the critique of practical reason-第6部分

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is　either　the　determining　ground　of　the　will　or　it　is　not。　In　the　former　case　the　rule　of　the　will　is　subjected　to　an　empirical　condition　（viz。；　the　relation　of　the　determining　idea　to　the　feeling　of　pleasure　and　pain）；　consequently　it　can　not　be　a　practical　law。　Now；　when　we　abstract　from　a　law　all　matter；　i。e。；　every　object　of　the　will　（as　a　determining　principle）；　nothing　is　left　but　the　mere　form　of　a　universal　legislation。　Therefore；　either　a　rational　being　cannot　conceive　his　subjective　practical　principles；　that　is；　his　maxims；　as　being　at　the　same　time　universal　laws；　or　he　must　suppose　that　their　mere　form；　by　which　they　are　fitted　for　universal　legislation；　is　alone　what　makes　them　practical　laws。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　REMARK。

　　The　commonest　understanding　can　distinguish　without　instruction　what　form　of　maxim　is　adapted　for　universal　legislation；　and　what　is　not。　Suppose；　for　example；　that　I　have　made　it　my　maxim　to　increase　my　fortune　by　every　safe　means。　Now；　I　have　a　deposit　in　my　hands；　the　owner　of　which　is　dead　and　has　left　no　writing　about　it。　This　is　just　the　case　for　my　maxim。　I　desire　then　to　know　whether　that　maxim　can　also　bold　good　as　a　universal　practical　law。　I　apply　it；　therefore；　to　the　present　case；　and　ask　whether　it　could　take　the　form　of　a　law；　and　consequently　whether　I　can　by　my　maxim　at　the　same　time　give　such　a　law　as　this；　that　everyone　may　deny　a　deposit　of　which　no　one　can　produce　a　proof。　I　at　once　become　aware　that　such　a　principle；　viewed　as　a　law；　would　annihilate　itself；　because　the　result　would　be　that　there　would　be　no　deposits。　A　practical　law　which　I　recognise　as　such　must　be　qualified　for　universal　legislation；　this　is　an　identical　proposition　and；　therefore；　self…evident。　Now；　if　I　say　that　my　will　is　subject　to　a　practical　law；　I　cannot　adduce　my　inclination　（e。g。；　in　the　present　case　my　avarice）　as　a　principle　of　determination　fitted　to　be　a　universal　practical　law；　for　this　is　so　far　from　being　fitted　for　a　universal　legislation　that；　if　put　in　the　form　of　a　universal　law；　it　would　destroy　itself。　　　It　is；　therefore；　surprising　that　intelligent　men　could　have　thought　of　calling　the　desire　of　happiness　a　universal　practical　law　on　the　ground　that　the　desire　is　universal；　and；　therefore；　also　the　maxim　by　which　everyone　makes　this　desire　determine　his　will。　For　whereas　in　other　cases　a　universal　law　of　nature　makes　everything　harmonious；　here；　on　the　contrary；　if　we　attribute　to　the　maxim　the　universality　of　a　law；　the　extreme　opposite　of　harmony　will　follow；　the　greatest　opposition　and　the　complete　destruction　of　the　maxim　itself　and　its　purpose。　For；　in　that　case；　the　will　of　all　has　not　one　and　the　same　object；　but　everyone　has　his　own　（his　private　welfare）；　which　may　accidentally　accord　with　the　purposes　of　others　which　are　equally　selfish；　but　it　is　far　from　sufficing　for　a　law；　because　the　occasional　exceptions　which　one　is　permitted　to　make　are　endless；　and　cannot　be　definitely　embraced　in　one　universal　rule。　In　this　manner；　then；　results　a　harmony　like　that　which　a　certain　satirical　poem　depicts　as　existing　between　a　married　couple　bent　on　going　to　ruin；　〃O；　marvellous　harmony；　what　he　wishes；　she　wishes　also〃；　or　like　what　is　said　of　the　pledge　of　Francis　I　to　the　Emperor　Charles　V；　〃What　my　brother　Charles　wishes　that　I　wish　also〃　（viz。；　Milan）。　Empirical　principles　of　determination　are　not　fit　for　any　universal　external　legislation；　but　just　as　little　for　internal；　for　each　man　makes　his　own　subject　the　foundation　of　his　inclination；　and　in　the　same　subject　sometimes　one　inclination；　sometimes　another；　has　the　preponderance。　To　discover　a　law　which　would　govern　them　all　under　this　condition；　namely；　bringing　them　all　into　harmony；　is　quite　impossible。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　V。　PROBLEM　I。

