the critique of practical reason-第35部分

快捷操作: 按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页 按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页 按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部! 如果本书没有阅读完，想下次继续接着阅读，可使用上方 "收藏到我的浏览器" 功能 和 "加入书签" 功能！


they　can　do　so　only　so　far　as　they　are　laid　to　heart　in　their　purity　as　motives；　unmixed　with　any　view　to　prosperity；　for　it　is　in　suffering　that　they　display　themselves　most　nobly。　Now　that　whose　removal　strengthens　the　effect　of　a　moving　force　must　have　been　a　hindrance；　consequently　every　admixture　of　motives　taken　from　our　own　happiness　is　a　hindrance　to　the　influence　of　the　moral　law　on　the　heart。　I　affirm　further　that　even　in　that　admired　action；　if　the　motive　from　which　it　was　done　was　a　high　regard　for　duty；　then　it　is　just　this　respect　for　the　law　that　has　the　greatest　influence　on　the　mind　of　the　spectator；　not　any　pretension　to　a　supposed　inward　greatness　of　mind　or　noble　meritorious　sentiments；　consequently　duty；　not　merit；　must　have　not　only　the　most　definite；　but；　when　it　is　represented　in　the　true　light　of　its　inviolability；　the　most　penetrating；　influence　on　the　mind。　　　It　is　more　necessary　than　ever　to　direct　attention　to　this　method　in　our　times；　when　men　hope　to　produce　more　effect　on　the　mind　with　soft；　tender　feelings；　or　high…flown；　puffing…up　pretensions；　which　rather　wither　the　heart　than　strengthen　it；　than　by　a　plain　and　earnest　representation　of　duty；　which　is　more　suited　to　human　imperfection　and　to　progress　in　goodness。　To　set　before　children；　as　a　pattern；　actions　that　are　called　noble；　magnanimous；　meritorious；　with　the　notion　of　captivating　them　by　infusing　enthusiasm　for　such　actions；　is　to　defeat　our　end。　For　as　they　are　still　so　backward　in　the　observance　of　the　commonest　duty；　and　even　in　the　correct　estimation　of　it；　this　means　simply　to　make　them　fantastical　romancers　betimes。　But；　even　with　the　instructed　and　experienced　part　of　mankind；　this　supposed　spring　has；　if　not　an　injurious；　at　least　no　genuine；　moral　effect　on　the　heart；　which；　however；　is　what　it　was　desired　to　produce。　　　All　feelings；　especially　those　that　are　to　produce　unwonted　exertions；　must　accomplish　their　effect　at　the　moment　they　are　at　their　height　and　before　the　calm　down；　otherwise　they　effect　nothing；　for　as　there　was　nothing　to　strengthen　the　heart；　but　only　to　excite　it；　it　naturally　returns　to　its　normal　moderate　tone　and；　thus；　falls　back　into　its　previous　languor。　Principles　must　be　built　on　conceptions；　on　any　other　basis　there　can　only　be　paroxysms；　which　can　give　the　person　no　moral　worth；　nay；　not　even　confidence　in　himself；　without　which　the　highest　good　in　man；　consciousness　of　the　morality　of　his　mind　and　character；　cannot　exist。　Now　if　these　conceptions　are　to　become　subjectively　practical；　we　must　not　rest　satisfied　with　admiring　the　objective　law　of　morality；　and　esteeming　it　highly　in　reference　to　humanity；　but　we　must　consider　the　conception　of　it　in　relation　to　man　as　an　individual；　and　then　this　law　appears　in　a　form　indeed　that　is　highly　deserving　of　respect；　but　not　so　pleasant　as　if　it　belonged　to　the　element　to　which　he　is　naturally　accustomed；　but　on　the　contrary　as　often　compelling　him　to　quit　this　element；　not　without　self…denial；　and　to　betake　himself　to　a　higher；　in　which　he　can　only　maintain　himself　with　trouble　and　with　unceasing　apprehension　of　a　relapse。　In　a　word；　the　moral　law　demands　obedience；　from　duty　not　from　predilection；　which　cannot　and　ought　not　to　be　presupposed　at　all。　　　Let　us　now　see；　in　an　example；　whether　the　conception　of　an　action；　as　a　noble　and　magnanimous　one；　has　more　subjective　moving　power　than　if　the　action　is　conceived　merely　as　duty　in　relation　to　the　solemn　law　of　morality。　The　action　by　which　a　man　endeavours　at　the　greatest　peril　of　life　to　rescue　people　from　shipwreck；　at　last　losing　his　life　in　the　attempt；　is　reckoned　on　one　side　as　duty；　but　on　the　other　and　for　the　most　part　as　a　meritorious　action；　but　our　esteem　for　it　is　much　weakened　by　the　notion　of　duty　to　himself　which　seems　in　this　case　to　be　somewhat　infringed。　More　decisive　is　the　magnanimous　sacrifice　of　life　for　the　safety　of　one's　country；　and　yet　there　still　remains　some　scruple　whether　it　is　a　perfect　duty　to　devote　one's　self　to　this　purpose　spontaneously　and　unbidden；　and　the　action　has　not　in　itself　the　full　force　of　a　pattern　and　impulse　to　imitation。　But　if　an　indispensable　duty　be　in　question；　the　transgression　of　which　violates　the　moral　law　itself；　and　without　regard　to　the　welfare　of　mankind；　and　as　it　were　tramples　on　its　holiness　（such　as　are　usually　called　duties　to　God；　because　in　Him　we　conceive　the　ideal　of　holiness　in　substance）；　then　we　give　our　most　perfect　esteem　to　the　pursuit　of　it　at　the　sacrifice　of　all　that　can　have　any　value　for　the　dearest　inclinations；　and　we　find　our　soul　strengthened　and　elevated　by　such　an　example；　when　we　convince　ourselves　by　contemplation　of　it　that　human　nature　is　capable　of　so　great　an　elevation　above　every　motive　that　nature　can　oppose　to　it。　Juvenal　describes　such　an　example　in　a　climax　which　makes　the　reader　feel　vividly　the　force　of　the　spring　that　is　contained　in　the　pure　law　of　duty；　as　duty：

