the critique of practical reason-第24部分

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a　supersensible　being　with　the　world　of　sense　（since　the　necessary　being　would　have　to　be　known　as　given　outside　ourselves）。　On　the　other　hand；　it　is　now　obvious　that　this　connection　is　quite　possible　in　relation　to　our　own　subject；　inasmuch　as　I　know　myself　to　be　on　the　one　side　as　an　intelligible　＇supersensible＇　being　determined　by　the　moral　law　（by　means　of　freedom）；　and　on　the　other　side　as　acting　in　the　world　of　sense。　It　is　the　concept　of　freedom　alone　that　enables　us　to　find　the　unconditioned　and　intelligible　for　the　conditioned　and　sensible　without　going　out　of　ourselves。　For　it　is　our　own　reason　that　by　means　of　the　supreme　and　unconditional　practical　law　knows　that　itself　and　the　being　that　is　conscious　of　this　law　（our　own　person）　belong　to　the　pure　world　of　understanding；　and　moreover　defines　the　manner　in　which；　as　such；　it　can　be　active。　In　this　way　it　can　be　understood　why　in　the　whole　faculty　of　reason　it　is　the　practical　reason　only　that　can　help　us　to　pass　beyond　the　world　of　sense　and　give　us　knowledge　of　a　supersensible　order　and　connection；　which；　however；　for　this　very　reason　cannot　be　extended　further　than　is　necessary　for　pure　practical　purposes。　　　Let　me　be　permitted　on　this　occasion　to　make　one　more　remark；　namely；　that　every　step　that　we　make　with　pure　reason；　even　in　the　practical　sphere　where　no　attention　is　paid　to　subtle　speculation；　nevertheless　accords　with　all　the　material　points　of　the　Critique　of　the　Theoretical　Reason　as　closely　and　directly　as　if　each　step　had　been　thought　out　with　deliberate　purpose　to　establish　this　confirmation。　Such　a　thorough　agreement；　wholly　unsought　for　and　quite　obvious　（as　anyone　can　convince　himself；　if　he　will　only　carry　moral　inquiries　up　to　their　principles）；　between　the　most　important　proposition　of　practical　reason　and　the　often　seemingly　too　subtle　and　needless　remarks　of　the　Critique　of　the　Speculative　Reason；　occasions　surprise　and　astonishment；　and　confirms　the　maxim　already　recognized　and　praised　by　others；　namely；　that　in　every　scientific　inquiry　we　should　pursue　our　way　steadily　with　all　possible　exactness　and　frankness；　without　caring　for　any　objections　that　may　be　raised　from　outside　its　sphere；　but；　as　far　as　we　can；　to　carry　out　our　inquiry　truthfully　and　completely　by　itself。　Frequent　observation　has　convinced　me　that；　when　such　researches　are　concluded；　that　which　in　one　part　of　them　appeared　to　me　very　questionable；　considered　in　relation　to　other　extraneous　doctrines；　when　I　left　this　doubtfulness　out　of　sight　for　a　time　and　only　attended　to　the　business　in　hand　until　it　was　completed；　at　last　was　unexpectedly　found　to　agree　perfectly　with　what　had　been　discovered　separately　without　the　least　regard　to　those　doctrines；　and　without　any　partiality　or　prejudice　for　them。　Authors　would　save　themselves　many　errors　and　much　labour　lost　（because　spent　on　a　delusion）　if　they　could　only　resolve　to　go　to　work　with　more　frankness。　　　　　　　　　BOOK　II。　Dialectic　of　Pure　Practical　Reason。

　　CHAPTER　I。　Of　a　Dialectic　of　Pure　Practical　Reason　Generally。

