the critique of practical reason-第31部分

快捷操作: 按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页 按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页 按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部! 如果本书没有阅读完，想下次继续接着阅读，可使用上方 "收藏到我的浏览器" 功能 和 "加入书签" 功能！


are　ideas　of　reason；　which　cannot　be　given　in　any　experience。　Only　we　are　not　here　concerned　with　the　theoretical　knowledge　of　the　objects　of　these　ideas；　but　only　with　this；　whether　they　have　objects　at　all。　This　reality　is　supplied　by　pure　practical　reason；　and　theoretical　reason　has　nothing　further　to　do　in　this　but　to　think　those　objects　by　means　of　categories。　This；　as　we　have　elsewhere　clearly　shown；　can　be　done　well　enough　without　needing　any　intuition　（either　sensible　or　supersensible）　because　the　categories　have　their　seat　and　origin　in　the　pure　understanding；　simply　as　the　faculty　of　thought；　before　and　independently　of　any　intuition；　and　they　always　only　signify　an　object　in　general；　no　matter　in　what　way　it　may　be　given　to　us。　Now　when　the　categories　are　to　be　applied　to　these　ideas；　it　is　not　possible　to　give　them　any　object　in　intuition；　but　that　such　an　object　actually　exists；　and　consequently　that　the　category　as　a　mere　form　of　thought　is　here　not　empty　but　has　significance；　this　is　sufficiently　assured　them　by　an　object　which　practical　reason　presents　beyond　doubt　in　the　concept　of　the　summum　bonum；　the　reality　of　the　conceptions　which　are　required　for　the　possibility　of　the　summum　bonum；　without；　however；　effecting　by　this　accession　the　least　extension　of　our　knowledge　on　theoretical　principles。

　　When　these　ideas　of　God；　of　an　intelligible　world　（the　kingdom　of　God）；　and　of　immortality　are　further　determined　by　predicates　taken　from　our　own　nature；　we　must　not　regard　this　determination　as　a　sensualizing　of　those　pure　rational　ideas　（anthropomorphism）；　nor　as　a　transcendent　knowledge　of　supersensible　objects；　for　these　predicates　are　no　others　than　understanding　and　will；　considered　too　in　the　relation　to　each　other　in　which　they　must　be　conceived　in　the　moral　law；　and　therefore；　only　so　far　as　a　pure　practical　use　is　made　of　them。　As　to　all　the　rest　that　belongs　to　these　conceptions　psychologically；　that　is；　so　far　as　we　observe　these　faculties　of　ours　empirically　in　their　exercise　（e。g。；　that　the　understanding　of　man　is　discursive；　and　its　notions　therefore　not　intuitions　but　thoughts；　that　these　follow　one　another　in　time；　that　his　will　has　its　satisfaction　always　dependent　on　the　existence　of　its　object；　etc。；　which　cannot　be　the　case　in　the　Supreme　Being）；　from　all　this　we　abstract　in　that　case；　and　then　there　remains　of　the　notions　by　which　we　conceive　a　pure　intelligence　nothing　more　than　just　what　is　required　for　the　possibility　of　conceiving　a　moral　law。　There　is　then　a　knowledge　of　God　indeed；　but　only　for　practical　purposes；　and；　if　we　attempt　to　extend　it　to　a　theoretical　knowledge；　we　find　an　understanding　that　has　intuitions；　not　thoughts；　a　will　that　is　directed　to　objects　on　the　existence　of　which　its　satisfaction　does　not　in　the　least　depend　（not　to　mention　the　transcendental　predicates；　as；　for　example；　a　magnitude　of　existence；　that　is　duration；　which；　however；　is　not　in　time；　the　only　possible　means　we　have　of　conceiving　existence　as　magnitude）。　Now　these　are　all　attributes　of　which　we　can　form　no　conception　that　would　help　to　the　knowledge　of　the　object；　and　we　learn　from　this　that　they　can　never　be　used　for　a　theory　of　supersensible　beings；　so　that　on　this　side　they　are　quite　incapable　of　being　the　foundation　of　a　speculative　knowledge；　and　their　use　is　limited　simply　to　the　practice　of　the　moral　law。　　　This　last　is　so　obvious；　and　can　be　proved　so　clearly　by　fact；　that　we　may　confidently　challenge　all　pretended　natural　theologians　（a　singular　name）*　to　specify　（over　and　above　the　merely　ontological　predicates）　one　single　attribute；　whether　of　the　understanding　or　of　the　will；　determining　this　object　of　theirs；　of　which　we　could　not　show　incontrovertibly　that；　if　we　abstract　from　it　everything　anthropomorphic；　nothing　would　remain　to　us　but　the　mere　word；　without　our　being　able　to　connect　with　it　the　smallest　notion　by　which　we　could　hope　for　an　extension　of　theoretical　knowledge。　But　as　to　the　practical；　there　still　remains　to　us　of　the　attributes　of　understanding　and　will　the　conception　of　a　relation　to　which　objective　reality　is　given　by　the　practical　law　（which　determines　a　priori　precisely　this　relation　of　the　understanding　to　the　will）。　When　once　this　is　done；　then　reality　is　given　to　the　conception　of　the　object　of　a　will　morally　determined　（the　conception　of　the　summum　bonum）；　and　with　it　to　the　conditions　of　its　possibility；　the　ideas　of　God；　freedom；　and　immortality；　but　always　only　relatively　to　the　practice　of　the　moral　law　（and　not　for　any　speculative　purpose）。

