the critique of practical reason-第22部分

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re；　although　we　do　not　mean　by　this　that　things　which　are　subject　to　it　must　be　really　material　machines。　We　look　here　only　to　the　necessity　of　the　connection　of　events　in　a　time…series　as　it　is　developed　according　to　the　physical　law；　whether　the　subject　in　which　this　development　takes　place　is　called　automaton　materiale　when　the　mechanical　being　is　moved　by　matter；　or　with　Leibnitz　spirituale　when　it　is　impelled　by　ideas；　and　if　the　freedom　of　our　will　were　no　other　than　the　latter　（say　the　psychological　and　comparative；　not　also　transcendental；　that　is；　absolute）；　then　it　would　at　bottom　be　nothing　better　than　the　freedom　of　a　turnspit；　which；　when　once　it　is　wound　up；　accomplishes　its　motions　of　itself。　　　Now；　in　order　to　remove　in　the　supposed　case　the　apparent　contradiction　between　freedom　and　the　mechanism　of　nature　in　one　and　the　same　action；　we　must　remember　what　was　said　in　the　Critique　of　Pure　Reason；　or　what　follows　therefrom；　viz。；　that　the　necessity　of　nature；　which　cannot　co…exist　with　the　freedom　of　the　subject；　appertains　only　to　the　attributes　of　the　thing　that　is　subject　to　time…conditions；　consequently　only　to　those　of　the　acting　subject　as　a　phenomenon；　that　therefore　in　this　respect　the　determining　principles　of　every　action　of　the　same　reside　in　what　belongs　to　past　time　and　is　no　longer　in　his　power　（in　which　must　be　included　his　own　past　actions　and　the　character　that　these　may　determine　for　him　in　his　own　eyes　as　a　phenomenon）。　But　the　very　same　subject；　being　on　the　other　side　conscious　of　himself　as　a　thing　in　himself；　considers　his　existence　also　in　so　far　as　it　is　not　subject　to　time…conditions；　and　regards　himself　as　only　determinable　by　laws　which　he　gives　himself　through　reason；　and　in　this　his　existence　nothing　is　antecedent　to　the　determination　of　his　will；　but　every　action；　and　in　general　every　modification　of　his　existence；　varying　according　to　his　internal　sense；　even　the　whole　series　of　his　existence　as　a　sensible　being　is　in　the　consciousness　of　his　supersensible　existence　nothing　but　the　result；　and　never　to　be　regarded　as　the　determining　principle；　of　his　causality　as　a　noumenon。　In　this　view　now　the　rational　being　can　justly　say　of　every　unlawful　action　that　he　performs；　that　he　could　very　well　have　left　it　undone；　although　as　appearance　it　is　sufficiently　determined　in　the　past；　and　in　this　respect　is　absolutely　necessary；　for　it；　with　all　the　past　which　determines　it；　belongs　to　the　one　single　phenomenon　of　his　character　which　he　makes　for　himself；　in　consequence　of　which　he　imputes　the　causality　of　those　appearances　to　himself　as　a　cause　independent　of　sensibility。　　　With　this　agree　perfectly　the　judicial　sentences　of　that　wonderful　faculty　in　us　which　we　call　conscience。　A　man　may　use　as　much　art　as　he　likes　in　order　to　paint　to　himself　an　unlawful　act；　that　he　remembers；　as　an　unintentional　error；　a　mere　oversight；　such　as　one　can　never　altogether　avoid；　and　therefore　as　something　in　which　he　was　carried　away　by　the　stream　of　physical　necessity；　and　thus　to　make　himself　out　innocent；　yet　he　finds　that　the　advocate　who　speaks　in　his　favour　can　by　no　means　silence　the　accuser　within；　if　only　he　is　conscious　that　at　the　time　when　he　did　this　wrong　he　was　in　his　senses；　that　is；　in　possession　of　his　freedom；　and；　nevertheless；　he　accounts　for　his　error　from　some　bad　habits；　which　by　gradual　neglect　of　attention　he　has　allowed　to　grow　upon　him　to　such　a　degree　that　he　can　regard　his　error　as　its　natural　consequence；　although　this　cannot　protect　him　from　the　blame　and　reproach　which　he　casts　upon　himself。　