the critique of practical reason-第23部分

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istence　of　finite　and　derived　beings；　but　not　to　that　of　the　infinite　Supreme　Being；　I　do　not　see　on　what　ground　they　can　justify　such　a　distinction；　or；　indeed；　how　they　can　avoid　the　contradiction　that　meets　them；　when　they　hold　that　existence　in　time　is　an　attribute　necessarily　belonging　to　finite　things　in　themselves；　whereas　God　is　the　cause　of　this　existence；　but　cannot　be　the　cause　of　time　（or　space）　itself　（since　this　must　be　presupposed　as　a　necessary　a　priori　condition　of　the　existence　of　things）；　and　consequently　as　regards　the　existence　of　these　things。　His　causality　must　be　subject　to　conditions　and　even　to　the　condition　of　time；　and　this　would　inevitably　bring　in　everything　contradictory　to　the　notions　of　His　infinity　and　independence。　On　the　other　hand；　it　is　quite　easy　for　us　to　draw　the　distinction　between　the　attribute　of　the　divine　existence　of　being　independent　on　all　time…conditions；　and　that　of　a　being　of　the　world　of　sense；　the　distinction　being　that　between　the　existence　of　a　being　in　itself　and　that　of　a　thing　in　appearance。　Hence；　if　this　ideality　of　time　and　space　is　not　adopted；　nothing　remains　but　Spinozism；　in　which　space　and　time　are　essential　attributes　of　the　Supreme　Being　Himself；　and　the　things　dependent　on　Him　（ourselves；　therefore；　included）　are　not　substances；　but　merely　accidents　inhering　in　Him；　since；　if　these　things　as　His　effects　exist　in　time　only；　this　being　the　condition　of　their　existence　in　themselves；　then　the　actions　of　these　beings　must　be　simply　His　actions　which　He　performs　in　some　place　and　time。　Thus；　Spinozism；　in　spite　of　the　absurdity　of　its　fundamental　idea；　argues　more　consistently　than　the　creation　theory　can；　when　beings　assumed　to　be　substances；　and　beings　in　themselves　existing　in　time；　are　regarded　as　effects　of　a　Supreme　Cause；　and　yet　as　not　＇belonging＇　to　Him　and　His　action；　but　as　separate　substances。　　　The　above…mentioned　difficulty　is　resolved　briefly　and　clearly　as　follows：　If　existence　in　time　is　a　mere　sensible　mode　of　representation　belonging　to　thinking　beings　in　the　world　and　consequently　does　not　apply　to　them　as　things　in　themselves；　then　the　creation　of　these　beings　is　a　creation　of　things　in　themselves；　since　the　notion　of　creation　does　not　belong　to　the　sensible　form　of　representation　of　existence　or　to　causality；　but　can　only　be　referred　to　noumena。　Consequently；　when　I　say　of　beings　in　the　world　of　sense　that　they　are　created；　I　so　far　regard　them　as　noumena。　As　it　would　be　a　contradiction；　therefore；　to　say　that　God　is　a　creator　of　appearances；　so　also　it　is　a　contradiction　to　say　that　as　creator　He　is　the　cause　of　actions　in　the　world　of　sense；　and　therefore　as　appearances；　although　He　is　the　cause　of　the　existence　of　the　acting　beings　（which　are　noumena）。　If　now　it　is　possible　to　affirm　freedom　in　spite　of　the　natural　mechanism　of　actions　as　appearances　（by　regarding　existence　in　time　as　something　that　belongs　only　to　appearances；　not　to　things　in　themselves）；　then　the　circumstance　that　the　acting　beings　are　creatures　cannot　make　the　slightest　difference；　since　creation　concerns　their　supersensible　and　not　their　sensible　existence；　and；　therefore；　cannot　be　regarded　as　the　determining　principle　of　the　appearances。　It　would　be　quite　different　if　the　beings　in　the　world　as　things　in　themselves　existed　in　time；　since　in　that　case　the　creator　of　substance　would　be　at　the　same　time　the　author　of　the　whole　mechanism　of　this　substance。　　　