　　　　Esto　bonus　miles；　tutor　bonus；　arbiter　idem　　　　　Integer；　ambiguae　si　quando　citabere　testis　　　　　Incertaeque　rei；　Phalaris　licet　imperet　ut　sis　　　　　Falsus；　et　admoto　dictet　periuria　tauro；　　　　　Summum　crede　nefas　animam　praeferre　pudori；　　　　　Et　propter　vitam　vivendi　perdere　causas。*

　　*＇Juvenal；　Satirae；　〃Be　you　a　good　soldier；　a　faithful　tutor；　an　uncorrupted　umpire　also；　if　you　are　summoned　as　a　witness　in　a　doubtful　and　uncertain　thing；　though　Phalaris　should　command　that　you　should　be　false；　and　should　dictate　perjuries　with　the　bull　brought　to　you；　believe　it　the　highest　impiety　to　prefer　life　to　reputation；　and　for　the　sake　of　life；　to　lose　the　causes　of　living。〃＇

　　When　we　can　bring　any　flattering　thought　of　merit　into　our　action；　then　the　motive　is　already　somewhat　alloyed　with　self…love　and　has　therefore　some　assistance　from　the　side　of　the　sensibility。　But　to　postpone　everything　to　the　holiness　of　duty　alone；　and　to　be　conscious　that　we　can　because　our　own　reason　recognises　this　as　its　command　and　says　that　we　ought　to　do　it；　this　is；　as　it　were；　to　raise　ourselves　altogether　above　the　world　of　sense；　and　there　is　inseparably　involved　in　the　same　a　consciousness　of　the　law；　as　a　spring　of　a　faculty　that　controls　the　sensibility；　and　although　this　is　not　always　attended　with　effect；　yet　frequent　engagement　with　this　spring；　and　the　at　first　minor　attempts　at　using　it；　give　hope　that　this　effect　may　be　wrought；　and　that　by　degrees　the　greatest；　and　that　a　purely　moral　interest　in　it　may　be　produced　in　us。　　　The　method　then　takes　the　following　course。　At　first　we　are　only　concerned　to　make　the　judging　of　actions　by　moral　laws　a　natural　employment　accompanying　all　our　own　free　actions；　as　well　as　the　observation　of　those　of　others；　and　to　make　it　as　it　were　a　habit；　and　to　sharpen　this　judgement；　asking　first　whether　the　action　conforms　objectively　to　the　moral　law；　and　to　what　law；　and　we　distinguish　the　law　that　merely　furnishes　a　principle　of　obligation　from　that　which　is　really　obligatory　（leges　obligandi　a　legibus　obligantibus）；　as；　for　instance；　the　law　of　what　men's　wants　require　from　me；　as　contrasted　with　that　which　their　rights　demand；　the　latter　of　which　prescribes　essential；　the　former　only　non…essential　duties；　and　thus　we　teach　how　to　distinguish　different　kinds　of　duties　which　meet　in　the　same　action。　The　other　point　to　which　attention　must　be　directed　is　the　question　whether　the　action　was　also　（subjectively）　done　for　the　sake　of　the　moral　law；　so　that　it　not　only　is　morally　correct　as　a　deed；　but　also；　by　the　maxim　from　which　it　is　done；　has　moral　worth　as　a　disposition。　