　　*Learning　is　properly　only　the　whole　content　of　the　historical　sciences。　Consequently　it　is　only　the　teacher　of　revealed　theology　that　can　be　called　a　learned　theologian。　If；　however；　we　choose　to　call　a　man　learned　who　is　in　possession　of　the　rational　sciences　（mathematics　and　philosophy）；　although　even　this　would　be　contrary　to　the　signification　of　the　word　（which　always　counts　as　learning　only　that　which　one　must　be　〃learned〃　and　which；　therefore；　he　cannot　discover　of　himself　by　reason）；　even　in　that　case　the　philosopher　would　make　too　poor　a　figure　with　his　knowledge　of　God　as　a　positive　science　to　let　himself　be　called　on　that　account　a　learned　man。

　　According　to　these　remarks　it　is　now　easy　to　find　the　answer　to　the　weighty　question　whether　the　notion　of　God　is　one　belonging　to　physics　（and　therefore　also　to　metaphysics；　which　contains　the　pure　a　priori　principles　of　the　former　in　their　universal　import）　or　to　morals。　If　we　have　recourse　to　God　as　the　Author　of　all　things；　in　order　to　explain　the　arrangements　of　nature　or　its　changes；　this　is　at　least　not　a　physical　explanation；　and　is　a　complete　confession　that　our　philosophy　has　come　to　an　end；　since　we　are　obliged　to　assume　something　of　which　in　itself　we　have　otherwise　no　conception；　in　order　to　be　able　to　frame　a　conception　of　the　possibility　of　what　we　see　before　our　eyes。　Metaphysics；　however；　cannot　enable　us　to　attain　by　certain　inference　from　the　knowledge　of　this　world　to　the　conception　of　God　and　to　the　proof　of　His　existence；　for　this　reason；　that　in　order　to　say　that　this　world　could　be　produced　only　by　a　God　（according　to　the　conception　implied　by　this　word）　we　should　know　this　world　as　the　most　perfect　whole　possible；　and　for　this　purpose　should　also　know　all　possible　worlds　（in　order　to　be　able　to　compare　them　with　this）；　in　other　words；　we　should　be　omniscient。　It　is　absolutely　impossible；　however；　to　know　the　existence　of　this　Being　from　mere　concepts；　because　every　existential　proposition；　that　is；　every　proposition　that　affirms　the　existence　of　a　being　of　which　I　frame　a　concept；　is　a　synthetic　proposition；　that　is；　one　by　which　I　go　beyond　that　conception　and　affirm　of　it　more　than　was　thought　in　the　conception　itself；　namely；　that　this　concept　in　the　understanding　has　an　object　corresponding　to　it　outside　the　understanding；　and　this　it　is　obviously　impossible　to　elicit　by　any　reasoning。　There　remains；　therefore；　only　one　single　process　possible　for　reason　to　attain　this　knowledge；　namely；　to　start　from　the　supreme　principle　of　its　pure　practical　use　（which　in　every　case　is　directed　simply　to　the　existence　of　something　as　a　consequence　of　reason）　and　thus　determine　its　object。　