This　is　also　the　ground　of　repentance　for　a　long　past　action　at　every　recollection　of　it；　a　painful　feeling　produced　by　the　moral　sentiment；　and　which　is　practically　void　in　so　far　as　it　cannot　serve　to　undo　what　has　been　done。　（Hence　Priestley；　as　a　true　and　consistent　fatalist；　declares　it　absurd；　and　he　deserves　to　be　commended　for　this　candour　more　than　those　who；　while　they　maintain　the　mechanism　of　the　will　in　fact；　and　its　freedom　in　words　only；　yet　wish　it　to　be　thought　that　they　include　it　in　their　system　of　compromise；　although　they　do　not　explain　the　possibility　of　such　moral　imputation。）　But　the　pain　is　quite　legitimate；　because　when　the　law　of　our　intelligible　＇supersensible＇　existence　（the　moral　law）　is　in　question；　reason　recognizes　no　distinction　of　time；　and　only　asks　whether　the　event　belongs　to　me；　as　my　act；　and　then　always　morally　connects　the　same　feeling　with　it；　whether　it　has　happened　just　now　or　long　ago。　For　in　reference　to　the　supersensible　consciousness　of　its　existence　（i。e。；　freedom）　the　life　of　sense　is　but　a　single　phenomenon；　which；　inasmuch　as　it　contains　merely　manifestations　of　the　mental　disposition　with　regard　to　the　moral　law　（i。e。；　of　the　character）；　must　be　judged　not　according　to　the　physical　necessity　that　belongs　to　it　as　phenomenon；　but　according　to　the　absolute　spontaneity　of　freedom。　It　may　therefore　be　admitted　that；　if　it　were　possible　to　have　so　profound　an　insight　into　a　man's　mental　character　as　shown　by　internal　as　well　as　external　actions　as　to　know　all　its　motives；　even　the　smallest；　and　likewise　all　the　external　occasions　that　can　influence　them；　we　could　calculate　a　man's　conduct　for　the　future　with　as　great　certainty　as　a　lunar　or　solar　eclipse；　and　nevertheless　we　may　maintain　that　the　man　is　free。　In　fact；　if　we　were　capable　of　a　further　glance；　namely；　an　intellectual　intuition　of　the　same　subject　（which　indeed　is　not　granted　to　us；　and　instead　of　it　we　have　only　the　rational　concept）；　then　we　should　perceive　that　this　whole　chain　of　appearances　in　regard　to　all　that　concerns　the　moral　laws　depends　on　the　spontaneity　of　the　subject　as　a　thing　in　itself；　of　the　determination　of　which　no　physical　explanation　can　be　given。　In　default　of　this　intuition；　the　moral　law　assures　us　of　this　distinction　between　the　relation　of　our　actions　as　appearance　to　our　sensible　nature；　and　the　relation　of　this　sensible　nature　to　the　supersensible　substratum　in　us。　In　this　view；　which　is　natural　to　our　reason；　though　inexplicable；　we　can　also　justify　some　judgements　which　we　passed　with　all　conscientiousness；　and　which　yet　at　first　sight　seem　quite　opposed　to　all　equity。　There　are　cases　in　which　men；　even　with　the　same　education　which　has　been　profitable　to　others；　yet　show　such　early　depravity；　and　so　continue　to　progress　in　it　to　years　of　manhood；　that　they　are　thought　to　be　born　villains；　and　their　character　altogether　incapable　of　improvement；　and　nevertheless　they　are　judged　for　what　they　do　or　leave　undone；　they　are　reproached　for　their　faults　as　guilty；　nay；　they　themselves　（the　children）　regard　these　reproaches　as　well　founded；　exactly　as　if　in　spite　of　the　hopeless　natural　quality　of　mind　ascribed　to　them；　they　remained　just　as　responsible　as　any　other　man。　