Of　so　great　importance　is　the　separation　of　time　（as　well　as　space）　from　the　existence　of　things　in　themselves　which　was　effected　in　the　Critique　of　the　Pure　Speculative　Reason。　　　It　may　be　said　that　the　solution　here　proposed　involves　great　difficulty　in　itself　and　is　scarcely　susceptible　of　a　lucid　exposition。　But　is　any　other　solution　that　has　been　attempted；　or　that　may　be　attempted；　easier　and　more　intelligible？　Rather　might　we　say　that　the　dogmatic　teachers　of　metaphysics　have　shown　more　shrewdness　than　candour　in　keeping　this　difficult　point　out　of　sight　as　much　as　possible；　in　the　hope　that　if　they　said　nothing　about　it；　probably　no　one　would　think　of　it。　If　science　is　to　be　advanced；　all　difficulties　must　be　laid　open；　and　we　must　even　search　for　those　that　are　hidden；　for　every　difficulty　calls　forth　a　remedy；　which　cannot　be　discovered　without　science　gaining　either　in　extent　or　in　exactness；　and　thus　even　obstacles　become　means　of　increasing　the　thoroughness　of　science。　On　the　other　hand；　if　the　difficulties　are　intentionally　concealed；　or　merely　removed　by　palliatives；　then　sooner　or　later　they　burst　out　into　incurable　mischiefs；　which　bring　science　to　ruin　in　an　absolute　scepticism。　　　Since　it　is；　properly　speaking；　the　notion　of　freedom　alone　amongst　all　the　ideas　of　pure　speculative　reason　that　so　greatly　enlarges　our　knowledge　in　the　sphere　of　the　supersensible；　though　only　of　our　practical　knowledge；　I　ask　myself　why　it　exclusively　possesses　so　great　fertility；　whereas　the　others　only　designate　the　vacant　space　for　possible　beings　of　the　pure　understanding；　but　are　unable　by　any　means　to　define　the　concept　of　them。　I　presently　find　that　as　I　cannot　think　anything　without　a　category；　I　must　first　look　for　a　category　for　the　rational　idea　of　freedom　with　which　I　am　now　concerned；　and　this　is　the　category　of　causality；　and　although　freedom；　a　concept　of　the　reason；　being　a　transcendent　concept；　cannot　have　any　intuition　corresponding　to　it；　yet　the　concept　of　the　understanding…　for　the　synthesis　of　which　the　former　demands　the　unconditioned…　（namely；　the　concept　of　causality）　must　have　a　sensible　intuition　given；　by　which　first　its　objective　reality　is　assured。　Now；　the　categories　are　all　divided　into　two　classes…　the　mathematical；　which　concern　the　unity　of　synthesis　in　the　conception　of　objects；　and　the　dynamical；　which　refer　to　the　unity　of　synthesis　in　the　conception　of　the　existence　of　objects。　The　former　（those　of　magnitude　and　quality）　always　contain　a　synthesis　of　the　homogeneous；　and　it　is　not　possible　to　find　in　this　the　unconditioned　antecedent　to　what　is　given　in　sensible　intuition　as　conditioned　in　space　and　time；　as　this　would　itself　have　to　belong　to　space　and　time；　and　therefore　be　again　still　conditioned。　Whence　it　resulted　in　the　Dialectic　of　Pure　Theoretic　Reason　that　the　opposite　methods　of　attaining　the　unconditioned　and　the　totality　of　the　conditions　were　both　wrong。　The　categories　of　the　second　class　（those　of　causality　and　of　the　necessity　of　a　thing）　did　not　require　this　homogeneity　（of　the　conditioned　and　the　condition　in　synthesis）；　since　here　what　we　have　to　explain　is　not　how　the　intuition　is　compounded　from　a　manifold　in　it；　but　only　how　the　existence　of　the　conditioned　object　corresponding　to　it　is　added　to　the　existence　of　the　condition　（added；　namely；　in　the　understanding　as　connected　therewith）；　and　in　that　case　it　was　allowable　to　suppose　in　the　supersensible　world　the　unconditioned　antecedent　to　the　altogether　conditioned　in　the　world　of　sense　（both　as　regards　the　causal　connection　and　the　contingent　existence　of　things　themselves）；　although　this　unconditioned　remained　indeterminate；　and　to　make　the　synthesis　transcendent。　