　　Supposing　that　the　mere　legislative　form　of　maxims　is　alone　the　sufficient　determining　principle　of　a　will；　to　find　the　nature　of　the　will　which　can　be　determined　by　it　alone。　　　　Since　the　bare　form　of　the　law　can　only　be　conceived　by　reason；　and　is；　therefore；　not　an　object　of　the　senses；　and　consequently　does　not　belong　to　the　class　of　phenomena；　it　follows　that　the　idea　of　it；　which　determines　the　will；　is　distinct　from　all　the　principles　that　determine　events　in　nature　according　to　the　law　of　causality；　because　in　their　case　the　determining　principles　must　themselves　be　phenomena。　Now；　if　no　other　determining　principle　can　serve　as　a　law　for　the　will　except　that　universal　legislative　form；　such　a　will　must　be　conceived　as　quite　independent　of　the　natural　law　of　phenomena　in　their　mutual　relation；　namely；　the　law　of　causality；　such　independence　is　called　freedom　in　the　strictest；　that　is；　in　the　transcendental；　sense；　consequently；　a　will　which　can　have　its　law　in　nothing　but　the　mere　legislative　form　of　the　maxim　is　a　free　will。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　VI。　PROBLEM　II。

　　Supposing　that　a　will　is　free；　to　find　the　law　which　alone　is　competent　to　determine　it　necessarily。　　　Since　the　matter　of　the　practical　law；　i。e。；　an　object　of　the　maxim；　can　never　be　given　otherwise　than　empirically；　and　the　free　will　is　independent　on　empirical　conditions　（that　is；　conditions　belonging　to　the　world　of　sense）　and　yet　is　determinable；　consequently　a　free　will　must　find　its　principle　of　determination　in　the　law；　and　yet　independently　of　the　matter　of　the　law。　But；　besides　the　matter　of　the　law；　nothing　is　contained　in　it　except　the　legislative　form。　It　is　the　legislative　form；　then；　contained　in　the　maxim；　which　can　alone　constitute　a　principle　of　determination　of　the　＇free＇　will。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　REMARK。

