical　reason　positively　refuses　to　admit　this　feeling　into　its　principle　as　a　condition。　The　heterogeneity　of　the　determining　principles　（the　empirical　and　rational）　is　clearly　detected　by　this　resistance　of　a　practically　legislating　reason　against　every　admixture　of　inclination；　and　by　a　peculiar　kind　of　sentiment；　which；　however；　does　not　precede　the　legislation　of　the　practical　reason；　but；　on　the　contrary；　is　produced　by　this　as　a　constraint；　namely；　by　the　feeling　of　a　respect　such　as　no　man　has　for　inclinations　of　whatever　kind　but　for　the　law　only；　and　it　is　detected　in　so　marked　and　prominent　a　manner　that　even　the　most　uninstructed　cannot　fail　to　see　at　once　in　an　example　presented　to　him；　that　empirical　principles　of　volition　may　indeed　urge　him　to　follow　their　attractions；　but　that　he　can　never　be　expected　to　obey　anything　but　the　pure　practical　law　of　reason　alone。　　　The　distinction　between　the　doctrine　of　happiness　and　the　doctrine　of　morality；　in　the　former　of　which　empirical　principles　constitute　the　entire　foundation；　while　in　the　second　they　do　not　form　the　smallest　part　of　it；　is　the　first　and　most　important　office　of　the　Analytic　of　pure　practical　reason；　and　it　must　proceed　in　it　with　as　much　exactness　and；　so　to　speak；　scrupulousness；　as　any　geometer　in　his　work。　The　philosopher；　however；　has　greater　difficulties　to　contend　with　here　（as　always　in　rational　cognition　by　means　of　concepts　merely　without　construction）；　because　he　cannot　take　any　intuition　as　a　foundation　（for　a　pure　noumenon）。　He　has；　however；　this　advantage　that；　like　the　chemist；　he　can　at　any　time　make　an　experiment　with　every　man's　practical　reason　for　the　purpose　of　distinguishing　the　moral　（pure）　principle　of　determination　from　the　empirical；　namely；　by　adding　the　moral　law　（as　a　determining　principle）　to　the　empirically　affected　will　（e。g。；　that　of　the　man　who　would　be　ready　to　lie　because　he　can　gain　something　thereby