the critique of practical reason-第5部分

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ow　could　we　compare　in　respect　of　magnitude　two　principles　of　determination；　the　ideas　of　which　depend　upon　different　faculties；　so　as　to　prefer　that　which　affects　the　faculty　of　desire　in　the　highest　degree。　The　same　man　may　return　unread　an　instructive　book　which　he　cannot　again　obtain；　in　order　not　to　miss　a　hunt；　he　may　depart　in　the　midst　of　a　fine　speech；　in　order　not　to　be　late　for　dinner；　he　may　leave　a　rational　conversation；　such　as　he　otherwise　values　highly；　to　take　his　place　at　the　gaming…table；　he　may　even　repulse　a　poor　man　whom　he　at　other　times　takes　pleasure　in　benefiting；　because　he　has　only　just　enough　money　in　his　pocket　to　pay　for　his　admission　to　the　theatre。　If　the　determination　of　his　will　rests　on　the　feeling　of　the　agreeableness　or　disagreeableness　that　he　expects　from　any　cause；　it　is　all　the　same　to　him　by　what　sort　of　ideas　he　will　be　affected。　The　only　thing　that　concerns　him；　in　order　to　decide　his　choice；　is；　how　great；　how　long　continued；　how　easily　obtained；　and　how　often　repeated；　this　agreeableness　is。　just　as　to　the　man　who　wants　money　to　spend；　it　is　all　the　same　whether　the　gold　was　dug　out　of　the　mountain　or　washed　out　of　the　sand；　provided　it　is　everywhere　accepted　at　the　same　value；　so　the　man　who　cares　only　for　the　enjoyment　of　life　does　not　ask　whether　the　ideas　are　of　the　understanding　or　the　senses；　but　only　how　much　and　how　great　pleasure　they　will　give　for　the　longest　time。　It　is　only　those　that　would　gladly　deny　to　pure　reason　the　power　of　determining　the　will；　without　the　presupposition　of　any　feeling；　who　could　deviate　so　far　from　their　own　exposition　as　to　describe　as　quite　heterogeneous　what　they　have　themselves　previously　brought　under　one　and　the　same　principle。　Thus；　for　example；　it　is　observed　that　we　can　find　pleasure　in　the　mere　exercise　of　power；　in　the　consciousness　of　our　strength　of　mind　in　overcoming　obstacles　which　are　opposed　to　our　designs；　in　the　culture　of　our　mental　talents；　etc。；　and　we　justly　call　these　more　refined　pleasures　and　enjoyments；　because　they　are　more　in　our　power　than　others；　they　do　not　wear　out；　but　rather　increase　the　capacity　for　further　enjoyment　of　them；　and　while　they　delight　they　at　the　same　time　cultivate。　But　to　say　on　this　account　that　they　determine　the　will　in　a　different　way　and　not　through　sense；　whereas　the　possibility　of　the　pleasure　presupposes　a　feeling　for　it　implanted　in　us；　which　is　the　first　condition　of　this　satisfaction；　this　is　just　as　when　ignorant　persons　that　like　to　dabble　in　metaphysics　imagine　matter　so　subtle；　so　supersubtle　that　they　almost　make　themselves　giddy　with　it；　and　then　think　that　in　this　way　they　have　conceived　it　as　a　spiritual　and　yet　extended　being。　If　with　Epicurus　we　make　virtue　determine　the　will　only　by　means　of　the　pleasure　it　promises；　we　cannot　afterwards　blame　him　for　holding　that　this　pleasure　is　of　the　same　kind　as　those　of　the　coarsest　senses。　For　we　have　no　reason　whatever　to　charge　him　with　holding　that　the　ideas　by　which　this　feeling　is　excited　in　us　belong　merely　to　the　bodily　senses。　As　far　as　can　be　conjectured；　he　sought　the　source　of　many　of　them　in　the　use　of　the　higher　cognitive　faculty；　but　this　did　not　prevent　him；　and　could　not　prevent　him；　from　holding　on　the　principle　above　stated；　that　the　pleasure　itself　which　those　intellectual　ideas　give　us；　and　by　which　alone　they　can　determine　the　will；　is　just　of　the　same　kind。　Consistency　is　the　highest　obligation　of　a　philosopher；　and　yet　the　most　rarely　found。　The　ancient　Greek　schools　give　us　more　examples　of　it　than　we　find　in　our　syncretistic　age；　in　which　a　certain　shallow　and　dishonest　system　of　compromise　of　contradictory　principles　is　devised；　because　it　commends　itself　better　to　a　public　which　is　content　to　know　something　of　everything　and　nothing　thoroughly；　so　as　to　please　every　party。　　　The　principle　of　private　happiness；　however　much　understanding　and　reason　may　be　used　in　it；　cannot　contain　any　other　determining　principles　for　the　will　than　those　which　belong　to　the　lower　desires；　and　either　there　are　no　＇higher＇　desires　at　all；　or　pure　reason　must　of　itself　alone　be　practical；　that　is；　it　must　be　able　to　determine　the　will　by　the　mere　form　of　the　practical　rule　without　supposing　any　feeling；　and　consequently　without　any　idea　of　the　pleasant　or　unpleasant；　which　is　the　matter　of　the　desire；　and　which　is　always　an　empirical　condition　of　the　principles。　Then　only；　when　reason　of　itself　determines　the　will　（not　as　the　servant　of　the　inclination）；　it　is　really　a　higher　desire　to　which　that　which　is　pathologically　determined　is　subordinate；　and　is　really；　and　even　specifically；　distinct　from　the　latter；　so　that　even　the　slightest　admixture　of　the　motives　of　the　latter　impairs　its　strength　and　superiority；　just　as　in　a　mathematical　demonstration　the　least　empirical　condition　would　degrade　and　destroy　its　force　and　value。　Reason；　with　its　practical　law；　determines　the　will　immediately；　not　by　means　of　an　intervening　feeling　of　pleasure　or　pain；　not　even　of　pleasure　in　the　law　itself；　and　it　is　only　because　it　can；　as　pure　reason；　be　practical；　that　it　is　possible　for　it　to　be　legislative。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　REMARK　II。