Hence；　it　was　found　in　the　Dialectic　of　the　Pure　Speculative　Reason　that　the　two　apparently　opposite　methods　of　obtaining　for　the　conditioned　the　unconditioned　were　not　really　contradictory；　e。g。；　in　the　synthesis　of　causality　to　conceive　for　the　conditioned　in　the　series　of　causes　and　effects　of　the　sensible　world；　a　causality　which　has　no　sensible　condition；　and　that　the　same　action　which；　as　belonging　to　the　world　of　sense；　is　always　sensibly　conditioned；　that　is；　mechanically　necessary；　yet　at　the　same　time　may　be　derived　from　a　causality　not　sensibly　conditioned…　being　the　causality　of　the　acting　being　as　belonging　to　the　supersensible　world…　and　may　consequently　be　conceived　as　free。　Now；　the　only　point　in　question　was　to　change　this　may　be　into　is；　that　is；　that　we　should　be　able　to　show　in　an　actual　case；　as　it　were　by　a　fact；　that　certain　actions　imply　such　a　causality　（namely；　the　intellectual；　sensibly　unconditioned）；　whether　they　are　actual　or　only　commanded；　that　is；　objectively　necessary　in　a　practical　sense。　We　could　not　hope　to　find　this　connections　in　actions　actually　given　in　experience　as　events　of　the　sensible　world；　since　causality　with　freedom　must　always　be　sought　outside　the　world　of　sense　in　the　world　of　intelligence。　But　things　of　sense　of　sense　in　the　world　of　intelligence。　But　things　of　sense　are　the　only　things　offered　to　our　perception　and　observation。　Hence；　nothing　remained　but　to　find　an　incontestable　objective　principle　of　causality　which　excludes　all　sensible　conditions：　that　is；　a　principle　in　which　reason　does　not　appeal　further　to　something　else　as　a　determining　ground　of　its　causality；　but　contains　this　determining　ground　itself　by　means　of　that　principle；　and　in　which　therefore　it　is　itself　as　pure　reason　practical。　Now；　this　principle　had　not　to　be　searched　for　or　discovered；　it　had　long　been　in　the　reason　of　all　men；　and　incorporated　in　their　nature；　and　is　the　principle　of　morality。　Therefore；　that　unconditioned　causality；　with　the　faculty　of　it；　namely；　freedom；　is　no　longer　merely　indefinitely　and　problematically　thought　（this　speculative　reason　could　prove　to　be　feasible）；　but　is　even　as　regards　the　law　of　its　causality　definitely　and　assertorially　known；　and　with　it　the　fact　that　a　being　（I　myself）；　belonging　to　the　world　of　sense；　belongs　also　to　the　supersensible　world；　this　is　also　positively　known；　and　thus　the　reality　of　the　supersensible　world　is　established　and　in　practical　respects　definitely　given；　and　this　definiteness；　which　for　theoretical　purposes　would　be　transcendent；　is　for　practical　purposes　immanent。　We　could　not；　however；　make　a　similar　step　as　regards　the　second　dynamical　idea；　namely；　that　of　a　necessary　being。　We　could　not　rise　to　it　from　the　sensible　world　without　the　aid　of　the　first　dynamical　idea。　For　if　we　attempted　to　do　so；　we　should　have　ventured　to　leave　at　a　bound　all　that　is　given　to　us；　and　to　leap　to　that　of　which　nothing　is　given　us　that　can　help　us　to　effect　the　connection　of　such　a　supersensible　being　with　the　world　of　sense　（since　the　necessary　being　would　have　to　be　known　as　g