the advancement of learning-第20部分

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selves　in　it；　　I　may　rather　challenge　it；　in　many　of　the　writers　thereof；　as　fabulous　and　fantastical。

VII。　1。　Leaving　therefore　divine　philosophy　or　natural　theology　（not　Divinity　or　inspired　theology；　which　we　reserve　for　the　last　of　all；　as　the　haven　and　sabbath　of　all　man's　contemplations）；　we　will　now　proceed　to　natural　philosophy。

If　then　it　be　true　that　Democritus　said；　THAT　THE　TRUTH　OF　NATURE　LIETH　HID　IN　CERTAIN　DEEP　MINES　AND　CAVES；　and　if　it　be　true　likewise　that　the　alchemists　do　so　much　inculcate；　that　Vulcan　is　a　second　nature；　and　imitateth　that　dexterously　and　compendiously；　which　nature　worketh　by　ambages　and　length　of　time；　it　were　good　to　divide　natural　philosophy　into　the　mine　and　the　furnace：　and　to　make　two　professions　or　occupations　of　natural　philosophers；　some　to　be　pioneers　and　some　smiths；　some　to　dig；　and　some　to　refine　and　hammer：　and　surely　I　do　best　allow　of　a　division　of　that　kind；　though　in　more　familiar　and　scholastical　terms；　namely；　that　these　be　the　two　parts　of　natural　philosophy；　　the　inquisition　of　causes；　and　the　production　of　sects；　speculative；　and　operable；　natural　science　and　natural　prudence。　＇＇　For　as　in　civil　matters　there　is　a　wisdom　of　discourse　and　a　wisdom　of　direction；　so　is　it　in　natural。　And　here　I　will　make　a　request；　that　for　the　latter；　or　at　least　for　a　part　thereof；　I　may　revive　and　reintegrate　the　misapplied　and　abused　name　of　natural　magic；　which；　in　the　true　sense；　is　but　natural　wisdom；　or　natural　prudence；　taken　according　to　the　ancient　acception；　purged　from　vanity　and　superstition。　Now　although　it　be　true；　and　I　know　it　well；　that　there　is　an　intercourse　between　causes　and　effects；　so　as　both　these　knowledges；　speculative　and　operative；　have　a　great　connection　between　themselves；　yet　because　all　true　and　fruitful　natural　philosophy　hath　a　double　scale　or　ladder；　ascendent　and　descendent；　ascending　from　experiments　to　the　invention　of　causes；　and　descending　from　causes　to　the　invention　of　new　experiments；　therefore　I　judge　it　most　requisite　that　these　two　parts　be　severally　considered　and　handled。

2。　Natural　science　or　theory　is　divided　into　physique　and　metaphysiqme：　wherein　I　desire　it　may　be　conceived　that　I　use　the　word　metaphysique　in　a　differing　sense　from　that　that　is　received：　and　in　like　manner；　I　doubt　not　but　it　will　easily　appear　to　men　of　judgment；　that　in　this　and　other　particulars；　wheresoever　my　conception　and　notion　may　differ　from　the　ancient；　yet　I　am　studious　to　keep　the　ancient　terms。　＇＇　For　hoping　well　to　deliver　myself　from　mistaking；　by　the　order　and　perspicuous　expressing　of　that　I　do　propound；　I　am　otherwise　zealous　and　affectionate　to　recede　as　little　from　antiquity；　either　in　terms　or　opinions；　as　may　stand　with　truth　and　the　proficience　of　knowledge。　＇＇　And　herein　I　cannot　a　little　marvel　at　the　philosopher　Aristotle；　that　did　proceed　in　such　a　spirit　of　difference　and　contradiction　towards　all　antiquity：　undertaking　not　only　to　frame　new　words　of　science　at　pleasure；　but　to　confound　and　extinguish　all　ancient　wisdom：　insomuch　as　he　never　nameth　or　mentioneth　an　ancient　author　or　opinion；　but　to　confute　and　reprove；　　wherein　for　glory；　and　drawing　followers　and　disciples；　he　took　the　right　course。　＇＇　For　certainly　there　cometh　to　pass　and　hath　place　in　human　truth；　that　which　was　noted　and　pronounced　in　the　highest　truth：　VENI　IN　NOMINE　PATRIS；　NEC　RECIPITIS　ME；　SI　QUIS　VENERIT　IN　NOMINE　SUO　EUM　RECIPIETIS。　But　in　this　divine　aphorism；　（considering　to　whom　it　was　applied；　namely　to　Antichrist；　the　highest　deceiver；）　we　may　discern　well　that　the　coming　in　a　man's　own　name；　without　regard　of　antiquity　or　paternity；　is　no　good　sign　of　truth；　although　it　be　joined　with　the　fortune　and　success　of　an　EUM　RECIPIETIS。　＇＇　But　for　this　excellent　person　Aristotle；　I　will　think　of　him　that　he　learned　that　humour　of　his　scholar；　with　whom；　it　seemeth；　he　did　emulate；　the　one　to　conquer　all　opinions；　as　the　other　to　conquer　all　nations；　wherein　nevertheless；　it　may　be；　he　may　at　some　men's　hands　that　are　of　a　bitter　disposition　get　a　like　title　as　his　scholar　did：