　　To　be　happy　is　necessarily　the　wish　of　every　finite　rational　being；　and　this；　therefore；　is　inevitably　a　determining　principle　of　its　faculty　of　desire。　For　we　are　not　in　possession　originally　of　satisfaction　with　our　whole　existence…　a　bliss　which　would　imply　a　consciousness　of　our　own　independent　self…sufficiency　this　is　a　problem　imposed　upon　us　by　our　own　finite　nature；　because　we　have　wants　and　these　wants　regard　the　matter　of　our　desires；　that　is；　something　that　is　relative　to　a　subjective　feeling　of　pleasure　or　pain；　which　determines　what　we　need　in　order　to　be　satisfied　with　our　condition。　But　just　because　this　material　principle　of　determination　can　only　be　empirically　known　by　the　subject；　it　is　impossible　to　regard　this　problem　as　a　law；　for　a　law　being　objective　must　contain　the　very　same　principle　of　determination　of　the　will　in　all　cases　and　for　all　rational　beings。　For；　although　the　notion　of　happiness　is　in　every　case　the　foundation　of　practical　relation　of　the　objects　to　the　desires；　yet　it　is　only　a　general　name　for　the　subjective　determining　principles；　and　determines　nothing　specifically；　whereas　this　is　what　alone　we　are　concerned　with　in　this　practical　problem；　which　cannot　be　solved　at　all　without　such　specific　determination。　For　it　is　every　man's　own　special　feeling　of　pleasure　and　pain　that　decides　in　what　he　is　to　place　his　happiness；　and　even　in　the　same　subject　this　will　vary　with　the　difference　of　his　wants　according　as　this　feeling　changes；　and　thus　a　law　which　is　subjectively　necessary　（as　a　law　of　nature）　is　objectively　a　very　contingent　practical　principle；　which　can　and　must　be　very　different　in　different　subjects　and　therefore　can　never　furnish　a　law；　since；　in　the　desire　for　happiness　it　is　not　the　form　（of　conformity　to　law）　that　is　decisive；　but　simply　the　matter；　namely；　whether　I　am　to　expect　pleasure　in　following　the　law；　and　how　much。　Principles　of　self…love　may；　indeed；　contain　universal　precepts　of　skill　（how　to　find　means　to　accomplish　one's　purpose）；　but　in　that　case　they　are　merely　theoretical　principles；*　as；　for　example；　how　he　who　would　like　to　eat　bread　should　contrive　a　mill；　but　practical　precepts　founded　on　them　can　never　be　universal；　for　the　determining　principle　of　the　desire　is　based　on　the　feeling　pleasure　and　pain；　which　can　never　be　supposed　to　be　universally　directed　to　the　same　objects。