　　Pure　reason　always　has　its　dialetic；　whether　it　is　considered　in　its　speculative　or　its　practical　employment；　for　it　requires　the　absolute　totality　of　the　'conditions　of　what　is　given　conditioned；　and　this　can　only　be　found　in　things　in　themselves。　But　as　all　conceptions　of　things　in　themselves　must　be　referred　to　intuitions；　and　with　us　men　these　can　never　be　other　than　sensible　and　hence　can　never　enable　us　to　know　objects　as　things　in　themselves　but　only　as　appearances；　and　since　the　unconditioned　can　never　be　found　in　this　chain　of　appearances　which　consists　only　of　conditioned　and　conditions；　thus　from　applying　this　rational　idea　of　the　totality　of　the　conditions　（in　other　words　of　the　unconditioned）　to　appearances；　there　arises　an　inevitable　illusion；　as　if　these　latter　were　things　in　themselves　（for　in　the　absence　of　a　warning　critique　they　are　always　regarded　as　such）。　This　illusion　would　never　be　noticed　as　delusive　if　it　did　not　betray　itself　by　a　conflict　of　reason　with　itself；　when　it　applies　to　appearances　its　fundamental　principle　of　presupposing　the　unconditioned　to　everything　conditioned。　By　this；　however；　reason　is　compelled　to　trace　this　illusion　to　its　source；　and　search　how　it　can　be　removed；　and　this　can　only　be　done　by　a　complete　critical　examination　of　the　whole　pure　faculty　of　reason；　so　that　the　antinomy　of　the　pure　reason　which　is　manifest　in　its　dialectic　is　in　fact　the　most　beneficial　error　into　which　human　reason　could　ever　have　fallen；　since　it　at　last　drives　us　to　search　for　the　key　to　escape　from　this　labyrinth；　and　when　this　key　is　found；　it　further　discovers　that　which　we　did　not　seek　but　yet　had　need　of；　namely；　a　view　into　a　higher　and　an　immutable　order　of　things；　in　which　we　even　now　are；　and　in　which　we　are　thereby　enabled　by　definite　precepts　to　continue　to　live　according　to　the　highest　dictates　of　reason。　　　It　may　be　seen　in　detail　in　the　Critique　of　Pure　Reason　how　in　its　speculative　employment　this　natural　dialectic　is　to　be　solved；　and　how　the　error　which　arises　from　a　very　natural　illusion　may　be　guarded　against。　But　reason　in　its　practical　use　is　not　a　whit　better　off。　As　pure　practical　reason；　it　likewise　seeks　to　find　the　unconditioned　for　the　practically　conditioned　（which　rests　on　inclinations　and　natural　wants）；　and　this　is　not　as　the　determining　principle　of　the　will；　but　even　when　this　is　given　（in　the　moral　law）　it　seeks　the　unconditioned　totality　of　the　object　of　pure　practical　reason　under　the　name　of　the　summum　bonum。　　　To　define　this　idea　practically；　i。e。；　sufficiently　for　the　maxims　of　our　rational　conduct；　is　the　business　of　practical　wisdom；　and　this　again　as　a　science　is　philosophy；　in　the　sense　in　which　the　word　was　understood　by　the　ancients；　with　whom　it　meant　instruction　in　the　conception　in　which　the　summum　bonum　was　to　be　placed；　and　the　conduct　by　which　it　was　to　be　obtained。　It　would　be　well　to　leave　this　word　in　its　ancient　signification　as　a　doctrine　of　the　summum　bonum；　so　far　as　reason　endeavours　to　make　this　into　a　science。　For　on　the　one　band　the　restriction　annexed　would　suit　the　Greek　expression　（which　signifies　the　love　of　wisdom）；　and　yet　at　the　same　time　would　be　sufficient　to　embrace　under　the　name　of　philosophy　the　love　of　science：　that　is　to　say；　of　all　speculative　rational　knowledge；　so　far　as　it　is　serviceable　to　reason；　both　for　that　conception　and　also　for　the　practical　principle　determining　our　conduct；　without　letting　out　of　sight　the　main　end；　on　account　of　which　alone　it　can　be　called　a　doctrine　of　practical　wisdom。　On　the　other　hand；　it　would　be　no　harm　to　deter　the　self…conceit　of　one　who　ventures　to　claim　the　title　of　philosopher　by　holding　before　him　in　the　very　definition　a　standard　of　self…estimation　which　would　very　much　lower　his　pretensions。　