Felix　terrarum　praedo；　non　utile　mundo　Editus　exemplum；　etc。

So

Felix　doctrinae　praedo。

But　to　me；　on　the　other　side；　that　do　desire　as　much　as　lieth　in　my　pen　to　ground　a　sociable　intercourse　between　antiquity　and　proficience；　it　seemeth　best　to　keep　way　with　antiquity　USQUE　AD　ARAS；　and　therefore　to　retain　the　ancient　terms；　though　I　sometimes　alter　the　uses　and　definitions；　according　to　＇36＇　the　moderate　proceeding　in　civil　government；　where　although　there　be　some　alteration；　yet　that　holdeth　which　Tacitus　wisely　noteth；　EADEM　MAGISTRATUUM　VOCABULA。

3。　To　return　therefore　to　the　use　and　acceptation　of　the　term　Metaphysique；　as　I　do　now　understand　the　word；　it　appeareth；　by　that　which　hath　been　already　said；　that　I　intend　PHILOSOPHIA　PRIMA；　Summary　Philosophy；　and　Metaphysique；　which　heretofore　have　been　confounded　as　one；　to　be　two　distinct　things。　For　the　one　I　have　made　as　a　parent　or　common　ancestor　to　all　knowledge；　and　the　other　I　have　now　brought　in　as　a　branch　or　descendent　of　natural　science。　It　appeareth　likewise　that　I　have　assigned　to　Summary　Philosophy　the　common　principles　and　axioms　which　are　promiscuous　and　indifferent　to　several　sciences：　I　have　assigned　unto　it　likewise　the　inquiry　touching　the　operation　of　the　relative　and　adventive　characters　of　essences；　as　quantity；　similitude；　diversity；　possibility；　and　the　rest：　with　this　distinction　and　provision；　that　they　be　handled　as　they　have　efficacy　in　nature；　and　not　logically。　It　appeareth　likewise　that　Natural　Theology；　which　heretofore　hath　been　handled　confusedly　with　Metaphysique；　I　have　inclosed　and　bounded　by　itself。　＇＇　It　is　therefore　now　a　question　which　is　left　remaining　for　Metaphysique；　wherein　I　may　without　prejudice　preserve　thus　much　of　the　conceit　of　antiquity；　that　Physique　should　contemplate　that　which　is　inherent　in　matter；　and　therefore　transitory；　and　Metaphysique　that　which　is　abstracted　and　fixed。　＇＇　And　again；　that　Physique　should　handle　that　which　supposeth　in　nature　only　a　being　and　moving；　and　Metaphysique　should　handle　that　which　supposeth　further　in　nature　a　reason；　understanding；　and　platform。　But　the　difference；　perspicuously　expressed；　is　most　familiar　and　sensible。　＇＇　For　as　we　divided　natural　philosophy　in　general　into　the　inquiry　of　causes；　and　productions　of　sects：　so　that　part　which　concerneth　the　inquiry　of　causes　we　do　subdivide　according　to　the　received　and　found　division　of　causes；　the　one　part；　which　is　Physique；　inquireth　and　handleth　the　material　and　scient　causes；　and　the　other；　which　is　Metaphysique；　handleth　the　formal　and　final　causes。

4。　Physique；　taking　it　according　to　the　derivation；　and　not　according　to　our　idiom　for　medicine；　is　situate　in　a　middle　term　or　distance　between　Natural　History　and　Metaphysique。　For　natural　history　describeth　the　variety　of　things；　physique；　the　causes；　but　variable　or　respective　causes；　and　metaphysique；　the　fixed　and　constant　causes。