Then　its　inevitable　problem；　namely；　the　necessary　direction　of　the　will　to　the　summum　bonum；　discovers　to　us　not　only　the　necessity　of　assuming　such　a　First　Being　in　reference　to　the　possibility　of　this　good　in　the　world；　but；　what　is　most　remarkable；　something　which　reason　in　its　progress　on　the　path　of　physical　nature　altogether　failed　to　find；　namely；　an　accurately　defined　conception　of　this　First　Being。　As　we　can　know　only　a　small　part　of　this　world；　and　can　still　less　compare　it　with　all　possible　worlds；　we　may　indeed　from　its　order；　design；　and　greatness；　infer　a　wise；　good；　powerful；　etc。；　Author　of　it；　but　not　that　He　is　all…wise；　all…good；　all…powerful；　etc。　It　may　indeed　very　well　be　granted　that　we　should　be　justified　in　supplying　this　inevitable　defect　by　a　legitimate　and　reasonable　hypothesis；　namely；　that　when　wisdom；　goodness；　etc；　are　displayed　in　all　the　parts　that　offer　themselves　to　our　nearer　knowledge；　it　is　just　the　same　in　all　the　rest；　and　that　it　would　therefore　be　reasonable　to　ascribe　all　possible　perfections　to　the　Author　of　the　world；　but　these　are　not　strict　logical　inferences　in　which　we　can　pride　ourselves　on　our　insight；　but　only　permitted　conclusions　in　which　we　may　be　indulged　and　which　require　further　recommendation　before　we　can　make　use　of　them。　On　the　path　of　empirical　inquiry　then　（physics）；　the　conception　of　God　remains　always　a　conception　of　the　perfection　of　the　First　Being　not　accurately　enough　determined　to　be　held　adequate　to　the　conception　of　Deity。　（With　metaphysic　in　its　transcendental　part　nothing　whatever　can　be　accomplished。）　　　When　I　now　try　to　test　this　conception　by　reference　to　the　object　of　practical　reason；　I　find　that　the　moral　principle　admits　as　possible　only　the　conception　of　an　Author　of　the　world　possessed　of　the　highest　perfection。　He　must　be　omniscient；　in　order　to　know　my　conduct　up　to　the　inmost　root　of　my　mental　state　in　all　possible　cases　and　into　all　future　time；　omnipotent；　in　order　to　allot　to　it　its　fitting　consequences；　similarly　He　must　be　omnipresent；　eternal；　etc。　Thus　the　moral　law；　by　means　of　the　conception　of　the　summum　bonum　as　the　object　of　a　pure　practical　reason；　determines　the　concept　of　the　First　Being　as　the　Supreme　Being；　a　thing　which　the　physical　（and　in　its　higher　development　the　metaphysical）；　in　other　words；　the　whole　speculative　course　of　reason；　was　unable　to　effect。　The　conception　of　God；　then；　is　one　that　belongs　originally　not　to　physics；　i。e。；　to　speculative　reason；　but　to　morals。　The　same　may　be　said　of　the　other　conceptions　of　reason　of　which　we　have　treated　above　as　postulates　of　it　in　its　practical　use。　　　In　the　history　of　Grecian　philosophy　we　find　no　distinct　traces　of　a　pure　rational　theology　earlier　than　Anaxagoras；　but　this　is　not　because　the　older　philosophers　had　not　intelligence　or　penetration　enough　to　raise　themselves　to　it　by　the　path　of　speculation；　at　least　with　the　aid　of　a　thoroughly　reasonable　hypothesis。　What　could　have　been　easier；　what　more　natural