　　*Propositions　which　in　mathematics　or　physics　are　called　practical　ought　properly　to　be　called　technical。　For　they　For　they　have　nothing　to　do　with　the　determination　of　the　theoretical　they　only　point　out　how　the　certain　must　is　to　be　produced　and　are；　therefore；　just　as　theoretical　as　any　propositions　which　express　the　connection　of　a　cause　with　an　effect。　Now　whoever　chooses　the　effect　must　also　choose　the　cause。

　　Even　supposing；　however；　that　all　finite　rational　beings　were　thoroughly　agreed　as　to　what　were　the　objects　of　their　feelings　of　pleasure　and　pain；　and　also　as　to　the　means　which　they　must　employ　to　attain　the　one　and　avoid　the　other；　still；　they　could　by　no　means　set　up　the　principle　of　self…love　as　a　practical　law；　for　this　unanimity　itself　would　be　only　contingent。　The　principle　of　determination　would　still　be　only　subjectively　valid　and　merely　empirical；　and　would　not　possess　the　necessity　which　is　conceived　in　every　law；　namely；　an　objective　necessity　arising　from　a　priori　grounds；　unless；　indeed；　we　hold　this　necessity　to　be　not　at　all　practical；　but　merely　physical；　viz。；　that　our　action　is　as　inevitably　determined　by　our　inclination；　as　yawning　when　we　see　others　yawn。　It　would　be　better　to　maintain　that　there　are　no　practical　laws　at　all；　but　only　counsels　for　the　service　of　our　desires；　than　to　raise　merely　subjective　principles　to　the　rank　of　practical　laws；　which　have　objective　necessity；　and　not　merely　subjective；　and　which　must　be　known　by　reason　a　priori；　not　by　experience　（however　empirically　universal　this　may　be）。　Even　the　rules　of　corresponding　phenomena　are　only　called　laws　of　nature　（e。g。；　the　mechanical　laws）；　when　we　either　know　them　really　a　priori；　or　（as　in　the　case　of　chemical　laws）　suppose　that　they　would　be　known　a　priori　from　objective　grounds　if　our　insight　reached　further。　But　in　the　case　of　merely　subjective　practical　principles；　it　is　expressly　made　a　condition　that　they　rest；　not　on　objective；　but　on　subjective　conditions　of　choice；　and　hence　that　they　must　always　be　represented　as　mere　maxims；　never　as　practical　laws。　This　second　remark　seems　at　first　sight　to　be　mere　verbal　refinement；　but　it　defines　the　terms　of　the　most　important　distinction　which　can　come　into　consideration　in　practical　investigations。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　IV。　THEOREM　II。

　　A　rational　being　cannot　regard　his　maxims　as　practical　universal　laws；　unless　he　conceives　them　as　principles　which　determine　the　will；　not　by　their　matter；　but　by　their　form　only。　　　By　the　matter　of　a　practical　principle　I　mean　the　object　of　the　will。　This　object　is　either　the　determining　ground　of　the　will　or　it　is　not。　In　the　former　case　the　rule　of　the　will　i