Limus　ut　hic　durescit；　et　haec　ut　cera　liquescit；　Uno　eodemque　igni：

Fire　is　the　cause　of　induration；　but　respective　to　clay；　fire　is　the　cause　of　colliquation；　but　respective　to　wax；　but　fire　is　no　constant　cause　either　of　induration　or　colliquation：　so　then　the　physical　causes　are　but　the　efficient　and　the　matter。　＇＇　Physique　hath　three　parts；　whereof　two　respect　nature　united　or　collected；　the　third　contemplateth　nature　diffused　or　distributed。　＇＇　Nature　is　collected　either　into　one　entire　total；　or　else　into　the　same　principles　or　seeds。　So　as　the　first　doctrine　is　touching　the　contexture　or　configuration　of　things；　as　DE　MUNDO；　DE　UNIVERSITATE　RERUM。　＇＇　The　second　is　the　doctrine　concerning　the　principles　or　originals　of　times。　＇＇　The　third　is　the　doctrine　concerning　all　variety　and　particularity　of　things；　whether　it　be　of　the　differing　substances；　or　their　differing　qualities　and　natures；　whereof　there　needeth　no　enumeration；　this　part　being　but　as　a　gloss；　or　paraphrase；　that　attendeth　upon　the　text　of　natural　history。　＇＇　Of　these　three　I　cannot　report　any　as　deficient。　In　what　truth　or　perfection　they　are　handled；　I　make　not　now　any　judgment；　but　they　are　parts　of　knowledge　not　deserted　by　the　labour　of　man。

5。　For　Metaphysique；　we　have　assigned　unto　it　the　inquiry　of　formal　and　final　causes；　which　assignation；　as　to　the　former　of　them；　may　seem　to　be　nugatory　and　void；　because　of　the　received　and　inveterate　opinion　that　the　inquisition　of　man　is　not　competent　to　find　out　essential　Forms　or　true　differences：　of　which　opinion　we　will　take　this　hold；　that　the　invention　of　Forms　is　of　all　other　parts　of　knowledge　the　worthiest　to　be　sought；　if　it　be　possible　to　be　found。　＇＇　As　for　the　possibility；　they　are　ill　discoverers　that　think　there　is　no　land；　when　they　can　see　nothing　but　sea。　＇＇　But　it　is　manifest　that　Plato；　in　his　opinion　of　Ideas；　as　one　that　had　a　wit　of　elevation　situate　as　upon　a　cliff；　did　descry；　THAT　FORMS　WERE　THE　TRUE　OBJECT　OF　KNOWLEDGE；　but　lost　the　real　fruit　of　his　opinion；　by　considering　of　Forms　as　absolutely　abstracted　from　matter；　and　not　confined　and　determined　by　matter；　and　so　turning　his　opinion　upon　theology；　wherewith　all　his　natural　philosophy　is　infected。　＇＇　But　if　any　man　shall　keep　a　continual　watchful　and　severe　eye　upon　action；　operation；　and　the　use　of　knowledge；　he　may　advise　and　take　notice　what　are　the　Forms；　the　disclosures　whereof　are　fruitful　and　important　to　the　state　of　man。　For　as　to　the　forms　of　substances；　man　only　except；　of　whom　it　is　said；　FORMAVIT　HOMINEM　DE　LIMO　TERRE；　ET　SPIRAVIT　IN　FACIEM　EJUS　SPIRACULUM　VITAE；　and　not　as　of　all　other　creatures；　PRODUCANT　AQUAE；　PRODUCAT　TERRA；　the　Forms　of　substances；　I　say；　as　they　are　now　by　compounding　and　transplanting　multiplied；　are　so　perplexed；　as　they　are　not　to　be　inquired；　no　more　than　it　were　either　possible　or　to　purpose　to　seek　in　gross　the　Forms　of　those　sounds　which　make　words；　which　by　composition　and　transposition　of　letters　are　infinite。　＇＇　But；　on　the　other　side；　to　inquire　the　Form　of　those　sounds　or　voices　which　make　simple　letters　is　easily　comprehensible；　and　being　known；　induceth　and　manifesteth　the　Forms　of　all　words；　which　consist　and　are　compounded　of　them。　In　t