Now　there　is　no　doubt　that　this　practice；　and　the　resulting　culture　of　our　reason　in　judging　merely　of　the　practical；　must　gradually　produce　a　certain　interest　even　in　the　law　of　reason；　and　consequently　in　morally　good　actions。　For　we　ultimately　take　a　liking　for　a　thing；　the　contemplation　of　which　makes　us　feel　that　the　use　of　our　cognitive　faculties　is　extended；　and　this　extension　is　especially　furthered　by　that　in　which　we　find　moral　correctness；　since　it　is　only　in　such　an　order　of　things　that　reason；　with　its　faculty　of　determining　a　priori　on　principle　what　ought　to　be　done；　can　find　satisfaction。　An　observer　of　nature　takes　liking　at　last　to　objects　that　at　first　offended　his　senses；　when　he　discovers　in　them　the　great　adaptation　of　their　organization　to　design；　so　that　his　reason　finds　food　in　its　contemplation。　So　Leibnitz　spared　an　insect　that　he　had　carefully　examined　with　the　microscope；　and　replaced　it　on　its　leaf；　because　he　had　found　himself　instructed　by　the　view　of　it　and　had；　as　it　were；　received　a　benefit　from　it。　　　But　this　employment　of　the　faculty　of　judgement；　which　makes　us　feel　our　own　cognitive　powers；　is　not　yet　the　interest　in　actions　and　in　their　morality　itself。　It　merely　causes　us　to　take　pleasure　in　engaging　in　such　criticism；　and　it　gives　to　virtue　or　the　disposition　that　conforms　to　moral　laws　a　form　of　beauty；　which　is　admired；　but　not　on　that　account　sought　after　（laudatur　et　alget）；　as　everything　the　contemplation　of　which　produces　a　consciousness　of　the　harmony　of　our　powers　of　conception；　and　in　which　we　feel　the　whole　of　our　faculty　of　knowledge　（understanding　and　imagination）　strengthened；　produces　a　satisfaction；　which　may　also　be　communicated　to　others；　while　nevertheless　the　existence　of　the　object　remains　indifferent　to　us；　being　only　regarded　as　the　occasion　of　our　becoming　aware　of　the　capacities　in　us　which　are　elevated　above　mere　animal　nature。　Now；　however；　the　second　exercise　comes　in；　the　living　exhibition　of　morality　of　character　by　examples；　in　which　attention　is　directed　to　purity　of　will；　first　only　as　a　negative　perfection；　in　so　far　as　in　an　action　done　from　duty　no　motives　of　inclination　have　any　influence　in　determining　it。　By　this　the　pupil's　attention　is　fixed　upon　the　consciousness　of　his　freedom；　and　although　this　renunciation　at　first　excites　a　feeling　of　pain；　nevertheless；　by　its　withdrawing　the　pupil　from　the　constraint　of　even　real　wants；　there　is　proclaimed　to　him　at　the　same　time　a　deliverance　from　the　manifold　dissatisfaction　in　which　all　these　wants　entangle　him；　and　the　mind　is　made　capable　of　receiving　the　sensation　of　satisfaction　from　other　sources。　The　heart　is　freed　and　light