This　could　not　happen　if　we　did　not　suppose　that　whatever　springs　from　a　man's　choice　（as　every　action　intentionally　performed　undoubtedly　does）　has　as　its　foundation　a　free　causality；　which　from　early　youth　expresses　its　character　in　its　manifestations　（i。e。；　actions）。　These；　on　account　of　the　uniformity　of　conduct；　exhibit　a　natural　connection；　which　however　does　not　make　the　vicious　quality　of　the　will　necessary；　but　on　the　contrary；　is　the　consequence　of　the　evil　principles　voluntarily　adopted　and　unchangeable；　which　only　make　it　so　much　the　more　culpable　and　deserving　of　punishment。　There　still　remains　a　difficulty　in　the　combination　of　freedom　with　the　mechanism　of　nature　in　a　being　belonging　to　the　world　of　sense；　a　difficulty　which；　even　after　all　the　foregoing　is　admitted；　threatens　freedom　with　complete　destruction。　But　with　this　danger　there　is　also　a　circumstance　that　offers　hope　of　an　issue　still　favourable　to　freedom；　namely；　that　the　same　difficulty　presses　much　more　strongly　（in　fact　as　we　shall　presently　see；　presses　only）　on　the　system　that　holds　the　existence　determinable　in　time　and　space　to　be　the　existence　of　things　in　themselves；　it　does　not　therefore　oblige　us　to　give　up　our　capital　supposition　of　the　ideality　of　time　as　a　mere　form　of　sensible　intuition；　and　consequently　as　a　mere　manner　of　representation　which　is　proper　to　the　subject　as　belonging　to　the　world　of　sense；　and　therefore　it　only　requires　that　this　view　be　reconciled　with　this　idea。　　　The　difficulty　is　as　follows：　Even　if　it　is　admitted　that　the　supersensible　subject　can　be　free　with　respect　to　a　given　action；　although；　as　a　subject　also　belonging　to　the　world　of　sense；　he　is　under　mechanical　conditions　with　respect　to　the　same　action；　still；　as　soon　as　we　allow　that　God　as　universal　first　cause　is　also　the　cause　of　the　existence　of　substance　（a　proposition　which　can　never　be　given　up　without　at　the　same　time　giving　up　the　notion　of　God　as　the　Being　of　all　beings；　and　therewith　giving　up　his　all　sufficiency；　on　which　everything　in　theology　depends）；　it　seems　as　if　we　must　admit　that　a　man's　actions　have　their　determining　principle　in　something　which　is　wholly　out　of　his　power…　namely；　in　the　causality　of　a　Supreme　Being　distinct　from　himself　and　on　whom　his　own　existence　and　the　whole　determination　of　his　causality　are　absolutely　dependent。　In　point　of　fact；　if　a　man's　actions　as　belonging　to　his　modifications　in　time　were　not　merely　modifications　of　him　as　appearance；　but　as　a　thing　in　itself；　freedom　could　not　be　saved。　Man　would　be　a　marionette　or　an　automaton；　like　Vaucanson's；　prepared　and　wound　up　by　the　Supreme　Artist。　Self…consciousness　would　indeed　make　him　a　thinking　automaton；　but　the　consciousness　of　his　own　spontaneity　would　be　mere　delusion　if　this　were　mistaken　for　freedom；　and　it　would　deserve　this　name　only　in　a　comparative　sense；　since；　although　the　proximate　determining　causes　of　its　motion　and　a　long　series　of　their　determining　causes　are　internal；　yet　the　last　and　highest　is　found　in　a　foreign　hand。　Therefore　I　do　not　see　how　those　who　still　insist　on　regarding　time　and　space　as　attributes　belonging　to　the　existence　of　things　in　themselves；　can　avoid　admitting　the　fatality　of　actions；　or　if　（like　the　otherwise　acute　Mendelssohn）　they　allow　them　to　be　conditions　necessarily　belonging　to　the　existence　of　finite　and　derived　beings；　but　not　to　that　of　the　infinite　Supreme　Being；　I　do　not　see　on