For　a　teacher　of　wisdom　would　mean　something　more　than　a　scholar　who　has　not　come　so　far　as　to　guide　himself；　much　less　to　guide　others；　with　certain　expectation　of　attaining　so　high　an　end：　it　would　mean　a　master　in　the　knowledge　of　wisdom；　which　implies　more　than　a　modest　man　would　claim　for　himself。　Thus　philosophy　as　well　as　wisdom　would　always　remain　an　ideal；　which　objectively　is　presented　complete　in　reason　alone；　while　subjectively　for　the　person　it　is　only　the　goal　of　his　unceasing　endeavours；　and　no　one　would　be　justified　in　professing　to　be　in　possession　of　it　so　as　to　assume　the　name　of　philosopher　who　could　not　also　show　its　infallible　effects　in　his　own　person　as　an　example　（in　his　self…mastery　and　the　unquestioned　interest　that　he　takes　pre…eminently　in　the　general　good）；　and　this　the　ancients　also　required　as　a　condition　of　deserving　that　honourable　title。　　　We　have　another　preliminary　remark　to　make　respecting　the　dialectic　of　the　pure　practical　reason；　on　the　point　of　the　definition　of　the　summum　bonum　（a　successful　solution　of　which　dialectic　would　lead　us　to　expect；　as　in　case　of　that　of　the　theoretical　reason；　the　most　beneficial　effects；　inasmuch　as　the　self…contradictions　of　pure　practical　reason　honestly　stated；　and　not　concealed；　force　us　to　undertake　a　complete　critique　of　this　faculty）。　　　The　moral　law　is　the　sole　determining　principle　of　a　pure　will。　But　since　this　is　merely　formal　（viz。；　as　prescribing　only　the　form　of　the　maxim　as　universally　legislative）；　it　abstracts　as　a　determining　principle　from　all　matter　that　is　to　say；　from　every　object　of　volition。　Hence；　though　the　summum　bonum　may　be　the　whole　object　of　a　pure　practical　reason；　i。e。；　a　pure　will；　yet　it　is　not　on　that　account　to　be　regarded　as　its　determining　principle；　and　the　moral　law　alone　must　be　regarded　as　the　principle　on　which　that　and　its　realization　or　promotion　are　aimed　at。　This　remark　is　important　in　so　delicate　a　case　as　the　determination　of　moral　principles；　where　the　slightest　misinterpretation　perverts　men's　minds。　For　it　will　have　been　seen　from　the　Analytic　that；　if　we　assume　any　object　under　the　name　of　a　good　as　a　determining　principle　of　the　will　prior　to　the　moral　law　and　then　deduce　from　it　the　supreme　practical　principle；　this　would　always　introduce　heteronomy　and　crush　out　the　moral　principle。　　　It　is；　however；　evident　that　if　the　notion　of　the　summum　bonum　includes　that　of　the　moral　law　as　its　supreme　condition；　then　the　summum　bonum　would　not　merely　be　an　object；　but　the　notion　of　it　and　the　conception　of　its　existence　as　possible　by　our　own　practical　reason　would　likewise　be　the　determining　principle　of　the　will；　since　in　that　case　the　will　is　in　fact　determined　by　the　moral　law　which　is　already　included　in　this　conception；　and　by　no　other　object；　as　the　principle　of　autonomy　requires。　This　order　of　the　conceptions　of　determination　of　the　will　must　not　be　lost　sight　of；　as　otherwise　we　should　misunderstand　ourselves　and　think　we　had　fallen　into　a　contradiction；　while　everything　remains　in　perfect　harmony。　　　　　CHAPTER　II。　Of　the　Dialectic　of　Pure　Reason　in　defining　the　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Conception　of　the　〃Summum　Bonum〃。

　　The　conception　of　the　summum　itself　contains　an　ambiguity　which　might　occasion　needless　disputes　if　we　did　not　attend　to　it。　The　summum　may　mean　either　the　supreme　（supremum）　or　the　perfect　（consummatum）。　The　former　is　that　condition　which　is　itse