　　Thus　freedom　and　an　unconditional　practical　law　reciprocally　imply　each　other。　Now　I　do　not　ask　here　whether　they　are　in　fact　distinct；　or　whether　an　unconditioned　law　is　not　rather　merely　the　consciousness　of　a　pure　practical　reason　and　the　latter　identical　with　the　positive　concept　of　freedom；　I　only　ask；　whence　begins　our　knowledge　of　the　unconditionally　practical；　whether　it　is　from　freedom　or　from　the　practical　law？　Now　it　cannot　begin　from　freedom；　for　of　this　we　cannot　be　immediately　conscious；　since　the　first　concept　of　it　is　negative；　nor　can　we　infer　it　from　experience；　for　experience　gives　us　the　knowledge　only　of　the　law　of　phenomena；　and　hence　of　the　mechanism　of　nature；　the　direct　opposite　of　freedom。　It　is　therefore　the　moral　law；　of　which　we　become　directly　conscious　（as　soon　as　we　trace　for　ourselves　maxims　of　the　will）；　that　first　presents　itself　to　us；　and　leads　directly　to　the　concept　of　freedom；　inasmuch　as　reason　presents　it　as　a　principle　of　determination　not　to　be　outweighed　by　any　sensible　conditions；　nay；　wholly　independent　of　them。　But　how　is　the　consciousness；　of　that　moral　law　possible？　We　can　become　conscious　of　pure　practical　laws　just　as　we　are　conscious　of　pure　theoretical　principles；　by　attending　to　the　necessity　with　which　reason　prescribes　them　and　to　the　elimination　of　all　empirical　conditions；　which　it　directs。　The　concept　of　a　pure　will　arises　out　of　the　former；　as　that　of　a　pure　understanding　arises　out　of　the　latter。　That　this　is　the　true　subordination　of　our　concepts；　and　that　it　is　morality　that　first　discovers　to　us　the　notion　of　freedom；　hence　that　it　is　practical　reason　which；　with　this　concept；　first　proposes　to　speculative　reason　the　most　insoluble　problem；　thereby　placing　it　in　the　greatest　perplexity；　is　evident　from　the　following　consideration：　Since　nothing　in　phenomena　can　be　explained　by　the　concept　of　freedom；　but　the　mechanism　of　nature　must　constitute　the　only　clue；　moreover；　when　pure　reason　tries　to　ascend　in　the　series　of　causes　to　the　unconditioned；　it　falls　into　an　antinomy　which　is　entangled　in　incomprehensibilities　on　the　one　side　as　much　as　the　other；　whilst　the　latter　（namely；　mechanism）　is　at　least　useful　in　the　explanation　of　phenomena；　therefore　no　one　would　ever　have　been　so　rash　as　to　introduce　freedom　into　science；　had　not　the　moral　law；　and　with　it　practical　reason；　come　in　and　forced　this　notion　upon　us。　Experience；　however；　confirms　this　order　of　notions。　Suppose　some　one　asserts　of　his　lustful　appetite　that；　when　the　desired　object　and　the　opportunity　are　present；　it　is　quite　irresistible。　＇Ask　him＇…　if　a　gallows　were　erected　before　the　house　where　he　finds　this　opportunity；　in　order　that　he　should　be　hanged　thereon　immediately　after　the　gratification　of　his　lust；　whether　he　could　not　then　control　his　passion；　we　need　not　be　long　in　doubt　what　he　would　reply。　Ask　him；　however…　if　his　sovereign　ordered　him；　on　pain　of　the　same　immediate　execution；　to　bear　false　witness　against　an　honourable　man；　whom　the　prince　might　wish　to　destroy　under　a　plausible　pretext；　would　he　consider　it　possible　in　that　case　to　overcome　his　love　of　life；　however　great　it　may　be。　He　would　perhaps　not　venture　to　affirm　whether　he　would　do　so　or　not；　but　he　must　unhesitatingly　admit　that　it　is　possible　to　do　so。　He　judges；　therefore；　that　he　can　do　a　certain　thing　because　he　is　conscious　that　he　ought；　and　he　recognizes　that　he　is　free…　a　fact　which　but　for　the　moral　law　he　would　never　have　known。

　　　　　　　　　VII。　FUNDAMENTAL　LAW　OF　THE　PURE　PRACTICAL　REASON。

　　Act　so　that　the　maxim　of　thy　will　can　always　at　the　same　time　hold　good　as　a　principle　of　universal　legislation。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　REMARK。

　　Pure　geometry　has　postulates　which　are　practical　propositions；　but　contain　nothing　further　than　the　assumption　that　we　can　do　something　if　it　is　required　that　we　should　do　it；　and　these　are　the　only　geometrical　propositions　that　concern　actual　existence。　They　are；　then；　practical　rules　under　a　problematical　condition　of　the　will；　but　here　the　rule　says：　We　absolutely　must　proceed　in　a　certain　manner。　The　practical　rule　is；　therefore；　unconditional；　and　hence　it　is　conceived　a　priori　as　a　categorically　practical　proposition　by　which　the　will　is　objectively　determined　absolutely　and　immediately　（by　the　practical　rule　itself；　which　thus　is　in　this　case　a　law）；　for　pure　reason　practical　of　itself　is　here　directly　legislative。　The　will　is　thought　as　independent　on　empirical　conditions；　and；　therefore；　as　pure　will　determined　by　the　mere　form　of　the　law；　and　this　principle　of　determination　is　regarded　as　the　supreme　co